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The making of this volume has been an arduous although interesting journey. 
As the final chapter to the collaboration within the Centre of Excellence in Cul-
tural Theory (CECT) it is rooted in the preparatory stages of this extensive project 
and the strengthening ties over seven years between the eight research groups 
and some 200 people. However, it was specifically planned as the summary of 
the project’s research at the annual meeting in Põhjaka manor on November 20, 
2013. It is only now, in 2020, a number of years after the project ended, that we 
can finally present our work. 
Considering the history of this volume it is impossible to name all to whom 
we owe our gratitude. This volume presents not only the research of the authors, 
but also other research group members who open-mindedly and curiously par-
ticipated in the experimental nature of CECT collaboration in the 2008–2015 
period. We owe particularly heartfelt thanks to our tireless leaders Valter Lang, 
Hannes Palang, Kalevi Kull, Ülo Valk, Art Leete, Halliki Harro-Loit, Riho Alt-
nurme and Raili Nugin (& Aili Aarelaid-Tart). 
The authors of the chapters in this volume deserve much appreciation for their 
venturous writing, which was tested time and time again. We are grateful for their 
trust and patience. We would like to thank all who contributed at the different 
stages of preparing, writing, discussing, reviewing and editing the chapters. Our 




Introduction. Expediency of  
interdisciplinary cooperation and experimentation 
Anu Kannike, Katre Pärn, Monika Tasa
Dedicated to the loving memory of CECT (2008–2015). 
The present volume was set in motion during an annual meeting of the Centre of 
Excellence in Cultural Theory (CECT) in November 2013.  While discussing the 
plans for the final publication of the CECT (2008–2015), an idea was proposed: 
in order to highlight the collaborative and interdisciplinary spirit of CECT, the 
articles ought to be written in cooperation between the members of the centre’s 
research groups.  
At the aforementioned meeting the board members reflected on the outcomes 
of the activities of CECT, noting that over the years the awareness of each other’s 
research as well as the dialogue between research groups had grown extensively. 
However, collaborative articles were still rare, pertaining to individual research-
ers with overlapping research topics. The previous experiences within the CECT 
had shown ample cooperation among research groups, members of the groups 
were successfully co-organizing conferences and seminars, coediting publica-
tions, etc. This indicated that CECT had become a seminal and inspirational 
environment for interdisciplinary collaboration. Now it was proposed to take 
a step further by initiating an experimental collaborative writing project that 
would lead to cross-disciplinary research and joint writing among the members 
of the research teams. 
The initiative aligned with the aims of CECT as well as the book series 
Approaches to Culture Theory which was launched by the centre in 2011: both 
aimed to bring together the various disciplines that study culture and develop 
culture theory across disciplines by providing a cordial space for bold thinking 
and experimentation. As the editors of the series announced in their foreword 
to the first volume: 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 17–26.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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We strive towards significant improvement in both the self-understanding of 
disciplinary fields and in the comprehension of general theoretical models 
by juxtaposing and comparing data, theories, and the methods of research 
in an interdisciplinary environment through crossdisciplinary cooperation. 
(Lang et al 2011, 5) 
Although the crossdisciplinary cooperation between research groups was rather 
intense, research articles were nevertheless mostly written within the bounds 
of one’s own research group and, as a rule, individually. The latter is, of course, 
characteristic to humanities in general, where collaborative writing is far from 
usual practice. To a lesser extent this applies to social sciences, included in the 
centre, as well. Yet the exceptionally dialogical space between researchers within 
CECT offered a favorable environment for changing this habitual practice. 
The proposed experimental project was open to all members of the eight 
research groups of the centre. The aim was to gather, accordingly, at least eight 
collaborative papers that would develop further the topics that had been, over the 
years, central for CECT, but would also be venturous with theoretical ideas and 
forms of interdisciplinary collaboration. The ambition was to create additional 
possibilities for polyvocal discussion by including discussants and commentators 
from within as well as outside of CECT.  
The process concluded with ten collaborative papers published in this vol-
ume and the authors of the chapters, indeed, represent all eight of the CECT’s 
research groups:  
• Archaeology: Valter Lang, Pikne Kama, Maarja Olli, Maria Smirnova, Kristiina 
Johanson 
• Cultural Communication Studies: Halliki Harro-Loit, Triin Vihalemm 
• Contemporary Cultural Studies: Raili Nugin, Maaris Raudsepp, Franz Krause, 
Kadri Kasemets, Tarmo Pikner, Anu Kannike 
• Ethnology: Art Leete, Kristin Kuutma, Toomas Gross, Ester Bardone, Kirsti 
Jõesalu, Kristel Rattus, Kristi Grünberg 
• Folkloristics: Tiiu Jaago, Elo-Hanna Seljamaa, Helen Kästik, Pihla Maria Siim 
• Landscape Studies: Hannes Palang, Tõnu Viik, Marju Kõivupuu, Helen Sooväli-
Sepping, Marek Tamm, Anu Printsmann 
• Religious Studies: Anne Kull, Lea Altnurme, Roland Karo, Atko Remmel 
• Semiotics: Kalevi Kull, Peeter Torop, Kati Lindström, Tiit Remm, Andreas 
Ventsel, Ott Puumeister, Timo Maran, Katre Pärn 
The experimental project was integrated into the traditional event cycle of CECT. 
Thus, before the next incubator of theory, an annual event that took place in the 
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beginning of the year, all research groups of CECT received an invitation to pre-
pare a list of topics their group would propose for the collaborative project. 
During the first day of the incubator that was held in February 14–15, 2014 all 
research groups made a short presentation on their proposed topics. The pres-
entations were followed by a joint discussion during which compatible proposi-
tions were converged into themes serving as an initial basis for potential articles. 
Subsequently, provisional collaborative teams were formed of the researchers 
interested in a particular theme. During the remainder of the incubator, the 
teams developed the themes further, arriving at a working title and keywords of 
the proposed collaborative paper.  
By the end of the incubator of theory, further benchmarks of the project 
were set in place, all of which, in hindsight, were realised more or less as planned 
during the first meeting. However, no restrictions or guidelines were set for the 
format of the collaboration, so that each of the teams could find the approach 
most fitting for them. 
Although the makeup of the teams changed slightly over the course of the 
collaboration, and the topics were developed further, the core conceptions of 
the finalised papers remained close to the initial outlines. It should be noted that 
not all of the collaborative teams were put together during the incubator – some 
joined the project later, which itself is an evidence of the enthusiasm towards the 
opportunity for interdisciplinary collaboration and openness for experimenta-
tion within CECT. 
The next benchmark for the project was the 7th autumn conference of CECT 
(October 29–31, 2014), the topic of which was “Deep Mechanisms of Estonian 
Culture”. The title refers to Juri Lotman’s and Boris Uspenskij’s conceptions of 
mechanisms underlying cultural dynamics, such as (self-)organisation, bounded-
ness, cultural polyglotism, cultural memory, autocommunication, etc., but also 
to the central role of Estonian culture as distinctive research material for CECT. 
The conference, held in Estonian, was dedicated to the work in progress. The aim 
of the conference was to provide constructive feedback to the research papers 
of the collaborative teams, to support them in moving towards the final articles 
as well as to contribute to the overall aim of polyvocality via discussion. For this 
purpose, each team chose one to three discussants for their papers, to whom 
the draft version of the paper was provided before the event. During the confer-
ence, each team’s presentation was followed by an extensive one-hour discus-
sion with their discussants as well as questions from the audience. Preliminary 
synopses of the collaborative articles were published in the book of abstracts of 
the conference. 
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The format of the conference was fairly innovative for the centre as in this 
field of research such extensive discussions, particularly at the stage of writing 
in progress are not common for conferences. For the authors, the situation was 
adventurous, since instead of the final, clean version of their paper, they had 
to present their draft versions. This itself resulted in interesting observations 
about and debates on the differences in metalanguages of different disciplines as 
these came to the fore in the unpolished drafts. These, at times heated discussions 
were fruitful for the final developments of the papers.
The shift in language posed additional difficulty for the process. It was decided 
from the start that although the final papers will be published in English, the 
presentations and discussions during the autumn conference were to be held 
in Estonian, to take full advantage of thinking, expressing and debating over the 
work in progress in researchers’ native language (mostly so, with some excep-
tions). However, in the end, the shift in language, or working on their topic in two 
languages in parallel, proved to be rather arduous.
In order to share the project and its outcomes with colleagues and general 
public in Estonia, the topics of the conference and contents of the collaborative 
research articles were communicated via various local cultural newspapers and 
magazines. After the conference, two discussion panels were organised and the 
discussions were published in Sirp, a weekly cultural newspaper. First panel, 
organised among members of CECT, was published in October 24, 2014, dis-
cussing the notion of deep mechanisms of Estonian culture (see Kull et al, 2014). 
Second panel, discussing the value and specificity of Estonian culture as research 
material for culture theory, was published in the same newspaper on January 
23, 2015 (see Kull & Lang 2015). Later that year, versions of some of the collabora-
tive papers were published in Estonian in a special number of Akadeemia, journal 
of Estonian academic culture, no 4/2015 dedicated to the outcomes of research 
within CECT. In addition, synopses of the collaborative projects were published 
in Horisont (no 4/2015), a magazine devoted to the dissemination of scientific 
knowledge (see Tasa et al 2015).
Looking back at the experiences gained through the large-scale interdisci-
plinary project of CECT, number of our colleagues saw the main value of the 
centre in offering an opportunity to enhance contacts with representatives of 
other disciplines. It took a few years for centre’s research community to genuinely 
overcome the sense of estrangement and preconceived notions about other disci-
plines, a wonted side effect of a lack of day-to-day interaction between research 
groups. However, by the end of the seven-year period the centre had achieved 
to establish a lively and congenial environment for academic dialogue and an 
exceptionally active interdisciplinary network. The papers presented in the 
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volume attest the willingness of the researchers to step outside their habitual 
boundaries and into unexpected dialogues, to look for new viewpoints and 
to experiment with novel approaches.
The approaches to interdisciplinary collaboration taken by the authors of the 
chapters are diverse. Some of them juxtapose or combine several disciplinary 
perspectives on common issue in order to bring forth its multifaceted nature that 
escapes the purview of any one discipline. In some instances, these juxtaposi-
tions reveal similarities or complementarities between the disciplines despite the 
apparent differences in their metalanguage and theoretical apparatus. Others take 
a more integrative approach and aim to present a more holistic interdisciplinary 
theoretical or methodological framework. 
Several of the chapters re-evaluate or re-interpret existing data or case stud-
ies from new theoretical or conceptual vantage points afforded by other fields, 
prompting to ask questions that are not usually asked within their own field. 
This further allowed to discover new patterns or even gaps within existing data/
studies, habitual limits of disciplinary modes of data description or analysis. But 
the experimental collaboration offered also a space for exploring issues located 
in the borderlands, in-between disciplines, issues whose relevance or even reoc-
curring presence becomes evident precisely when diverse disciplines and studies 
are brought in dialogue. 
As such, the process provided context for disciplinary self-reflection as 
well as for emergence of novel research objects for culture theory; it prompted 
discussions over epistemological underpinnings of humanities and social sci-
ences as well as questions about the ontological statuses of their objects of 
study. In many cases, the collaboration revealed, once more, the ambiguous and 
dynamic nature of the cultural field.
In the end of the collaborative venture we can wholeheartedly agree with 
Art Leete’s and Peeter Torop’s assertion (Leete & Torop in this volume, p 121): 
“the diversity of the object-level must be countered by a diversity of theories or 
disciplines.” Complexity and heterogeneity of culture necessitates from scholars 
the degree of diversity that can, perhaps, be properly achieved through interdis-
ciplinary collaboration and juxtaposition. 
In order to extend the dialogue between researchers and fields even further 
and add to the polyvocality on the topics, each chapter in this volume is accom-
panied by a short comment. The authors for the commentaries were suggested 
by the authors of the chapters and/or chosen by the editors, on the account that 
their research area intersects with the topic of the chapter, thereby their com-
ments and notes would add a valuable complementary dimension to the discus-
sion. The format of the comments was free, the guiding idea was to reflect on the 
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approach that was taken in the article or on its outcomes, to provide additional 
context and/or propose alternative perspectives or possible further trajectories 
for the research.
Furthermore, adding short comments to the chapters was intended to empha-
sise that there are no final answers or ultimate truths on the issues and, more 
importantly, the articles do not represent the end of collaboration. Instead, the 
process continues in the discussions had in between the covers of the current 
volume as well as outside them.
Contributing chapters
The variety of contributions in this volume gives evidence of the diverse 
approaches to cultural theory tackled across disciplinary boundaries within the 
CECT. The phenomena under scrutiny range from broader conceptual issues 
concerning the history and philosophy of cultural theory in Estonia to methodo-
logical problems and more specific analyses of local cultural heritage or days of 
celebration, for example.
The first chapter by Marek Tamm and Kalevi Kull examines the philosophical 
foundations of Estonian theory as well as its main epistemic facets, testing the 
hypothesis according to which a certain coherence and continuity can be identi-
fied in the tradition of theoretical thought in Estonia. The authors focus on the 
older layers of Estonian theory, mainly from the beginning of the 19th to the 
middle of the 20th centuries. They argue for conceiving of it as a separate local 
episteme – “a territorialised web of epistemological associations and rules” and 
underline a coherence and continuity in the Estonian cultural-theoretical tradi-
tion, based on common sources of influence and similar basic attitudes. 
In their comment Jaanus Sooväli and Margus Ott challenge some aspects of 
the territorialisation of culture theory presented in the chapter, while agreeing 
with the claim that culture theory is in need of greater historicisation and its 
territorialisation could bring about interesting discoveries.
The complex issues of culture-dependent meaning formation are dealt with 
by Tõnu Viik, Peeter Torop and Maaris Raudsepp. Building on hermeneutics, 
semiotics, phenomenology and cultural psychology, they compare the theoreti-
cal models of meaning formation developed in these four sciences and high-
light their common features, also exposing their culture-dependent character. 
They ask how the collective mechanisms of meaning formation operate within 
individual consciousness, how are the contents of individual experience com-
munalised between subjects, and how are these contents socially validated. The 
authors argue that all the theories examined postulate the existence of a particular 
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collective or intersubjective meaning structure, by virtue of which subjective 
states can become meaningful and intersubjectively understandable. 
In her comment to the chapter, Katre Pärn elaborates on the epistemological 
underpinnings put forward by the authors who extend, via Cassirer, the Uexkül-
lian idea of plurality of species-specific umwelts to culture-specific realities. She 
emphasises the role of dialogue and translation as means for overcoming the 
monadic tendencies of human, cultural as well as disciplinary umwelts, leading 
towards dialogical epistemology. 
In their contribution “Cultural theory and the ethnographic field: method-
ological views” Art Leete and Peeter Torop discuss the relationship between 
theory and empirical data in semiotics and ethnology. They suggest a hybrid 
methodology for combining broader analysis of cultural semiotics and interpreta-
tive ethnography in order to reach a joint metadisciplinary conceptual framework 
for cultural theory. Examining classical approaches to the relationship between 
the ethnographic field and cultural theory, especially Geertz’s concept of the thick 
description, they tackle the changing understandings of this association. They 
claim that recent developments in cultural theory require a deeper understanding 
of the dynamics of the ethnographic field and hybrid methodology. 
In his comment, Toomas Gross contextualises the issues tackled in the chap-
ter within the broader trends in anthropology, among them the perils of anthro-
pological methods and changes in ethnographic fields that have led to increased 
self-awareness within the discipline and affirm the continuing relevance of theory 
in anthropology. 
Franz Krause, Tarmo Pikner, Maaris Raudsepp, Kadri Kasemets and Anne 
Kull dedicate their chapter to the concept of the unnatural. They proceed from the 
idea that cultural theory must transcend its traditional limitation to the ‘unnatu-
ral’ and grapple with reframing its analyses to include the total world, including 
the ‘natural’. The authors approach the unnatural from six different angles, each of 
which is illustrated through an excursion. Consequently, the unnatural emerges 
out of specific, materially and semiotically situated practices and discourses and 
can be approached as a rich source for empirical studies into its production, 
negotiation, and the assumptions and projects articulated through it. The chap-
ter suggests that ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ are in dynamic tension as categories 
that emerge from people’s situated experiences and strategic uses.
Timo Maran offers in his comment additional perspective on the ‘unnatural’ 
that goes beyond viewing it as an ambiguous concept or an issue of framing. 
Instead, he proposes to view it as having its own ontological status and particu-
lar role in the cultural dynamics that culture theory should take into account. 
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As a starting point for further discussion, he provides a rough sketch of the 
ontology of the Unnatural.
In the next chapter, Maaris Raudsepp and Andreas Ventsel turn to the prob-
lem of systemic power and autonomy from the social, semiotic and psychological 
perspectives. They discuss the different approaches to interrelations between 
habitus, social representation and semiotic autonomy, conceptualizing them 
in the context of power relations. Building on these discussions, they demonstrate 
the most significant preconditions for the realisation of specific power relations. 
Their study allows describing specific power relations as dynamic and context-
dependent, constantly recreated or transformed in the process of collective and 
individual meaning-making. 
In his comment, Peeter Selg locates Raudsepp’s and Ventsel’s approach 
within the relational sociology, seeing it as radical or ‘deep’ relational perspec-
tive to power. He perceives the value of their approach in establishing a dialogue 
between semiotics and various approaches to power in social sciences, the lack 
of which has been one of the reasons for the marginal position of semiotic power 
analysis. 
Power relations in vernacular and institutional discourses on religion are 
the subject of analysis in the chapter by Andreas Ventsel, Atko Remmel, Lea 
Altnurme, Kristiina Johanson, Roland Karo and Maaris Raudsepp. The authors 
tackle the interdependent meaning-making of different institutional and ver-
nacular discourses, drawing on examples from the Estonian cultural context, 
mainly associated with religion. As a result of their study, they suggest a typology 
of power relations based on Norbert Elias’ conception of functions that allows 
to conceptualise meaning making in religious phenomena.
Ott Puumeister observes in his comment how religious discourses operate 
within the complex of knowledge–power–identity. While every discourse has 
its “will to truth”, to be recognized as legitimate knowledge, its epistemic status 
depends on power relations between discourses. However, the will to truth is 
stronger when the discourse is related to issues of identity, and the latter becomes 
additional dimension of power relations. 
The contribution by Ester Bardone, Kristi Grünberg, Helen Sooväli-Sep-
ping, Marju Kõivupuu and Helen Kästik considers three Estonian cases of herit-
age management looking at them from the community perspective. They outline 
the different roles given to communities in the process of heritage management, 
as well as the impact of heritage politics in shaping communities. This allows 
them to highlight the problem that alongside with democratization, community 
is understood quite differently in varied policy discourses and practices. Thus, 
25
Introduction
the question arises who represents the community and how to preserve the mul-
tivocality in heritage processes. 
In the comment to the chapter, Kristel Rattus brings out the problemat-
ics of understanding ‘community’ in the context of democratization of heritage 
management that advocates the inclusion of communities into the management 
process. While the real-life situations discussed in the chapter are revealing, she 
calls for further theoretical reflection on the use of the concept of community.
Halliki Harro-Loit, Triin Vihalemm, Kirsti Jõesalu and Elo-Hanna Seljamaa 
address celebration practices in Estonia and their influence on societal rhythms. 
They are applying an actor approach to the understanding of holidays, anniver-
saries and festivals, combining a sociological approach with ethnological and 
folkloristic studies. The authors focus on various catalyst actors that have the 
power to create days of importance as well as introduce and disseminate celebra-
tion practices. They pay particular attention to the bodily and sensory aspects 
of celebrations as well as to the multi-ethnic context in Estonia, revealing the 
variety and controversial nature of these practices. 
Pirjo Korkiakangas commends the innovative and experimental analysis 
of celebrations of anniversaries and holidays presented in the abovementioned 
chapter. The national and socio-political changes and disruptions in Estonia 
turn holidays and forms of their celebration into an interesting material for 
approaching cultural, national, ethnic, generational, gender, etc. relations to days 
of celebration.
In the chapter “A plurality of pasts and boundaries: evidence from Estonia’s 
last one hundred years” Raili Nugin, Tiiu Jaago, Anu Kannike, Kalevi Kull, 
Hannes Palang, Anu Printsmann, Pihla Maria Siim and Kati Lindström investi-
gate how temporal boundaries are experienced and how everyday lives have been 
shaped in Estonia over the last century. Aiming to raise awareness of the com-
plexity of cultural boundaries, they use multidisciplinary examples to illustrate 
how borders are perceived, constructed, negotiated and contested, as well as how 
everyday practices maintain the borders vanished in other spheres. The authors 
argue that people make sense of space by creating boundaries that are tightly 
tied with boundaries of time. Thus, a change of regime does not necessarily cre-
ate sharp boundaries, but rather provides an environment for change in which 
a crucial role is also played by continuities based on memory, disposition and 
practice.
Tuulikki Kurki observes in her comment that the conceptualised understand-
ings of border that arise from multidisciplinary approaches enable to account 
for different aspects of borders (e.g. social, cultural, territorial) on various levels 
(e.g. micro and macro level). She sees the chapter by Nugin et al as valuable 
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contribution to the theorisation of border, its dimensions and its ontological 
nature.
The final chapter by Pikne Kama, Valter Lang, Maarja Olli, Katre Pärn, 
Tiit Remm and Maria Smirnova analyses the problematic notion of archaeo-
logical culture and discuss the boundaries in cultures of the past. They present 
an innovative exploration of the potential of semiotic model of culture for recon-
structing past cultures, particularly their boundaries, based on archaeological 
material. The authors use the archaeological cultures of tarand graves and long 
barrows to enquire into the prospects of re-evaluating the internal and external 
boundaries of these cultures from the semiotic point of view. This enables them 
to interpret archaeological artefacts as signs of the self-model of past culture and 
provide a theoretical and methodological framework with which to re-evaluate 
existing archaeological data and interpretations.
In his comment, Daniele Monticelli notes that the semiotic analysis presented 
in the chapter shows how various functions of boundary – e.g. differentiation, 
integration and indifferentiation – may have been activated in parallel in burial 
sites, demonstrating that boundary offers a valuable theoretical tool for interdis-
ciplinary experimentation.
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Estonian theory
Marek Tamm, Kalevi Kull
Abstract. By Estonian theory we mean a local episteme – a territorialised 
web of epistemological associations and rules for making sense of the world 
that favours some premises while discouraging others. This article argues 
that from a territorial perspective a certain coherence and continuity can be 
identified in the Estonian cultural-theoretical tradition – a discursive body 
based on common sources of influence and similar fundamental attitudes. 
The analysis focuses on the older layers of Estonian theory, discussing the 
work of Karl Ernst von Baer, Victor Hehn, Gustav Teichmüller, Jakob von 
Uexküll, Hermann Keyserling, Johannes Gabriel Granö, Juri Lotman among 
others. We examine the philosophical foundations of Estonian theory as well 
as its main epistemic facets. The article concludes that the conceptualisation 
of Estonian theory could contribute to a general transformation of contem-
porary (cultural) theory and a redefining of the relations between the centre 
and the peripheries. 
Keywords: cultural geography, cultural theory, episteme, semiosphere, semi-
otics of culture, umwelt, University of Tartu
In memoriam Madis Kõiv
Theory as local episteme
Estonia is a place. This article undertakes to test the hypothesis according to 
which a certain coherence and continuity can be identified in the tradition of 
theoretical thought in Estonia – a discursive body based on common sources 
of influence and similar fundamental attitudes, the closer study of which might 
contribute to the further development of cultural theory both in Estonia and 
abroad. This hypothetical and relative, continually transforming and evolving 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
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body we shall call Estonian theory, with full awareness of the tentative nature 
of such a designation but also of its compliance with contemporary theoretical 
discourse.1 A conceptual parallel and example is provided by the recognition, 
first in America in the 1970s and 1980s, of a certain generic similarity shared 
by recent French theoretical and philosophical research that came to be called 
French theory (see Cusset 2003). More recently, the term Russian theory (Русская 
теория) has occasionally been used to refer to the Russian literary and cultural 
theoretical studies of the first half of the 20th century (see Zenkin 2004, Dmitriev 
2010); and attempts have also been made to conceptualise the philosophical tradi-
tion of cultural and social theory that evolved in the German cultural space as 
German theory (see Steinmetz 2006). Czech theory has been described recently by 
Vít Gvoždiak (2016). Likewise, Italian theory was formulated by Roberto Esposito 
and others (Gentili 2012; Esposito 2015a, 2015b; Claverini 2016).
This kind of approach is underpinned by the notion of a condensation of 
theories within the heterogeneous network of cultural communication, and 
of the evolution of certain local peculiarities which then lend support to the 
thinkers’ pursuits and form a mental atmosphere, powerfully shaping the ideas 
and questions raised by those participating in it. This atmosphere may com-
prise intellectually highly charged fields affecting several generations, as well as 
transdisciplinary sets of concepts, thinking styles, and judgements that will keep 
diversity and peculiarities alive. An obvious part is played in this mechanism by 
the attractiveness of essential concepts, which in itself rallies thinkers around it. 
Fundamental understandings and productive theories can, of course, spring up 
anywhere in the world. But an idea proposed in the framework of contextually 
more familiar basic attitudes and distinctions is more easily accepted by col-
leagues. Therefore a certain localness is inevitable and, due to its autocatalytic and 
cumulative nature, relatively persistent even in science. Differences of language 
and origins need not seriously hinder a meeting of ideas; such difficulties are 
generally outweighed by mutually compliant basic attitudes and intelligibility. 
Although the discussions have so far failed to propose a clear definition of 
theory in this context, or to reach agreement on all details, they do take note of 
the main characteristics. In the context of French theory, Jonathan Culler writes: 
“what counts as theory are works that succeed in exercising influence outside 
their original discipline because their analyses of language, mind, identity, or 
social and political structure prove productive for rethinking other domains 
of signification” (Culler 2014, 4). In his description of Russian theory, Sergei 
Zenkin stipulates that theory must be historical–geographical, interdisciplinary 
and “international – at least potentially” (Zenkin 2004, 8–9)2. These important 
aspects highlighted by him fully coincide with our approach. Speaking about 
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German theory, George Steinmetz emphasises that “the focus here is on theo-
rists whose ideas are still (or once again) attractive” (Steinmetz 2006, 5). This is 
not a researcher’s accidental position but addresses a significant feature of the 
theory – because the figures whom we regard as belonging to the core of the 
theory are precisely those whose share in building up the enduring part of local 
intellectual memory is the greatest. Steinmetz makes room in the local theory 
even for émigrés, refugees, and other intercultural migrants. This is an important 
aspect, since scientific-cultural experiences play a huge role in introducing vigor-
ous (and therefore also better recognisable within the given academic culture) 
concepts, meaning that a great contribution is often made to the local episteme3 
by those who have spent only a part of their life working in the given locus. It is 
also linked to the fact that such theories do not evolve through opposition to oth-
ers; for instance, those of the neighbours. Therefore, different theories, including 
Estonian theory and Russian theory, can easily have some parts in common, and 
many scholars may well belong to both, or several, at once.
Estonian theory as we see it is thus a comparatively coherent aggregate of 
outstanding notions that originate with scholars linked to Estonia, which may 
have significant intellectual value and interest for the whole intellectual world. 
In the first approximation, it is made up of a certain corpus of proposals (archive 
of statements4) projecting from a sufficiently voluminous set of scholarly texts. 
In fact, it is only as such that it is identifiable. But in the second approximation, 
and keeping in mind the theory’s mechanism of formation and evolvement, we 
must concede that it nevertheless is to a certain extent variable in time. On the 
one hand, this gives more weight and permanent usability to such a theory if 
recognised; on the other hand it calls for specification of the particular period in 
time to which we refer. Yet, regardless of its variability, it is no short-term popular 
view but a slowly evolving and far from easily definable or noticeable body of 
thought. Nor does Estonian theory have to be dominant at any point in time, or 
involve the majority of local scholars. Therefore, it is difficult to discover it with 
the help of statistical or scientometric methods. 
Methodologically, we shall be guided by two main points of view. On the one 
hand, we shall be engaged in archaeological analysis in the Foucauldian sense 
of the term, that is, our aim is to analyse the archive of Estonian theory – the 
cultural-theoretical statements accumulated over the last centuries, their inter-
connections and groupings into various conceptual communities. In so doing, 
we are well aware that “the archive cannot be described in its totality; and in its 
presence it is unavoidable” (Foucault 2002 [1969], 147). Thus we offer only a few 
extracts and bold generalisations based on them, in the hope that they may 
encourage further research. From another vantage point, the analysis moves 
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into the sphere of genealogical analysis (this time, however, only weakly related 
to the sense that Foucault gave to this term); yet it is not the origins of Estonian 
theory that are highlighted, but we aim at (re)constructing the continuities inher-
ent in the local theoretical tradition. We are interested in Estonian theory not 
merely in its historical evolution, but also as it relates to the present; we are happy 
to adopt the ‘retrospective look’ and try to construct a genealogical network for 
Estonian theory. Unlike traditional historians who try “to erase the elements in 
their work which reveal their grounding in a particular time and place” (Foucault 
1984 [1971], 90), we consider it necessary to point out our own perspective and 
vantage point; it is our aim “to create [our] own genealogy in the act of cognition” 
(op cit). Our attitude is summarised aptly (and in terms surprisingly similar to 
our own) by an important author in Estonian theory, Adolf von Harnack, in the 
preface to his book of lectures, Das Wesen des Christentums (What Is Christi-
anity?): “The task has been set up and dealt with in a purely historical manner. 
This entails the obligation of finding, highlighting and making intelligible what 
is essential and enduring in various phenomena, even if it be partly concealed. 
In such a work, mistakes will be inevitable; but as mere ‘archaeology’, all history 
is mute” (Harnack 1902 [1900], iii).
In addition, the present article also includes two more general epistemological 
attitudes that are at the same time also appeals. First, we find that cultural theory 
is in need of greater historicisation than it has so far received, since productive 
theoretical reflexion must be aware of the origins of the concepts, ideas and 
attitudes it uses. Theoretical investigation must be able to see simultaneously the 
past and the future; indeed it is often from a close dialogue with the old that the 
new is born.5 Second, we call for a territorialisation of theory. Whereas generally 
such historically bent discussions as the present one prefer a certain unity of 
time – Zeitgeist or air du temps – as their points of departure, we believe that the 
unity of space – genius loci or air du lieu – is even more important than temporal 
unity. The theoretical thought related to Estonia is born primarily from the spirit 
of place, not of time. Or, as another important author of Estonian theory, the 
philosopher Madis Kõiv, has put it: “The spirit of time is, in the final analysis, 
reducible to that of place, it erupts from some hidden depth of a place and is then 
dissipated over places in the course of time” (Kõiv 2005 [1993], 344). And else-
where: “Because this is the way it is – he who changes a place, changes the spirit 
of the place by doing so; because place is sensitive to spirit, it receives spirits and 
cultivates them, itself ” (Kõiv 2005 [2001], 334). The principle of territorialisation 
also allows us to delimit the subject matter of our research: we include in the 
archive of Estonian theory all the scholarly texts whose authors have been closely 
linked to Estonia, either through origin, study, or teaching.6 Thus, by choosing 
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the territorial principle as our point of departure in outlining Estonian theory, 
we are not constrained by ethnic or linguistic criteria.7 Nor is it insignificant 
that any territorialisation (of theory), as pointed out by Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, inspired in their turn by Jakob von Uexküll, “presupposes a prior deter-
ritorialization” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994 [1991], 68). Neither does it presuppose 
any reshuffling of previous relations, something that is also important for the 
present undertaking: the conceptualisation of Estonian theory could, in such 
a way, contribute to a general transformation of contemporary (cultural) theory, 
a redefining of the relations between the centre and the periphery. 
The article focuses on the older layers of Estonian theory, mainly from the 
beginning of the 19th to the middle of the 20th centuries. Therefore, the authors 
discussed here will, for the main part, be German (both Baltic and Reichsdeutsch, 
or Imperial German), and later also Finnish and Russian scholars linked to Esto-
nia, as well as native Estonian scholars. We will not explicate here the associations 
that unite the scholars of yore with those of the present, but implicitly we keep in 
mind that the continuity of ideas may occasionally be very strong and significant. 
At the same time we are aware that any theoretical self-description of a culture, 
as well as a description of culture theory’s own local history, in turn influence 
the further identity and evolution of the described culture. 
The archive of Estonian theory
Before going on to analyse the archive of Estonian theory, we should take a look 
at its constituters and organising principles. First, we must answer two questions: 
(a) what is the institutional environment of this sphere, and under the influence 
of which Estonian theory did it take shape and was it given a legitimate point of 
application; and (b) who are the individuals who speak in Estonian theory, what 
is their status and to what fields do they belong (cf. Foucault 2002 [1969], 26–28).
Presumably the most important institutional generator of the archive of Esto-
nian theory is Tartu University8. Although it might be possible, with meticulous 
research, to detect fragments of an evolving Estonian theory from the end of the 
medieval period onwards – keeping in mind, for instance, the Baltic Enlighten-
ment movement – it is only after the reopening of Tartu University in 1802 that 
we can speak about it with an important degree of particularity and compre-
hensiveness. Since this is not the right place to go into a lengthy discussion of 
the history of Tartu University, we shall outline only a few characteristics and 
development features that are important for our present purposes.
The main peculiarity of Tartu University in the 19th century was certainly 
the fact that it was a university simultaneously both Russian and German. It was 
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established in order to meet the intellectual needs of the Russian Empire, and 
financed mainly from the funds of Russia’s central government, yet up to the last 
quarter of the 19th century Tartu University clearly enjoyed special status and 
autonomy, as compared with the other higher education establishments of the 
Russian Empire. The structure of the university was modelled on German exam-
ples, and professors were invited mainly from Germany. In the years 1802–1886, 
a total of 209 professors worked in Tartu, of whom more than half (118) came 
from Germany, 64 from the Baltic provinces, and 22 from Russia (Meyer 1887, 6). 
Whereas at first the professoriate consisted mainly of the alumni of the universi-
ties of Halle, Jena, Göttingen, and Leipzig, these ties weakened in the 1820s when 
the relative importance of Berlin began to grow rapidly. In the second half of the 
century the German connection (except for Jena) grew stronger again until the 
1890s, when the policy of russification hit the university, significantly curtailing 
the previous German orientation and bringing to the fore the influence of the 
universities of Moscow and St. Petersburg (Tamul 2007).
The development of the reopened Tartu University up to World War II can, 
with some simplification, be divided into three stages: the German University of 
Dorpat (1802 through to the 1880s), the Russian University of Yuryev (the 1880s 
through to 1918)9, and the Estonian University of Tartu (1920–1940). Each of 
these periods was characterised by clear changes in academic (and political) ori-
entation, the choice of professors, and language policies. These turns of fate have 
left a significant mark on the shaping of the archive of Estonian theory. The years 
1820–1865 and 1920–1940 can be regarded as key periods. In the 1820s, the uni-
versity began to develop rapidly, opening a number of new professorships, while 
the number of students multiplied (from 262 in 1820 to 712 in 1853) (Siilivask 1985, 
75). The university ranked among the foremost intellectual centres of the Russian 
Empire (a number of its professors were elected to the St. Petersburg Academy 
of Sciences), and belonged at the same time among the top German-language 
universities in Europe. In the 1920s, after Estonia had gained independence, work 
began building up an Estonian-language national university, a process initially 
involving the recruitment of new academic cadres from neighbouring countries, 
mainly Finland and Sweden, but also from among Germans. The contribution of 
this new professoriate to the furthering of Estonian theory is remarkable, as is 
their role in shaping Estonia’s new generation of scholars. 
Tartu has also been the centre for schools of thought that became known 
under the name of this place. These include the Dorpat School of religious psy-
chology, established by Karl Girgensohn (1875–1925), and the Tartu–Moscow 
School of semiotics, established by Juri Lotman. Both of these schools have been 
active over several generations of scholars10. That these schools owe something 
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fundamentally to Tartu as a place has been claimed repeatedly (see, for example, 
Espagne 2010; Beecher 2014).
The vantage point of the present article does not, to any considerable extent, 
cover the developments that took place in Estonian theory after the Second 
World War; yet it should be mentioned that institutionally the new constraints 
in Tartu University’s academic orientation and freedom of activity, as well as the 
recruiting of new professors from Russia and new contacts made with Russian 
scholars in Moscow, Leningrad and elsewhere, had an impact.
Although the University of Tartu has been the undisputed institutional centre 
of Estonian theory, as a force of both attraction and repulsion, other institutional 
environments should not be neglected. The most important of these appears to 
be the Baltic manor. It is certainly no accident that several central authors of 
Estonian theory have come from a manorial background and frequently also 
worked in manors. Suffice it to name Karl Ernst von Baer, who was born on Piibe 
(German: Piep) manor; or Alexander and Hermann Keyserling, the squires of 
Raikküla (German: Rayküll); or Jakob von Uexküll, who spent his summers on 
Puhtu (German: Pucht) manor; with the intellectual environment of the manors 
of Vana-Vigala (German: Fickel), Sangaste (German: Sagnitz) and others also 
being noteworthy. Theoretical thinking remained the privilege of the upper class 
in Estonia for a long time, and manors were the nobility’s most important liv-
ing environment. Literary historian Jaan Undusk has ingenuously linked a cen-
tral part of Estonian theory – the idea of a subjective umwelt or “self-centered 
world” – to the specific nature of Baltic manorial life where the appreciation of 
culture effortlessly combined with an appreciation of nature. “In a certain sense 
the Umweltlehre, the doctrine of umwelten, is a theoretical generalisation spring-
ing from the Baltic manorial life,” Undusk observes, reducing Uexküll’s teaching 
to the simple maxim: “My world is my manor!” (Undusk 2008, 100).
The step from institutions to individuals is the riskiest and most arbitrary part 
of the present venture. Whose statements constitute Estonian theory? Whose 
speech qualifies? Whose position is adequate? How should one determine ade-
quacy? Clearly these questions can, as yet, be answered only in a groping and 
haphazard manner. It is easier, however, to talk about social status: in the 19th 
century these people mainly belonged to the hereditary nobility or the literate 
class (Literatenstand). This class began to evolve in Estonia and Livonia in the 
18th century, and counted among its numbers bourgeois intellectuals who had 
attended university (Lenz 1953, 1997). This earlier hierarchical order was upset 
only by the advent of independent Estonian statehood in 1918 and the emergence 
of a national class of intellectuals.
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Th e archive of Estonian theory has taken shape through the participation 
of numerous scholars. Th eir numbers include those responsible for a cluster of 
mutually attractive and productive ideas. At the present state of research, it seems 
best to represent the archive as a kind of web of statements that is densest (most 
coherent, as to the fundamental positions, and most compact, as to the authors 
involved) at its centre and more dispersed at the margins (Figure 1). Here we 
venture to highlight seven scholars from the dense centre (on whom the follow-
ing analysis will hinge, for the most part) whose ideas have had a major infl uence 
within, but also outside, their original discipline and still (or once again) attract 
increasing international interest. However, needless to say, the list is not and 
cannot be closed (besides, both here and in the following we shall limit ourselves 
to deceased authors). Although a natural scientist (biologist and anthropologist) 
by profession, a very signifi cant shaper of Estonian theory was Karl Ernst von 
 Baer (1792–1896); several of the ideas fi rst proposed by him can be encountered 
in the works of later theorists, variously worded and built upon. A somewhat 
exceptional yet extremely intriguing fi gure in Estonian theory is the philologist 
Figure 1. Three rings of authors of Estonian theory.
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and cultural historian Victor Hehn (1813–1890), a native of Tartu. Another Ger-
man holding a central position in Estonian theory is long-term professor of 
philosophy at Tartu University, Gustav Teichmüller (1832–1888). A biologist 
who exercised a very multifaceted influence on Estonian theory is Jakob von 
Uexküll (1864–1944), who grew up on the manor of Haimre (German: Heimar). 
Side by side with him stands the representative of another well-known Baltic 
German family, “the philosopher of Raikküla” Hermann Keyserling (1880–1946). 
Johannes Gabriel Granö (1882–1956), invited from Finland in 1919 to become 
the first professor of geography at Tartu University, engaged effortlessly in the 
already distinct tradition of Estonian theory. An even greater creative contribu-
tion to the furthering of the local theoretical tradition was made by Juri Lotman 
(1922–1993), founder of the Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics, who began work 
at Tartu University in the early 1950s.
In the second ring of the archive web, the community of statements is less 
homogeneous and more dispersed, in addition to which the number of source 
texts is greater. Among the authors, mention could be made of the first profes-
sor of philosophy at Tartu University, Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche (1762–1842); 
Ludwig Strümpell (1812–1899), the long-term professor of theoretical and practi-
cal philosophy and pedagogics at Tartu; the curator of the university, geologist 
and paleontologist Alexander Keyserling (1815–1891), born on Kabile (Ger-
man: Kabillen) manor, Courland; Jan Baudouin de Courtenay (1845–1929), 
who worked in Tartu between 1883 and 1893 as professor of the comparative 
grammar of Slavonic languages; Estonia’s first indologist, long-term professor 
of Tartu University Leopold von Schroeder (1851–1920); theologian and church 
historian Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930), who was born and studied in Tartu; 
the first Estonian philosopher of religion, Teichmüller’s pupil Eduard Tennmann 
(1878–1936); the Austrian Walther Schmied-Kowarzik (1885–1958), who worked 
at Tartu University as professor of philosophy and psychology; Granö’s pupil 
Edgar Kant (1902–1978), who continued his teacher’s work in Tartu; and also 
theologian Uku Masing (1909–1985) and physicist and philosopher Madis Kõiv 
(1929–2014). More names could naturally be added to this list, especially from 
among the pupils of those mentioned above.
Thus, the archive of Estonian theory is not clearly delimited and a number of 
statements easily connectible to the core of the web can be found in its margins. 
These statements originate with a comparatively large and diverse group of schol-
ars, not all of them necessarily very closely connected to Estonia. Some of the 
more outstanding would be the founder and long-term director of the University 
Library as well as professor of classical philology, rhetoric, aesthetics, and the 
history of both literature and art, Johann Karl Simon Morgenstern (1770–1852); 
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publicist and philosopher of politics and language Carl Gustav Jochmann (1789–
1830), native of Pärnu; professor of systematic theology at Tartu University Alex-
ander von Oettingen (1827–1905), born on Visusti (German: Wissust) manor; 
physiological chemist and a pioneer of neovitalism Gustav Bunge (1844–1920); 
Nobel prize winner for chemistry Wilhelm Ostwald (1853–1932), who studied 
and for a short period and also taught at the University of Tartu; the linguist 
Jakob Linzbach (1874–1953), born in Kõmmaste village, Risti, and known for his 
research into artificial languages; the philosopher Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950), 
native of Riga, who studied medicine in Tartu for two terms; the first professor of 
Tartu University’s chair of Estonian and comparative folklore, Walter Anderson 
(1885–1962); and one of the founders of Gestalt psychology, Wolfgang Köhler 
(1887–1967), who was born in Tallinn.11
Looking at this list it is clear that a remarkable number of scholars, mainly – 
but not exclusively – in the humanities, who have been linked with Estonia over 
the last couple of centuries, have contributed to Estonian theory. What is more 
interesting and more complicated than just listing the names, however, is to try 
to organise this vast theoretical archive, to identify common sources of influ-
ence, spot similar epistemic positions and construct thematic communities of 
statements. 
Estonian theory’s sources of influence 
One of the most important factors contributing to the internal unity of Estonian 
theory is its common sources of influence. The philosophical foundations of Esto-
nian theory are surprisingly distinct without excluding, however, several excep-
tions and deviations. Unrivalled has been the influence of Immanuel Kant (1724–
1804) and the later elaborators of his philosophy. Kant’s impact is complemented, 
on the one hand, by the views of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), and 
on the other by the works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832); a lesser 
role also being played by the other German romanticists. What is unexpected 
is the relative scarcity, although not complete absence (especially in a mediated 
form), of the influence of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) and Georg Wil-
helm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) in Estonian theory of the relevant period. It is, 
however, likely that further research may lead to a reconsideration of this view.12
The important role of Leibniz in the evolution of Estonian theory is rela-
tively unexpected and merits closer attention in the future. Although Leibniz’s 
influence is multifaceted, his pluralist doctrine of substance in general, and his 
monadology in particular, seem to have had a major role in shaping local recep-
tion. Leibniz saw the world as divided into the substantial and the phenomenal, 
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and claimed that the phenomenal sprang from simple substances, or monads. 
Monads were innumerable, and no two resembled each other. They were all 
self-sufficient, autonomously operating, and not subject to external influence. 
“The monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave”, as 
Leibniz puts it in paragraph 7 of his Monadology (Leibniz 1989 [1714], 214).
Leibniz’s ideas seeped into Estonian theory in the last decades of the 19th 
century, primarily via the works of Gustav Teichmüller and Jakob von Uexküll. 
Teichmüller became acquainted with Leibniz’s views in 1860, while working 
in Göttingen, and later repeatedly acknowledged Leibniz’s significant impact 
on the evolution of his own positions – which does not, of course, exclude 
several alterations (Teichmüller 1874, 67–69, 1882, 138–140, 1889, 58–60). The 
metaphysical position of Teichmüller’s later years can be considered an elabora-
tion of Leibniz’s monadology (cf. Vaska 1995 [1964], 99, n. 2), with the greatest 
difference being the provision of monads with ‘windows’ – that is, allowing for 
their interaction. This aspect has been summarised by Otmar Pello (1989 [1964], 
1153–1154) (accounting for both Teichmüller and his pupil Tennmann): “To a cer-
tain extent, Teichmüller’s philosophy relies on the monadology of Leibniz. Yet, 
having said that, we must immediately call attention to the difference of the two 
philosophies, too. Leibniz’s monads were ‘windowless’, thus precluding the idea 
of mutual interaction between them. Each correspondence was supposed to be 
based only on some prestabilised harmony, as he called it. Teichmüller and Ten-
nmann, however, speak about the soul’s function of movement, and it is through 
this function that the interaction of the monads or, as they preferred to call them, 
the substances, becomes possible.”
Jakob von Uexküll liked to point to Immanuel Kant as his philosophical 
model, but his umwelten-doctrine also owes a lot to Leibniz. Among the first 
to notice this was his pupil Friedrich Brock (1939), followed later by Harald Las-
sen (1939) and others (e.g., Buchanan 2008, 23; Guidetti 2013; Brentari 2015, 167). 
Yet traces of Leibniz’s monadology can also be found elsewhere in the archive 
of Estonian theory. The question of the monads’ interaction interested not only 
Teichmüller, but also Hermann Keyserling who, however, remained unable 
to decide whether the monads should be conceived of as having or not having 
‘windows’ (H. von Keyserling 1922, 3; 1936, 48).13 Even more interesting is the fact 
that in his late period, Juri Lotman turned to Leibniz “whose ideas seem to gain 
new intellectual interest once again” (Lotman 1997 [1989], 9; see also Restaneo 
2018). Lotman represents the semiotic universe or semiosphere as consisting 
of separate structures of meaning production called ‘semiotic monads’: “The 
monads of this kind are both the culture as a whole and any sufficiently compli-
cated text incorporated in it, including separate human personalities, regarded 
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as texts” (op cit). It is worth noting that unlike Leibniz, Lotman, too, prefers 
to regard the semiotic monads as having ‘windows’ – that is, as open structures: 
“The above-mentioned separateness of such a monad (within certain limits) not 
only presumes the presence of borders and an immanent structure but, at the 
same time, the existence of ‘input’ and ‘output’. Since the monad does not pos-
sess a material but rather a semiotic-informational existence, the ‘consumption’ 
of any entering text by the monad results not only in its physical, but also in its 
informational destruction: being transformed during the process of the ‘con-
sumption’, in the course of which a new text appears at the exit, the initial text is 
retained in its original form and is able to enter into new relations with its own 
transformation” (op cit).
While Leibniz’s influence on Estonian theory remains intermittent, that of 
Kant is all-encompassing. By way of a broad generalisation it might be said that 
Estonian theory is based on Kantian foundations, especially as concerns epis-
temological questions – without, nevertheless, implying any blind mimicking 
of Kant, but rather a creative elaboration of his teaching. Most of the important 
participants in Estonian theory listed above, particularly those in the first two 
rings, can be said to have had a closer or more distant connection with the Kan-
tian world outlook. A tell-tale exception is Victor Hehn, one of the few Hegelians 
in Estonian theory.
Kant’s influence reached Estonian theory through several channels, of which 
four might be highlighted where different target groups valued different aspects 
of Kant’s doctrine. Initially Kant’s ideas arrived in Estonia directly with the 
Keyserlings. Kant established close ties with this Courland family who resided 
in Rautenburg, near Königsberg, at a very early date and socialised with them 
for nearly thirty years. The beginning of this acquaintance remains obscure, but 
it seems probable that in the mid-1770s Kant spent some years with the fam-
ily as tutor (Kuehn 2002, 96, Zammito 2002, 122). Kant educated the two sons 
of the Keyserling (or Keyserlingk) family; and later the younger son, Albrecht 
Johann Otto Keyserlingk (1747–1809), attended Kant’s lectures at the University 
of Königsberg. Albrecht Johann’s son Heinrich Dietrich Wilhelm von Keyserling 
(1775–1850) entered the university in 1794, just in time to benefit from Kant’s last 
lectures. Heinrich’s son Alexander Keyserling, who went on to become cura-
tor of Tartu University, can also be called a Kantian (Rappe 2007). In his post-
humously published diaries he frequently addresses Kant, giving a fairly good 
idea of how the philosopher’s influence was passed on in the male line of the 
family: “My father had attained a Kantian way of life, albeit with certain conces-
sions that a man of the world [Lebe mann] must necessarily make. True enough, 
he only met Kant at a very tender age, reciting to him some verses he had learned 
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by heart. My grandfather was probably more deeply influenced by Kant, having 
been tutored by him – although for a short time, only up to the age eight –, and 
later benefiting from his lectures in Königsberg. A certain Kantian quality has 
been perceptible in my family’s way of life ever since” (A. Keyserling 1894, 61–62). 
Kant’s influence is also clearly discernible in the views of Alexander’s grandson 
Hermann Keyserling, a telling testimony of how the philosopher’s first-person 
influence endured in the family across five generations.14
However, the dissemination of Kant’s ideas was not limited to the family 
circle; his philosophical positions, particularly his moral doctrine, won early 
support from the Baltic German pastors, as testified among other sources by the 
influential sermon collections of Livonia’s Superintendent General, Karl Gottlob 
Sonntag (1765–1827). A good example of an early interest in Kant is provided by 
the professor of rhetoric at Tallinn Grammar School (Kaiserliches Stadt-Gym-
nasium Reval), Ernst August Wilhelm Hörschelmann (1743–1795), who began 
to teach Kant’s philosophy to his students as early as 1789, stating in the course 
programme: “I wish that this philosophy may spread and be accepted ever more 
broadly. The study of this philosophy sharpens the mind, undermines supercili-
ously dogmatic attitudes and enables us to reject several arguments that have so 
far been put forth, especially against religion; it also teaches exemplary morals, 
excellently edifying the human mind” (Hörschelmann 1789, 6).
It was, however, the reopened (in 1802) Tartu University that became the 
main stronghold of Kantianism, with one of its first foreign professors, Gottlob 
Benjamin Jäsche, a close disciple of Kant’s. Jäsche, the first publisher of Kant’s lec-
tures on logic, held the professorship of philosophy in Tartu for nearly forty years 
(1802–1839), and although his views underwent certain alterations, Kant, “that 
new Socrates, my immortal teacher and guide on the paths of science” (Jäsche 
2002 [1808], 2535), remained his main source of inspiration until the end of 
his days.15 It is also telling that even after his retirement in 1833, Jäsche was still 
offered the professorship over the young Hegelian, former student of Tartu Uni-
versity, Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805–1892). But the resonance of Kant’s ideas 
was broader than a professorship in philosophy; many of the progressive profes-
sors of the reopened university – members of the so-called Society of the Church 
of Ephesus – can be considered Kantians, starting with the first Rector, professor 
of physics Georg Friedrich Parrot (1767–1852). Several of them, including Parrot, 
may have come to Kantianism only in Tartu (Ruutsoo 1979: 17).
A separate line of influence that helped Kantian principles to take root 
in Estonian theory proceeds from the natural scientists associated with Tartu. 
This is not exactly surprising, since Kant’s ideas can be regarded as one of the 
foremost influences on German biology in the first half of the 19th century, with 
43
Estonian theory
his Critique of Judgement making a particularly significant impact (Lenoir 1982, 
Ginsborg 2006, 2015). Karl Ernst von Baer could, as he has reminisced, par-
take of Kant’s philosophy while studying in Würzburg under Ignaz Döllinger 
(1770–1841) (Baer 1886 [1866], 184–187), and to the end of his days he insisted 
that, fundamentally, his views harmonised with those of Kant (Baer 1876, 231, 
see also Lenoir 1988). The biological teaching of Jakob von Uexküll, who became 
acquainted with the works of the Königsberg philosopher in his student years 
but immersed himself in them while working in Heidelberg, likewise rests on 
Kantian foundations (Mildenberger 2007a, 72). Uexküll did in fact see the expan-
sion of Kant’s teaching to living nature as the main aim of his own scientific work. 
In the introduction to one of his major works Theoretical Biology, originally 
published in 1920, he summarises the aims of biology in two points: “The task 
of biology consists in expanding in two directions the results of Kant’s inves-
tigations: – (1) by considering the part played by our body, and especially by 
our sense-organs and central nervous system, and (2) by studying the relations 
of other subjects (animals) to objects” (Uexküll 1926 [1920], xv).16 In A Foray 
into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, he observed in the same spirit: “With 
this observation, biology has once and for all connected with Kant’s philosophy, 
which biology will now utilize through the natural sciences by emphasizing the 
decisive role of the subject” (Uexküll 2010 [1934], 52).
Johannes Gabriel Granö, elected professor of geography at Tartu University 
in 1919, had decided to base his geographical teaching on a Kantian foundation 
about a decade before that, thus proving a smooth fit in the Kantian framework 
of Estonian theory (Tiitta 2011, 101, 212). Another scholar to match the tradition 
effortlessly was Juri Lotman, who arrived in Tartu after World War II and who 
can also be considered a Kantian, as convincingly demonstrated by Mihhail Lot-
man: “Although he does not often refer to Kant’s ideas and writings (the most sig-
nificant references appear in his final works), Kant was his habitual interlocutor 
over many years, and in his lectures the name of the Königsberg thinker appeared 
much more frequently than in written texts.” And he adds, generalising: “How-
ever, even that is not the point. The most fundamental constructs of the Tartu 
school of semiotics reveal a clearly Kantian foundation” (M. Lotman 2000, 26).
German rationalism as represented by Leibniz and Kant did not, however, 
remain the only forces to shape Estonian theory. They were supplemented, from 
the opposite direction, by German (and to a degree also Russian) romanticism, 
especially Goethe and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854). The 
underpinning notions of Estonian theory reflect the clear and long-term influ-
ence of the holistic and organicist natural philosophy of the German romanticists, 
which acquired great resonance in the German cultural space of the first half 
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of the 19th century (Richards 2002). In Tartu, the first to teach the views of the 
natural philosophers, and Schelling in particular, was Karl Friedrich Burdach 
(1776–1847), professor of anatomy, physiology, and forensics at the university 
in 1811–1814. He recalls in his memoirs: “In Tartu, neither philosophy nor natu-
ral sciences were as yet in the least influenced by Schelling nor his school; and 
therefore my attempts at giving a deeper meaning to empiricism met with great 
resonance among the young men capable of a higher education” (Burdach 1848, 
226). He also notes the hostility of his colleagues to the new teaching; thus, for 
instance, the professor of physics, Parrot, apparently did not wish to befriend 
him, considering him a natural philosopher beyond recall (Burdach 1848, 259). 
Elsewhere, Morgenstern (1843, 43) notes that Jäsche also took a negative view 
of Schelling. Baer, too, has recorded a telling recollection of his student years in 
Tartu: “We were warned off natural philosophy as anxiously as if it were a ghost, 
without anybody ever giving a closer explanation of its harmfulness – because 
nobody really knew what it was” (Baer 1886 [1866], 94). It is quite likely that 
Baer may have first heard about natural philosophers from Burdach, although 
according to his own testimony he became acquainted with their views thanks to 
Döllinger’s lectures, in Würzburg (op cit, 187, 289). And it was not only on Baer 
that the German natural philosophers, and Goethe in particular, left their mark; 
the same goes for Jakob von Uexküll, as pointed out already in the early 1940s 
by his kindred thinker, philosopher Ernst Cassirer (1950, 205).17
However, the attitudes of Goethe and Schelling shaped Estonian theory not 
only through natural scientists, but also humanists, especially Victor Hehn, who 
can be considered one of the most important and original interpreters of Goethe 
in the last decades of the 19th century. For Hehn, Goethe was not just a subject 
matter, rather he was the point of departure for his own original theory of cul-
ture. Thomas Taterka is justified in saying that “Hehn’s studies of Goethe stand 
at the heart of his cultural research, only in relation to Goethe do they find 
their place and acquire a significance: they indeed constitute a cornerstone of 
Hehn’s conception of culture” (Taterka 2000, 152, cf. Schwidtal 2002). Having 
been elected lecturer of German at Tartu University, in 1846, Hehn eagerly set 
out to introduce Goethe and his contemporaries to his students, thus definitely 
contributing to the popularisation of Goethe’s ideas in the university town even 
though he was not the first to do so, since his predecessor Carl Eduard Raupach 
(1793–1882) had given lectures on Goethe fifteen years earlier (Rutiku 2003, 27; 
Undusk 2006, 566–567). There were, of course, many others in Tartu at that time 
who took an interest in Goethe, among them one of the most devoted promot-
ers of the ‘Weimar spirit’, Karl Morgenstern (Rand 2000), to say nothing of later 
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firm admirers of Goethe such as Leopold von Schroeder or Adolf von Harnack 
(see Barner 2003).
Briefly, the above sketch allows us to conclude that Estonian theory took 
shape primarily in the field of tensions between rationalism and romanticism18, 
and it is precisely this double influence from which Estonian theory’s main epis-
temic positions or facets have sprung.
The epistemic facets of Estonian theory
The most productive way to discuss Estonian theory seems to be by conceiving of 
it as a separate local episteme – a territorialised web of epistemological associa-
tions and rules for making sense of the world that favours some premises while 
discouraging others. We shall make a tentative attempt to describe this epistemic 
entanglement from five different perspectives, without claiming that the five 
facets make up an exhaustive or homogeneous model; rather, we conceive of 
Estonian theory as a dynamic whole, with discords and contradictions constitut-
ing an integral part of the system and now one, now another facet being given 
precedence according to the various constellations.
Holisticity
Estonian theory is holistic in nature, presuming that the whole precedes the 
parts, the general precedes the particular: in order to study elementary parts, 
one must first study complex systems. As pointed out above, the holistic roots of 
Estonian theory should be looked for first and foremost in German romanticism, 
particularly the work of Goethe and Schelling where holism was first developed 
into an independent world view and scientific method (Bortoft 1996, Richards 
2002). In view of an important distinction made by Patrick Sériot (2014 [1999], 
251), it is best to discuss the holistic nature of Estonian theory in an ontological 
rather than epistemological key; the associations between the elements are not 
mere constructs devised by the investigator but exist in reality – the world itself 
constitutes an integral system. It is probably due to the central holistic attitude of 
Estonian theory, as well as to a favourable environment, that the quest for a com-
mon denominator shared by living nature and culture, as well as for transitions 
from the one to the other, began so early in Estonia, and why students both of 
nature and culture have contributed equally to the local theory.19
The holistic nature of Estonian theory lends itself well to expression by musi-
cal metaphors, which indeed have cropped up frequently in the texts of vari-
ous scholars. An early example is offered by Baer in his famous speech at the 
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foundation ceremony of the Russian Entomological Society, in October 1860. 
Deliberating over the internally purposeful nature of life forms, he concludes: 
“Therefore I believe it is justified to call various life processes, by drawing a parallel 
with musical thoughts or themes, creation-thoughts that build up their bodies, 
on their own. What in music is called harmony or melody, is here type (togeth-
erness of parts) and rhythm (sequence of forms)” (Baer 1864, 281). Eighty years 
later, Uexküll takes up the same line as he looks for a way to escape the limited 
confines of umwelten in one of his last books, Theory of Meaning: “Only when 
we recognize that everything in nature is created by its meaning, and that all the 
umwelten are but voices that take part in a universal score, will the way be open 
to lead us out of the narrow confines of our own umwelt” (Uexküll 1982 [1940], 
72). But there are more holistic allegories to be found in Estonian theory. Per-
haps one of the best known among them was authored by Juri Lotman: “Just as, 
by sticking together individual steaks, we don’t obtain a calf, but by cutting up 
a calf, we may obtain steaks, – in summing separate semiotic acts, we don’t obtain 
a semiotic universe. On the contrary, only the existence of such a universe – the 
semiosphere – makes the specific sign act real” (Lotman 2005 [1984], 208, transla-
tion is slightly corrected).20 Indeed, Lotman’s conception of the semiosphere (in 
which he generalised the concept of text) can be said to take the holistic line of 
Estonian theory to its ultimate logical conclusion. It is interesting to note how 
beautifully Lotman’s use of metaphors matches the musical metaphors used by 
Uexküll in his reference to an experiment by Hans Driesch (1867–1941): “Only 
with the demonstration provided by Driesch that a sea urchin germ cell cut in 
half became not two half, but two whole sea urchins of half the size, opened the 
way for a deeper understanding of the technology of Nature. Everything physical 
can be cut with a knife – but not a melody” (Uexküll 2010 [1934], 194).
The holistic attitude has given rise to several original approaches in Estonian 
theory. Thus, Johannes Gabriel Granö’s innovative understanding of geography, 
for example, developed in its broad outlines during his Tartu period (1919–1923) 
and fully recognised for its originality only decades later (O. Granö & Paasi 1997; 
O. Granö 2003), is clearly the product of a holistic way of thinking. In the opening 
paragraph of his Pure Geography he defines his point of departure: “The aim of 
this work is to demonstrate that the topic of geographical research is the human 
environment, understood as the whole complex of phenomena and objects that 
can be perceived by the senses” (Granö 1997 [1929], 1). Granö was the first geo-
grapher to encompass in his vision the natural environment – milieu – as a whole, 





The holistic attitude of Estonian theory is fundamentally organic: the whole is 
not formed mechanically, but constitutes a living, harmonious and dynamic sys-
tem informed by some deeper intentionality. Again, the roots of this epistemic 
attitude mainly go back to Kant and Goethe. Yet whereas for Kant, the organicist 
approach was an epistemological device (Zumbach 1984, 129; Cohen 2009, 16), 
the Romanticists added a metaphysical touch – the world itself became organic 
(Richards 2002, 114). Examples of both lines of thought can be found in Estonian 
theory, although ontological organicism tends to prevail. This approach mani-
fests the above mentioned tendency to entwine the cultural and the natural: in 
Estonian theory, the distinction is made not so much along the lines between 
nature and culture, as along those between the living (organic) and the lifeless 
(mechanical).
The organicist perspective of Estonian theory has perhaps been best formu-
lated by Hermann Keyserling: “The actual, decisive problem is that spiritual 
life, forming part of the natural sphere, must everywhere be taken back to its 
meaning [Sinn]. Then that which heretofore had appeared to the world as two 
mutually exclusive types, will prove to be one organism. Is this aim practically 
attainable? – Yes, it is, since the world of thought forms as organic a whole as the 
world of bodily life. Each cell has its meaningful place in an organ, each organ 
in the organism, while the latter has a place in a broader spatial and temporal 
context. Thus, each meaningful act in turn points back to a deeper meaning” 
(H. von Keyserling 1922, 29). Keyserling’s way of posing the problem owes a lot to 
the works of both Baer and Uexküll, who never tired of emphasising the organic 
unity and purposefulness of all life. Baer is the author of the famous observa-
tion, tellingly based on Immanuel Kant: “Nearly a century ago Kant taught that 
in an organism all the parts must be viewed as both ends and means (Zweck 
und Mittel) at the same time. We would rather say: goals and means (Ziele und 
Mittel). Now it is announced loudly and confidently: Ends do not exist in nature, 
there are in it only necessities; and it is not even recognised that precisely these 
necessities are the means for reaching certain goals. Becoming without a goal is 
simply unintelligible” (Baer 1876, 231). Uexküll represents much the same way 
of thinking when proposing his idea of the ‘plan-accordance’ (Planmässigkeit) of 
organic life (see Hoffmeyer 2004; Buchanan 2008, 8–12; Magnus 2011). In 1935, 
he writes: “The only thing we can identify is a preposterously rich network of 
overlapping and fittable-in-one-another subjective umwelten. This network of 
umwelten is beyond all doubt governed by accordance to a plan that will meet 
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our eye on every step as soon as we have learned to pay attention to biological 
relations” (Uexküll 1980 [1935], 377).
Again, a good example of the fruitfulness of the organicist approach is pro-
vided by the human geography of Granö’s school of thought, whose crowning 
achievement was the formulation of the fundamental principles of human ecol-
ogy (Granö 1997 [1929], 175). In his 1923 valedictory lecture at Tartu University, 
Granö succinctly summarised the starting point of his scientific work (para-
phrased here by Edgar Kant): “The surface of the whole world is often composed 
of complexly structured landscapes. These landscapes are, in a way, organisms 
that can be studied as entities. They are not similar to animal organisms, but 
like the latter they can be studied both from a general and a particular point 
of view” (Kant 1999 [1923], 218, original emphasis). In his innovative study of 
Tartu, tellingly entitled Tartu: the Town as Milieu and Organism (Tartu: linn kui 
ümbrus ja organism), Edgar Kant himself also discussed the university town 
as a kind of organism with its own particular rhythms and structure (Kant 1926). 
This, in turn, can be compared with Uexküll’s politically loaded comparison of 
state with organism in his Staatsbiologie (Biology of State) (1920; cf. Dreschler 
2009, 89–91). 
It is intriguing to note that organicist thinking is also deeply characteristic 
of Juri Lotman’s late period, as Amy Mandelker has amply demonstrated (1994, 
1995). Lotman’s theory of the semiosphere is greatly indebted to biological think-
ing and metaphors. In the article “On Semiosphere” he writes that “all semiotic 
space may be regarded as a unified mechanism (if not organism)”, and adds: 
“In this case, primacy does not lie in one or another sign, but in the “greater sys-
tem”, namely the semiosphere” (Lotman 2005 [1984], 208).
Subjectivity
The world, treated as holistic and organicistic in Estonian theory, also manifests 
itself to each observer only in a subjective reality – that is, instead of objective 
time and space, the subjective spacetimes (umwelten or chronotopes) are treated 
as primary ones. In Estonian theory it is not the environment that shapes the 
subject, but vice versa – each subject shapes his or her own environment. This 
basically Kantian notion has been happily formulated by Hermann Keyserling: 
“The subject, as recognised already by Kant, is the insuperable precondition of 
objective cognition, it is only through him that cognition becomes meaningful; 
from the vantage point of the Spirit, all nature is underpinned by a communion of 
meaning” (H. von Keyserling 1922, 27–28). Uexküll formulates the same principle 
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even more laconically: “The secret of the world is to be sought not behind objects, 
but behind subjects” (Uexküll 1926 [1920], 29).
An understanding of a subjective perception of space and time took shape 
early on in Estonian theory, and was extended successfully to making sense of 
all life. Baer was one of the first to demonstrate each organism’s individual and 
unique, one might even say, monadic way of being. “The natural and true scope 
of our life is our perception and the speed of the response following perception”, 
he noted in his 1860 talk entitled “Welche Auffassung der lebenden Natur ist 
die richtige? Und wie ist diese Auffassung auf die Entomologie anzuwenden?” 
(“Which view of living nature is the correct one? And how to apply this view in 
entomology?”), adding “that the inner life of a human or an animal may pass 
more quickly or more slowly in terms of the same external time, and that this 
inner life is the basic scale we use to measure time in the observation of nature” 
(Baer 1864, 257–258). It is on this original insight that Uexküll, a few decades 
later, based his famous doctrine of umwelten, an early and important conclusion 
of which states: “In this way, we then conclude that each and every subject lives 
in a world in which there are only subjective realities and that umwelten them-
selves represent only subjective realities” (Uexküll 2010 [1934], 125–126, transla-
tion is slightly corrected). Everything the subject perceives forms its perception-
world, and everything it exercises influence on becomes its influence-world. The 
perception-world and influence-world together, Uexküll teaches, form an integral 
entity – the umwelt. The absolute, objective world is a mere abstract construct, 
“the objective realities of the surroundings never appear as such in the umwel-
ten” (Uexküll 2010 [1934], 125, translation is slightly corrected). Every subjec-
tive umwelt is qualitatively different from the others, and the number of such 
umwelten is infinite.
This idea of a subjective perception of space and time, originating with Baer, 
was further elaborated not only in the biological parts of Estonian theory, but also 
in the humanistic ones. Gustav Teichmüller centred his philosophical system on 
the autonomous subject and his unique perception of the world.22 In one of his 
major works, Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt (The Real and the Apparent 
World), he states: “We define the ‘I’ as a relation-basis, given in numerical unity 
and aware of itself, to all ideal and real being given in consciousness” (Teichmül-
ler 1882, 68). From this point of departure, Teichmüller developed a new philo-
sophical approach which he called “perspectivism”: we always perceive the world 
from one particular perspective, and this is what creates the illusion that space 
and time exist. Only a perspectival order of space and time, owing its existence 
to our sense data and not corresponding to the actual order of the world, is given 
to each subject; space and time are merely “perspectival images from a particular 
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vantage point” (Teichmüller 1877, 47). It is worth noting that this idea of Teich-
müller’s was picked up and developed into his own philosophical platform by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Teichmüller’s former colleague at the University of Basel, 
which is why perspectivism is today associated with Nietzsche rather than with 
Teichmüller. The research of the last few years has, however, convincingly dem-
onstrated that although in his published works, Nietzsche never directly refers 
to the Tartu philosopher, his notebooks offer clear testimony (through a dozen 
direct or indirect references) that he picked up the idea of perspectivism from 
Teichmüller, whose works he read with great interest in the 1880s (Vaska 1995 
[1964], 144–162; Dickopp 1970; D’Iorio 1993, 283–294; Orsucci 1997; Holub 2002, 
127–126; Riccardi 2009; Small 2010, 89, 115–116; Small 2001, 43–56; Bailey 2013, 
143; Foley 2015).
The subject’s unique perception of the world also forms the basis for Granö’s 
human geography, where research focuses on peoples’ perceived environments, 
that is, the natural environment is studied in the form that it assumes in each 
particular person’s field of perception (Granö 1997 [1929], 9). And finally, we may 
include Juri Lotman’s works in the same tradition of thought, which also empha-
sise the primacy and sovereignty of the subject. This aspect has been excellently 
exposed by Mihhail Lotman through comparison with Uexküll’s views: “In the 
function of organism he had text, the analogy of umwelt was context. Unlike 
earlier linguistic and semiotic ideas (e.g. Saussure’s and Jakobson’s) the context 
for Lotman does not precede text, being its preliminary condition, but, vice versa, 
text produces its context in the widest sense, including all the participants in the 
communicative act” (M. Lotman 2002, 34).
Substantiality
The subject-based nature of Estonian theory closely borders on another impor-
tant fundamental attitude that could be called substantiality or, perhaps, onto-
logical pluralism. According to this attitude, clearly associable with the influ-
ence of Leibniz, the world is divided into elementary parts, mutually connected 
substantial entities that generate meanings. These substantial elements can vary 
from one promoter of Estonian theory to another (‘I’, ‘consciousness’, ‘text’, etc.). 
As a rule, the substances are not isolated but form organic wholes: substances can 
influence and establish contact with each other, but are not completely closed.
The way in which substantiality is born of subjectivity is most clearly dis-
cernible in Teichmüller’s work. Having placed ‘I’ at the centre of his epistemol-
ogy, he takes the next step: “If we were now required to find a name for the 
unity of “I”, we could call it substantial unity” (Teichmüller 1882, 71, original 
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emphasis; cf. Teichmüller 1889, 218). From this basis, Teichmüller develops his 
second original philosophical teaching besides perspectivism – namely, person-
alism. According to this teaching, we have immediate access only to our inner 
worlds; it is only through ourselves, our self-consciousnesses that we perceive 
the external world, i.e. being manifests itself only through the ‘I’.23 Teichmüller’s 
substantialist philosophy was further developed by Eduard Tennmann, who fol-
lowed his teacher in emphasising the substantial character of human subjectivity 
(Tennmann 1999 [1932], 342) and formulated the thesis of consciousness as a 
substance: “Even in the strongest friendship or enmity, interpersonal relations 
can never overcome the limits of ideality, because substance is impenetrable 
(whether we think materialistically or idealistically) or irreplaceable, just like 
qualities or personal consciousness. God as the greatest unity, however, also 
constitutes the whole unity of substances and really inhabits all substances (not 
spatio-projectively, but metaphysically). Thus it might perhaps be more adequate 
to speak about reality of substances, rather than substance of substances. Yet the 
term is not appropriate, since it is only the acts of substances and the revelations 
of consciousness that we can count as real. Consciousness itself is a substance” 
(Tennmann 1999 [1930], 357, original emphasis).
Cognitive subjectivism is also characteristic of Alexander Keyserling’s 
thought, who in his diary frequently deliberates on “self-contemplating sub-
stance” (die selbstempfindende Substanz) (A. Keyserling 1894, 30, 45, etc.). And, 
as Jaan Undusk points out, “from here, the familial tradition of thought might 
in turn lead to his grandson Hermann, who in his later philosophy fixated on the 
concept of ‘substantial mind’ (‘that which is and creates, rather than interprets’)” 
(Undusk 2004, 144). At the beginning of Schöpferische Erkenntnis (Creative Cog-
nition), Keyserling writes in the best Leibnizian tradition that “every individual 
is profoundly unique, a true windowless monad in the sense that as concerns 
understanding [Verstehen], there is no independent external mediation between 
itself and others” (H. von Keyserling 1922, 3). Years later, however, he appears 
to modify his views to a certain extent: “It has become clear that man is not 
the isolated individual that the white man of the 20th century has involuntarily 
imagined himself to be; he is not a monad, and most certainly not a windowless 
monad; rather, he embodies the ‘relation’ between himself and the world in the 
broadest sense of the term” (H. von Keyserling 1936, 48).
We noted above that influences of a Leibnizian substantial thinking can also 
be recognised in the work of Juri Lotman. There, also, the somewhat paradoxical 
nature of Estonian theory emerges clearly – the same tension between rationalist 
and romanticist ways of thinking that upholds both the part and the whole, both 
substantiality and holisticity. In his article “Culture as a Subject and an Object in 
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Itself ”, in which Lotman introduces the concept of the semiotic monad, he writes: 
“The monad, defined in this way, acts as a unity, permanently extending itself 
within the limits of a certain individual semiotic space and, at the same time, like 
a decimal numeral obsessed by the idea of becoming a whole, endlessly enters 
into new combinations. By and large, each monad, irrespective of its relation 
to any level, is a part and a whole at the same time” (Lotman 1997 [1989], 12).
Spatiality
The final facet of the main epistemic attitudes of Estonian theory that we wish 
to highlight is the preference of the spatial over the temporal. Estonian theory 
seems to think predominantly in spatial categories, resulting in an emphasis on 
the relationship between centre and periphery, internal and external, familiar 
and foreign, as well as in enhanced attention to environment and landscapes. 
This attitude may well be informed by Estonia’s geographical position, its loca-
tion on the crossroads of various ecological, political, cultural and linguistic 
influences. 
One of the earliest great theoreticians of space in Estonian theory is Victor 
Hehn, who can, in more than one sense, be considered a forefather of mod-
ern cultural geography and one of the first to interpret culture in spatial terms 
(Wuthenow 1992, 2002; See 1992; Undusk 2006; Schwidtal 2011). Hehn studied 
classical philology at Tartu University, under Morgenstern, improved his knowl-
edge of Hegel’s philosophy in Berlin, and in 1839 started out on the long-dreamt-
of trip to Italy, where he accumulated experiences and observations that later 
became the basis of his culture–theoretical views and offered material for several 
books. One of the earliest of these, the little book Über die Physiognomie der ita-
lienischen Landschaft (On the Physiognomy of the Italian Landscape), published 
in Pärnu in 1844, presents Hehn’s culture–geographical views in a nutshell. Hehn 
uses the comparative method: he distinguishes the northern (situated north of 
the Alps) and the southern lands (mainly Italy). He characterises the north-
ern landscape as lyrical and musical, the southern as plastic and architectonic 
(Hehn 1844, 11). While the former is romantic by nature, the latter is classical 
and antique. (It is not surprising that in order to understand the latter, he mainly 
resorts to Goethe.) The transition of nature to culture, best exemplified by Italy in 
his view, remains a staple motif in Hehn’s work. In his travel diary we can read: 
“In this country [Italy], nature itself is a plastic and architectonic form, shaped 
according to the classical principle; the obscure intuitiveness of romanticism 
is alien to it. Their cypresses are columns, their pine-trees domes; each pattern, 
each house, each mountain a crystal” (Hehn 1906 [1839–1840], 190). His opus 
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magnum, alongside the books devoted to Goethe and Italy, is the 700 page study 
Kulturpflanzen und Hausthiere in ihrem übergang aus Asien nach Griechenland 
und Italien sowie in das übrige Europa (Cultivated Plants and Domesticated Ani-
mals in their Migration from Asia to Greece and Italy and the Rest of Europe, 1883 
[1870]), in which he analyses the evolution from natural objects to cultural forms 
of almost fifty plants and fifteen animals of European importance, based on very 
rich material from classical antiquity. In this long process, Hehn sees the birth 
of culture in Europe: the cultivation of land (agriculture and husbandry) creates 
the preconditions for the cultivation of mind. Jaan Undusk has aptly summarised 
Hehn’s position: “The main motifs of Hehn’s work are cultivation, domestication, 
acculturation – the production of artificial nature, or culture, out of a raw mate-
rial consisting of minerals, plants and animals, the new level of organisation that 
arises as human mind intervenes in nature” (Undusk 2006, 469).
Hehn’s space-centred theory of culture is later developed by Hermann Key-
serling, a leitmotif of whose work is that of culture as a kind of place-conscious-
ness, born from the joint influence of mental initiative and a certain natural 
environment (Undusk 2008, 101). In his posthumously published three-volume 
autobiography, Reise durch die Zeit (Travel Through the Times, 1948–1963) Key-
serling observes that “where a human type is soulless and cannot therefore be 
wed to a specific soil, there no culture can arise” (H. von Keyserling 1958, 342). 
The spatial orientation of Estonian theory seems to have favoured the early and 
original development of human and cultural geography in Estonia, including the 
conception of landscape as a cultural category and an emphasis on the mutual 
influence of men and environment of a kind that has elsewhere won broader 
acceptance only in recent decades. This is very obvious in the works of Granö and 
his Estonian pupils, the topicality and originality of which have not diminished 
over decades (see O. Granö 2003; Buttimer 2005, 2011; Jauhiainen 2005).
As in many other aspects, so also, it would seem, concerning the spatiality 
of Estonian theory an important complement is made by Juri Lotman, whose 
teaching of cultural semiotics is straightforwardly space-centred, even if in its 
latest phases the questions of time acquire ever more weight (see Randviir 2007). 
Lotman conceptualises culture primarily in terms of spatial categories, regard-
ing the relations between the internal and external as most important in the 
dynamics of culture. Semiosphere is for him a separate semiotic space, internally 
heterogeneous and with enhanced semiotic activity going on in its border areas. 
“The border of semiotic space is the most important functional and structural 
position, giving substance to its semiotic mechanism. The border is a bilingual 
mechanism, translating external communications into the internal language 
of the semiosphere and vice versa. Thus, only with the help of the boundary is 
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the semiosphere able to establish contact with non-semiotic and extra-semiotic 
spaces” (Lotman 2005 [1984], 210).
Conclusion
Estonian theory belongs among the phenomena that come to life only when 
they are studied. The present article was an attempt to conjure up something 
that as yet does not really exist, but may come into being given the communal 
will to carry it through. Of course, the picture painted here remained sketchy 
and fragmentary, with several important aspects glossed over, and many scholars 
failing to get due attention. But then, it was meant only as an appeal for further 
research. 
We described Estonian theory through the degree of affinity of certain fun-
damental ideas in the works of scholars linked to Estonia. The entanglement 
thus formed is like an invisible school of thought, the members of which need 
not even be aware of their mutual connections. After its most eminent repre-
sentatives, this school might perhaps be called the Baer–Lotman line in Estonian 
intellectual history.
In our view, every culture creates some kind of a “local theory” – now clearer, 
more permanent and distinct in form, now vaguer or more short-lived. Its 
acknowledgement as a peculiarity of a given culture could be associated with 
a non-essentialist conception of culture, that is, with a view that cultures differ 
from each other not by virtue of their permanent features, but of their more 
fruitful entanglements of changing networks of ideas.
Although the linking of Estonian theory to a “local episteme” may appear 
mysterious, in fact it constitutes a rather traditional phenomenon consisting of 
common sources of influence, immediate personal relations and academic proto-
types.24 All the authors discussed above were interrelated in one way or another, 
mainly through texts and models, but often also directly. A very good idea of 
the formation of the local episteme is given by the young professor of geography, 
Granö, in his letter to a friend, J. K. V. Tuominen, of December 20, 1919, soon 
after his arrival in Tartu: “Walking along the embankments of the River Emajõgi 
or in the beautiful park on Dome Hill, I vividly envision the faces of the great 
scientists who have walked in Tartu before me – such as Baer, Ledebour, Helm-
ersen, etc. – scientists whose shoelaces the present generation of professors is 
not fit to touch.” And, referring to his own usage of theoretical concepts, he adds: 
“‘Milieu’ thus offers certain advantages to work on, and memories compel” (Tiitta 
2011, 203–204). Not a single school originating in Estonia is exempt from contacts 
with Estonian theory. Those who have achieved much in a given culture or locus 
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are more tightly bound to each other than they might, perhaps, notice. 25 Taken 
together, Estonian theory or its core authors has or have already had something 
significant to say, perhaps to others rather than to particular scholars in Estonia. 
To make one final attempt at formulating our vision of Estonian theory during 
the last two centuries (including both the themes discussed and undiscussed in 
the article), we might try to compress it into the following eight theses: (1) Esto-
nian theory embodies in itself both the influence of and tension between rational-
ism and Romanticism; (2) Estonian theory searches for and proffers explanations 
of diversity; (3) Estonian theory approaches the particular from the general, and 
conceives of the whole as the basis for distinguishing the parts; (4) Estonian 
theory presumes that the subject is the creator of its environment; (5) Estonian 
theory is characterised by a pluralistic conception of substantiality; (6) Estonian 
theory prefers spatiality over temporality; (7) Estonian theory is predominantly 
given to theorising based on actual subject matter; (8) Estonian theory involves 
much more than that, both in its centre and at the periphery. 
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1  Our approach in a way follows up, more extensively and ambitiously, on what was 
said in the article “Semiotica Tartuensis” a couple of decades ago (see Kull & M. Lot-
man 1995, cf. Kull & M. Lotman 2012). There is a more general affinity between this 
essay and Jaan Undusk’s numerous articles on the various manifestations of the “Baltic 
spirit” in the 18th to 20th centuries (see, for example, Undusk 1995, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2011, 
2013). Additional details on the topic can be found in recent reviews on Estonian psychol-
ogy (Allik 2007), philosophy of science (Vihalemm & Müürsepp 2007) and philosophy 
(Sutrop 2016). We deliberately refrained from discussing here the ethnic and linguistic 
aspects highlighted in the searches for a local component of valuable ideas, as well as those 
related to landscape peculiarities and environment shaping. They both certainly play a role 
as cultural memory and scaffolding, thus also stabilising or channelling Estonian theory. 
It should be noted that most of the authors we shall discuss were not ethnic Estonians 
and did not write in Estonian.
2  Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Russian, German, Finnish and Esto-
nian are our own.
3  Michel Foucault, who launched the concept of ‘episteme’ (French épistème) in the 
1960s (Foucault 1966), conceived of it as a temporal category, a system of knowledge-
making characteristic of a given age; in this article, however, we attempt to “spatialise” the 
term, since the episteme of Estonian theory is defined by unity of space rather than of time. 
4  Or enouncements; in French énoncé, as used by Foucault.
5  An important example of this is provided by Friedrich Kittler’s book of lectures, 
Eine Kulturgeschichte der Kulturwissenschaft (A Cultural History of Cultural Science), the 
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more significant for containing fragments of Estonian theory (the views of Victor Hehn, 
to be precise); see Kittler 2001, 142–152.
6  It is worth noting that territorial treatment has, indeed, been relatively widely 
used to describe the history of both Estonian institutions and intellectual domains. But 
attempts to discern something like Estonian theory have, in these contexts, been rare; 
the only things highlighted have been a relatively marked interdisciplinarity and associa-
tion with nature (e.g. Vihalemm & Müürsepp 2007). The task is, indeed, complicated by 
the somewhat transdisciplinary nature of Estonian theory – with similar processes and 
views simultaneously cropping up in different wordings, different languages and differ-
ent disciplines.
7  For a better understanding of the territorial perspective, it is important to add that 
Estonia’s intellectual boundaries are not identical to the country’s political borders. This 
is particularly important to keep in mind when speaking about the 19th century, when 
the Estonia–Latvia border was non-existent (it came into being only in 1917 when North 
Livonia was included in the Governorate of Estonia). Tartu University, however, situ-
ated in what had formerly been Livonia, made its influence felt both in the Governorate 
of Estonia and in the city of Riga, neither of which had a university of their own. Saint 
Petersburg University was (re)established in 1819. 
8  Initially, Tartu University was established in 1632 as a Swedish university. Its current 
official name is the University of Tartu.
9  It must nevertheless be emphasised that German influences were very strong up to 
the end of the First World War, since many German lecturers stayed on at the university 
even after the onset of Russian-language tuition. 
10  Wulff (1985, 131) mentions: “Virtually halted by World War II, the work of the 
Dorpat school represents today a still viable ideal”. See also Tammiksaar & Kull 2001.
11  Let us also note that since we consider Estonian theory mainly an academic phe-
nomenon, we have not mentioned texts written in other genres, even if they are related 
or influential. Thus we do not analyse journalism, fiction, or the arts.
12  As for Hegel, see, for instance, Mildenberger (2007a, 38), Winthrop-Young (2010, 
230), as well as Avtonomova (2009, 244) in the context of J. Lotman’s views. Concerning 
Herder, we can presume that his influence found expression via the later German roman-
ticists, while he of course also played a very important role in the Baltic Enlightenment, 
Baltic German political ideology, and early Estonian national history of thought (see, 
for example, Undusk 1995; Piirimäe 2012).
13  It may be worth noting that in his search for the principles of philosophical lan-
guage, Jakob Linzbach also relied on Leibniz’s works, see Dulichenko 2000. From the 
more recent past, Madis Kõiv’s great interest in Leibniz is well known (see, most recently, 
Kõiv 2014).
14  In fact the most important influence to shape Hermann Keyserling’s interest 
in Kant was that of Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), introduced to Keyser-
ling in 1901 in Vienna by the Tartu indologist Leopold von Schroeder (Schroeder 1921, 
164). (Naturally Schroeder, too, considered Kant a major influence on his own work, see 
op cit, 235.) The closeness of the two thinkers is also proven by the fact that Chamberlain 
dedicated his major study of Kant (Chamberlain 1905) to “the friend” Keyserling. A good 
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survey of Keyserling’s life and philosophical views, including his philosophy of culture, 
is given by Ute Gahlings (1992, 1996, 2000, 2007).
15  This is also confirmed by Jäsche’s close friend and colleague, Karl Morgenstern 
(1843, 42), in his obituary to his deceased friend.
16  Kant’s influence on Uexküll has drawn the attention of numerous scholars; see 
most recently, Buchanan (2008, 9–14), Stjernfelt (2001, 81–82; 2011, 171), Pollmann (2013, 
778, 785, 798). Winthrop-Young (2010, 231) thinks Kant’s importance has been somewhat 
overestimated. It is not without interest that Uexküll also wrote two short articles on Kant’s 
impact on natural sciences (Uexküll 1924, 1939). By way of digression, it is worth noting 
that Uexküll dedicated his Theoretical Biology to former compatriot Adolf von Harnack, 
grateful for his friendly interest in umwelt studies. Harnack’s attitude to Uexküll’s works, 
as inferred from his memoirs, was positive (Harnack 1923, 395–399; see Mildenberger 
2007b, 74–75).
17  The fruitful dialogue between Uexküll and Cassirer has attracted closer attention 
in this century, bringing to light Uexküll’s important role in shaping the neo-Kantian 
theory of culture, launched by Cassirer and influential to the present day. See Heusden 
2001, Krois 2004, Weber 2004, Chien 2006, Stjernfelt 2011, Verene 2013.
18  In doing so, one must of course refrain from directly opposing rationalism and 
Romanticism; rather, the two movements clearly had certain features in common (see, for 
instance, Skidelsky 2008, 72–73); in addition, the significant influence of Leibniz on Kant 
(Cicovacki 2006) and of Kant on Goethe and Schelling must be kept in mind (Richards 
2002, 427–430; 2007).
19  Partly it may also be due to the fact that Estonia has belonged within the bounds 
of both Russian and German language areas, both of which have bestowed the title of 
science on the humanities (гуманитарные науки, Geisteswissenschaften); that is, the gap 
between the two large categories is not as great as in many other cultures which reserve 
the term science only for natural sciences.
20  In his introduction to the English translation of one of Lotman’s works, Umberto 
Eco suggests another comparison for those “squeamish readers unwilling to consider 
art and culture in terms of calves and raw meat”: “If we put together many branches and 
great quantity of leaves, we still cannot understand the forest. But if we know how to walk 
through the forest of culture with our eyes open, confidently following the numerous 
paths which criss-cross it, not only shall we be able to understand better the vastness and 
complexity of the forest, but we shall also be able to discover the nature of the leaves and 
branches of every single tree” (Eco 1990, xiii).
21  Obiter dictum, epistemological holism largely provides the starting points 
for Gestalt psychology, the theoretical foundations of which were defined by native Tal-
linnite, Wolfgang Köhler (see Lõo 2007, more generally Ash 1995), among whose prede-
cessors, however, there is also the structural psychologist Oswald Külpe (1862–1915), who 
studied for a short period in Tartu (see Allik 2007).
22  Teichmüller knew Baer from his time in St. Petersburg (1856–1860), and it was 
on Baer’s proposal that he later wrote his book Darwinismus und Philosophie (Darwinism 
and Philosophy, 1877), in which he on the one hand criticised Darwinism in a Baerian 
spirit, while on the other hand defining, in Baer’s footsteps, the philosophical principles 
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of perspectivism, which he went on to develop in greater detail in a subsequent study, 
Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt, published five years later (see Schwenke 2006, 31, 
81; Schwenke 2015, 109).
23  For a recent survey of the influence of Teichmüller’s personalism in Russia (and 
the problems related to its promotion there), see Ryzshkova 2013 and 2014.
24  In a recent article, the prominent French comparative historian of culture, Michel 
Espagne (2010), has ably demonstrated the fruitfulness of a place-centred and retrospec-
tive history of ideas, based on material from Tartu.
25  Thus, in some cases it is not impossible that the scholars concerned are not even 
consciously aware of their association with the local episteme but rather emphasise their 
dissatisfaction with the place. A good example is provided by Teichmüller, who in his let-
ters never seems to tire of complaining of his scientific isolation and “Siberian solitude” in 
Tartu (Schwenke 2006, 57); but as Madis Kõiv has pointed out, “And yet his major works 
are written here, and perhaps, regardless of all, this here is the right place for him, and 
the genii loci, even the deepest of them, accept him; and perhaps only here, in solitude, 
without any ‘we’ yet together with the genii loci, can the philosophy we call Teichmüller’s 
personalism, centred on an ‘I’ conscious of itself as a person, be born” (Kõiv 2005 [2001], 
338). Another example could be Jan Baudouin de Courtenay, who on November 22, 1883, 
soon after arriving in Tartu, writes to a colleague: “Whoever thinks that this here is Europe 
in any positive sense of the word, is grievously mistaken [...]. First and foremost, this is 
a place of very little civilisation, mainly as concerns lodgings, industry, etc. Everything 
is still very primitive here, almost comparable to the level of Far Russia. The students’ 
manners are exceedingly savage. They are perfect medieval barbarians” (Pullat 1974, 254). 
Yet scientifically, he was very productive over his Tartu period: in ten years, he wrote 
almost 25 works on very diverse topics in linguistics (Smirnov 1958, 751, more generally see 
Mugdan 1984). And his work did not fail to influence the local scholars, as evidenced by 
Uku Masing (1998 [1963], 278), “J. Baudouin de Courtenay’s book Der Einfluss der Sprache 
auf Weltanschauung und Stimmung [...] first gave me the encouragement of there being 
others who thought along similar lines”.
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On territorialisation of theory
Jaanus Sooväli, Margus Ott
The idea that a certain ‘localness’ plays a role in a theoretical tradition is no 
doubt plausible. Thus, investigating the peculiarities of various local theoretical 
traditions seems to be an interesting research field. We are to a large extent in 
agreement with the authors’ methodological point of views – Foucault’s archae-
ology and genealogy (the latter’s relation to Foucault being looser) – as well as 
their two more general epistemological attitudes. We believe that cultural theory 
is indeed in need of greater historicisation, and the territorialised approach to 
theoretical traditions might bring about some interesting discoveries. No scien-
tist or theorist is a freely floating Cartesian subject outside of space and time. 
Theorists are rooted in some place and time, more generally, in a certain context, 
and it would be naïve to think that the latter has no influence on their theories. 
The authors give a rather expressive example of this rootedness by referring to 
Jaan Undusk’s observation that Uexküll’s discourse on “subjective Umwelt” or 
a “self-centered” world goes back “to the specific nature of Baltic manorial life 
where the appreciation of culture effortlessly combined with an appreciation of 
nature” (p. 36). It is a somewhat speculative interpretation of the matter, but an 
interesting one nonetheless.
However, some questions do arise about how far one can push this idea of 
territorialisation and what it actually designates in the article. The authors speak 
of the spirit and unity of the place that they regard to be more important than the 
unity of time: “The theoretical thought related to Estonia is born primarily from 
the spirit of place, not of time.” (p. 33) What is this spirit of a place, genius loci, air 
du lieu? Is it the lifestyle of a place as Undusk’s observation would suggest? Are 
these the natural conditions of a place, the geographic location, the climate? Or 
the soil as Keyserling’s quote would suggest (p. 53)? The idea that a place could 
function as a unifying principle for various theories would be rather speculative. 
A theory is indeed born in a certain place, but it is hardly a matter of simple cause 
and effect. There is a potentially infinite number of ways, some of which might 
be fundamentally incompatible, in which a place can have an effect on a theory. 
The place probably matters, but the spirit of the place can speak rather differently 
depending on the author. Does it not speak “in tongues”?
However, the authors do recognise that the “linking of Estonian theory to a 
‘local episteme’ may appear mysterious”, and explain that, in fact, “it constitutes 
68
Jaanus Sooväli, Margus Ott
a rather traditional phenomenon consisting of common sources of influence, 
immediate personal relations and academic prototypes” (p. 54). Common context 
could indeed, to some degree, function as a unifying basis for various theories 
and would give some support to the idea of the “unity of space”, but to what extent 
is the context ever common (except for some very closed spaces and societies)? 
Even more seriously, to what extent is the common context “relatively persis-
tent” in time (see p. 31)? Supposing that there is a great multiplicity of sources 
of influence at a place, can one not say, metaphorically perhaps, that there are a 
“thousand places in one place”?
When we look at the Estonian theory in particular, as laid down by the 
authors, some of the very same difficulties arise. For example, Estonian theory 
is described as Kantian in so many ways. However, one of the central figures 
of Estonian theory, Gustav Teichmüller (located in the very innermost circle, 
see p. 37), was one of the sharpest critics of Kant and regarded his thinking as 
a regression in philosophy. Teichmüller’s own main sources of influence were 
Plato and Aristotle. 
A still more problematic example is Uku Masing. Kull and Tamm situate 
Masing in the second sphere of Estonian theory, so quite centrally as well, but 
it seems that he would have a hard time sharing any of the epistemic principles 
underlying Estonian theory as outlined by Kull and Tamm. Masing sketches a 
Finno-Ugric way of thinking, which seems to be fundamentally heterogenous to 
the most basic assumptions of Estonian theory1. But if there are these fundamen-
tal heterogeneities in the various theoretical traditions in Estonia, what justifies 
their homogenisation and unification under the general heading and label of 
Estonian theory? It could be imagined that someone would rather prefer to call 
Masing’s Finno-Ugric way of thinking Estonian theory, as it is based on the native 
language of Estonia. In one instance (p. 54) the authors indeed call Estonian 
theory the Baer–Lotman line in Estonian intellectual history, and that seems to 
be fair. The article does exceptionally well to clarify and illuminate this line of 
thought. But can and should one generalise it into the “Estonian theory”? Such 
naming homogenises and marginalises in the same breath, in one single move.
To be fair, the authors define Estonian theory a little bit more specifically as 
“a comparatively coherent aggregate of outstanding notions that originate with 
scholars linked to Estonia, which may have significant intellectual value and 
interest for the whole intellectual world” (p. 32), and also explain that the majority 
of Estonian scholars do not need to be part of it. But who is to define what the 
“outstanding notions” with “intellectual value for the whole intellectual world” 
are? To us it seems that there are several, incompatible lines of thought in Estonia 
which may have significant “intellectual value” for the world.   
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We suggest that another way of bringing in a specific context would be to 
focus on heterogeneities, discrepancies and incongruities. No tradition is uni-
form: it always has dissenting voices, it is always dialogic (as says Lotman2). 
Together with the thinker there are always also that heterogeneity, those with 
whom s/he is in contact, including those with whom s/he does not agree and 
against whom s/he has disputes. An Estonian thinker may relate to people and 
places in Germany, or in China, or to the Kachins in South East Asia, or the Rapa 
Nui on Easter Island. As the authors themselves acknowledge: “different theories, 
including Estonian theory and Russian theory, can easily have some parts in com-
mon, and many scholars may well belong to both, or several, at once.” 
By creating these lines of flight, a different topology would be created: not 
one of concentric circles of more or less ‘core’ personalities, but a rhizome that is 
connected to different other places and no-places (utopia). If we would observe 
this rhizome in a certain place, we would discover a specific ‘ecosystem’ of con-
nections, and it would have different nodes (concepts, thinkers, groups), some of 
which are more important than others in the sense of having more connections to 
other nodes, but they would not obey a single axiomatic that would bring them 
into concentric circles. From the standpoint of different interests, it will be organ-
ised differently: not just the Estonian theory, but a plurality of Estonian theories. 
Together with the Baer–Lotman line there would be numerous other lines (and 
perhaps also different Baers and different Lotmans who appear in other stories). 
In this way we may perhaps come closer to a ‘tailor-made’ notion of a place; we 
could take all the singularities of society, economy, history, institutions, etc., that 
make up the peculiarity of a place into account more precisely.
Notes
1  Cf. Masing, U. (2004) Keelest ja meelest. Ilmamaa, Tartu.  
2  See, for instance: Lotman, J. (2009) Culture and explosion. Mouton de Gruyter, 
Berlin, New York.
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Culture-dependent meaning formation  
in hermeneutics, phenomenology,  
cultural semiotics and cultural psychology
Tõnu Viik, Peeter Torop, Maaris Raudsepp
Abstract. This paper describes the conceptualisation of culture-dependent 
meaning formation (or meaning making) in hermeneutics, semiotics, phe-
nomenology and cultural psychology. The authors define ‘culture-dependent 
meaning formation’ as all such situations of meaning making, the outcome of 
which depends on one or another cultural context. Meaning making itself is 
understood as a semiotic process by means of which human world is organ-
ised into identifiable, familiar and customary things, units and processes. 
We will compare the theoretical models of culture-dependent meaning for-
mation developed in these four sciences and highlight their common features. 
We argue that these models postulate the structure of collective meanings, 
which functions as a cultural symbol system from the perspective of indi-
vidual meaning making and differentiates the outcome of meaning formation 
in one cultural community from those of other cultural communities.
Keywords: culture, meaning making, meaning formation, culture-dependent 
meaning formation, umwelt, cultural symbol system, hermeneutic rule, cul-
tural Lebenswelt, language, sign system, secondary modelling system, social 
representations
We live in the world where each and every thing we encounter bears a meaning 
for us. Knowing the meaning of a thing allows us to recognise it, distinguish 
it from others, and use or ignore it. Similarly, we experience all circumstances 
and situations as meaningful. When we attend school, a meeting, take a tram 
ride, have dinner and so forth, we understand where we are, what we are doing 
at this point, why we are doing it, and what the attitude and relation of other 
people to this situation is. Obviously this knowledge is not final or conclusive – 
sometimes we are confused about things and situations –, but for the majority 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 72–111.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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of everyday life we deal with things and situations the meanings of which are 
familiar and evident to us. 
Space and time are likewise meaningfully structured for humans. People 
live and move in places which they know through the meanings that they have 
assigned to them (one’s home, place of employment, urban neighborhood, city, 
country, homeland, etc.), and they differentiate and organise their lives accord-
ing to shorter or longer time periods, intervals and durations that are structured 
through meaning ascribed to them (day, night, work hours, time for the meeting, 
the time spent watching a movie, the period of growing into adulthood, one’s 
whole life span, the period of national independence, etc.). Our own self is also 
meaningful for us, as are our significant others, as well as our own and other 
peoples’ activities and attitudes. Social groups, too, have a meaningful identity 
beginning with family and extending to nation. 
Thus we can say that the entire reality perceived by humans consists of dif-
ferent meaningful units. The visual field is divided into meaningful objects and 
differences between them. The auditory field is divided into sequences of different 
types of sound among which we can distinguish linguistic messages, melodies 
and miscellaneous sound backgrounds. The latter generally come across as noise. 
However, we should bear in mind that the sounds constituting the background 
gain their status by virtue of the meanings we assign to other sounds. Once 
a background sound moves into focus, its meaning will change. For instance, 
a conversational hum in the distance becomes an articulated text once we attend 
to it.
While traditional scientific and metaphysical thinking presupposes that there 
is one and only one reality that must be described from its own point of view, in 
several disciplines devoted to the study of culture it has become clear that real-
ity is different in the experience of different subjects and different inter-subjec-
tive communities. The theory of surrounding worlds (Umwelten) of organisms 
advanced by Jakob von Uexküll at the beginning of the previous century shows 
that this difference of realities is dependent upon meaning formation processes 
that living creatures apply to their surroundings. If in  ‘objective’ reality per-
ceived by a ‘neutral’ observer every creature is situated in its surroundings as 
if a thing among other things, then the relationship of the creature itself to the 
reality around it is always mediated through its processes of meaning making. 
For most organisms, there are only the things and distinctions which their senses 
can perceive. Uexküll calls this world, to which an organism is able to relate 
itself according to its capacity for perceptual discrimination a surrounding-world, 
umwelt. An umwelt differs from the ‘objectively’ mapped environment precisely 
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because it consists of only that which is experienced as meaningful by the living 
organism itself:
Each Umwelt forms a closed unit in itself, which is governed, in all its parts, 
by the meaning it has for the subject. According to its meaning for the ani-
mal, the stage on which it plays its life-roles (Lebensbühne) embraces a wider 
or narrower space. This space is built up by the animal’s sense organs, upon 
whose powers of resolution will depend the size and number of its locali-
ties (Orte). The girl’s field of vision resembles ours, the cow’s field of vision 
extends away over its grazing-area, while the diameter of the ant’s field of 
vision does not exceed 50 centimeters and the cicada’s only a few centimeters. 
The localities are distributed differently in each space: The fine pavement the 
ant feels while crawling up the flower stem does not exist for the girl’s hands 
and certainly not for the cow’s mouth. (Uexküll 1982, 30)
In order to ascertain the contents of a meaningful reality we must study the 
perceptual discrimination capacity and its operations by means of which the 
organism makes the world meaningful for itself. We will call these the processes 
of ‘meaning formation’. These are processes through which a subject’s umwelt is 
structured, and through which the discernible units of that world are formed, as 
well as distinctions between the units. This occurs on the spatial and temporal 
as well as material and ideational planes of the subject’s world.
Elaborating upon Uexküll’s theory of umwelts, the philosopher of culture 
Ernst Cassirer notes that although the umwelt of humans also depends on spe-
cies-specific mechanisms of meaning making, its relationship with the reality 
is additionally mediated by means of cultural symbol systems which make the 
human umwelt dependent on a culture. Due to this symbol system, humans are 
no longer inhabitants of the physical world alone, but also of a symbolic world. 
Cassirer explains:
Language, myth, art, and religion are parts of this universe. They are the 
varied threads, which weave the symbolic net, the tangled web of human 
experience. […] No longer can man confront reality immediately; he cannot 
see it, as it were, face to face. […] He has so enveloped himself in linguistic 
forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he can-
not see or know anything except by the imposition of this artificial medium. 
His situation is the same in the theoretical as in the practical sphere. Even 
here man does not live in a world of hard facts, or according to his immedi-
ate needs and desires. He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, 
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in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusions, in his fantasies and dreams. 
(Cassirer 1954, 43)
Thus humans live in a world (of differentiations) created by cultural means, of 
which the natural lifeworld that is formed by virtue of the meaning making 
capacity characteristic of the species is only one facet. The other facet is created 
by the symbolic means of culture, or more precisely, as Cassirer puts it, through 
“the symbolic imagination and intelligence” (op cit, 52). Therefore, Cassirer finds 
that man should be defined as animal symbolicum instead of the traditional 
animal rationale (op cit, 44).
Now, if it is true that in addition to species-specific processes of meaning mak-
ing, the relationship of human beings with the world is also mediated through 
a cultural symbol system, then we must postulate a cultural plurality of human 
worlds. Culture, in this context, may be termed a means of symbolic meaning 
making. Since there are many cultures, we must acknowledge that there are many 
human umwelts. In other words, human umwelts are not species-specifically 
uniform but differ according to the number of cultural communities. Temporally 
and spatially separated cultural communities, as well as various professional and 
other sub-communities, may have their peculiar umwelts created by means of 
“the symbolic imagination and intelligence”.
Such a notion of culture-dependent meaning formation was already devel-
oped in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German philosophy, in which the 
concept of spirit (Geist) and its derivatives (Volksgeist, objektiver Geist, National-
Geist, Gemein-Geist) were used to denote a cultural umwelt of a particular society. 
However, these theories lost their popularity in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury. The idea of culturally dependent meaning making was rediscovered in the 
20th century under new terminology. As its sole legacy, the concept of ‘objective 
spirit’ was retained in the early 20th century, as taken over from Hegel by Dilthey. 
The concept of spirit (Geist) is also employed by Max Weber in a similar sense. 
However, from the second half of the 20th century onwards, culture-dependent 
meaning formation is described using concepts such as sign and symbol, stereo-
types, social representations, cognitive models, cultural languages (i.e. secondary 
modelling systems), the collective conscious, collective memory, the semiosphere 
and common sense.
In this paper we will focus on the idea of culture-dependent meaning for-
mation within only a few of the many academic disciplines that deal with this 
problem. But before we proceed, we will make an attempt to formulate briefly 
three theoretical postulates on which the idea relies. 
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First, an organism perceives in the surrounding environment only that which 
has some meaning for it. It can be said that an organism experiences things 
through the medium of meanings, or by means of meaning. From the phenom-
enological and social-constructionist perspective, it could be argued that humans 
‘invest’ meanings in things, and as a result perceive the world and specific things 
around them as full of meaningful distinctions. 
Second, the mass of meaningful things, (literary/art) works, places, times, 
personal and collective identities, messages as well as collective ideas comprise 
the umwelt of the subject – the subject’s surrounding world, which must be 
distinguished from the environment around the subject as it could be observed 
by an external spectator. The latter is a part of the observer’s umwelt and the 
distinctions in it are conditioned by the meaning making possibilities of the 
observing subject. But no subject can make any distinctions that are not possible 
within that subject’s own umwelt. The position of the researcher in the univer-
salism–relativism debate often depends on whether the possibility of attaining 
the position of ‘neutral observer’ or achieving the ‘divine gaze’ is considered 
possible or not. 
And third, as shown by Uexküll, the means of meaning making vary between 
species, although, as follows from Cassirer’s hypothesis about the symbolic imagi-
nation and intelligence, the means of meaning making within the species homo 
sapiens also vary between cultures. This suggests that people have at their dis-
posal means of collective meaning making which may belong to one cultural 
community only. In reality they are more often borrowed from other cultures, 
but nonetheless our means of meaning making are characterised by a remarkable 
historical and geographical variation, the most vivid example of which are natural 
languages and the secondary modelling systems that are based upon them. 
Hence meanings, which people have collectively assigned to things, mediate 
the realities of their worlds for them. Thus, for example, we may perceive light 
dots in the clear night sky as remote sun-like celestial bodies, or we may perceive 
them as the eyes of spirits or gods watching us. We can also see in these light 
dots rips in the fabric of the celestial sphere, or our ancestors’ souls. The choice 
of a specific meaning depends on the collective beliefs and attitudes prevalent 
in the person’s cultural community. These are most often regarded as self-evident 
and self-explanatory. This principle applies in even stronger measure to items 
created by humans, or cultural objects. Even if a pipe is simply a pipe, it still has 
the meaning of a pipe, which defines the way we classify this object, the category 
or mental reference model we employ to recognise it, as well as the way we deal 
with it, what we use it for and how we relate to it. The pipe has its own function, 
manner of use and cultural history the knowledge of which is what enables 
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us to regard this object as a pipe, and to relate to it accordingly. Therefore, the 
assignation of meanings to things is always a historically, socially and culturally 
conditioned process, and the same applies to the perception of places, circum-
stances, situations and various temporal durations.
The culture-dependency of meaning making is even more obvious in the 
case of such objects where the work’s material embodiment is of no particular 
consequence from the viewpoint of its contents, for example literary works of 
art. The contents of a novel do not in any considerable degree depend on the 
kind of paper it is printed on or what has been used to bind the tome together. 
And to continue this line of thought, the culture-dependency of meaning making 
is most clearly evident in the case of ideal objects such as gods, cultural heroes, 
ethical values, political images, etc. Ideal objects exist in fact only in the collec-
tive consciousness and memory of a cultural community and only as such (i.e. as 
being intersubjectively valid immaterial objects) do they exert real influence on 
the power relations, institutional practices and behavioural patterns of a society. 
In various fields of research, the idea of culture-dependent meaning forma-
tion has been explicitly expressed and theoretically and systematically expounded. 
Many attempts have been made to construct epistemological models of culture-
dependent meaning making that would be applicable to particular objects and 
the acts of meaning formation related to these objects. In what follows, we will 
examine the concepts that have been used to discuss culture-dependent mean-
ing formation in hermeneutics, phenomenology, cultural semiotics and cultural 
psychology. As mentioned above, by “acts of meaning-making” we mean the 
situations in which someone experiences things, circumstances, people, groups of 
people, places and times as meaningful phenomena, and reacts and acts accord-
ing to the meaning ascribed to them. 
A hermeneutic approach to culture-dependent meaning formation
Hermeneutics, as a methodological theory, does not look at the processes of 
meaning making in the context of everyday life. However, the epistemological 
platform of the hermeneutic position does accord with the above three postu-
lates upon which the idea of culture-dependent meaning-making is grounded. 
According to Dilthey, understanding (Verstehen) is an everyday process “by which 
we intuit, behind the signs given to our senses, that psychic reality of which it is 
an expression” (Dilthey 1972, 232). This occurs either when we interpret the inten-
tions of a person standing before us, or understand the trouble of a crying child. 
In principle a similar empathic process unfolds in a situation when we compre-
hend the content of a text or the meaning of a work of art. At any rate, the object 
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of understanding is a certain subjective “inner reality” (op cit, 231) or “something 
spiritual” (Dilthey 1977, 123) which may only be reached from “the outside”, or 
more precisely, by means of “external sensory signs” (Dilthey 1972, 231–2). But if 
our everyday understanding deals with such sensorially perceived expressions 
that are impermanent and have significance only within specific practical situ-
ations (for example I understand that the child is crying from hunger and will 
feed it), the hermeneutic art of interpretation concerns itself with the “orderly 
and systematic understanding of fixed and relatively permanent life expressions” 
(op cit, 232). In Dilthey’s view, this primarily concerns those expressions of spir-
itual content that are fixed in writing, although the art of interpretation can 
also be applied when construing the expressions of ‘human spirit’ as found in 
stones, marble, musical tones, gestures, activities, economic arrangements and 
constitutions. The core essence of the art of understanding, however, resides 
in the “interpretation of those residues of human reality preserved in written 
form” (op cit, 233), since it is only in language that the “inner life of man finds its 
exhaustive, most objectively comprehensible expression” (op cit). Hermeneutics, 
according to Dilthey, is consequently the science of interpretational procedures 
by virtue of which something ‘inner’ and ‘spiritual’ becomes comprehensible. 
We need not concur with Dilthey in his preference for linguistic means of 
expressions over other possible means of expressing the ‘inner’, ‘mental’ or ‘spir-
itual’ reality of human life, but the idea that the goal of our analysis of a work of 
art is to ascertain the author’s idea, for the expression of which that work was 
created in the first place, is one of the most widespread assumptions made when 
analysing works of art. Thus, according to Dilthey, the meanings of artworks 
derive from the author’s personality, and are captured in a sensorially perceptible 
form (a written text) by virtue of which others can apprehend what was meant 
by the author. Interpretation is the opposite process of original meaning making: 
it discloses the ideational original form from its materialised embodiment. But 
let us have a closer look at the way this works. As said above, Dilthey views the 
hermeneutic art of interpretation as one of the highest forms of understanding. 
In contrast to the processes of understanding that we use spontaneously in daily 
life, and the purpose of which is also to disclose the mental states of other people 
on the basis of their external gestures, in the hermeneutic art of interpretation, 
understanding is attained by directing the interpreter’s attention to the nexus of 
the external relationships of a given text. Dilthey explains:
A drama is played. Not only the non-literary spectator lives entirely within the 
action, without thinking about the author of the piece; the person knowledge-
able in literature can also fall completely under the spell of what happens here. 
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Then this understanding is directed to the nexus of the plot, the characters 
of the persons, and the interplay of forces [Momente], which determine the 
turn of fate. Indeed, only then will he enjoy the full reality of the slice of life 
which is presented. Only then will the process of understanding and re–expe-
riencing [Nacherleben] be completed in him, as the poet intends to produce 
it. […] The understanding which was governed by the relationship between 
an aggregate of expressions of life and that which was expressed in them is 
transmuted into an understanding governed by the relationship between 
a creation and the creator only when the spectator notices how that which 
he took as a piece of reality arose artistically and according to a plan in the 
head of the poet. (Dilthey 1977, 130)
The main question of hermeneutic methodology concerns precisely that: which 
“aggregate” of relationships a given text or work of art is placed within. Already 
Schleiermacher made a distinction between “the totality of language” and “the 
whole thought of its originator” with regard to this question (Schleiermacher 
1998, 8), and the totality of the author’s life here is subsumed by yet other inter-
subjective totalities of the next order: 
In the same way every utterance is to be understood only via the whole life 
to which it belongs, i.e. because every utterance can only be recognized as 
a moment of the life of the language-user in the determinedness of all the 
moments of their life, and this only from the totality of their environments, 
via which their development and continued existence are determined, every 
language-user can only be understood via their nationality and their era. 
(op cit, 9). 
Drawing upon Hegel, Dilthey terms intersubjective cultural forms such as nation 
or era the “objective spirit”, which he defines as “the medium of common context” 
(Gemeinsamkeit) through which the understanding of other persons and their 
life manifestations may be reached (Dilthey 1977, 126–7). The objective spirit 
includes all the spheres of culture from everyday life to high art: “Its domain 
extends from the style of life and forms of economic interaction to the system 
[or nexus – Zusammenhang] of ends which society has formed: the morality, 
law, the state, religion, art, science and philosophy” (op cit, 126). Andrus Tool 
comments that “the commonality which Dilthey refers to could be interpreted 
as a sphere of commonly shared meanings that binds members of one human 
association” (Tool 2014, 219). Tool adds that these commonly shared meanings 
are intersubjectively valid in the following sense: “General validity in this case 
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means a validity recognized by members of a specific human association and 
indeed not something that is valid for “all peoples and all times”; thus it is not 
a universal validity” (op cit). In more contemporary terms, Dilthey’s ‘objective 
spirit’ could thus be defined as a field of intersubjectively valid meanings char-
acteristic of a particular cultural community.
The epistemological principle of hermeneutics lies in the idea that the mean-
ing of each work can be found with the help of the following contextual wholes: 
the whole of the ideas and literary figures presented in the work, the whole of the 
author’s psychic life, and the whole of the specific era and culture. A knowledge 
of the objective spirit is also a precondition for our understanding of everyday 
occurrences, as individual states of mind can be understood by others only when 
they are expressed by symbolic means that are commonly used in a given cultural 
context, and which make them intersubjectively recognisable and interpretable. 
Everybody acquires these means of expression in the course of socialisation, and 
since all people belong to a particular era and a particular nation, the means of 
the objective spirit are uniform for members of a given cultural community. The 
most common example of such a means is natural language. 
Obviously, for an interpreter, “fixed and relatively permanent life expres-
sions” could belong to the context of a foreign and historically remote objective 
spirit, in which case the interpreter must first become a historian in order to 
understand the culture of a epoch in question so that this contextual knowledge 
could be employed in order to interpret a specific work or its author. On the one 
hand, the content of each work reflects the era of its creation because the era’s 
social and cultural context affects the creator’s thought processes without her 
acknowledging that. On the other hand, authors purposefully select their means 
of expression – the rules of the genre and technique – from the reservoir of pos-
sible choices, valid in their historical setting. A renewal of, or a revolt against, 
the rules of the genre, too, is possible only from a certain historical position 
which has been defined by the spirit of the era. (Dilthey 1985a, 160–173). How-
ever, in Dilthey’s hermeneutics, the goal of understanding of the objective spirit 
is subjugated to the goal of understanding of what he calls “the mystery of the 
creator’s personality” (op cit).  The personality of an author and the author’s idea 
for creating his work is the most important context for interpreting the mean-
ing of a work. Twentieth-century structuralist theories are by far more sceptical 
about the importance of the author’s personality in understanding her work. 
Foucault (1977), for example, understands the author as being a figure who has 
not been discovered but rather is generated in the course of interpretation and 




However, to this day the hermeneutic methodology is valid in the sense that 
one of the most important means of understanding a work is the construction 
of whole and understanding its parts through this whole, and vice versa; but 
also, the construction (or detection) of the wholes external to the work which 
are then used to make sense of it or its elements. The contextual whole external 
to the work can be a collection of works (which can be composed on the basis 
of the idea of authorship, genre, discipline or some other characteristic), the life 
of the author, culture or era. Dilthey summarises this methodological principle 
by emphasising, again, the whole of the author’s life:  
Just as we distinguish the chemical composition, weight, and temperature of 
natural objects, and study them for themselves, so we can take a narrative 
poetic work, whether it be an epic, romance or ballad, drama or novel, and 
distinguish within it subject matter, poetic mood, motif, plot, characters, and 
means of representation. […] These particular moments which can be distin-
guished in the poem [Dichtung] develop out of [the author’s] life-experience 
as if by organic growth; each of them performs a function relative to the 
work as a whole. Thus every poem is a living creation [lebendiges Geschöph] 
of a special kind. A full appreciation of a poet would require us to define 
all the conditions, both within him and external to him, which influence 
the modifications of lived experience and understanding characteristic of 
his creativity, and to comprehend the productive nexus [Zusammenhang] 
in which the motif, plot, characters, and means of representation are then 
formed (Dilthey 1985b, 252–3).
External and internal conditions that effect the formation of “the productive 
nexus” are directly connected to Dilthey’s concept of the objective spirit or the 
author’s contemporary culture. The reason Dilthey stresses the necessity of 
understanding the meaning of a poetic work in the context of the author’s whole 
life and contemporary culture is that for him, the most essential task is to dis-
close “the mystery of the creator’s personality”; however, subsequent developers 
of hermeneutic methodology find this goal less appealing. As a consequence, 
they emphasise more historical and cultural contexts and less the biographical 
and psychological ones. However, what remains valid allowing us to understand 
the meaning of things is “the hermeneutic rule that we must understand the 
whole in terms of the detail, and the detail in terms of the whole” on account of 
which “the movement of understanding is constantly from the whole to the part 
and back to the whole” (Gadamer 1988, 68). According to Gadamer, it is even 
impossible not to use a hermeneutic approach with regard to certain cultural 
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objects because “the concept of text [...] presents itself only in connection with 
interpretation and from the point of view of interpretation, as the authentic given 
that is to be understood” (Gadamer 1989, 30). The researcher him/herself, his or 
her life situation, interests and power relationships, his or her cultural context, 
language, and so forth, are already among those pre-given contextual wholes 
that make it possible for objects to have any meaning which could be discovered. 
In conclusion we may say that in hermeneutics, a meaningful object is viewed 
as a ‘work’ (in Dilthey’s words, “fixed and relatively permanent life expression”) – 
something that expresses someone’s individual and particular psychic–mental 
content through means of the objective spirit that is given to the creator of the 
work in her historical life situation.  Understanding the meaning of the work 
becomes possible by virtue of the processes of contextualisation with the help 
of which we can view it in terms of a whole consisting of parts and explain one 
through the other. This is why the movement of understanding goes from the 
whole to the parts and back to the whole. In addition, the work and its parts 
are situated in the context of some broader whole through which its meaning is 
uncovered using the same movement of understanding. 
Thus in hermeneutics one proceeds from the assumption that a human life 
is fundamentally situated within the objective spirit, or what is the same: within 
a certain historically, socially and culturally conditioned situation that gives the 
creator intersubjectively valid means of meaning making and forms a starting 
point for his or her creative activity. In order to understand the meaning of 
the works it is consequently necessary to reconstruct these historical, social 
and cultural contexts, and include them in the explanation of the meaning of 
the works. Several hermeneutical thinkers, especially such as Heidegger and 
 Gadamer, emphasise the necessity of including the context of the historical situ-
ation of the interpreters themselves into the hermeneutic procedure, because the 
institutional dynamic and the power relations that are applied to the interpreters 
impact the focus of their attention and the formation of the research questions. 
Therefore it is important to note that upon closer examination the meaning 
of an object turns out to be at least a dialogic process in which more parties are 
involved and in which the object under study, such as a text, constitutes only one 
of the sides of the process. As Robert Brandom observes, “meaning is a product 
of the words on the page and other features of the context in which it is situ-
ated – for instance, a tradition in which it features, or the concerns and questions 
a reader brings to the text.” (Brandom 2002, 93). But in this case a plurality of 
meanings arises, as it is possible to furnish every text with an infinite number of 
various contexts, each of which discloses the meaning of the text differently. And 
since the number of contexts is not limited or pre-determined, the possibility of 
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creating new meanings will remain open. Therefore, it is necessary to  re-interpret 
classic texts continually, for a bulk of new relevant contexts can emerge that 
provide additional elucidations of the meaning of the object (op cit, 93–94). The 
author’s own life and intentions, his or her inner world, or cultural context and 
historical circumstances need not necessarily be privileged or focused on as the 
only possible background even though for a biographical reading the first set of 
contexts remains indispensable, just as the latter contexts are crucial for a histori-
cal understanding of the work. 
We just need to take notice that in principle the hermeneutic paradigm pre-
supposes a processuality and plurality of meanings, as well as continual openness 
to new perspectives that all arise from the possibilities of contextualisation of 
a work. Therefore we may regard hermeneutics first of all as an art or a tech-
nique of contextualisation. It remains to be widely used inside and outside of 
academia. The main divide between the users of the hermeneutic method lies in 
the answer to the question whether contexts are disclosed or created, i.e. whether 
certain contexts are pre-given and naturally belonging to a text, or constructed 
on purpose. 
A phenomenological approach  
to culture-dependent meaning formation
Any phenomenological approach to the meanings of things proceeds from the 
study of the activity of consciousness that is intentionally related to things and 
events outside it. Phenomenological authors have primarily proceeded from 
an analysis of empirical perception and raised epistemological questions as to 
why a perception of one or another object is formed the way it is. The object is 
understood here in very broad terms. Anything in the real world could be defined 
as an intentional object of consciousness (such as an empirically perceptible table, 
chair, book, artwork, etc.), but also something abstract and ideational (numbers, 
words, signs, scientific propositions, theories, works of art), as well as things 
imaginary and phantasmagoric (objects of an individual’s private dreams, fan-
tasies, daydreams and imaginings). The only criterion that an object must satisfy 
is its capacity to come to the fore in an individual consciousness through seeing, 
hearing, touch, reflection, recollection, projections of the future, daydreaming, 
desiring, fearing or some other act of consciousness. In other words, all that 
which an individual could be aware of can become an intentional object of our 
mind – in the sense that the object is consciously experienced by the individual. 
As stated above, an object need not be empirically real; according to Husserl it 
could also be non-existing in reality, or something fictional, and might also be 
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a logically impossible ideational object such as a “square circle” (Husserl 1984, 
59–60).
Human consciousness is always consciousness of something, as already 
claimed by Franz Brentano, from whom Husserl borrowed the idea of the inten-
tionality of consciousness.  That which consciousness is directed toward, or what 
it is conscious of, is the intentional object of experience. But how does conscious-
ness establish its directedness toward the object? It modifies unconscious sensory 
data (such as light impulses on the eye’s retina) into units of our mindful aware-
ness that have a recognisable shape, identity, and differentiations between such 
units. As a result, the visual field of consciousness, as it is experienced, is divided 
into objects external to the subject and their backgrounds (while sensory data 
remains unconscious, unexperienced, and internal to the body). Similarly, the 
auditory field that we are conscious of is divided into recognisable sound units 
(units of speech, melody) and noise, etc. 
Objects constituted in this way form a subject’s field of experience which 
is very similar to Uexküll’s concept of umwelt. What brings Husserl’s phenom-
enological theory even closer to that of Uexküll is the role of meaning in the 
constitution of objects of experience. Already in Logical Investigations, Husserl 
notes that an intentional object is constituted through the medium of its meaning. 
This clashes with most of the epistemological theories, since it is usually claimed 
that the existence or essence of a thing does not depend on a subject, and that 
the meaning of an object results from its objective characteristics.  Husserl, how-
ever, maintains that intentionality is established by virtue of meaning: “a [verbal] 
expression is related to the signified or named object [Gegenstand] only through 
its meaning” (Husserl 1984, 54, emphasis in original; see also p. 59). Likewise, 
in the first volume of Ideas Husserl repeats this idea in the context of noematic 
analysis: “Each noema has a ‘content’, that is to say, its ‘meaning’ [Sinn], and is 
related through it to ‘its’ object [Gegenstand]” (Husserl 1931, 361). 
Thus consciousness establishes its intentionality by means of a meaning that 
it ascribes to an object it experiences. In other words, consciousness is con-
sciousness of something by virtue of the fact that this ‘something’ which is the 
object of consciousness has a meaning. Or the way Husserl himself phrases it, 
we are always conscious of something as something – als etwas. This “als etwas”, 
the as something of an intentional act, is precisely the meaning of this thing. 
For instance, when I perceive, on the table in front of me, a small cubic object 
on the sides of which there are symmetrically placed black dots of different num-
ber, as a die, this ‘something’ is presented in my consciousness as being a die, 
because I applied the meaning of the die to it. If I did not know the meaning of 
the die, I would not see the object in front of me as a die, but as a mere white 
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cube covered with black dots (which presupposes, in turn, that I know what the 
meaning of a cube is, etc.)
Just as the concept of the object of consciousness, so the concept of meaning 
is very broad in phenomenology. Meaning can be all that through which some 
intentional relation is established. It can be something highly concrete, but also 
something indeterminate and unformulable, such as the meaning of a poem 
read or some other work of art through the medium of which a reader or an 
observer experiences what has been presented in that work. Such an approach 
to the intentionality of consciousness opens up the possibility of interpreting 
perceptual processes in culture-dependent terms, although this is not the path 
Husserl himself follows since his intent was to develop phenomenology into a rig-
orous science that would serve as the foundation for other disciplines. Some later 
authors, such as Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, have reproached Husserl 
for not noticing the culture-dependent and intersubjective aspects of meaning 
formation and for attempting to reduce all achievements of consciousness to a 
life of an individual ego. 
However, when reading Husserl’s manuscripts, unpublished during his life-
time, we can learn that he did concern himself intensively with intersubjective, 
historical and cultural aspects of meaning making. These developments are 
primarily related to his endeavours to re-conceptualise the transcendental field 
of experience. If before Husserl had talked about transcendental ego (or tran-
scendental subject) as the residue of phenomenological reduction and as a new 
research field discovered by phenomenology, then in his manuscripts, he intro-
duces the concept of transcendental intersubjectivity that plays a role in constitut-
ing the world and objects that are valid and existing for a certain community of 
subjects. Of course, the constitution of intersubjective reality pertains primarily 
to the existence of ideal objects and their collective validity. Thus for example 
Husserl states in his Vienna lecture:
[T]he historical surrounding-world [historiche Umwelt] of the Greeks is not 
the objective world in our sense but rather their “world-representation”, i.e., 
their own subjective validity with all the actualities which are valid for them 
within it, including, for example, gods, demons, etc. (Husserl 1970, 272.)
Elsewhere Husserl claims that transcendental intersubjectivity is a structure of 
meaning-making that helps to establish what can be called “the world common 
to us all” (“Welt für alle”) (op cit, 186, original emphasis). It includes a process 
called “communalisation” (Vergemeinschaftung) of individual experiences – it is 
when we perceive both real and ideal things as “also perceived by others” (op cit, 
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251ff). In our everyday life we indeed make a distinction between “things” that 
are valid for everybody, such as empirical objects, gods, cultural values, national 
identities, etc., and “things” that exist for me only, as for example the objects of 
my dreams. Objectivity is in this sense intersubjectively constituted. We regard as 
being objective these things, processes and ideations that are “also perceived” so 
by others. What is more, certain things are perceived as existing, or as objectively 
valid, only because they are perceived as existing by others. Gods and demons 
from the citation above are a good example of the objects of this type.
The intersubjective constitution of objectivity primarily comes to the fore in 
the context of the concept of lifeworld (Lebenswelt), because it is always a par-
ticular lifeworld, and not the world as such, that is communalised and forms 
“the world common to us all”. The lifeword may be seen as an environment that 
unfolds for us in our ‘natural attitude’ (natürliche Einstellung). However, it is not 
simply a sum of all things, it is also the broadest possible horizon of any ‘thing-
experience’ (Dingerfarung): 
Things, objects (always understood purely in the sense of the life-world) are 
“given” as being valid for us in each case, but in principle only in such a way 
that we are conscious of them as things or objects within the world-horizon 
(Welthorizont). Each one is something, “something of ” the world which we 
are constantly conscious of as a horizon [of this thing].  (op cit, 143; original 
emphasis)
The most important feature of the lifeworld, as Husserl keeps emphasising, is its 
pre-givenness, a fact that it is immer schon da, “always already there”. If objects are 
given to us in our experience, the world is always already “pre-given” (vorgegeben) 
as the horizon of the objects of experience.  As he writes,
[T]he lifeworld, for us who wakingly live in it, is always already there, existing 
in advance for us, the “ground” of all praxis whether theoretical or extra-
theoretical. The world is pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practi-
cally interested subjects, not occasionally but always and necessarily as the 
universal field of all actual and possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always 
to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. (op cit, 142). 
But how is this pre-given world-horizon related to transcendental intersubjec-
tivity, and hence to culture-dependent meaning-formation? Husserl explains 
this by stating that the lifeworld and its contents are always “communalised”. 
This means that the reciprocal correction of the meaning that is applied to the 
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individual contents of consciousness among different subjects leads to “inter-
subjective harmony of validity” of these contents. As a result, one and the same 
lifeworld is valid for the subjects that belong the community of people who have 
been involved in the reciprocal correction of the meaning of their contents of 
consciousness. They form a society of people between whom we can witness what 
he calls “the intersubjective harmony of validity” of the contents of experience. 
Thus in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the com-
munity of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly 
perceptual is communalized (Vergemeinschaftung). In this communaliza-
tion, too, there constantly occurs an alteration of validity through reciprocal 
correction. In reciprocal understanding, my experiences and experiential 
acquisitions enter into contact with those of others, similar to the contact 
between individual series of experiences within my (one’s own) experiential 
life; and here again, for the most part, intersubjective harmony of validity 
occurs, [establishing what is] normal in respect to particular details, and 
thus an intersubjective unity [intersubjektive Einheit] also comes about in the 
multiplicity of validities and of what is valid through them; here again, fur-
thermore, intersubjective discrepancies show themselves often enough; but 
then, whether it is unspoken and even unnoticed, or is expressed through 
discussion and criticism, a unification is brought about or at least is certain 
in advance as possibly attainable by everyone. All this takes place in such 
a way that in the consciousness of each individual, and in the overarching 
community consciousness which has grown up through [social] contact, one 
and the same world achieves and continuously maintains constant validity as 
the world which is in part already experienced and in part the open horizon 
of possible experiences for all; it is the world as the universal horizon, com-
mon to all men, of actually existing things. (Husserl 1970, 163–4)
By establishing common validities a cultural umwelt, or a lifeworld which is 
valid for a particular cultural community, is formed. According to Husserl, this 
lifeworld includes universal structures of meaning common to humankind as 
well as structures which are specific to this culture only. Normally we do think 
of the lifeworld in thematic terms as an object in the natural attitude. Rather it 
remains the widest possible horizon of all things, and consequently a means of 
meaning making, and not its outcome. 
Thus we may conclude that in order to understand the processes of culture-
dependent meaning making from the phenomenological point of view we 
must take into account the role of transcendental intersubjectivity in meaning 
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formation processes. This will lead us to the understanding of how the collective, 
and hence historical and cultural, mechanisms of meaning formation operate 
within individual consciousness; how are the contents of individual experience 
communalised between the subjects that form communities, and how are these 
contents socially validated.  This would extend the means of phenomenological 
analysis beyond the form they were given in Husserl’s works that he published 
during his lifetime, while involving his own ideas of cultural lifeworld and tran-
scendental intersubjectivity that he started to develop in his later manuscripts.
Cultural semiotics and models of  
culture-dependent meaning formation
When talking about semiotic models of culture-dependent meaning formation, 
we should begin with a semiotic discussion of natural language and examine 
the sign in terms of semiosis. The first example to refer to comes from one of 
the founders of the Tartu–Moscow semiotic school, Isaak Revzin. In his posthu-
mously published book The Structure of Language as a Modeling System (1978) 
Revzin termed semiotics a science that studies the general properties of sign sys-
tems and which in addition to natural languages, is also concerned with artificial 
languages, and where one of the most important issues is the relationship of 
natural languages to other sign systems. In his book, Revzin lists the properties 
of natural language: 
Human language addresses a series of human needs. This determines its fol-
lowing characteristics:  
1. universality: language addresses any human activity;
2. non-closedness: language can continually incorporate new elements;
3. creativity: language can express new content by old means, i.e. continually 
new sentences can emerge in a language;
4. mutability: language can change;
5. stability: for a language carrier, language seems unchangeable.
Language fulfils three major functions:
1. The function of social interaction or the communicative function; thereby 
meaning the establishment of contact between the speaker and the listener 
and creation of conditions for forwarding messages […];
2. The function of forwarding the contents of mental activity or cogni-
tive function: thereby meaning the registration and objectivisation of 
a thought that corresponds to some extra-lingual reality. […]
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3. The function of self-organisation [функция самоорганизации]: thereby 
meaning the fact that language is not only intended to meet communi-
cative needs, but also to strengthen its organisational level both para-
digmatically (in terms of the internal organisation of word classes) and 
syntagmatically (in terms of forming the message). (Revzin 1978, 133–134). 
The distinctive feature of another book by Revzin, Modern Structural Linguistics 
(1977) is the combining of structural linguistics and mathematical linguistics. 
Linguistics have been combined with mathematics for the purpose of solving 
questions regarding language modelling. The fundamental concept of any lan-
guage model is that of a text in an alphabet. Models are divided into synthesising 
models, where text is an output object, i.e. the result of the model’s effect, and 
analytical models, where text is an input object, i.e. the model’s source material. 
Synthesising models are in turn divided into directly synthesising models or 
synthesis models and generative models. What forms the context for the crea-
tion of models is a recognition that statistical and structural methods solve the 
same types of problem. If Revzin typically refers to the separation of the unique 
from the commonplace as a statistical problem, then all claims regarding the 
structure of language likewise apply to the commonplace and not the unique 
phenomenon (Revzin 1977, 33).
In trying to make sense of the general theoretical development of structural 
linguistics, Revzin claims: “An abstract approach to natural languages related to 
the idea of modelling has led to the situation that natural languages have come to 
be regarded as a special case of sign systems, and linguistics gradually turns into 
a component of semiotics” (Revzin 1977, 35). In this work Revzin defines semiot-
ics as follows: “Semiotics is a science of the general properties of sign systems 
and regularities of their functioning, regardless of the specific embodiment of 
the respective signs and the area of their use” (op cit, 35). 
Among Saussure’s principles, Revzin highlights two as the most essential: the 
principle of manifestation, or the registering of such components of meaning for 
which there is expression in the language, and the principle of differentiality. The 
latter may be expressed through two postulates: 1) the postulate of identification, 
2) the postulate of differentiation. According to Revzin, it is these two postulates 
that discussion of structure in semiotics relies on: 
semiotics looks for identifiable, recurrent, commonplace elements which are 
similar on the basis of some characteristics and examines which relations are 
not dependent on the concrete essence of these elements. […] The identity of 
elements which is the precondition of structurality may be easily detectable, 
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but it may also be manifested in a rather covert form so that a whole series 
of layers would have to be removed in order to detect a structure.
It must be that irregularity in the making of structures is characteristic of 
semiotics as a science, which is necessarily connected to the description of 
humans and their social existence, for here we always encounter both: quite 
frequently recurring configurations of elements, which allow us to detect 
a structure immediately, as well as rare, but rather important, configurations 
in which only a few components turn out to be recurrent. (Revzin 1977: 44)
What poses a problem, in Revzin’s view, is the describing of structures indepen-
dently of the structures of the same or of a lower lever: 
The major achievement of the entire post-Saussurian linguistics was a concep-
tion of language as not just a multilevel system, but as such a system in which 
everything is interrelated, in which every element acquires meaning only 
by contrast to other elements. Thus the clash between system and structure 
lies in the clash between integral linguistic concepts and the locality of modes 
intended for their description (op cit, 59).
In order to ascribe characteristics of systematicness to a structure Revzin consid-
ers it important to add two more postulates to those of Saussure. So, coming after 
the two postulates above by Saussure, the third and fourth postulates suggested 
by Revzin would go as follows: 3) Each element of the original quantity has more 
than one functionally meaningful relation. 4) If the elements of the level i have 
been assigned some meanings, then the meanings of the elements of the level 
(i+1) are not derived from these meanings only, but there are also such meanings 
of the elements of the level (i+1) which are not at all derived from the meanings 
of the lower level elements (op cit, 59–60). To put it into simpler terms, Revzin’s 
intention was to emphasise that it is characteristic of language, and most likely, of 
other complex systems, that 1) the meaning of each element is conditioned by its 
location in the system of the whole and 2) the whole is not a straightforward sum 
of its elements because the meaning of the whole cannot be reduced to the sum 
of the meanings of the components (op cit, 60).
On the one hand, it would be pertinent here to add a discussion of the param-
eters of the meaning of the sign in semiosis. If the general standpoint in semiotics 
is that semiosis is a condition in which something functions as a sign, we should 
talk about the meaning of the sign in complementary terms by proceeding from 
three parameters proposed by Charles Morris (1955): semantics registers the 
original or immanent meaning of a sign; syntactics monitors changes in the 
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meaning of the sign depending on the sign system and the meaning of other 
signs; and pragmatics highlights the functional meaning of the sign, the relation 
between the sign and the receiver. What follows from this is that there is a need 
for a functional classification of signs outside the common classification of sign 
types. On the basis of recognisability, it is expedient to distinguish a priori, or 
generally known signs, from processual or authorial signs, which carry a con-
cept and are often ad hoc signs, and a posteriori signs, or signs making sense 
of a situation or a text as a whole. The functional aspect enables us to monitor 
cultural autocommunicative sign processes and transformations; for example, the 
translation of processual or authorial signs into a priori or conventional signs. 
This applies both to the translation of a verbal sign into another verbal sign and 
its translation into a visual or audiovisual one.
On the other hand, we should touch upon the concept of structure. In 1963 
Juri Lotman published an article entitled “On the Delimitation of the Concept 
of Structure in Linguistics and Literary Scholarship”, which also became his first 
paper translated into another language1. In this article, Lotman makes a clear 
differentiation: 
In language, structure emerges spontaneously through history and acts as 
a means for the communication of information. In literature, structure is 
born as the result of a creative act and is itself the content of information, 
and its aim. Structure, in this case, becomes a model of life phenomena pre-
sented by the author, and assumes all the cognitive features of a model. […] 
Linguistic structure is a precondition for the communication of information, 
it is a means for it; literary structure is its purpose and content. The purely 
linguistic means of analysis will not reveal to the researcher the structure of 
an artistic text. (Lotman 1977, 172) 
From the perspective of the analysis of the whole it is again important to add: 
“… in verbal art, the structure of content is realized through the structure of lan-
guage and forms an intricate, composite whole” (op cit, 172).
Lotman’s first semiotic book Lectures on Structural Poetics, which was pub-
lished in 1964, establishes the cultural–semiotic concept of structure: “A genuine 
knowledge of an artistic work is possible only by approaching the work as an inte-
grated, multi-level, functioning structure” (Lotman 1994, 26).
The gist of Lotman’s Lectures on Structural Poetics is that each type of art 
has its own language, and that, for instance, a literary text recorded in a natural 
language acquires meaning by virtue of the author’s special relationship to the 
language in question, wherefore an interpretation of the text on the level of the 
92
Tõnu Viik, Peeter Torop, Maaris Raudsepp
dictionary meaning of the words might turn out to be a distortion of the text. 
This means that in a fictional text, natural language is turned into a language of 
a higher order – it becomes a secondary modelling system. 
What follows from this is Lotman’s idea that words which have different 
denotations on the level of natural language can assume a common denotation 
in a text. This in turn leads to the conclusion that “the problem of content is 
always the problem of recoding” (Lotman 1994, 31). Dutch cheese and a Varan-
gian shield have different denotations, but in Lermontov’s poem, “Sashka”, they 
both denote the Moon (op cit, 32). A common interpretation of them, in addition 
to Lermontov’s text, is offered by yet another modelling system on the level of 
romantic word usage and literary creation, which in turn, enables us to perceive 
a parodic relationship of the two word pairs. 
In the preface to his collection, Papers on Typology of Culture 2 (1973), Lotman 
suggests an important concept of the universal that a typologisation of culture 
can be based on. This is the need of each culture for a self-description: “This need 
is realized on the meta-cultural level in the creation of self-descriptive texts, 
which may be regarded as grammars created by a culture in order to describe 
itself ” (Lotman 1973, 5). Self-descriptive languages and texts recorded in them 
will become part of cultural diversity and meaning-making and start affecting 
the cultural equilibrium: 
The dynamism and resilience of a culture as a whole presupposes an increase 
of the diversity of subsystems and their relative independence in parallel 
with an increase of the capacity of the metasystem. “The triumph” of the 
subsystems over the metasystems is the cause of a disintegration of culture 
as an integral person (a culture’s “schizophrenia”), while “the triumph” of the 
metasystem over the relative disorganization – individuality – of the diver-
sity of the single subsystems signals the ossification of the system, its death. 
(Egorov, Ignatyev & Lotman 1995, 281)
This is what Lotman’s typology is based on. Its foundation is the distinction 
between the static and dynamic aspects of cultural languages. In their static 
aspect, cultural languages divide into discrete and continual (iconic-spatial) lan-
guages, and for Lotman, this forms the semiotic primordial dualism. In discrete 
languages signs are primary and meanings are created through the meanings of 
the signs, whereas in continual languages text comes first with meaning emerging 
through an integral text that incorporates even the most heterogeneous elements. 
It is difficult to create translatability between these two languages. Difficulties of 
translatability and the impossibility of reverse translation make any mediating 
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activity between these languages creative and thus build the foundation for crea-
tivity. In their dynamic aspect, cultural languages divide into object languages 
and metalanguages, or descriptive languages and languages of description respec-
tively, and meaning formation in a culture occurs in their tension field.
The key concept in cultural semiotics is text, which also carries the meaning 
of a model. Lotman’s article, “Culture as a Subject and Object for Itself ”, includes 
the following lines: “The main question of semiotics of culture is the problem of 
the generation of meaning. What we term the generation of meaning is the capac-
ity of both culture as a whole and its parts to issue new, nontrivial texts ‘from 
the output’. We call new texts those texts that emerge as the result of irreversible 
processes (in Ilya Prigogine’s terms), i.e. these texts are unpredictable to a certain 
degree” (Lotman 2000, 640). First of all, text is a space in which some language 
manifests itself as the material of the text and the material of the structure turns 
into the structure of the text. With regard to verbal texts it is natural that levels 
of language from phonemes to sentences also become levels of the text. The logic 
of language structuring, however, does not lend itself to discussion of films and 
paintings as texts. Although there was a time in the history of cultural semiot-
ics when linguistic units from phonemes to words and sentences were traced 
in a wide variety of art forms, the universalisation of linguistic approach did 
not prove productive. In this connection it must be pointed out that a text with 
a continual dominant creates its meaning through the whole, or deductively, and 
a text with a discrete dominant does so through the elements, or inductively. The 
general principle is that continuality and discreteness are co-existing parameters.
The linguistic approach (text as speech fixed in writing) initiates a change 
in the concept of text. This means that text is a manifestation of language. As the 
next step, semioticians began to see texts as multilingual systems in which the 
co-existence of discreteness and continuality was an elementary thing. The third 
development that could be highlighted is the treatment of text as a creative mech-
anism or a dialogic whole. Lotman consciously substituted the concept of recep-
tion with that of communication and underlined thus the dialogical activeness 
of text. When text and addressee come into contact, several different levels of 
communication can simultaneously or separately be involved: text as a message 
denotes communication between the addresser and addressee; text as a carrier 
of cultural memory denotes communication between the audience and cultural 
tradition; text as a medium influencing the development of personality denotes 
communication of the reader with him- or herself; text as an autonomous intel-
lectual formation and independent partner in dialogue denotes communication 
of the reader with the text; text as a full-fledged participant in a communication 
act denotes communication between the text and cultural context (Lotman 1988, 
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55–6). By interpreting a text from the perspective of communication, it becomes 
possible to talk about subtextual or general linguistic meanings, textual meanings 
and various functions of the texts (meanings deriving from the text’s function) 
within the cultural system. Culture in turn may be described in terms of three 
levels: the level of subtextual messages, the level of culture as the system of texts 
and the level of culture as the mass of functions addressing the texts (Lotman 
1970, 73–77).
The expansion of the concept of text resulted in the appearance of a new 
concept, that of semiosphere (cf Lotman 2005). A semiosphere is the conditional 
space without which semiosis would not be possible; at the same time, however, 
the concept of semiosphere presupposes that we rather include the notion of 
intersemiosis. This means that the seemingly chaotic mishmash of sign systems 
becomes organised on the different levels of their delimitation. Limit or bound-
ary, thus, is the most important notion of semiosphere. At one time Lotman felt 
it was necessary to use the notion of framedness in order to delimit a text. Now 
it is boundary that frames the semiosphere, but the entanglement of boundaries 
within the semiosphere is just as significant: 
The border of semiotic space is the most important functional and struc-
tural position, giving substance to its semiotic mechanism. The border is 
a bilingual mechanism, translating external communications into the internal 
language of the semiosphere and vice versa. Thus, only with the help of the 
boundary is the semiosphere able to establish contact with non-semiotic and 
extra-semiotic spaces. (Lotman 2005, 210)
The same mechanism also operates inside the semiosphere: 
In this way, the semiosphere repeatedly traverses the internal borders, assign-
ing a specialized role to its parts in a semiotic sense. The translation of infor-
mation though these borders, a game between different structures and sub-
structures; the continuous semiotic “invasions” to one or other structure in 
the “other territory” gives birth to meaning, generating new information. 
(op sit, 215)
If text is first and foremost a model of synchronic delimitation, the semiosphere 
also incorporates a diachronic dimension and becomes a dynamic model com-
pared with the text. Likewise the concept of semiosphere conceptualises cul-
tural meaning formation as a multistep mechanism where one meaning is used 
to create new meanings on its foundation and meaning becomes relative, plural 
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and dynamic. At the same time, semiosphere is also a model of cultural mean-
ing making, which enables us to understand the mechanism for preservation 
of meaning in a culture through multiple descriptions in specialised languages 
as well as the complementariness of the partial meaning and the meaning of 
the whole. Thus it can be said that the dynamics of the terminological field of 
cultural semiotics with regard to the concepts of sign, structure and language 
as a sign system and sign systems as cultural languages, text and semiosphere 
enables us to approach these concepts as theoretical models of culture-dependent 
meaning formation since they expose the peculiarities of cultural thinking and 
communication and carry, at the same time, a differentiating meaning on the 
object level and the metalevel.
Culture-dependent meaning formation in cultural psychology
In this section, we examine a family of psychological theories which approach 
meaning formation as a process by means of which people relate to their envi-
ronment. In cultural-historical psychology (Vygotsky, Rubinstein, Leontyev, 
Zinchenko, etc.), semiotic cultural psychology (Valsiner, Wagoner, Zittoun, 
etc.) as well as social representations theory (Moscovici, Wagner, Marková, etc.), 
human meaning formation is viewed as a dynamic, essentially social and cultural 
process. The dynamic aspect of meaning primarily encompasses the life course 
of meaning – its formation, retention and extinction – as well as the functional 
operation of meaning, or its use in human activities and society. Meaning carriers 
are social-cultural subjects – individuals and groups. The object of meaning is 
any real or imaginary phenomenon in the subject’s inner or outer environment 
(including other subjects) and the subject itself. In the broadest sense, meaning 
expresses the subject’s intention regarding a given object in some context. Mean-
ing formation takes place at the interaction between an active subject and the 
environment (through action), where meanings express and regulate the inter-
relationship between the subject and the environment.
In cultural psychology, culture is defined as a system of signs and mean-
ings that mediates the relationships between humans and the environment and 
which acts as a regulator of social and psychic processes (for example Valsiner 
2000, 49). Culture semiotically directs and circumscribes interindividual and 
intraindividual processes in both intersubjective (collective) and intrasubjective 
(individual) reality. Meanings have multiple aspects and belong to the meaning 
systems of different levels. Collective meanings are public, relatively stable and 
shared by a certain community. They constitute external limits (a framework) 
within which individuals can relatively freely construct their subjective meanings 
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which form individualised versions of collective meanings. Subjective meanings 
are expressive of the subject’s individuality: his or her intentions, individual expe-
rience and unique link with the world. The field of collective meanings is viewed 
as being primary in cultural psychology, and the individual meaning making is 
derivative of it, at the same time, however, it is an activity that in turn reshapes 
collective meanings.
First we will have a closer look at individual meaning formation and the role 
of culture in this process. In this case, meaning must be understood as a basic 
unit of consciousness by which social and individual experiences are linked. 
Thus meaning is a bridge between the material and the ideal. Intraconscious 
processes of meaning formation (internal activities) correspond to the processes 
of external interaction between the subject and the environment (Leontyev, 2003). 
Individual meaning formation is thus directed and circumscribed by social and 
cultural conditions.
Valsiner (2007) attempts to describe processes by which humans continually 
create (and destroy) semiotic regulators (meanings) to plan their activities and 
make sense of a situation. The irreversibility of time and indeterminacy of the 
future necessitates that meanings must continually be (re)created. Meanings 
are hierarchically organised, they enable us to relate to the existing situation in 
different ways, alter an experience at a given time and plan our activities for the 
future. The dynamic of meaning making lies in the continual transformation of 
the meanings’ hierarchy, or in keeping it unchanged. Valsiner describes meaning 
as a complex of united opposites (meaning ‘A’ is connected to some oppositional 
meaning ‘non-A’). Each concept is related to the field of potential opposites which 
is the developmental potential of the concept, and through which a differentia-
tion of meaning takes place. The foundation for the change of meaning is ten-
sion between the meaning and its opposite meanings. As a result of this tension, 
meaning is altered, drawing upon the reservoir of existing opposite meanings 
(for example love versus hate–love versus indifference).
On the level of human interactions, we can observe the individual’s entrance 
into the realm of collective meanings in the course of socialisation. For instance, 
in Vygotsky’s theory of social development, the development of a child’s psyche 
is described as a process in which interpersonal relationships with adults and 
collective meanings/language expressed therein are internalised in the psyche of 
the child. The subjectivity that arises through this is intersubjective in its essence. 
Similar processes unfold when a newcomer enters the group. Marková (2003) 
suggests that an intersubjective relationship, the positioning of the ego in rela-
tion to both the object and other subjects, is always involved in the shaping of 
the object’s meaning. Meanings are generated (retained, transformed) together 
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with other people through a common activity regarding the object of the mean-
ing. Meaning making as a dialogical process presupposes a specific or imaginary 
‘other’. The specific ‘other’ occurs in the context of immediate interaction, while 
the imaginary generalised ‘Other’ represents an abstract cultural field or group. 
Gillespie (2009) conceptualises interpersonal meaning formation through 
an individual’s performative positioning in various complementary roles, such 
as child–mother, dominator–domineered, actor–observer, and a synthesis of 
these different perspectives. Moving in the social field, people experience differ-
ent roles, situations, perspectives and ways of thinking. In this manner, diverse 
perspectives become represented in an individual’s consciousness. In the con-
text of common action, common intersubjective meanings are created which 
interweave meanings originating in diverse social positions. Here assumptions 
and constraints which are connected to the individual’s affiliation with a certain 
group as well as intergroup relationships in the society are added to the meaning 
making. An individual’s positioning in the socio-cultural field determines which 
collective meanings are available to him or her and make sense, and which ver-
sion of the meaning is adequate from the given position.
Thus meaning formation has multiple levels and aspects: cultural and insti-
tutional, contextual (orientation towards a specific other), positional, situational 
and personal. In addition to these, Marková (1996) also distinguishes those mean-
ing levels which emerge in various activities, in various relationships to the object: 
1) a non-reflective, automatic, surface level represents the conventional, consen-
sual and uncontested aspect; 2) a reflective level is activated when people must 
think about a concept, for example to define it; 3) a yet deeper level emerges 
when tackling more difficult tasks and when one is confronted with antithetical 
meanings.
If the umwelt of animals consists of fixed meanings, the multilevel meaning 
making practices of humans allow a multiplicity of meanings and changeability. 
Uexküll’s theory of meaning examines the emergence of functional meanings in 
the feedbacked cycles of an organism’s life activity. In the umwelts of living organ-
isms, there are only functional meanings of objects in the form of the elements of 
an organism’s functional cycle, but human beings are able to produce meanings 
that are distanced from the immediate situation, and perceive the object from 
different vantage points and reveal its essence.2
Let us now also examine more carefully collective meaning formation as well 
as collective meanings in cultural psychology theories. The field of collective 
meanings is structured and multi-layered, consisting of partially overlapping 
mental spaces of different subjects and shared intersubjective meaning com-
plexes. Meaning systems peculiar to a group’s subjects are examined in social 
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representations theory which explains the formation of collective meaning sys-
tems and their functioning by drawing upon intergroup relationships and prac-
tices as well as intragroup interactions. The research program initiated by Serge 
Moscovici (1984; 1998; 2001) belongs to sociological social psychology: on the one 
hand, it has affinities with Durkheim’s and Weber’s sociology; on the other, it is 
close to Wundt’s cultural psychology and the socio-cultural strand in psychology 
(Valsiner & Van der Veer, 2000, 409; Marková, 1996). Moscovici’s theory of social 
representations grew out of an interest in how an idea (for example psychoanaly-
sis) is transformed in various groups and interacts with the “self-evident things” 
peculiar to the group.
According to one widespread definition, social representations are concepts, 
values and systems of activity that are characteristic of some group. They are 
representations due to the fact that they consist of different representational con-
structs (beliefs, conceptions, ideas, values, action plans, models, meanings, fanta-
sies, explanations, interpretations, etc.). At the same time, social representations 
are not an amorphous mass of such representational constructs, but a system 
which has a definite structure and mode of functioning. Social representations 
are not the result of aggregation of individual attitudes, but a systematic prod-
uct of coordinated group processes (Wagner et al 1999, 96). In addition to the 
 so-called mental elements, social representations also include the group’s behav-
ioural patterns and social practices regarding the object of representation.
Social representations are social in three ways:
a) they are shared by at least two people, but generally by entire groups, insti-
tutions or communities;
b) they arise and change through communication and interaction. Social 
representations emerge in intragroup and intergroup intercourse and inter action. 
Communication is the means by which a community preserves and alters its 
social representations. In contrast to Durkheim’s collective images (which are 
uniform in the entire culture and as such are obligatory for all members of the 
group), social representations are understood as “unity amidst diversity”;
c) social representations are related to socially important objects, its object 
must be in some way important for the group, and the “naïve” theory expressed 
in social representations is necessary in daily life. In this sense, social represen-
tations embody a theory (a model) used in everyday life to explain a socially 
significant phenomenon.
Thus social representations can be approached as meaning systems which cir-
culate within a human association and upon which single individuals construct 
their subjective meaning complexes (and thereby the content of their identity 
as well). With regard to individuals, these meaning systems constitute a support 
99
Culture-dependent meaning formation
(a reference point, resource and constraint) offered by the culture for interacting 
with other people and for organising their thoughts and activities. In this sense, 
social representations form a certain system of meanings or a commonsensical 
“theory”.  
From the dynamic point of view, social representing is an activity in which 
the social object is created in the course of social interaction and coactivity; this 
coactivity involves both discursive and externally observable behaviour (Wagner 
et al 1999, 313). In coactivity, people create a semiotic environment for them-
selves (shared structures) which in turn fosters and allows certain activities and 
ways of thinking while barring others. The objects of social representations are 
social constructs which emerge and are stored in a specific cultural and histori-
cal context. Social representations are inherently predicated on public debates 
and the exchange of ideas. In other words, an intra-systemic heterogeneity, or 
the existence of different positions in the social field, is a precondition of social 
representations. 
Social representations theory views representations as being simultaneously 
both social and cognitive phenomena. Two regulatory systems are examined: 
the social metasystem, and the individual cognitive system. In terms of the phe-
nomena realised on the cultural (group) level, social representations represent 
a certain knowledge, a version of reality shared by the group. This knowledge is 
practical and its purpose is to understand and control reality on the one hand, 
and interact and coordinate coactivity, on the other. Doise et al (1993, 157) define 
social representations theory as a general theory about how the metasystem of 
social regulations controls the functioning of the cognitive system. Such a mac-
rosystematic influence acts through self-regulation as well as the goal-directed 
action of institutions – the latter consciously use social representations to achieve 
their goals. On an individual level, social representations express the influence of 
the social macrosystem that regulates, controls and directs individual practices. 
According to Doise et al (op cit) social representations theory has in fact three 
main concerns: 1) which social regulators influence 2) which cognitive functions 
3) in which context.
In a single cultural field, social representations can have a different status. 
Thus, for example, hegemonic representations are widespread in the entire soci-
ety; they are stable, obligatory, homogeneous, and they are perceived as self-
evident (similarly to Durkheim’s ‘collective representations’). Polemical repre-
sentations are contestable, they may be found among certain groups (subgroups) 
and are connected to narrower group interests or alternative ideas. 
Social representations manifest themselves in people’s speech, ways of think-
ing and behaviour (Wagner 2015) as well as in cultural products such as images, 
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discourses, texts, etc. Thinking by virtue of social representations differs from 
thinking in scientific concepts: with regard to the first, the primary regulative 
principle is not formal logic, but some social criteria (for example attempts 
to reach a consensus in the group, to set apart one group from others and so on). 
In discussions of the structure and content of social representations, two tra-
ditions can be distinguished: First, a conception of social representations as atti-
tudes, beliefs, stereotypes, knowledge, explanations, etc., that are shared by some 
association. This is the consensual and explicit content of social representations. 
In this approach, social representations are viewed as “surface” phenomena avail-
able to all members of the group, and the emphasis is laid on the concrete and 
consciously perceived aspects of social representations. Second, social representa-
tions are discussed in terms of implicit organising principles. Such abstract base 
principles (dimensions, meaningful oppositional categories) reflect the regulative 
operation of the social metasystem on cognitive functioning (Doise et al 1993; 
Moscovici 1984). On the basis of these base principles, individuals and groups 
define their place within the system of social relations and differentiate them-
selves from others, and choose their relative position in relation to these base 
principles in the common representational field of the group. Individual beliefs 
and attitudes express the adoption of a certain position in the general system of 
meanings. This approach is inspired by Bourdieu’s sociology and borrows from 
it notions such as the representational field, organising principles (antithetical 
forces that organise the social field), and the subject’s position in the social field.
Doise et al (1993) define social representations as organising principles of 
interindividual and intergroup symbolic relationships. Shared structural prin-
ciples can organise a different content. Different organising principles are acti-
vated under different conditions (with regard to different tasks), for example 
constraints arising from social relationships (everyday thinking) or formal logic 
(scientific thinking). These organising principles are not immediately observable, 
but rather must be derived by analysis from some pattern of responses – they can 
be defined as the dimensions of a semantic space or implicit rules. Such com-
mon coordinates form a network of normative meanings in a given social space.
Such a structuralist interpretation of social representations theory emphasises 
the importance of (invisible) structures that underlie signification when regulat-
ing social and cognitive systems. In this approach, the degree of consensuality is 
of little consequence, what matters is the general configuration of meanings and 
dimensions which generate different positionings (Doise et at 1993). Here com-
mon social representations denote access to the same system of meanings, which 
is in constant development, and not so much the similar beliefs characteristic 
of the majority. In this form, social representations are implicit, unconscious 
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structures (transparent and self-evident “like water for fish”) which nevertheless 
have a profound effect on people’s social functioning (Moscovici 1984). 
Another approach in analysing these structures (Marková 2000) proceeds 
from the hierarchical model of the structures according to which there are certain 
core ideas (themata, core beliefs) which form the basis of social representations 
and which generate different meaning systems around themselves. These core 
ideas may be viewed as pairs of mutually dependent opposites that are stable and 
self-explanatory in a particular culture.
Thus social representations are a means by which social reality is created, sus-
tained and altered, and by which shared social objects are produced for the group. 
Hence social representations have both a constitutive (creating a certain version of 
reality) and regulative function. The function of social representations is to keep 
together groups and coordinate activity with others. On the other hand, they 
serve as a means of making sense of reality (sense making) and of symbolic adap-
tation to new things. The regulative aspect of social representations is manifested 
in the (often implicit) control of psychic processes and behaviour (Moscovici, 
1984, 9). The content of social representations is always prescriptive, i.e. it always 
contains some instruction for action (cf Harré’s (1998, 135) definition: “social rep-
resentations are systems of signs, with the rules or conventions for their proper 
use”). They include information about some object that must be used in just 
this (and not another) manner corresponding to a socially preferred tendency 
(Valsiner & Van der Veer 2000, 409). Consequently, social representations are 
a mechanism for organising and stabilising meanings in both culture and psyche. 
It can be said that in their totality, they create a commonly understandable social 
reality or “interobjectivity” for a cultural community (Moghaddam 2003, 221).
It will be interesting to study why and how some social representations are 
selected while others are ignored. Why are some more full of vitality than others? 
Why and how are new ideas and norms resisted (for example green thinking)? 
One cluster of reasons might emanate from the difficulty of associating new 
ideas with existing meaning systems (their so-called ‘anchoring’ in some context). 
The second cluster of reasons is connected with identity. According to social 
representations theory, the principal mechanism for organising and stabilising 
meanings is social identity. Identity is a mechanism that holds together certain 
attitudes, beliefs and values – it is the creative component of representations 
(Duveen 2001). It is precisely with the support of identity that one makes choices 
between the different social representations, retains and modifies them. Simi-
larly to Thomas Kuhn’s model of paradigms, the choice of theory (itself a social 
representation) is made not as much on the basis of the logic of arguments as on 
the basis of the intersubjective relationships behind the theory. People’s position 
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in the social structure (and the subjective system of identities) influences which 
social representations are adopted. Stable connections between social represen-
tations and identity enable them to act as a sign of identity, or a designation of 
a certain social position: in addition to some object, social representations also 
point to a certain subject (group). And vice versa: an assigned or selected iden-
tity signifies a certain system of social representations. It follows from this that 
subjectively significant social identities may facilitate or inhibit the adoption of 
certain regulative ideas. If an idea endangers someone’s essential identity, it will 
be resisted or transformed into one which is suitable for the particular identity. 
According to Bauer (1995), social representations act as a kind of cultural immune 
system in the intergroup context.
It can be concluded that collective meanings are, on the one hand, essen-
tial preconditions for individual consciousness, while on the other are a source 
of inescapable pressure and constraint. A non-reflexive functioning in some 
collective meaning field encloses a person in a comfortable collective umwelt. 
Reflection and the ability to distance oneself and change subject positions offer 
an individual relative autonomy with regard to consensual collective meanings. 
The degree of autonomy depends on the capacity of the individual to choose con-
sciously between different symbolic resources, and realise alternative possibilities 
of meaning making as compared to the collectively imposed self-evident things. 
Thus, as active participants in the life field, people are indeed influenced by the 
structure of the fields as well as by the events taking place in it and its power 
relations. On the other hand, however, they are relatively free to choose them-
selves from the available cultural forms those that would give meaning to and 
regulate their actions – a phenomenon which Jaan Valsiner (1998, 386) describes 
as “bounded indeterminacy” or being “dependently independent”. 
The creation of personal meanings is one of the means of semiotic self-reg-
ulation. Collective cultural forms are used, to be sure, as a resource to draw 
upon, but individuality is attained by combining them in a unique way, through 
locating them in new contexts and constructing one’s unique purpose in life 
(see Leontyev 2003). At the same time, collective culture is manifested and acts 
through living people who reconstruct social recommendations and cultural 
forms in their individual contexts. A person may counteract and alter certain 
collective meanings if he or she thereby relies on some other cultural meaning 
systems, but it is impossible in principle to act and think outside of the culture. 




Although many of the paradigmatic assumptions of the theories examined here 
vary, they make similar differentiations regarding culture-dependent meaning 
formation. The concept of meaning plays an important role in all the theories 
examined in this paper,  however, the meaning of the meaning, the way this term 
is conceptualised in these disciplines, is obviously not the same. If phenomenol-
ogy and cultural psychology view meaning as being primarily connected to the 
functioning of consciousness or the psyche (meaning is viewed as a moment of 
the psychic life of an individual), then semiotics of culture and hermeneutics 
approach meaning, above all, in terms it being a property of a text or a work 
(meaning is related to the existence of texts, emergence of new texts, and inter-
preting the existing ones). Nonetheless, the theories outlined here do not oppose 
each other’s viewpoints: in semiotics and hermeneutics it is assumed that a text or 
a work can become meaningful only within a communicative situation, or within 
an act of semiosis – that is, when it is read or interpreted. And likewise, in phe-
nomenology and cultural psychology, the study of conscious activity of a subject 
includes the cases of reading and interpreting texts and works. 
The aim of the present article, however, was not to show and juxtapose mean-
ing formation in all its complexity, but rather to expose its culture-dependent 
character. In this regard, despite the terminological distinctions, we can see a very 
important conceptual commonality between the theories we discussed. All the 
theories examined here postulate the existence of a particular collective or inter-
subjective meaning structure by virtue of which subjective states can become 
meaningful and intersubjectively understandable. This feature is expressed most 
strongly in cultural psychology, and perhaps most weakly in phenomenology. 
In cultural psychology it is shown most explicitly how the intersubjective mean-
ing structures shape, influence and delimit individual meaning making processes. 
However, according to all four disciplines a collectively valid nexus of meaning 
(a cultural symbol system) is needed to assign a meaning to something “inner” 
of the subject in order to make it meaningful for the individual herself and the 
others. 
It is important to note that this collective framework of meanings is not 
reducible to individual psychic events, but it exists as if “before” the particular 
acts of expression – much in the same way as language precedes particular speech 
acts. In other words, the collective component of meaning formation has a cer-
tain independent status and can be described independently of all specific acts 
of meaning formation. Secondly, things and events in the surrounding world of 
the subject are meaningful by means of the same collectively valid framework of 
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meaning. And third, some kind of a historically and culturally specific umwelt 
or lifeworld appears for the community of subjects using the same set of collec-
tively valid framework of meanings. In Dilthey’s hermeneutics, the totality of all 
intersubjectively valid structures of meaning making found in a society at a given 
time is called objective spirit; in phenomenology it is termed cultural umwelt or 
lifeworld (Lebenswelt); in Lotman’s cultural semiotics, semiosphere; in cultural 
psychology, culture as system of meanings. Cassirer, in his cultural philosophical 
approach, calls it cultural symbol system.
Without this structure individual acts of meaning making were not possible. 
Thus we can view it as being one of the necessary preconditions of meaning 
formation. It is not an a priori structure, nor one without a history, but comes 
about during the course of reciprocal acts of meaning making within one or 
another cultural community.  It is a historically and culturally particular, and yet 
universally necessary condition of meaning formation. It is also the feature that 
makes any act of meaning making dependent on culture.  Due to this structure 
all acts of meaning formation are characterised, on the one hand, by embed-
dedness in an objective spirit, semiosphere, or a cultural lifeworld, and on the 
other, by remarkable variability which arises from the plurality of cultural symbol 
systems employed in these worlds.
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1  Published as “Sur la délimitation linguistique et littéraire de la notion de structure” 
in the French journal Linguistics 6 (2), 59-72 in 1964.
2  Gadamer (2006, 441-2), for example, states that animals have an umwelt, whereas 
people have a Welt. Leontyev (2003: 119), similarly, states: “Thus, human being is the only 
living creature to whom the world is given as a single coherent whole which extends 
in space and time beyond the limits of the immediately experienced situation as well as 
what the subject possesses or what befalls him; it is more than just that which surrounds 
the subject.” 
108
Tõnu Viik, Peeter Torop, Maaris Raudsepp
Towards dialogical umwelts
Katre Pärn
The growing plurality of approaches within human sciences calls for comparative 
and integrative perspectives that can map the similarities, complementarities and 
possible incompatibilities of approaches, bring to the fore their common episte-
mological assumptions as well as points of divergence, and establish informed 
relations between the variety of theoretical and methodological means available 
in the human sciences. The comparative and integrative approaches have impor-
tant roles in helping to avoid the traps of disciplinary self-absorption, disintegra-
tion of knowledge or multiplication of superficially novel insights. They are also 
a springboard for advancing new insights. From this stance, the comparative 
approach to the four disciplines – hermeneutics, phenomenology, semiotics and 
cultural psychology – undertaken by Tõnu Viik, Peeter Torop and Maaris Raud-
sepp is an invaluable endeavour.
Instead of tracing the diverse historio-genetic interconnections and entangle-
ments between these disciplines, an approach that might offer itself as an obvious 
and attractive strategy for interdisciplinary juxtaposition, the article takes the 
topic of culture-dependent meaning formation as the grounds for comparison. 
This choice might seem self-evident, since, after all, the context- or culture-
dependence of meaning making can be seen as a cornerstone of, or common 
assumption held by, all human sciences or cultural sciences, implicitly grounding 
or explicitly present in all theoretical approaches that deal with the human con-
dition. However, and perhaps even because of its centrality, this assumption or 
thesis itself is surprisingly rarely used as grounds for comparison of disciplines or 
theoretical frameworks. Yet the culture-dependence of meaning formation is the 
problematics from where the core epistemological and methodological challenges 
of human sciences arise, as well as the difficulties with interdisciplinary dialogues.
The paper by Viik, Torop and Raudsepp sets these disciplines side by side 
in a way that allows for emergence of a space of unforced dialogue between 
the different perspectives. The overview of discussions on culture-dependent 
meaning formation by the selected authors in hermeneutics, phenomenology, 
semiotics and cultural psychology provides an good foundation that is waiting 
to be extended by adding other authors from the aforementioned disciplines as 
well as others who deal with the issue. Even while reading the article, various 
possibilities suggest themselves for such expansion.
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However, the authors propose a threefold system of theoretical underpinnings 
informing the epistemological problematics. The starting point is in Jakob von 
Uexküll’s (1992 [1934]) conception of species-specific umwelt, upon which rests 
the idea that as soon as we posit living beings as our central concern, the notion 
of an absolute, universal reality becomes obsolete. Instead, we have a plurality of 
realities as experienced by organisms. In this conception, ‘reality’ is not simply 
organism-dependent but ultimately dependent upon the (species-specific) mean-
ing making processes mediating the organism’s interaction with the world, since 
umwelt is constituted by objects that are meaningful for the organism. 
This is elaborated further through Ernst Cassirer (1953 [1944]), who extended 
the Uexküllian idea of meaning-based umwelts to human beings as symbolic 
creatures, for whom the meaning making mechanisms constituting their reality 
are not biologically but culturally given. For humans, things in the world become 
meaningful through the mediation of specifically human means of meaning mak-
ing which Cassirer designates ‘symbolic forms’. A variety of concepts has been 
used in different approaches to these human-specific means, as discussed in the 
article, but regardless of the particular concepts used, the mechanisms and forma-
tions are fundamentally culture-dependent and intersubjective. 
This dependence of human world upon cultural means of meaning mak-
ing, in turn, provides the basis for extending the idea of plurality of species-
specific realities to plurality of realities ‘within’ the human species due to cul-
tural diversity. This extends the epistemological problematics of gaining access 
to the umwelts of other species into the human realm. While this epistemological 
quandary is not central to the article, its relevance as undercurrent of the discus-
sion is highlighted. The implicit solution to the problem is somewhat similar 
to the one proposed by Uexküll in the context of the study of animal umwelts: 
by defining the research object – umwelt – as species-specific, or in this case 
a culture-specific realm, the mechanisms constituting it are seen as communally 
shared, ‘objective’ aspects – anatomical, perceptual, etc., characteristics of species 
observable by the researcher in Uexküll’s approach, or collectively shared means 
of meaning-making intersubjectively available to members of the collective and 
to the researcher in the case of cultural umwelts. Although in both cases what is 
still required to access the alien umwelts is “the symbolic imagination and intel-
ligence” (Cassirer 1953, 52) of researcher.
However, to avoid repeating the contents of the article any further, I will 
rather point out some of the promising topics for discussion emerging from the 
paper.
As the notions of ‘umwelt’, ‘human umwelt’ or ‘cultural umwelt’ gain traction 
in the humanities, it would be timely to make similar enquiry into the uses and 
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senses of the concept of umwelt in various disciplinary contexts from phenom-
enology and biology to semiotics, cultural psychology, and beyond. It would be 
particularly interesting to revisit earlier debates and views on the application of 
the Uexküllian conception of umwelt in the context of the human realm.1
In the article, these compound notions are used without further critical dis-
cussion, although the surrounding debates are referred to in a footnote. Thus 
while the idea of human umwelt as distinct from umwelts of other species, or 
cultural umwelt as specific semiotic realm enclosing particular human collec-
tivity might seem quite self-evident and on par with the general conceptions of 
culture and cultural diversity, these debates, particularly those emerging in the 
context of philosophical anthropology in the middle of the 20th century (in the 
works of Max Scheler, Arnold Gehlen, Helmuth Plessner and others) underline 
another crucial aspect. In their view, humans do not have an umwelt, but a world, 
since they are not confined by their species-specific surrounding-world which is 
determined dominantly by their biology. And although culture becomes a ‘second 
nature’ for humans that can be seen as approximating structurally or function-
ally to umwelt (see Gutmann 2002, 216, 225), the analogy does not capture the 
qualitative difference between the human world and the umwelt of other animals. 
As was also recognised by Cassirer, this difference makes Uexküllian concepts 
insufficient for description of the human world (Brentari 2011, 192). This is not 
about depriving humans of umwelt, since umwelt, as Gadamer (2005 [1975], 441) 
reaffirms, is something all living beings possess, but about acknowledging the 
unparallel world-openness (to use Sheler’s/Gehlen’s concept) of humans. This 
world-openness is a result of increasing semiotic freedom resulting from the 
existence as well as creative use of the multiplicity of symbolic forms, languages 
or meaning systems that allows a person to “rise above the particular environ-
ment in which he happens to find himself ” (Gadamer 2005, 442). 
Thus while the concept of umwelt in useful and often used to highlight the 
crucial difference between the world-in-itself and the world-as-perceived, as well 
as the existence of a plurality of subjective, species-specific or cultural realities, 
it also creates a risk of over-emphasising the “monadic”, self-enclosed aspect of 
these worlds-as-perceived, resulting in a kind of “prison-house of culture” per-
spective at the expense of appreciating the ways these realities can be extended 
to encompass others and in turn be encompassed by them. Or, perhaps the con-
cept of umwelt as applied to the human realm becomes useful precisely by bring-
ing to the fore the potential of humans and cultures to be world-open and rise 
above themselves due to translatability and “dialogical activeness” (to borrow 
a phrase from the paper) of the symbolic systems and ‘cultural umwelten’.
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Moreover, the content as well as the form of investigation of the article by Viik 
et al provides a self-reflexive perspective for the human sciences themselves as 
self-enclosed in their disciplinary umwelts, yet having the means and incen-
tives for dialogue and extension. Next to the epistemology of manifold self-
enclosed (disciplinary) universes, the disciplines juxtaposed in the article also 
offer an alternative trajectory – as highlighted by Ivana Marková (2000) – in the 
form of dialogical epistemology. Indeed, perhaps dialogue and translation will 
provide the next step beyond understanding the formation of human/cultural 
umwelts towards understanding the mechanisms that make it possible to rise 
above the self-enclosed human or cultural umwelt towards a more open world.
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Cultural theory and the ethnographic field: 
methodological views
Art Leete, Peeter Torop
Abstract. Our aim is to discuss the relationship between theory and empiri-
cal data in semiotics and ethnology. We depart from the notion that in the 
methodology of studying cultural processes and phenomena, the ontological 
delimitation of the object of study and the epistemological aspect of the justi-
fication of the means of research complete each other. We start our discussion 
with an analysis of classical approaches to the relationship between the ethno-
graphic field and cultural theory, proposed by Bronisław Malinowski, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss and Clifford Geertz. We then concentrate on closer examination 
of Geertz’s concept of the thick description and its application, as well as re–
conceptualisation by various scholars representing different disciplines. We 
also explore the changing understanding of the ethnographic field and affects 
of this process on cultural theory. As a result of our discussion, we propose an 
outline for a hybrid methodology for combining broader analysis of cultural 
semiotics and the situational hermeneutics of interpretative ethnography in 
order to reach a joint metadisciplinary conceptual framework for cultural 
theory. We suppose that such an approach enables one to combine abstract 
cultural reconstructions with an understanding of the fragmentariness of 
real life cultural phenomena.
Keywords: thick description, ethnographic field, cultural theory, interpreta-
tion, methodology
The heterogeneity of methodological principles of a scientific study of culture 
correlates strongly with the need to understand the processes and phenomena of 
a culture or cultures in an integrated manner. Culture is an environment in which 
individual and collective identities are shaped and in which cohesion between 
various parts of society is established. At the same time there is no systematic sci-
ence of culture, nor is there a general theory that would yield methods to analyse 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 114–137.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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a cultural environment and to obtain an everyday understanding of it. Therefore 
the urgent scientific problem remains making culture analysable, as does the task 
of synthesising different parts of culture into a holistic approach. 
One of the most significant methodological problems in cultural studies is 
how to merge two poles. At one pole there is the creation of typologies and ascer-
taining the complementariness between them, which would enable us to talk 
about the developmental features of general cultural theory. At the other pole 
there is the ethnographic field, and its dynamism in particular. Thus methodo-
logically it becomes a question of how the meta-level and the object-level inter-
relate. Different solutions have been suggested for this universal problem. 
Our aim is to discuss the relationship between theory and empirical data 
in  semiotics and ethnology (the terms ‘ethnology’ and ‘anthropology’ are 
addressed as synonyms in our study). Methodologically, the ontological aspect 
focusing on the demarcation of the object of study and the epistemological aspect 
of the rationalisation of the means of research are complementary. However, this 
complementariness takes on a variety of forms, which then compels us to con-
sider the best or optimal relationship between theory and data: 1) a theory can 
be derived from the specificity of the empirical evidence either in its entirety or 
in part; 2) a theory can precede empirical research and serve as a basis for field-
work, or for the compilation of databases; 3) a theory can have been validated 
in some other field and then applied to new empirical evidence for a variety of 
reasons, such as its popularity, universality and so forth; 4) a theory is estranged 
from the empirical evidence and distorts the research object; 5) interdisciplinary 
theories are applied to the same empirical evidence, resulting in complementari-
ness, hybridity and eclecticism. The interpretative power of scientific research 
into culture largely depends on the ways in which the connection between theory 
and empirical data is expressed in methodology, terminological fields and the 
creation of explanatory models. The purpose of this article is not to explain all 
qualitative methods in ethnology from working theory to grounded and ad hoc 
theories. We aim to explore links between ethnology and cultural semiotics in 
order to sketch a few methodological guidelines for connecting cultural theory 
and ethnographic field data.
The connection between theory and research material depends to a great 
extent upon interpretation. What, for instance, supports the possible conclusion 
that one theory is compatible with a particular ethnographic research object, and 
allows for an adequate interpretation of it, while another one would distort it? 
On the one hand, this decision might be intuitive, while on the other, it might 
also be founded upon a detailed analysis of the research process itself. However, 
even a detailed analysis need not reveal every single logical connection, and in 
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order to make conceptual conclusions, theoretical intuition is ultimately used. 
Often, one of the distinctive features of ethnographic documentation is subjective 
uniqueness. Researchers usually do fieldwork on their own, they observe non-
recurring situations that they cannot actually elicit or entirely control, and they 
can never be certain that they understand everything adequately (Errington 2011, 
37). Difference, alienation and estrangement are encoded in fieldwork situations 
(Brooks 2011, 10). At the same time, it can also happen that for practical reasons, 
an ethnographer must quickly decide what the adequate interpretation of a situ-
ation will be. It is hoped that field notes could be of use to make subsequent 
perceptible and intimate conclusions (Errington 2011, 37). Such a provisional 
situational interpretation can have a decisive impact on subsequent explanatory 
sequences. Innovative ethnological and anthropological ideas are often justified 
in light of meaningful field episodes. 
At the same time, it is also difficult to critique the conclusions reached in 
this way, as other scholars cannot undergo such situations, and often, there are 
no alternative descriptions of sufficiently similar situations. In such cases, the 
presented arguments are analysed on the basis of analogously constructed but 
independent, or strictly speaking, unrelated examples, drawing upon the reflec-
tive remarks of the author. The analysis to test the conclusions could also be 
performed in reverse order, by proceeding from available theories. A theory is 
accessible to all scholars, but the cultural reality discussed by other researchers 
will remain foreign and different from the experience of each, which is precisely 
what makes criticism of a work that originates from a theory such a complicated 
matter. Theoretical diversity in some disciplinary fields is an important reason 
for more systematic thinking on the methodological level.
The starting point of this paper is the recognition of such an ambivalent rela-
tionship between theory and empirical evidence. On the one hand, it would be 
methodologically simplistic to maintain that ethnographic fieldwork material is 
basically subjective and by its nature imperceptible to a bystander. On the other 
hand, for ethnographic studies, the problem of sketching an adequate methodo-
logical base does not have an obvious, unified and uniform solution.
Fieldwork: deriving a theoretical interpretation  
from a Khanty example
Let us consider the first possible relationship between theory and research prac-
tice presented by us. We suggested above that theory can be derived from the 
specificity of empirical evidence. Thus, in this case it may be argued as a hypoth-
esis that empirical practice engenders in the researcher a theoretical motivation 
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which the scholar was not cognizant of before the empirical experience and 
rethinking. In order to test this argument we present an illustrative episode from 
Art Leete’s field trip to the Western Siberia, to the Khanty in 1991.
This incident took place during Leete’s first trip to the Khanty, when he had 
just begun his fieldwork and, together with his companions, met two Khanty 
families. These two families were departing for their summer camps from the 
local town. It was thus an experience that the students taking part in fieldwork 
gained for the first time while on a classical ethnographic expedition (to a tradi-
tional forest camp of a Khanty hunter).
All of them were riding to the forest in one of the oil company’s vehicles: 
a group of Estonian students, two Khanty families and a worker’s foreman. The 
foreman asked a Khanty man, Aiser, how many kilometres it was from the spot 
at which he would be dropped off to the camp. Aiser responded, “for the Khanty, 
it is two kilometers, but I can’t say how much it would be for Russians, maybe 
ten kilometers”.
In the days that followed such a response evoked a lively discussion among 
the Estonian students, and led to the formulation of an ad hoc hypothesis about 
the Khanty’s peculiar perception of time and space. That the observation con-
cerning the vagueness of explaining distances proved to be adequate was also 
confirmed by subsequent fieldwork impressions. In the following years the 
Khanty have repeatedly estimated whatever distance was traversed during the 
daytime to be two kilometers. At the same time, the knowledge that Khanty ref-
erences to road distances must be taken figuratively was also necessary in order 
to be able to exercise caution when someone assured you that “two kilometers” 
is all you needed to walk. In fact (as it turned out in practice) Aiser meant that it 
takes two hours to get to the campsite. Hence Khanty “kilometers” may denote 
both a spatial and a temporal remark, which points to the disparities of cultural 
perception. On the other hand, this incident also shows that an intercultural 
conceptual translation can be unclear, for it was also clearly a joke. Aiser’s remark 
did not hide any deep cultural philosophy, but was a clarification given during 
a conversation, at the same time remaining within the framework of a culture-
specific narrative strategy. 
It seemed to Leete and his friends that it was at this moment when a break-
through in cultural perception occurred, and the Khanty worldview and life 
was perceived in an adequate way even though their acquaintance with Aiser 
had begun just a few days earlier. This expected grasp of cultural perception did 
not take place by virtue of any action or dialogue initiated by the students. The 
students were more a passive party in this act of understanding, and presumably 
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also of acceptance (they had just started to perform their first shared cultural 
practice with the Khanty – the crossing of “two kilometers”).
It must be admitted that the group of Estonian students who travelled to Sibe-
ria in 1991 cannot consider themselves to be the discoverers of the boreal kilo-
metre. For instance, in his 1837 expedition journal, the polar explorer Alexander 
Schrenk describes his travels among the Komi and Nenets. He notes that the 
tundra method of measuring distances by the lengths of diurnal journeys is 
not reliable (“is completely useless”). Schrenk highlights that distances referred 
to identically in terms of time may actually differ in their lengths by up to two 
times depending on whether it was winter or summer (Schrenk 1855, 20). The 
Russian scholar Ivan G. Ostroumov (1904, 20) likewise observed the vagueness of 
calculations of space and time among the Mansi in Western Siberia. Even earlier, 
in 1830, Komi traveller Vassili Latkin noticed, when he was travelling among the 
Pechora river Komi, that “versts here are somehow very long”. Travellers were 
unable to traverse in a day the distance that was supposed to be ten versts, accord-
ing to the locals. The next day they still had “four versts” to travel in a boat, and 
Latkin had no clue as to what this should actually involve (Latkin 1853, 17–18). 
The question of the vagueness of animistic world perception, the formulation 
of which was spurred by the encounter with Aiser, has also been examined in Art 
Leete’s subsequent studies (for example Leete & Lipin 2012). Arguments concern-
ing the indeterminacy and ambivalence of a religious worldview have also been 
furthered by Stewart Guthrie, for example (1980, 187–188; 1993). However, it has 
also been claimed that animistic knowledge is concrete and specific and that 
in hunter cultures uncertainty is rather avoided (Willerslev 2007, 16; 2013, 44). 
Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1940) discussed joking as a way of establishing 
culturally formalised relationships. By the same token, it could be argued that 
the functions of humour, irony and truth are interlaced in the narrative rules of 
several northern peoples. Leete’s more recent research has shown that northern 
hunters tell their stories by following an ambivalent narrative strategy peppered 
with irony, but all the while keeping in mind a clear idea of something that they 
refer to as “the state of affairs”. In the communication practice of hunters, the 
same joking and irony has a culture-specific regular presence (Leete & Lipin 
2015).
The theoretical outcome of this first experience of Khanty culture for Art 
Leete and his friends naturally cannot compare to the effect that ultimately 
accompanied Clifford Geertz’s first ethnographically justified misdemeanour 
in connection with a cockfight which he later interpreted as the key element of 
Balinese culture. According to Geertz, he reached a perceptual breakthrough 
when he was fleeing the cockpit along with the villagers after a police raid in Bali 
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in 1958 (Geertz 1993, 412–417; see also Clifford 1988, 40; Marcus 1998, 105–106). 
But what connects these incidents is the feeling of achieving a trusting relation-
ship with people through complicity in a common culture-specific misdeed.
George Marcus (1998, 107) has noted that many stories about how field rap-
port is established between the ethnographer and research subjects involve, 
to some extent, complicity in some misdemeanour. According to Marcus, the 
research process is guided here by Geertz’s analytical magic, which allows a mis-
demeanour to become the determining component of a reflexive testimony. 
In Marcus’s view (op cit, 109), Geertz purposefully presents himself as naïve 
and vulnerable when describing the Balinese cockfight episode. Through his 
analysis, Geertz associates a common misdemeanour with a subsequent deep 
cultural interpretation to which petty crime is the key. It is a play on the bound-
ary of cultural and formal rules that creates a human bond and opens the door 
for the ethnographer to enter a culture.
To some respect, such access to cultural meanings also serves subsequently 
as an algorithm for the interpretation of the deep structures of an ethnographic 
field (in the Geerztian sense) on the part of the ethnographer. Ethnographers 
must be able to let themselves (either rationally or intuitively) be seized by signifi-
cant chances, which would enable them to discover cultural symbols in a natural 
way. Such unintentional entries will also enable the researcher to endow the 
subsequent theoretical and methodological arguments with an aura of cultural 
naturalness and authenticity. Readers are informed that conceptions have been 
obtained from informants through the ethnographer’s gradual submergence 
into the ethnographic field. And it is precisely in this manner that an episode 
occurring in the ethnographic field can gain a cognitive authority to bolster 
theoretical conceptions. James Clifford (1988, 25) challenges such a methodologi-
cal induction according to which “ethnography produces cultural interpretation 
through intense research experience”. He urges one to pay attention to the man-
ner in which ungovernable experiences are turned into indisputable theoretical 
postulates (cf Marcus & Fischer 1999, 23).
Interdependence of theory and empirical data in classical ethnologies
One of the first attempts to unite cultural theory and the ethnographic field, 
or the meta-level and the object-level, is Bronisław Malinowski’s (1969 [1944]) 
scientific theory of culture. The first step towards the scientificity of a study of 
culture is to delineate the field of study. In studies of culture from that time 
it was precisely this capacity of identifying research phenomena during their 
observation or juxtaposition that seemed to be missing. Malinowski emphasised 
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that culture cannot be studied without a theoretical preparation, and that even 
the most elementary description inevitably means that one makes some kind of 
selection; however, in science, the act of making a selection supposedly involves 
the isolation of particular things or phenomena from others on the basis of some 
theory. At the same time, theory itself is grounded upon past experience. Hence 
the primary objective of any discipline is to recognise an object of study and 
establish a method to describe it. In his functional cultural analysis, Malinowski 
differentiated between three dimensions of cultural process: artefacts; organised 
groups or human social relations; and symbolism or symbolic acts. Based on 
these premises, Malinowski conceded that in culture, everything must be studied 
within a context and through an understanding of the function of the objects 
of study.
Malinowski underlined that ethnographers must not pin their hopes solely on 
the cultural inspiration they receive from fieldwork. The scientific interpretation 
of culture should not be only inductive, but it must already be theoretically pre-
framed to an extent and systematised in light of the social contexts of the phe-
nomena examined. However, with Malinowski’s approach the question of to what 
extent ethnographic research must be theoretically rationalised before undergo-
ing the experience, or to what extent fieldwork could offer inspiration to the 
ethnographer for working out new theories or theoretical innovations, remains 
unanswered. Likewise, with this approach it remains unclear how to relate the 
approach that has emerged on the basis of displaced dialogues (which are affected 
by the inevitable gap between the ethnographers’ and their partners’ unclearly 
adapted conceptual worlds) to such a rigorous and clear way of defining the 
research problem or providing a theoretical contextualisation for it, or how to 
model the theory even before the fieldwork has begun.
The respective methodological “guide” should include quite direct clues, but 
at the same time it should be sufficiently broad and flexible so as not to restrict 
or block the researcher from unexpected, non-standard experiences with its 
theoretical presuppositions. The ironic aspect of Malinowski (which consisted 
of the fact that after the publication of his fieldwork diaries, see Malinowski 1989, 
it turned out that Malinowski had never attempted to immerse himself in the 
indigenous culture as immediately and as fully as his writings would suggest) as 
a paradigmatic example of the ambivalent relationship between the conceptual 
perception of an indigenous culture being documented during fieldwork, and 
the theoretical generalisation of it was brought into ethnographic focus by Geertz 
(1974). Clifford argues that although Malinowski’s diary revealed the ambivalence 
of his conception of culture, it is also a polyphonic text as well as a fragmentary 
document of an aggregate of complex and intersubjective situations. Malinowski’s 
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diary also exemplifies the fact that all texts based on fieldwork are in part con-
structions (Clifford 1988, 97; Marcus & Fischer 1999, 34). 
The second type of approach is represented by Claude Lévi-Strauss, who per-
ceives the object-level, i.e. the ethnographic field, as something that can in part 
be immediately described and in part be reconstructed on the basis of indirect 
data, such as the reconstruction of an ancient worldview on the basis of archaic 
linguistic forms. But this means that the diversity of the object-level must be 
countered by a diversity of theories or disciplines. By their nature his meth-
odological principles are interdisciplinary, but the disciplines are hierarchically 
structured. The number of disciplines is parametric, i.e. sufficient for a holistic 
analysis of culture. To illustrate his point, he provided a diagram (Fig 1). 
“In the above diagram, the horizontals mainly represent the view of cul-
tural anthropology, the verticals that of social anthropology, and the obliques 
both” (Lévi-Strauss 1963, 359; see also Johnson 2003). In his juxtaposition of 
geography, anthropology, psychology, sociology, linguistics and archaeology as 
culture-studying disciplines, Lévi-Strauss emphasised that the differences pri-
marily lie not in the objects of study themselves, but in their perspectives, and 
therefore he also considered the attempt to unify their terminologies as futile. 
Lévi-Strauss characterised the special status of anthropology in terms of three 
qualities: objectivity, totality and meaningfulness. Whereas ‘totality’ denotes the 
observation of social life as systematic, and this systematicness in turn, the iden-
tification of a universal structure, the manifestations of which indeed constitute 
social life, aspirations toward meaningfulness are primarily associated with the 
study of social life in oral tradition cultures (those lacking written language). 
Aspirations towards objectivity differ from those of economics or demography, 
as social sciences employ the methods of natural sciences, while anthropology 
has closer ties with the humanities. A systematic and humanist interest in hidden 
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structures and meanings in culture is the reason why Lévi-Strauss predicted the 
transformation of anthropology into a semiotic discipline: “Anthropology aims 
to be a semeiological science, and takes as a guiding principle that of ‘meaning’” 
(Lévi-Strauss 1963, 364)
In Lévi-Strauss’s approach, it is a meta-language that unites the meta-level 
and the object level. While each discipline included in his model has its own 
terminological apparatus, linguistics is the most prominent of all, mainly due 
to the fact that the use of linguistic methods brings about the approximation of 
the object-level to the language: 
New perspectives then open up. We are no longer dealing with an occa-
sional collaboration where the linguist and the anthropologist, each working 
by himself, occasionally communicate those findings which each thinks may 
interest the other. In the study of kinship problems (and, no doubt, the study 
of other problems as well), the anthropologist finds himself in a situation 
which formally resembles that of the structural linguist. Like phonemes, kin-
ship terms are elements of meaning; like phonemes, they acquire meaning 
only if they are integrated into systems. ‘Kinship systems’, like ‘phonemic 
systems’, are built by the mind on the level of unconscious thought. Finally, 
the recurrence of kinship patterns, marriage rules, similar prescribed atti-
tudes between certain types of relatives, and so forth, in scattered regions of 
the globe and in fundamentally different societies, leads us to believe that, 
in the case of kinship as well as linguistics, the observable phenomena result 
from the action of laws which are general but implicit. The problem can 
therefore be formulated as follows: Although they belong to another order 
of reality, kinship phenomena are of the same type as linguistic phenomena 
(Lévi-Strauss 1963, 34).
In spite of the distinctiveness of linguistics, in Lévi-Strauss’s view, semiology or 
semiotics is the best way of helping us to understand the interdisciplinary nature 
of anthropology. Around the same time, Roland Barthes (1967 [1964]) was also 
envisioning a new semiological discipline. Instead of interdisciplinarity, Barthes 
emphasised metadisciplinarity. In his opinion, the extension of linguistics from 
the study of language to include other cultural codes, such as a dress code, would 
enable us to create a systematic cultural analysis within the frames of a new 
semiological discipline, translinguistics. The theoretical explorations of Lévi-
Strauss and Barthes as well as Geertz reflect the significance of cultural semiotics 
for the methodology of cultural studies (see also Torop 2015).
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We consider Malinowski and Lévi-Strauss especially valuable in the meth-
odological sense. Malinowski conceptualised fieldwork as needing preliminary 
theory that can be corrected during fieldwork. Similarly, Lévi-Strauss consid-
ers thorough preparations necessary in order to produce an interdisciplinary 
whole and initiate disciplinary dialogue, or to adapt one’s approach to a certain 
interpretative strategy. Lévi-Strauss carries on interpretative movement by using 
dynamic interdisciplinary connections. 
At the same time, Geertz creates the approach of complementary databases. 
He connects traditional ethnography with dynamic description, adding to it data 
concerning situations of usage and overview of functions. These three authors 
are the most meaningful for an interdisciplinary methodological field of culture 
research, although Geertz has inspired later scholars more than Malinowski and 
Lévi-Strauss, having thus the biggest methodological potential.
Interpretative approach
Geertz represents the third type of approach. The first edition of his collection 
The Interpretation of Culture, which caused a stir in cultural theory, came out 
in New York in 1973. In this work, the concepts ‘interpretational’ and ‘semi-
otic’ are used as synonyms. Thus Geertz’s interpretational anthropology bears 
a parallel of sorts to cultural semiotics. In order to acquaint themselves with 
the essence of a science Geertz advises researchers not to turn to theories 
but to examine what the practitioners of that science do. Social anthropolo-
gists, in Geertz’s view, “do” ethnography: “In anthropology, or anyway social 
anthropology, what the practitioners do is ethnography” (Geertz 1993 [1973], 5). 
Regarding ethnography, however, Geertz entertains two conceptions. According 
to the first, textbook approach, ethnography is about the compiling of reports 
on expeditions, transcribing texts, selecting informants, mapping research, etc. 
Geertz espouses the second approach, according to which ethnography is a thick 
description, i.e. in actuality an ethnographer encounters a mass of different, often 
intertwined, conceptual structures that have no visible regularity and which do 
not exist in a plainly perceptible, explicit form. Fieldwork involves interviews, 
observations, and note-taking. But the “doing” of ethnography must involve 
an attempt to construe an alien, figurative, and incoherent manuscript in which 
the graphic signs of ordinary language are substituted with behavioural examples. 
And within the frames of this conception, the culture that is being described 
turns into “an acted document” that can be interpreted by communicating with 
it (op cit, 10). There are surprisingly many points of convergence between Geertz 
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and the writings of Lotman and the Tartu-Moscow school although these two 
conceptions probably did not have any direct contact with each other.
The singularity, thick description, consists of recording and interpreting 
ephemeral situations and phenomena (Geertz 1993, 20; see also Lichterman 2011, 
78). The precondition for the implementation of the thick description is the 
detection of cultural categories that enable one to interpret the meaningfulness 
of human activities. A scholar must know how people conceptually structure the 
world and in which manner and how intensively they apply this general under-
standing in everyday situations. The conceptual fragments connected with cultur-
ally specific details combine to form peculiar behavioural and cognitive models, 
and it becomes the task of the ethnographer to map them (see also Lichterman 
2011, 79). Interpretative anthropology focuses on ethnographic observations and 
narratives and on the ethnographic invention of “cultural” objects (Clifford 1988, 
38) as well as on segments of less structured social behaviour (Marcus & Fischer 
1999, 26) that the earlier methodologies had overlooked.
Thus a thick description functions heuristically when documenting and 
deciphering the most detailed level of cultural practices. Such a methodology 
makes it possible to foreground ways in which culture shapes human activities 
daily, at every moment. At the same time, Geertz’s approach also offers a method 
for interpreting culture on a more general level (see Marcus & Fischer 1999, 
25–26), and this is where the methodology of interpretative anthropology, among 
other things, has a recognisable connection with semiotics. We recognise that the 
theoretical and methodological potential of Geertz’s approach can be fruitfully 
expanded beyond its disciplinary cradle. At the same time we also claim that 
ethnology or cultural anthropology remain the main environment of develop-
ment for culture theory.
The new conception of the ethnographic field
The three aforementioned methodological trends of thought may be termed clas-
sical, as they proceed from the so-called traditional ethnographic field, i.e. they 
are immediate and mediated. The concept of such a socially static ethnographic 
field gradually began to lose its theoretically fertile disciplinary potential. At the 
same time, these approaches have given theoretical impetus to the interdiscipli-
nary field of theory. However, the developments in cultural theory that occurred 
in the last quarter of the 20th century, and in the first decades of the 21st century, 
point to a need to view the ethnographic field itself as dynamic.
A new conceptualisation of the ethnographic field has developed within the 
context of globalisation, meaning that an ethnographic field under study is not 
125
Cultural theory and the ethnographic field: methodological views
an isolated and exotic place of research (Marcus 1998, 79). New ethnographic 
fields waiting to be studied are rather “islands” within larger cultures that have 
emerged as a result of global and/or historical migration processes, and it is not 
easy to demarcate them clearly. Hence the boundary between the scientific ‘us’ 
and the cultural ‘other’ is much more complex and the clarity of the methodologi-
cal principles is much more essential. Ethnography has abandoned the intensive 
analysis of single sites and local conditions in order to discuss the circulation 
of cultural meanings and identities in diffuse time-space. A new, multi-sited 
ethnography observes the production of cultural forms simultaneously in dif-
ferent localities, thereby itself becoming fragmentary in a manner similar to its 
object of study (op cit, 79–83). The dynamics of the ethnographic field has two 
tendencies. Firstly, these changes depend on modification of immediate cultural 
(geographic, economic or socio-political) environment (see Wall 2015; Crabtree 
et al 2012). Secondly, the mediated cultural environment itself becomes an object 
of immediate scholarly exploration (see, for example Steinmetz 2012; Jemielniak 
2014; Boellstorff 2006).
Anthropology, which has so far studied alien or other cultures, now studies its 
own culture or universal global culture. Such a situation raises several questions: 
How is a scientific discipline, which was originally designed as a cognitive instru-
ment for the understanding of ‘others’ (who, in the case of living societies, were 
always others with no chance of answering back), transforming itself as a project 
wherein groups within societies that were the traditional object of anthropologi-
cal study start to use this cognitive instrument in order to gain anthropological 
knowledge of both their own socio-cultural reality (in the immediate sense) 
and of global socio-cultural reality as seen from their specific, local perspective? 
What are the distinctive characteristics of these Other Anthropologies when 
compared to the originals? How do their emergence and presence modify the 
whole of anthropology, that is, world anthropology? What would have to change 
within both dominant and emergent anthropologies to allow us to develop better 
than we currently do their cognitive potential as single yet plural? How can we 
speed the renewal of a discipline distanced once and for all from monocentrism 
and unitarism? (Krotz 2006, 234) In order to answer these questions one needs 
to engage in significant metatheoretical activity within anthropology, i.e. the 
anthropology of anthropology (op cit, 236, cf Torop 2006). 
This leads to a more problematic differentiation between the analyses carried 
out on the classical micro and macro levels. In addition to a local analysis, one 
must also undertake “an exercise in mapping terrain”, but the goal is not a holistic 
representation. An intimate perception of a community is not replaced by statis-
tics, the global is not opposed to the local, but their relationship is redefined in 
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the course of the emergence of a new ethnographic field. “The global is an emer-
gent dimension of arguing about the connection among sites in a multi-sited 
ethnography” (Marcus 1998, 83). Multi-sited ethnography is constructed from 
various inter-disciplinary discourses (op cit, 86–89), which in turn opens the 
new ethnographic field to the diversity of cultural theory.
The synthesis of cultural semiotics with ethnology
Cultural semiotics and ethnology have developed alongside each other in a semi-
spontaneous way. Lévi-Strauss influenced the initial appearance of cultural semi-
otics, while Geertz has admitted that his approach was a parallel phenomenon to 
semiotics. Ashok R. Kelkar proposed a classification in which cultural semiot-
ics correlates with the semiosis of culture, and cultural semiosis correlates with 
ethnology (Kelkar 1984, 132). This reminds one of Geertz’s two conceptions of 
ethnography and the Tartu–Moscow school’s dynamic examination of the rela-
tionship between the sign and the sign system, as well as the attempt of Irene 
Portis Winner to describe ethnic texts with recourse to Lotman’s cultural semiot-
ics (Portis Winner 1989).
Cultural semiotics is a culture-studying discipline that investigates sign sys-
tems that function within a culture as cultural languages, and the relationships 
and mediations between these systems (Lotman 1990). The premium it puts 
on descriptive languages has made cultural semiotics a discipline that is also 
utilised by other culture-studying disciplines in the formulation of their meth-
odological foundations. In addition, through its interest in various cultural lan-
guages, cultural semiotics is intimately connected to disciplines that research 
these cultural languages, such as theatre, literary and film semiotics, etc. The 
basis of cultural semiotics is a conception of the universality of each culture, 
like that of any human, in terms of its need to understand its own nature and to 
work out various descriptive languages in order to arrive at an understanding of 
itself. Self-description gives rise to the unique feature of a semiotic understand-
ing of culture – each communication process within a culture can be interpreted, 
at a level of higher generalisation, as autocommunication. The function of auto-
communication is the formation of a culture’s mnemonic technique, and hence 
the preservation of information and experience. At the same time, autocom-
munication has another function, that of creativity, which is to generate new 
associations in a culture, to reinvigorate perception and to understand a culture 
in a deeper way. Autocommunication results in the emergence of self-models, 
whereas these self-models can arise as generalisations of a current situation, or 
as a search for the preconditions for change in the situation, or as theoretical 
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constructs. The process of creating self-models is also the process of internal 
re-structuring of a culture.
Cultural semiotics is concerned with the study of various texts and commu-
nication processes within a culture. Its research is carried out on a level where 
engagement with various arts occurs naturally, and a cultural semiotician pro-
duces a more general picture of a culture than an expert studying only one type 
or field of art. One of the essential features of the value of cultural semiotics is its 
ad hoc attitude towards culture – cultural semiotics does not attempt to enforce 
on cultures a single universal scheme of analysis, instead it searches for an appro-
priate measure of analysis for each cultural specificity. This is done at the level 
of particular texts as well as events. Modern ethnography aspires towards the 
same kind of flexibility: 
Contemporary ethnography does connect to a long tradition of systematic 
and empirical methods based in experience (as generated by fieldwork, for 
example), which in turn have stemmed from scientific assumptions about the 
acquisition of knowledge (that all is, in theory, knowable, for example), and 
the problem-solving potential of applying that knowledge to larger human 
issues (as in comparative sociology, for example). Ethnography as art, in our 
view, is not necessarily opposed to science, but it is different from science. 
And it seems to us that when ethnography is positioned as a kind of “objective,” 
scientific research method that can be acquired and applied independent of 
its humanistic, textual, and intellectual histories and traditions, its promise 
is limited (in the same way that, say, the history, function, and meaning of 
Shakespeare and the theatrical arts are limited when reduced to method). 
(Campbell & Lassiter 2015, 9) 
In discussions of ethnographic methods, likewise, what comes to the fore is 
a dialogue between ethnography and semiotics, which is expressed in both the 
exposition of the structure of ethnographic texts and their interpretation using 
semiotic methods (O’Reilly 2005, 173). Ethnography and semiotics can be com-
pared in their paradoxality: both initially generate their object of study (col-
lect, describe, delineate) so that it can then be researched, and in some respect, 
ethnography studies ethnography (an ethnographic description or dataset) and 
semiotics, semiotics (a semiotically demarcated object of study, such as sign 
system, text or semiosphere).
Aspects of the analysability of culture are inexorably linked to a consideration 
of methodological problems. From the ontological perspective of the methodol-
ogy of cultural semiotics, staticism and dynamicism can be specified on three 
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levels. On the level of language, it is essential to differentiate between discrete 
(the natural language) and continual or iconic-spatial languages (the pictorial, 
film or theatre language), and on the textual level, between textuality and proces-
suality, and on the level of the semiosphere, between narrative (linearity) and 
performance (simultaneity). Each specification thus also involves a specification 
of the object of study as well as the ontologisation of analysability, i.e. a concep-
tion of the study object as being analysable. The ontology of the objects of study 
is divided in two: natural objects, which are clearly demarcated (a book, a film, 
a biography, etc.), and so-called ontologised objects, which are reflectively or 
theoretically demarcated (an event, a historical period, phenomena such as art 
life or cultural life, etc.). The concept of text is still central in cultural semiotics, 
and methodologically indispensable in order to secure an understanding of the 
demarcation of the objects of study. There is no doubt about the boundaries of 
a novel’s text. However, a novel is a portion of an author’s work and a semioti-
cian, when analysing an author’s work, might use the concept of the text of the 
author’s work as a basis for discussion. Here the text is already an abstraction. 
At the same time, the text of an author’s work could be a portion of biographical 
texts (a text of a life’s story), literary texts (a text of realism or romanticism) or 
national literary texts (a text of Estonian literature). Thus the demarcation line 
is movable and the demarcation process itself, a way of creating analysability. 
From the epistemological perspective of the methodology of cultural semiot-
ics, staticism and dynamicism are specifying strategies of analysis. At the level of 
language, there is a differentiation between a (disciplinary and terminological) 
delineation of the object of study and dialogisation (the finding or creation of 
an empathetic language of description). At the textual level, we can differenti-
ate between strategies of analysis that proceed from the features of the mate-
rial (structural) and those which are based on its organisation (compositional). 
On the other hand, we can also talk about spatiotemporal (chronotopic) or 
medium-centred (multimedial, etc.) strategies of analysis which are not directly 
dependent upon the structure or material of the text. At the level of the semio-
sphere, a differentiation between the levels of narrative and performance serves 
as a basis for linear and simultaneous strategies of analysis. From the epistemo-
logical perspective, analysability is determined by the choice of research strate-
gies. If a text in cultural semiotics is rather an ontological concept, then the 
semiosphere rather belongs to the realm of epistemology. This means that while 
probing the limits of analysability, a synchronic approach is supplemented by 
a diachronic one. Each phenomenon has its historical place in a culture and is 
part of a diachronic sequence. The implementation of the concept of semiosphere 
is what adds a diachronic dimension, and semiosphere credits the relationship 
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between part and whole in a culture – if it is difficult to delineate a cultural phe-
nomenon in terms of synchronousness, it is always possible to interpret it as part 
of the historical process. This can be compared to ethnographic research in the 
course of which fieldwork material is interpreted with the help of both historical 
sources and a consideration of contemporary theories and research experiences 
regarding comparable materials (Fife 2005).
Thick description as a methodological concept
The methodological topicality of the thick description is highlighted in the study 
of mediated cultural situations, where the ethnographic field extends to the Web 
(Hickey & Austin 2008; Jemielniak 2014), and instead of a structured analysis 
of the emic and etic levels, it is important to see these as symbiotic (Berry 1999). 
John W. Berry analyses ethnology from the perspective of cross-cultural psychol-
ogy. For instance, the “Khanty kilometre” could be considered in juxtaposition 
with Berry’s three-step interpretation: 
First is to transport and test our current psychological knowledge and per-
spectives by using them in other cultures in order to learn if they are valid; 
second is to explore and discover new aspects of the phenomenon being stud-
ied in local cultural terms; and third is to integrate what has been learned 
from these first two approaches in order to generate a more nearly universal 
psychology, one that has pan-human validity (Berry 1999, 165–166). 
For the sake of these three steps, Barry also obliterates the classical binary 
between the emic and etic, and organises the interpretative process respectively 
into the following stages: the imposed etic, emic and derived etic (op cit, 166).
Following Geertz, Isaac Reed presents the idea of “maximal interpretation” 
which is an interpretation “aimed at social life, which is theoretically driven and 
epistemologically risky, and which claims to know more about human research 
subjects than they know about themselves” (Reed 2008, 188–189). In contrast to 
the thick description, a maximal interpretation enables one to involve a larger 
number of ‘scientific’ explanations, and in this case one’s approach does not 
remain exclusively within the frames of the meaning categories examined. Reed 
maintains that such a manner of interpretation can be acquired at the intersec-
tion of the cognitive backgrounds of the researcher and the research subjects, 
by implementing a sequence of interpretations that reaches beyond the existing 
cultural theory and collected data (op cit, 188–191).
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The interpretative process in the course of which a ‘thick description’ is pro-
duced penetrates beyond facts and their superficial recognition (both on the part 
of the researcher and the researched). Such a secondary, concentrated description 
contains a concealed cognitive argument of the ethnographer that she or he has 
obtained a better knowledge of the researched than they had about themselves. 
This, however, does not mean that the researcher’s knowledge is postulated as par-
amount, but rather that a displacement of the meaning universes is acknowledged. 
While doing research, this displacement makes it possible to arrive “at a com-
prehension of meaning in which the actions of others made some sort of sense” 
(op cit, 190). A maximal interpretation does not take into account only cultural 
meanings, but also considers a wider social context (op cit, 190–191). Via interpre-
tation, culture is associated with the multiplicity of social factors. Such a maximal 
translation, centring on meaning, makes it possible to reach a contextually more 
sensitive and theoretically sounder approach (op cit, 198).
Jeffrey Alexander’s high estimation of Geertz derives from his initial premises: 
“Proposition 1: Social structures do not exist objectively” (Alexander 2008, 162). 
He ends his article with a recognition that a thick description is not so much 
a description as a reconstruction: 
In this brief piece, I have interpreted ‘Clifford Geertz’ as having crystallized, 
in his massively influential work, core methodological and theoretical ele-
ments of strong program cultural sociology. If meaning is central, then the 
theoretical tools that the humanities have developed to investigate art and 
language must become central to the human sciences more generally. Thick 
descriptions are powerful reconstructions, not simply detailed observations. 
Local knowledge is inevitably rooted in more encompassing, global meaning-
structures, even while every global theme becomes not enriched but different 
as it emerges locally (Alexander 2008, 166).
Such a methodological movement towards a disclosure of the conceptual deep 
structures of a culture and a more sensitive consideration of the broader social 
context corrodes the possible dictates of theory over the ethnographic practice. 
With the help of an existing theory, however, it is easier to make thin ethno-
graphic matter cohere. However, if the description is thick and the social context 
is made comprehensively coherent (while also being detailed), the probability 
that there will be a logical need for a theoretically novel interpretation will also 
arise. A search for novelty may then arise from both an impetus received from 
thick or total empirical data, and the need to implement a theory validated in 
an interdisciplinary or another field. 
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A thick description has been understood to be an interpretation, which exhib-
its an analytical awareness and a consideration of the context. By presenting thick 
descriptions, scholars hermeneutically reconstruct the interrelations between 
part and whole in an attempt to uncover both human motives and sensibili-
ties and the cultural structures and systems of symbolic relations affecting these 
(Alexander 2008, 159–160; Lichterman 2011, 78). The methodological challenge 
of the thick description is largely dependent upon the fact that the systemic 
complexes of cultural symbols are in part interpreted from the perspective of 
human moods and motivations, while certain kinds of action are associated 
with respective feelings. Geertz explains motivations as a recurrent tendency or 
proclivity to associate certain feelings with the respective situations. Motivations 
are thus directed feelings, whereas moods are static but vary in intensity (or as 
Geertz metaphorically puts it: “like a fog that rises and dissipates”). (Geertz 1993, 
96–98; see also Trondman 2011, 149)
The question to consider is: how should one establish a methodology on 
the basis of human motivation, moods and feelings, even in part? How will 
an ethnographer document adequately such constantly shifting cultural facts 
that are grounded on emotions? A scholar must offer a thorough description of 
the circumstances that have led him/her to a conclusion and demonstrate why 
feelings are to be trusted. As indicated above, a transitory phenomenon can 
have a temporary, unique meaning and symbolism. The key to an understand-
ing of such phenomena may lie precisely in an adequate interpretation of non-
verbalised emotions founded upon cultural conceptions. Even if an interpretation 
is built on feelings at the outset, in an ethnographic description, attempts must 
be made to prove it conclusively. For an ethnographer, the explanations of field 
partners would serve as indubitable evidence in this context, as otherwise read-
ers and critics would say that “the accounts of the informants do not support the 
researcher’s conclusions”. At the same time, it is impossible to obtain explanations 
about everything while doing fieldwork because some situations and feelings may 
have passed for people before the ethnographer can pose any questions.
Conclusion: towards a hybrid methodology
The general methodological challenge of ethnology lies in overcoming the cog-
nitive contradiction between a potential multifurcation of the induction, which 
arises from the detailedness of empirical data and an initial lack of system, and 
one’s aspiration to establish a theoretical cohesion. Approaches analogous to the 
thick description enable an ethnographer to penetrate to the culture-specific 
conceptual connections. However, such an analytic strategy does not necessarily 
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support broader theoretical conclusions. In Geertz’s treatment, culture is local, 
flexible and manifested in nuances. This allows for an interpretation of culture 
as a mass of practices and ideas without a uniform form and principles, which 
makes it impossible to create a more general picture of a culture (Smith 2011, 28). 
Cultural semiotics seems to offer ethnology a potential to work out elaborated 
theoretical models. When we apply thick description simultaneously with a cul-
tural-semiotic analysis, there is a danger that the intuitive leap from earlier stages 
of ethnographic description to the utilisation of theories validated in cultural 
semiotics would be too vast. If, however, we approach cultural semiotics as part 
of the “social context” of ethnology (and inversely), then an interdisciplinary, 
consistent and total theoretical interpretation may offer novel solutions.
A broader, more abstract analysis of cultural semiotics and the flexible and sit-
uational hermeneutics of interpretative ethnography might be united in a hybrid 
methodology that is less ambitious in terms of providing a specific explanation 
of cultural details. At the same time, while creating a theory, such an approach 
makes it possible to combine abstract cultural reconstructions with an under-
standing of the occasional fluidity of cultural phenomena (as exemplified above 
by the relativity of the concept of the Khanty kilometre) as well as fragmentari-
ness. A generalising theoretical orientation could in this way engage in a dia-
logue with a temporary and situational interpretation (cf Smith 2011, 19–22). 
It is natural that in their search for methods, cultural-analytical disciplines rely 
on ethnography, which assumes a general qualitative foundation (for instance, 
within the context of cultural studies, see Gray 2003, 15).
Geertz argues that concepts that are close to experience and those removed 
from it can be tactfully connected through an effort of mental identification. This 
identification does not mean that ethnographers should spiritually merge with 
the informants. It is important to understand motivation driving people’s action 
and thought (Geertz 1974, 29). Ethnographic interpretation is central to the pen-
etration of other people’s ways of thinking, day-to-day experience and everyday 
wisdom (op cit, 43–43). The scholars’ immediate comprehension of their inform-
ants’ experiences can be partially correct and such a hermeneutics of everyday 
wisdom could lead to an adequate understanding, even from a cognitive distance 
(op cit, 45). Such an approach can function as a very general methodological 
frame for the interweaving of thick description and cultural theory.
Hence culture analysts are scholars with a double responsibility. Their profes-
sionalism relies on both the ability to analyse and create (imagine and delineate) 
the object of study. These abilities also determine the parameters of analysability. 
Often, the culture itself dictates its analysability, which is why ad-hoc theories 
based on the object of study are used in culture-analysing disciplines. An analysis 
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of culture and thereby the analysability of a culture thus begin with an under-
standing of the object of study and initiation of a dialogue with it, as well as the 
finding of an appropriate language of communication for this dialogue (scientific 
or simply analytical). And the best language for communication could emerge 
from a dialogue, including one between semiotics and ethnology. 
The diversity of the contemporary ethnographic field serves as a catalyst 
for intensifying dialogue between disciplines and research objects. In addition 
to which creative negotiations between different disciplines should be another 
shared scholarly adventure, departing from diversification of the ethnographic 
field. Hybrid methodology serves as toolbox for conceptualising the analysabil-
ity of culture. At the same time, this hybrid methodology supports a holistic 
approach towards diversity of analytical experiences and movement in the direc-
tion of complexity of cultural theory. 
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On methodology and theory in anthropology
Toomas Gross
Anthropology has long circumvented the conventional methodological stand-
ards that frame research in most other social sciences, and therein lies the para-
dox. The openness and flexibility of participant observation, the discipline’s only 
‘proper’ and ‘authentic’ data-collection method – interviews are obviously not 
anthropology’s monopoly – has rendered anthropology an easy target for those 
who advocate a more rigorous, transparent, and less subjective modes of data 
collection and analysis. And yet, despite these caveats, there is really no other 
method that produces data as grounded in social and cultural reality as partici-
pant observation. 
Anthropologists have always been keenly aware of the perils and possibilities 
of their methods and the implications that the subjectivity of their endeavours 
might have for the theoretical claims that they are able to make. The triangle of 
method-theory-data has been at the core of most ‘anthropology wars’ – for exam-
ple, between Oscar Lewis and Robert Redfield on Tepoztlán, Gananath Obeyes-
ekere and Marshall Sahlins on Hawaii, Derek Freeman and Margaret Mead on 
Samoa, and Patrick Tierney (backed by many others) and Napoleon Chagnon on 
the Yanomamö. Apart from these well-known confrontations, allegations from 
within and beyond the discipline accusing anthropologists of anecdotalism or 
even fraud have been multiple. The recent case of Dutch anthropologist Mart Bax 
is just an extreme example at one end of this continuum of criticism.
The trend to polish the research results into a publishable form and ignore 
the negative cases is, of course, characteristic not only of anthropology but the 
publish or perish reality in most of contemporary academia. In a certain sense 
it might even be argued that anthropologists, these days at least, tend to be rela-
tively more self-critical than scholars in many other disciplines when it comes 
to the generalisability of their claims, or the reliability and validity of their argu-
ments. The road to such self-awareness has been a long and often painful one. 
Perhaps more than any other discipline, anthropology has had to deal with its 
colonial, modernist, Western-centric, and masculine past. A motley crew of 
actors, such as feminist anthropology, Edward Said, Laura Nader with her call 
to “study up”, post-colonial theorists, the Writing Culture school of the 1980s, 
and many others have endeavoured to transform anthropology from within with 
a more or less common aim – to give stage to the hitherto silenced voices and 
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to undermine the traditional authority in anthropological texts. Consequently, 
and for a few decades already, anthropology of anthropology is part and parcel 
of critical anthropological research.
Those who preached the death of theory in the 1980s, on the wave of post-
modern eclecticism which deeply affected how anthropologists collected data and 
wrote books, and how those books were read, have been wrong. Anthropological 
theory is far from dead, and the recent so-called ontological turn in anthropol-
ogy and other social sciences is but one proof of this. The ethnographic fields on 
which contemporary anthropologists work have also become more multifarious, 
i.e. the ‘traditional’ fields are now coupled with delocalised, transnational, and 
even virtual fields. This has direct implications for the data that anthropologists 
collect and the methods that they use for analysis. 
Art Leete’s and Peeter Torop’s co-authored paper builds on these broad trends, 
but focuses more specifically on the contested interplay between ethnographic 
data and cultural theory. This is a joint venture by an ethnologist/anthropologist 
and a semiotician, and as such contributes to both disciplines, which, despite 
their proximity, have in recent decades collaborated less that they potentially 
could.

Maie Helm “Kiirustaja” (“Haste”) 1987.  
Etching, paper. 25 x 24.1 cm.
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The unnatural:  
six excursions towards a situated concept
Franz Krause, Tarmo Pikner, Maaris Raudsepp, Kadri Kasemets, Anne Kull
Abstract. What does it mean to call something unnatural? And what does it 
do? This chapter illustrates how the unnatural is an immensely powerful, if 
inherently ambiguous, concept with critical implications for the formation of 
social categories, the morality of classifications, the terms of urban govern-
ance and the directions of environmental conflicts. What people consider 
unnatural is a question of framing, strategising, and the significance of the 
respective categorical boundaries; its meaning emerges through on-going 
and often conflicting ecologies of practice. Thinking about the unnatural 
can be seen as an opportunity to explicitly expand cultural theory beyond 
a focus on describing and explaining unnatural (human, constructed, imag-
ined, symbolic) phenomena, and towards an exploration of the material-
semiotic processes that produce the unnatural and the powerful efficacy of 
the concept. The chapter lays out various dimensions of the unnatural in six 
excursions that take the reader through (1) its implications in the academic 
division of labour; (2) the making and maintaining of categorical boundaries; 
(3) theories of hybrids and monsters; (4) articulations of the unnatural in 
urban ruins;  (5) the unnatural in urban planning for former summer house 
cooperatives in Estonia; and (6) the role of the unnatural in assigning or 
foregoing responsibility for environmental change. The chapter concludes 
that the unnatural should be approached as a label that functions as a means 
for policing boundaries, articulating claims and positioning humans vis-à-vis 
each other and in relation to the wider world.
Keywords: categorisation, cyborg, environmental conflict, morality, respon-
sibility, urban governance
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 140–173.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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Introduction
What is unnatural? Why do people refer to certain things as unnatural? And how 
does this reference configure their relationships to other humans and the wider 
world? This chapter explores how the concept of the ‘unnatural’ emerges and is 
used in different contexts, and what consequences the ‘unnatural’ has politically, 
socially and culturally. It does so through six excursions that illustrate different 
dimensions of the unnatural, their emergence, utilisation and consequences.
Much has been written about the concept of ‘nature’, while its polar oppo-
site has largely remained in the shadows of academic attention. However, in an 
age when the natural has been declared obsolete as a substantive category (e.g. 
McKibben 1989; Sayre 2012), it may be high time to inspect its antonym more 
closely. In this chapter, we illustrate how the unnatural is an immensely powerful, 
if inherently ambiguous, concept with critical implications for the formation of 
social categories, the morality of classifications, the terms of urban governance 
and the directions of environmental conflicts. What is considered unnatural is 
a question of framing, strategizing, and of the significance of the respective cat-
egorial boundaries; its meaning emerges through on-going and often conflicting 
‘ecologies of practice’ (Stengers 2005). This applies both to so-called ‘emic’, or folk 
conceptualisations, and to the world of the ‘etic’ categories in which our own 
scholarly practice is couched. We argue that the construction of the unnatural 
is so deeply entwined with wider social, political and cultural dynamics that it 
must not be taken for granted as a foundational circumscription of the subject 
matter of cultural theory. In a world where natural and unnatural emerge as 
shifting configurations of matter and meaning, cultural theory is faced with the 
opportunity to explicitly expand its own frame of reference beyond what the 
‘natural sciences’ have left over, to embrace the total spectrum of phenomena in 
which culture is cultivated. 
In what follows, we approach the unnatural from six different angles, in order 
to elucidate complementary aspects of the concept’s efficacy. Each angle is illus-
trated through an excursion, which may to some extent link to other excursions, 
but may also be read as a stand-alone section. The sheer multiplicity of the ways 
in which the different sections tackle this issue is illustrative of the multiple ways 
in which the ‘unnatural’ is produced. In the first excursion, we shall trace how 
the ‘unnatural’ has come to be synonymous with the ‘cultural’ in the academic 
division of labour between the natural sciences and the humanities. We argue 
that cultural theory must not limit itself to the ‘unnatural’ leftovers of the natural 
sciences, but should dare to approach the world as a whole. 
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The analogy of the unnatural and the cultural is only one of the many dimen-
sions that make up the term. The second excursion will outline another important 
aspect of the unnatural, namely as a label to verbalise and sanction categorial and 
social boundaries. Whereas essentialising behaviour creates and maintains strict 
delineations of what belongs inside a certain category or group, the outside of 
this is usually less strictly defined. Therefore, the unnatural – as a label indicat-
ing a negation of an essential quality, without specifying its otherness – becomes 
a powerful concept, invoking abjection, fear or disgust. 
This is developed further in the third excursion, which brings the unnatural 
into a conversation with the cyborg concept. We note two dimensions of this jux-
taposition: on the one hand, the unnaturalness of the cyborg rests in its categorial 
transgression, and therefore its threat to the classificatory order; on the other 
hand, the tension between the omnipresence of cyborgs and the maintenance of 
categorial boundaries also points toward the ceaseless and complicated work of 
‘purification’ that is needed to uphold a classificatory order in the face of a much 
messier reality. This builds on Donna Haraway’s work on the cyborg (e.g. 1991), 
in which she problematises the limitation of categories for new ways of think-
ing, and celebrates the potential of the cyborg as a figure beyond these limita-
tions. The section also engages Bruno Latour’s (1993) observations concerning 
the processes of purification that are necessary, for instance, for distinguishing 
and keeping apart the domains of nature and culture.  
The fourth excursion considers such processes of amalgamation and purifica-
tion in the context of urban ruins in Estonia. It illustrates how the unnatural is 
never a given entity, but emerges out of complex ecologies of practice, in which 
materiality and non-human entities are participating alongside human beings. 
In Estonian urban ruins, ‘natural’ processes of decay and growth intersperse 
with and complicate the ‘unnatural’ forms and materials of urban structures. 
Conversely, these forms and materials also complicate naive assumptions about 
a re-naturalisation of the ruins: an urban gardening initiative enthusiastic to 
advance the post-industrial use of the ruins, for instance, was faced with the 
problem of potentially contaminated ground, turning their home-grown produce 
into a health hazard.     
In the fifth excursion, the unnatural is traced as a discursive strategy by which 
a new urban planning philosophy is distancing itself from the planning main-
stream. Here, the unnatural addresses the question of to what extent it is ‘natural’ 
to extend urban lifestyles into ‘nature’, or whether the logic of cities itself can 
be transformed so as to re-develop ecological relationships and consciousness 
in urban contexts that have classically been considered ‘unnatural’ par excellence. 
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In this light, urban sprawl around Tallinn is analysed as a development facing 
conflicting understandings of the unnatural in urban planning.  
Finally, the sixth excursion traces how the unnatural functions as an attribu-
tor of responsibility. Based on two accounts of hydroengineering, we illustrate 
how calling a flood ‘unnatural’ brings it into the human sphere of causation, 
where the respective actions are subject to moral evaluation. Conversely, we show 
that labelling a reservoir ‘natural’ downplays the responsibility of its builders 
for the violence and destruction it caused. If something is called unnatural, it is 
presented as somebody’s fault. This insight is used to develop Latour’s (2004a) 
proposition that an appeal to the natural ‒ as a given realm of reality known 
through the sciences ‒ forecloses political debate: the unnatural pries this open, 
and explicitly reintroduces situated human beings and ways of knowing, thereby 
facilitating, if not outright demanding, debate. 
In these explorations of the unnatural, the concept always emerges out of 
specific, materially and semiotically situated practices and discourses. The result-
ing understanding of unnatural must therefore not be mistaken for a claim to 
the universality of the concept or its particular set of meanings presented here. 
Furthermore, in arguing for an attention to the situatedness of the unnatural, 
we must be cautious that this arguing is done in a specific language ‒ i.e. the 
English of early 21st century academic writing ‒ which itself implies certain webs 
of meanings in relation to the term ‘unnatural’. In other languages, this term 
may be bound up in significantly different webs of meaning, or may not exist as 
a direct translation at all. For example, we forcefully encountered this tension 
when writing and discussing earlier drafts of this text in Estonian, a language 
which distinguishes between ebaloomulik (unnatural concerning a deviance from 
an essence, expectation or habit) and mittelooduslik (unnatural concerning a phe-
nomenon that is not considered part of the realm of nature). In discussions, we 
learned that our analysis not only veered between these two concepts, but that 
in some sections our focus might be best translated as loodusetu (literally: with-
out nature), even though this word is not actually used in Estonian. Studying 
lists of synonyms and antonyms to these Estonian words, we found that what 
in English is called ‘unnatural’ may describe the unfamiliar, out of place, non-
normal or unpredictable; the immoral, wrong or perverse; a divergence from 
an inner essence or inherent logic; the fake, sham or insincere; or the artificial, 
cultivated and cultured.
This multisemantic field caused not only some confusion among us authors 
and Estonian-speaking audiences, but also an increased alertness to the specific-
ity and potential incommensurability of the concept across linguistic, historical 
and socio-cultural settings. Most of all, it underlined the fact that the ‘unnatural’ 
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is inevitably a constructed phenomenon, where both the content – that which 
is referred to as unnatural – and the meaning – that which is implied by calling 
something unnatural, ebaloomulik, mittelooduslik or loodusetu – depends on the 
social, political and material context. All claims about the ‘unnatural’ are hence 
situated in specific sets of relationships and ideologies, including those made 
by scientists. 
The unnatural and cultural theory
At its core, the question of what is unnatural is a question of framing, and of 
reinforcing its opposite, the ‘natural’. This has also become a central problem for 
cultural theory, since its subject matter, ‘culture’, has traditionally been considered 
an opposite to ‘nature’: ‘culture’ was seen as ‘unnatural’ par excellence. If, how-
ever, the unnatural emerges from practices of framing, it is itself a sociocultur-
ally contingent phenomenon and not to be mistaken for an analytical concept 
in cultural theory, and even less for a domain defining the subject matter of 
cultural theory. Rather than using the unnatural – as that which is ‘not natural’ 
– to explain cultural processes, we need to explore cultural processes to explain 
how the unnatural comes about in specific contexts and for particular people, 
both materially and categorially. Furthermore, instead of confining the scope of 
these cultural processes to the unnatural, i.e. to phenomena that are left out of 
the theories and methods of the natural sciences, cultural theory must embrace 
the entire world in which culture unfolds, no matter whether this happens to be 
labelled ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’. 
Considering the historical roots of studies of culture and society, it is evident 
that this field has its origins in the 19th century, shortly after the establishment 
of biology as a distinct field of study. To some extent, the ‘unnatural’ can thus 
be considered the foundational claim of cultural theory in general. When biol-
ogy grew as the authoritative method of studying and explaining ‘nature’, some 
scholars were at pains to emphasise that human life is not reducible to the natural 
laws formulated by biology (Carrithers 2010). They argued above all that human 
diversity is not due to a variety of biologically determined races, but rather to 
a set of learned characteristics that became known as ‘culture’. Cultural research 
and theory came to work on this aspect of humanity, which was considered not 
instinctive or inborn, not governed by the biologically defined laws of nature, 
in a word: unnatural.
This heritage still haunts social and cultural theory today. As Nigel Clark 
(2011) observes, when ‘critical theory’ attempted to grapple with environmental 
issues in the second half of the 20th century, it encountered severe conceptual 
145
The unnatural: six excursions towards a situated concept
impasses as it found itself limited to treating the natural as conflicting sets of 
social and cultural constructions because it lacked direct access to the natural. 
Its more successful attempts to reframe these issues and overcome the divide 
came in the guise of emphasising the reworking and negotiating of material 
realities through social and cultural processes. Focusing on urbanisation, pollu-
tion, genetic engineering, and other human-induced processes, the natural was 
declared obsolete and replaced by hybrids or cyborgs, i.e. manifestations of the 
social and cultural in material forms and spheres that were formerly considered 
natural.
Clark considers this approach as an inadequate concealment of cultural 
theory in its established realm, extending its accustomed logic of the ‘unnatural’ 
(i.e. about technologies, mental constructions, symbols, etc.) to the natural, and 
thereby failing to take into account the full potential of the natural: “It at once 
treats the environmental predicament with deadly seriousness, and shrewdly 
turns this predicament around so that it bolsters rather than undermines the 
resistance of social and cultural thought to the natural referent” (Clark 2011, 8). 
Some accounts of the Anthropocene, for instance, may therefore be severely 
limited, as they are based on integrating the natural world into cultural frames 
of analysis and theorising – i.e. unnaturalising – it, based on the established 
division of labour.
A crucial implication of analysing the unnatural is therefore that cultural 
theory must transcend its traditional limitation to the ‘unnatural’ and grapple 
with reframing its analyses to include the total world, including the ‘natural’. It is 
in this total world – which includes not only symbols and urban planning, but 
also concrete, plants, animals and rivers – that humans form, experience and 
reinvent their collective lives. Realising that what is considered unnatural and 
what is not fundamentally depends on social, cultural and material processes 
of transformation and negotiation, cultural theory cannot restrict its frame of 
reference to the unnatural, to those things not covered by the natural sciences. 
A broadening of cultural theory has the potential to come to terms with the cur-
rent ecological crisis and its deep connections to various other crises, including 
those in cultures of energy use, production and consumption, urbanity, and 
environmental conservation.
In order to overcome the limitations of cultural theory to the ‘unnatural’, we 
might be well advised to follow recent theoretical developments in the social 
sciences and humanities. For example, within semiotics, an approach that is 
often termed ecosemiotics analyses communication and meaning-making across 
species, to present human culture as part of a larger continuum of semiotic pro-
cesses (Maran & K. Kull 2014; Kohn 2013). “Ecosemiotics does not build a barrier 
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between human semiotic activities and those of other habitants and thus allows 
research questions to be raised about the whole communicative structure of the 
geographical space” (Maran & K. Kull 2014, 48). Focusing more on agency than 
on communication, the approach that has become famous as Actor–Network-
Theory emphasises that ‘social’ or ‘cultural’ phenomena like institutions, markets 
and knowledge critically depend on the material, non-human elements within 
their make-up (Latour 2005b). The social or the cultural, in this view, do not 
exist in opposition to the natural or the material, even if this opposition is the 
hallmark of modernity. Rather, social and cultural forms are assembled out of 
heterogeneous elements, many of which have non-human origins. In addition, 
in political theory scholars like Bennett (2010) have noted how non-humans – 
and even inorganic matter – play a critical and active role in political processes 
and power struggles, not just as ‘objects’ of struggles, but as ‘vibrant’ participants 
in the assemblages that shape and enable polities and politics. 
In sociology, the continuity of human and non-human relations has been 
conceptualised through a social practice approach (Shove et al 2012; Shove & 
Spurling 2013), which analyses practices as enduring social entities, consisting of 
interdependent elements – bodily activities, mental activities (knowledge, belief, 
motivation, etc.) and the physical environment. By recurrently enacting certain 
practices, human beings both reproduce and innovate social rules and meanings, 
and shape their environments. Since these practices are not set against a pas-
sive ‘natural world’, but are conceptualised as arising in close relationships with 
non-humans, they cannot be easily assigned to an ‘unnatural’ domain of human 
life. Furthermore, there are on-going discussions in human geography about 
turbulent, interrogative and excessive materiality, which is perpetually beyond 
the grasp of humans (e.g. Anderson & Harrison 2010). Hence, recent theoreti-
cal and methodological developments in geography have aimed at “reimagining 
relations between the material, perceptual, affectual, and discursive” (Anderson 
& Wylie 2009, 332). All these trends suggest that the unnatural ‒ and its relation 
to culture and cultural theory ‒ must not be taken for granted. Rather, once we 
recognise forms and meanings as enactments in a context of turbulent materi-
ality, it becomes clear that no phenomenon is inherently natural or unnatural. 
Instead, the ‘unnatural’ emerges from materially and socially situated processes 
of dynamic meaning-making. If the natural and the unnatural are not pre-given 
categories, then no particular disciplinary tradition – neither the natural sciences 
nor cultural theory – has exclusive access to any specific part of the world.
Within anthropology, research has long pointed to the problems of attempt-
ing to limit the study of culture to the ‘unnatural’ aspects of people’s lives, not 
only in ecological anthropology (Steward 1955; Ingold 2000), which emphasises 
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the integration of social and ecological relations, but also in the studies of cos-
mologies (Strathern 1980; Bird-David 1990; Kohn 2013) that problematise the 
validity of the natural–unnatural conceptual pair as an analytical frame alto-
gether. Recently, anthropologists have begun to write ‘multispecies ethnographies’ 
(Kirksey & Helmreich 2010) and argued for making ‘more-than-human sociality’ 
(Tsing 2013) more explicit in description and analysis. Developing cultural theory 
beyond the ‘unnatural’ also implies radically rethinking the concepts of person 
and organism, classically the principal units of cultural and biological studies 
respectively. Ingold (2013, 10), for instance, argues that “we can no longer think of 
the organism, human or otherwise, as a discrete, bounded entity, set over against 
an environment. It is rather a locus of growth within a field of relations traced 
out in flows of materials.” And Kohn observes:
An anthropology that focuses on the relations we humans have with non-
human beings forces us to step beyond the human. In the process it makes 
what we’ve taken to be the human condition ‒ namely, the paradoxical, and 
‘provincialized’, fact that our nature is to live immersed in the ‘unnatural’ 
worlds we construct ‒ appear a little strange. Learning how to appreciate this 
is an important goal of an anthropology beyond the human. (Kohn 2013, 42)
Thinking about the unnatural can therefore be seen as an opportunity to explicitly 
expand cultural theory, beyond a focus on describing and explaining unnatural 
(human, constructed, imagined, symbolic) phenomena, and towards an explo-
ration of the material-semiotic processes that produce the unnatural and the 
powerful efficacy of the concept. 
Moral boundaries and the uncanny beyond
Thus, the unnatural arises out of oppositions to what is considered natural, and 
thereby crucially depends on the framing of the natural. In the previous sec-
tion, we have shown how this opposition has traditionally played out in the 
academic division of labour. In what follows, we shall spell out some of the other 
dimensions of the unnatural, which are all oppositions to particular aspects of 
an assumed ‘natural’ other. If the essence of this natural other is perceived to be 
adulterated, the outcome is an ‘unnatural’ phenomenon, which is often evaluated 
negatively as a deviation from the morally correct state of affairs. As will become 
clear, the idea of unnatural that defines the academic division of labour is not 
fundamentally different from that which has been invoked to justify racism or 
assign responsibility for disasters. The natural–unnatural dichotomy can indeed 
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be considered one of the basic cultural antinomies (Markova 2003) that comprise 
the underlying structure of various meaning complexes and can take different 
forms in specific historical and cultural contexts. The natural–unnatural con-
ceptual pair is not, however, a one-dimensional opposition, as we have hinted at 
in the introduction in relation to the varied Estonian meanings of unnatural. 
Often, these meanings mix and overlap in use, and this multiplicity and ambiva-
lence of meanings provides some of the concept’s power. In the European cultural 
tradition, the opposition to natural may also be the supernatural, associated 
with a transcendental dimension, implying an order beyond the earthly world. 
However, for various reasons including brevity we will not be able to explore this 
dimension further within the scope of this chapter.  
The morality of the unnatural manifests itself in manifold social encoun-
ters, for instance in intergroup relations, when ingroup bias is enhanced by the 
perceived naturalness (normality, habituality) of ingroup characteristics and 
norms, and attributes of outgroups are perceived through some degree of unnatu-
ralness (deviance from one’s own norm). According to sociocultural theories, 
basic antinomies (Marková 2003), or complementary dualities (Valsiner 2007) 
– for example good–bad, us–them, human–nonhuman, edible–inedible, natu-
ral–unnatural ‒ are core components of meaning-making for both individuals 
and societies. On the most basic level, they hold a dialogical tension between 
the opposites that embodies a potential for the dynamic generation of various 
meanings in particular socio-cultural contexts.
In semiotic cultural psychology, it is posited that meaning arises in the form 
of complexes of united opposites (Josephs et al 1999; Valsiner 2007, 2014). The 
meaning is a complex sign given by its manifest part (A) and its hidden counter-
part (non-A) ‒ an indeterminate field of all possible opposites, which participate 
in the dialogical transformation of A. It is through the opposition between the 
meaning and its opposites that new meanings are formed.
New meanings grow in the A < > non-A field through oppositions between 
the known (A) and the ‘hidden other’ (non-A). Such oppositions take the 
form of striving towards ‘the other’: the unknown, the disallowed-yet-desired, 
or to ‘away from’ the already established (A) (Valsiner 2007, 162).
Beyond this semantic opposition there is the vast context of not-A, which does 
not participate in the particular meaning-making process of the A versus non-A 
opposition, but may become a resource for new meanings in other circumstances.
We propose to approach the unnatural as a non-A, a negative, yet dis-
tinctly undefined field that arises out of what A ‒ a meaning, an order, a 
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distinction ‒ is not. This elusiveness and uncanniness of the unnatural, with an 
identity defined by what it is not, rather than by what it is, accounts for part of 
the power of the concept. It can be alluded to, it can be used to label outsiders 
and infractions, it can lurk at the margins, and it can be implied to redistribute 
blame; but it cannot be grasped, dissected and made harmless. 
Of course, meanings are never singular, and never fixed in time. Processes 
of meaning transformation are catalysed by socio-cultural change: a rupture 
in societal routine, a situation of social controversy or conflict, may activate dis-
cussions, disputes and debate, in the process of which unreflective levels of mean-
ing (implicit antinomies) become the focus of attention. In the process of social 
dialogues, these basic oppositions are problematised and re-ordered (anchored 
to an existing system of meanings) and tied to certain communication genres. 
Symbolic meanings are ascribed to them, and they are elaborated into full-scale 
social representations (Marková 2003). The antinomy of natural–unnatural thus 
embodies a meaning potential that can generate various individual and collec-
tive meaning complexes, expressed through narratives, discourses and systems 
of practice. The natural–unnatural opposition belongs to their deep underlying 
structure.
The socio-cultural mechanisms of collective meaning-making include the 
processes of anchoring and objectification (Moscovici 1984). Anchoring means 
relating the represented object to a network of conventionalised meanings and 
socio-cultural subject positions, and objectification refers to the elaboration of 
a figurative form (iconic, metaphorical) that is comfortable for representing 
and communication. These processes may be multi-layered and multi-staged. 
For instance, anchoring may start by establishing the general valence and emo-
tional tone of the object (Rochira 2014). Depending on that initial stage, natural 
(as opposed to unnatural) may acquire either positive or negative valence in the 
subsequent anchoring to a certain semantic context. An example of positive 
valence would be the meaning of natural nature as harmonious being, as opposed 
to non-natural human culture as disharmonious being (Lotman 1992, 44–51). 
Negative valence of natural being can be found in Sloterdijk’s (2013) opposition 
of a natural, unreflective and non-authentic ‘swamp of habit’ to a hyper-natural 
authentic self-conscious self-mastery.
Collective meaning complexes are multi-dimensional, embracing multiple 
thematic oppositions where the ‘unnatural’ may stand for the non-natural, the 
non-civilised or the non-us; in each case it denotes a claim that something or 
someone is not part of a particular, ‘correct’ order. The basic natural–unnatural 
antinomy may participate in generating social representations of AIDS, certain 
outgroups (Perez et al 2007), genetically modified food (Wagner et al 2002), 
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global warming (Smith & Joffe 2013), etc. For example, Perez et al (2007) illus-
trate how mainstream representations of Roma are based on the dichotomies of 
nature versus culture and human versus animal, thus justifying the superiority 
of cultured European majorities over natural (uncultivated) Roma minorities. 
Thinking through the antinomy of natural–unnatural may thus occur in vari-
ous spheres of activity and reflect cultural socialisation in particular contexts. 
The natural–unnatural dichotomy may also be used strategically, for example to 
stigmatise and exclude certain social groups or phenomena as ‘unnatural’. So the 
‘naturalness’ of the Roma becomes ‘unnaturalness’ from the point of view of the 
‘civilised’ ingroup, as ‘natural’ Roma do not fit into the cultured world of ‘us’.
Douglas (1966) suggests that conventions are legitimated and reified through 
an analogy with what counts locally as natural. Consider, for example, how, 
in western society, the theme of competition from the biological theory of natu-
ral selection is used to support the ‘naturalness’ of individualism. The idea of 
the natural is thus a strategic resource mobilised to support truth claims, with 
categories in nature mirroring and reinforcing conventions relating to social 
practice (Tansey 2004, 21).
Psychological transformations in the process of dialogical meaning-making 
may include boundary transformation (Marková 2003, 185; for example, the con-
tent of what is natural and unnatural may change), transition between opposites, 
modulation of the tension between the opposites, or synthesis of a new tension 
between new opposites (Josephs et al 1999). However, it is not only the changing 
of these meanings that requires work, special activity is also required to maintain 
oppositions and ensure they continue to relate to certain entities.
Hybridity, cyborgs and monsters
In this third section, we focus on the unnatural as it emerges through perceived 
confusion or infraction of categorial essences and boundaries. Such structural 
models are usually based on Mary Douglas’s (1966) seminal work Purity and Dan-
ger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, which defines pollution 
and dirt as ‘matter out of place’, i.e. phenomena that disturb a particular concep-
tual order. According to this view, things or practices are not dirty in themselves, 
but become dirty when they transgress the order they are meant to be part of. 
Shoes, therefore, are not dirty when they are on the floor, but become pollution 
when placed on the kitchen table. Perhaps, the unnatural should be considered 
a ‘residual category’ in Douglas’s (1966) sense, as an attempt to describe phe-
nomena that do not fit our general classification system. According to Douglas, 
this is not merely a cognitive issue, but equally an emotional one. She argues 
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that disgust is a response to a threat to the known and predictable order, the 
“cherished classifications” (op cit, 45). For example, there may be psychological 
and cultural barriers against accepting biological hybrids or genetically modified 
organisms as unproblematic sources of food – these products are perceived as 
unnatural, weird and provoking public resistance. Support or resistance to new 
biotechnologies is closely related to perceived naturalness or unnaturalness of 
the technology (Raudsepp & Rämmer 2013).
In the Western cultural context, the monster is originally related to something 
anomalous outside the natural order, something that could not be categorised, 
described, named or explained. In pre-modern times, monsters were treated as 
a message, for example a warning against human hubris and future catastrophes, 
or a reminder of the divine order. Monsters of modernity tend to reflect the hid-
den and dark sides of the human mind. An analysis of media representation of 
modern biotechnology, which is felt to transgress the boundary between natu-
ral and artefactual, reveals the features of monstrosity: hybridity (blurring the 
boundaries between natural types), turning the moral order upside down, and 
exposing an invisible threat under the guise of normality (Wagner et al 2006). 
The opposition of natural (as normal) and unnatural (as abnormal) is clearly 
demonstrated here. These images resonate with public representations of hybrids.
Several experimental studies (e.g. Wagner et al 2010) have revealed that peo-
ple in different cultures perceive genetic hybrids more negatively and with emer-
gent qualities of monstrosity compared to ‘natural’ animals. Similarly, if a group 
is conceptualised in terms of unalterable essences, then ethnically mixed mating 
tends to be perceived as producing hybrid offspring that are met with disgust 
by extreme right-wing individuals or other people who essentialise (Holtz & 
Wagner 2012; Wagner et al 2010). This disgust is related to a perceived category 
confusion and blurring of natural boundaries that undermines order in society.
In both cases the unnatural monstrosity is constructed as a result of a per-
ceived destruction of a natural categorial order:
We argue that the mechanism is based on a way of thinking that tends to 
essentialize natural and social categories, making their members mutually 
exclusive entities, where ‘essence’ is widely understood as being equivalent 
to an exemplar’s genetic endowment (Wagner et al 2010, 232–233).
Clearly, for racists, culture and nature form an inseparable whole that 
defines the essence of ethnic groups. As a result, the offspring of mixed mar-
riages are perceived as lacking a clearly defined identity (op cit, 244).
[…] besides being unfamiliar, an essentializer will perceive the hybrid 
as highly unnatural, unpleasant, negative, as a threat to the received ‘natural 
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order’ and as lacking a category identity. Hybrids transcend the categorical 
grid of the local world, as seen by the essentializer, and imply category con-
fusion (op cit, 235).
Thus, by transcending the perceived boundaries of naturalness and normality, 
hybrids, biological and cultural mixtures may be understood as monsters repre-
senting an unnatural order of being. In contemporary Western society, the barely 
secularised salvation story still depends on the transcendental origins of order, 
laws and essences (if not God, then Nature or Culture); popular discourse sees 
the search for our own true nature in deciphering the code structures of DNA 
(Haraway 1997). 
A natural phenomenon is perceived as unnatural if its ‘essence’ has been 
transformed (for example, when by certain genetic modifications it is mixed 
with other ‘essences’). Thinking in terms of essence, that is, attributing organ-
isms a species-specific essence, implies that genetic hybrids (genetically modified 
organisms) are perceived as lacking identity and a clear belonging to a ‘natu-
ral kind’ category. The hybrid’s lack of belonging makes people judge them as 
unnatural and threatening, close to being monsters – cultural phenomena that 
mark the transcendence of hitherto known categories that structure the familiar 
world of natural beings (Wagner et al 2006, 2010).
“While cultures may differ in the ways in which they name and classify natural 
kinds, societies across the globe mobilize moral feelings to defend their cul-
ture’s classification system against deviant cases” (Leach 1972 in Kronberger et al 
2014, 109). This theoretical line suggests that abnormalities ‒ such as hybrids ‒ 
should be abhorred and met with moral repugnance (Douglas 1966), no mat-
ter whether they have come into existence naturally or by genetic modification 
(Kronberger et al 2014, 109). However, part of the context in which repugnance 
and prohibitions appear consists of permissions and prescriptions. Typically, 
negative judgments are the reverse side of affirmative valuations and cannot be 
understood without keeping these in mind. If harmonious social and cosmic 
order is an ultimate value, then monsters in their perverse way underline this 
value. Understanding the cultural basis of such ‘monsterising’ transformation 
of meaning should enable us to reflect critically on attempts to naturalise social 
categories in group-specific (political) interests, and to see the possibilities for 
their representational and discursive denaturalisation (see Holtz & Wagner 2012).
Something or somebody is a monster, an abomination, with respect to some 
system of concepts. An abomination must be anomalous or at least marginal. 
It must combine characteristics uniquely identified with separate kinds of thing, 
or at least fail to fall unambiguously into any recognised class (Stout 1988, 148). 
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For example, if the line between masculine and feminine roles is strict and forms 
the basis of the division of labour or the rules of inheritance, we may expect to 
see bearded women and hermaphrodites turning up in freak shows, or observe 
strong condemnation of homosexual behaviour. The degree of repugnance 
depends on such factors as the presence, sharpness, and social significance of 
conceptual distinctions. However, the inversion of the norms may also be playful, 
allowing a momentary release from their sway, as is evident, for instance, in car-
nivals. The transgressor, the monster, the trickster may then act as a mediator 
between different realms, or as a demonstrator of the proper laws of cosmic and 
social order by the very act of transgressing them in a controlled (for example, 
ritual or staged) situation. 
Not all categorial transgressions are policed in the same manner. This seems 
to depend on the situation in which the transgression occurs, and on the signifi-
cance of the categorial distinction that is being upset. Only some transgressions 
are labelled as unnatural and are subject to severe moral judgement. Jeffrey Stout 
(1988) notes that his young daughter confused cats with rabbits, calling animals 
from both species “cabbits”. Evidently, the girl had not yet learned to distinguish 
them as different categorial kinds, and therefore was unlikely not only to notice 
anything anomalous in the cabbit, but also to be disgusted by it. A “moral abomi-
nation”, in Stout’s analysis, thus only arises if it is “anomalous or ambiguous with 
respect to some system of concepts” (Stout 1988, 148). Stout further notes that the 
intensity of moral disgust generated by abominations (he discusses homosexual-
ity!) depends upon the presence, social significance, and sharpness of conceptual 
distinctions. This is an important observation, for it explains why the cabbit, 
articulated by a young girl, remains merely a repugnant curiosity, whereas bestial-
ity or cannibalism arouse deep feelings of horror and disgust. The conceptual line 
between cats and rabbits may be less significant than the conceptual line between 
humans and other animals. This also explains why the image of the cyborg often 
arouses intense fear and disgust, for it visually and conceptually transgresses the 
same ontological boundary as cannibalism or bestiality: it threatens the distinc-
tion between human and nonhuman.
Categorial transgressions thus come under different guises ‒ some are playful, 
some might just signal ignorance or lack of style, but some produce phenomena 
that are labelled unnatural and met with outrage or disgust. Discussions sur-
rounding the cyborg suggest that it may be particularly when basic ontological 
boundaries – for example between different natural kinds, such as species, or 
between human and non-human ‒ are breached, that the unnatural emerges. 
For example, Leon Kass (1997), an American physician and conservative public 
intellectual and educator, controversial chairman of the President’s Council on 
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Bioethics from 2001 to 2005, and sharp critic of euthanasia, human cloning and 
embryo research, categorises cloning alongside incest, bestiality, and cannibal-
ism, suggesting that like these acts ‒ which arouse horror and disgust by violat-
ing the ontological boundary of human and nonhuman ‒ cloning, too, violates 
this boundary at the expense of valuing human dignity and identity by making 
human children into ‘artefacts’. For this reason, cyborgs and other posthuman 
hybrids are often seen as figures of the monstrous, moral abominations resulting 
from the transgression of ontological boundaries. Elaine Graham writes: “Just 
as monsters of the past marked out the moral and topographical limits of their 
day, so today other similar[ly] strange and alien creatures enable us to gauge the 
implications of the crossing of technological boundaries” (Graham 2002, 39). 
If the monsters’ monstrosity is thus a product of a particular representational 
framing that cannot take account of them, then we can “reorient and regulate 
the proliferation of monsters by representing their existence officially”, as Latour 
(1993, 12) writes. Monsters and cyborgs are unnatural as long as the phenomena 
they embody cannot be easily accommodated in our conceptual framing. 
A cyborg is a hybrid figure: neither wholly organic nor solely mechanical, the 
cyborg is both simultaneously, straddling these taken-for-granted ontological and 
social categories. Haraway (1991, 151‒153) identifies three “breached boundaries” 
represented by the cyborg: human/animal, organism/machine, and (as a subset 
of the second) physical/nonphysical. The human/nonhuman animal boundary 
is as actively defended as it is breached. That we often feel a need to police the 
boundary is the direct result and a symptom of the fragility of boundaries. Yet, 
the cyborg can be seen as a symbol and description of a contemporary mode of 
existence. The hybridity of the cyborg, as well as its manufactured, technologi-
cal origin, defy the expectation of a single, given, biologically inherited ‘nature’. 
In addition, in a wider sense, cyborg hybridity calls into question the concept 
of ‘Nature’ as the determining origin of all biological natures. Again, this has 
tangible moral implications. Haraway (op cit) argues against appeals to ahistoric 
Nature not only because concepts of nature are culturally constructed and his-
torical rather than timeless and essential, but also because these historical, cul-
tural concepts have not been morally neutral. Rather, they have been damaging 
and oppressive, employed to reinforce sexism, racism, homophobia, and other 
forms of infectious fear of the other. At the same time, Haraway resists mod-
ern technoscience’s opposite extreme of a ‘nature of no nature’. This perspective 
reads nature as a blank slate, infinitely malleable and available as raw material 
for the meaning-giving activities of human beings. As Haraway points out, this 
is simply a reiteration of the old dualism of nature–culture, only without the 
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transcendental – nature without the capital N but nonetheless equally available 
for human exploitation as infinite resource.
Looking for “another relationship to nature besides reification and possession,” 
Haraway (1992b, 296) insists that nature is a socially constructed category, pos-
ing as an absolute with the power to dictate permissible social, moral, political, 
and technoscientific norms and practices. The illusion of naturally given norms 
appears in many contexts. However, nature is not constructed solely by humans: 
the construction of nature is a project, a kind of relationship and an achieve-
ment undertaken by human and nonhuman agents. Whatever nature is, it is not 
a simple given, and Haraway’s plea is that we recognise our responsibility in its 
construction, and our complicity in its destruction. Haraway attempts to dispel 
the illusion of self-evident necessity surrounding natural discourse wherever it 
appears: “Queering what counts as nature is my categorical imperative […] not 
for the easy frisson of transgression, but for the hope of livable worlds” (Haraway 
1992a, 60).
Different kinds of cyborg are all around us. There are those humans who have 
artificial organs or prostheses, there are those whose creativity is expressed pre-
dominantly via technologies, and those who dream of enhancement, military or 
otherwise. Even to have a concept of cyborg, without literally cyborgic embodi-
ment, makes us different from people who lived perhaps only a few decades 
ago. Haraway has pointed out that all claims of identity based on a natural or 
organic standpoint are suspect. Her talk of cyborgs deliberately breaks down the 
dichotomy between nature and technology, natural and unnatural. The cyborg 
has no recourse to an imagined organic unity: it requires both the biological and 
the technological. Our nature is technonature and our culture is technoculture. 
If we look for nature outside of ourselves and our practices, we may lose both 
ourselves and nature (K. Kull 2000). 
As Latour (1993) has pointed out, the cyborg represents one side of a coin 
of twin movements in modern Western society. Latour focuses on the relation-
ship between the concepts of nature and culture, and how the context, which 
he calls “the modern constitution” (op cit, e.g. 13), simultaneously connects and 
distinguishes them. In order to produce and to deal with hybrid mixtures, the 
inverse movement of keeping nature and culture separate, which Latour terms 
‘purification’, is equally important. “If we consider hybrids, we are dealing only 
with mixtures of nature and culture; if we consider the work of purification, we 
confront a total separation between nature and culture” (op cit 1993, 30). This 
relationship is also at play in the production of the unnatural. The on-going work 
in producing and maintaining a conceptual framework that makes particular 
phenomena (sexual practices, hybrid life forms, urban structures, etc.) appear 
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unnatural must be concealed when presenting the framing as factual. As much 
as an acknowledgement of the ‘proliferation of the unnatural’ (to paraphrase 
Latour) is contributing to a re-evaluation of the cyborg, the parallel process of 
purification keeps enacting categorial distinction and boundaries, producing 
new or reproducing old conceptual spaces of the unnatural. 
The cyborg, the embodiment of this problematic interrelationship between 
mixture and separation, between naturalising and unnaturalising, draws atten-
tion not only to the multi-directional dynamics involved in producing the unnat-
ural, but also to the direct implication of human bodies and identities in ques-
tions of the unnatural and its negotiation. Framing the unnatural is thus not only 
a statement about the order of a world external from us, but includes at its heart 
a positioning of the human within this world, and of human relationships with 
organic and technological forms and processes.
The unnatural as a tension in abandoned urban areas
Discursive enactments and categorisations do not exist on their own, but thrive 
and change within an ‘ecology of practices’ (Stengers 2005) where such categories 
are used strategically and emotionally by agents immersed in particular social 
and material relationships. This section considers the ‘unnatural’ as the flicker-
ing and often salient flip-side co-present in various enactments of ‘nature’. This 
flickering category or emotional articulation appears often in practice, unfolding 
and enrolling people and their multiple attachments. Thus, there is a challenge 
to read the ‘unnatural’ in the dance of on-goings, which pushes particular envi-
ronmental realties.
An ecology of practices generates a perspective to understand the becoming 
of practices without grounding definitions or ideals, but according to middle and 
surroundings (Stengers 2005). In an urbanised world, for example, three general 
and often intermingled judgements about nature can be distinguished (Hinchliffe 
2007, 7): nature as an independent state ‘out there’ (but threatened by invasion); 
nature as a dependent colony, a holiday home; and nature as enacted (a co-pro-
duction). This third approach demands imagination and sensibilities to describe 
how urban nature evolves through the myriad relations between humans and 
non-humans, which create and shift essential properties of matter. In this fram-
ing, natural and unnatural are two flickering extremes, which usually interweave 
in transformations of environments and places. 
Wylie (2007) argues that landscape can be approached as a set of tensions 
including the dimensions of inside–outside, presence–absence and near–far. 
In addition, the tension between natural and unnatural can be seen as part of 
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landscape formations, a device enabling people to perceive and understand 
worlds. These tensions may appear along with disturbing things and situations 
in everyday life, where different realities and enacted boundaries generate fric-
tions. Bodies and spaces can incorporate a number of realities, becoming actual 
through partial (not fully exhaustive) social connections (Hinchliffe 2010). This 
means that things are never simply of their current set of relations, but there is 
always something in reserve, something that withdraws. This reserve generates 
the possibility for (unexpected) excess of matter, affecting discourses and cat-
egory boundaries (Anderson & Harrison 2010).  
The tensions between enactments of natural and unnatural can be analysed, 
for example, in the context of wastelands, ruins or other kinds of abandoned 
urban areas. Abandonment is a label or situational quality usually defined in rela-
tion to human usage. However, abandonment by humans as partial rupture of 
care also enables us to reframe the modern vision of linear development and 
decay. Ruins are often taken over by various plants generating suitable habitats for 
birds. Decaying buildings can be squatted or used by artists enacting particular 
qualities and atmospheres. Thus, ruins are interesting because they constitute 
undefined change and void, which dissolve and create some properties/qualities 
of matter by bringing together things, emotions and discourses.
In many city centres of Europe and beyond, former industrial complexes 
are integrated into a dynamic urban fabric by generating a wide spectrum of 
values. The design and reuse of industrial remains enable us to problematise 
and understand the relations between urbanity and nature (Whatmore & Hinch-
liffe 2010). Here, engagements with nature evolve from abstract visions of the 
revitalisation of ruins to the tactile encounters of experimental city gardening. 
Some of these visions incorporate entities and processes of nature as exemplary 
trajectories of social (non)ordering. The rationalities behind the experimental 
garden as a shared space can be refocused over time since the garden is made up 
of a number of realities such as a community for growing edible plants, a meeting 
place for leisure, a stage for creative collaborations, and a node of urban renewal 
(Pikner 2014). The experience of gardening creates knowledge about the sur-
rounding industrial ruins, and taken-for-granted rationalities of growing edible 
plants may generate doubts when practiced in formerly polluted environments. 
The possibility of pollution, which may be actualised in the form of edible plants, 
triggers an articulation of unnatural entities. These tendencies reveal some ten-
sions and co-constituted relations framing the (un)natural in process.  
Various appearances of pollution and waste influence the framings of the 
unnatural. As an illustrative example, this can be exhaust from petrol engines or 
traffic noise from the streets that become categorised as disturbing matter. But 
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graffiti on neighbourhood walls, the stench of compost piles or thrash metal 
music can evoke different emotions depending on the situations in which they 
appear. This means that particular people, at different times, consider certain 
places more proper for certain things than others. Society and matter grow 
dynamically together by identifying and locating matter (Moore 2012). Waste is 
a transitory relational matter, which reveals some tensions between natural and 
unnatural. These tensions indicate a struggle in generating (local) categories for 
disturbing matter. The disposal of waste involves the managing of social rela-
tions and their representations around themes of movement, incompleteness, 
transformation, and return (Hetherington 2004). The return of divested materi-
als may take several forms, both negative and positive, such as from dangerous 
pollution and disease to an art installation or progressive calls for the clean-
up of surrounding environments. Enacted categories of waste include multiple 
negotiations about what is disturbing (and unnatural). The unnatural appears as 
an emotional attitude and boundary-making practice in association with illegally 
divested trash loads that have extensively been made public. Here, technologically 
mediated spaces of visualisation, of embodiment and of circulation empower 
particular situations and bodies in generating vibrant matter of concern (Pikner 
& Jauhiainen 2014). Thus, tensions bound to conceptual frames of the (un)natu-
ral can be approached as emergent singularities, which become translated into 
on-going socialisation.  
Unnatural urban sprawl?
This section analyses how different urban planning paradigms use understand-
ings of the unnatural to reconstruct the meanings of ‘good urbanity’. It illustrates 
the differences in how modernist and environmental sustainability-oriented 
planning paradigms contextualise the meaning of nature in the urban condition. 
The meaning of unnatural is constantly redefined according to other meaning 
transformations and social transformations in society. This applies, for instance, 
to meanings ascribed to urban landscapes, which in turn influence their fur-
ther developments and appearances (Dakin 2003). Re-valuing choices and solv-
ing various problems may be initiated on both a local and an institutional level 
(municipal planning politics, education, media), but new meaning-making has 
special strength when it is supported by local everyday agency. The meaning 
of unnatural in urban contexts emerges through the city inhabitants’ reflexive 
practices and reasoning. This development could be understood as the innate 
logic of the city (Eigenlogik der Städte), a term widely used in contemporary 
urban sociology. It claims that particular city environments have specific innate 
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characteristics, which can be used for ‘city branding’ or in other meaning-making 
projects by picking up a city’s coherent self-expressions. Such ‘branding’ only 
works, however, if the selected expressions are also livable in everyday practice. 
The self-representation of cities can only be effective when it is based on their 
specific, everyday innate pattern (Löw 2008).
The innate logic of some cities is currently influenced by urban planning 
epistemologies oriented at alternative human-environment relationships. One of 
their strategic aims is to transform the meaning of ecology, nature and greenness 
in people’s minds. The social aspects of ecological issues are emphasised in order 
to deal with different interpretations of ecological contexts in planning processes. 
Understandings of what is natural and unnatural depend on the politics of the 
different interest groups that shape potentially conflicting meanings of ecology 
(Hinchliffe 2007). The meaning of urbanity itself is questioned by asking to what 
extent urbanity is actually opposed to nature. Rather than further emphasis-
ing an assumed urban-rural opposition, this new planning approach highlights 
the potentialities that the unnatural in urban settings offers. These discourses 
understand the unnatural as including ruins, wasteland, unmaintained buildings, 
undervalued built environments like prefabricated housing areas, industrial-
ised environments, motorways, empty lands, dirt, or slums. Different sustain-
able planning theories are provided to engage ecologists, landscape architects, 
urban planners, politicians and local people with each other (Ignatieva et al 2011). 
In planning jargon, this new urban paradigm has been termed “new urbanism”, 
“smart growth”, or “compact city” (Atkinson-Palombo 2010; Hankins & Powers 
2009; Miles & Song 2009; Bell & Lyall 2000; Moore 2010; Talen 2010). The para-
digm may include attempts at ‘ecological design’ by which people’s way of think-
ing about the environment is meant to be influenced (Rogers & Sukolratanametee 
2009). It may also include technologies for renewable energy production such 
as solar panels or wind turbines, or simple techniques like organic gardening or 
compost making (Bang 2005), not to mention ecologically oriented urban com-
munities. The ethics of this socio-ecological approach fosters an awareness of 
how people influence their surroundings with their everyday activities (Steiner 
2011).
This environmentally oriented urban planning paradigm questions urban 
sprawl, which is seen as a problematic outcome of urbanisation. Through criticis-
ing road widening projects (Young et al 2005) or opposing housing developments 
on urban fringes to preserve green space (Cadieux 2008), the usefulness of re-
arranging already urbanised environments is foregrounded (Atkinson-Palombo 
2010). To exemplify the ambivalence of the unnatural–natural opposition in the 
context of changing urban paradigms in Estonia, it is thought-provoking to study 
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the landscapes of former Soviet summerhouse cooperatives around the bigger 
Estonian cities and their transformation into permanent residential areas. Sum-
merhouse cooperatives (known also as dacha areas) were built by different enter-
prises for their employees from the 1960s to the 1980s, during the Soviet period. 
People used their plots to grow vegetables and erect small non-heated houses 
for summer residence. Dachas were inhabited only seasonally. After Estonian 
re-independence in 1991, in the process of large-scale privatisation of formerly 
state-owned assets, these summerhouse cooperatives became entangled in the 
dynamics of urban sprawl, which was often the outcome of unregulated urbani-
sation processes. The land was distributed to the individual members of the 
cooperatives, who fenced off their pieces of land and often sold them. Urban 
sprawl was especially intensive during the housing boom at the end of the 1990s 
and during the 2000s, when new housing developments extended into the forests, 
rural landscapes and former dacha areas (Samarüütel et al 2010). 
The main impulses to move from the city to former cooperatives were simi-
lar to the general causes of suburbanisation, such as desiring one’s own house 
outside the city and the attraction of greenness. Even though the dacha building 
standards and aesthetic appearance did not correspond to popular housing ideals, 
former summerhouse settlements were preferred for permanent living over new 
suburban settlements because in a summerhouse area the price of the plot was 
cheaper (Leetmaa et al 2012). These cooperatives were often built in vernacular 
style, which initially followed construction plans but changed appearance over 
time according to necessity, resulting in an improvised or untidy appearance. 
Such architecture is still in place where initial summerhouse owners have not 
rebuilt or sold their plots. This somewhat messy and wild aesthetic is partly 
changing because for new suburban owners it is more economical to build a com-
pletely new house than to renovate or rebuild an existing former summerhouse. 
Permanent residents’ gardening practices differ from those of former summer 
residents in that permanent residents prefer lawns to a vegetable garden. Some 
summerhouse cooperatives are located on peat soil, and because of spring and 
autumn floods the houses need to be built on raised platforms, the roads need 
continuous maintenance and the gardens need more care. With the transforma-
tion from summer colonies to suburban neighbourhoods, municipal infrastruc-
ture like roads, water and sewerage systems are provided, which raise the prices 
of the plots.
This transformation from summerhouse cooperatives to permanent residen-
tial areas follows modern strategies of urban planning and approaches to green-
ness and nature, where urban sprawl is considered a natural outcome of urbani-
sation processes. People’s decisions about their preferred places of residence are 
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based on traditional understandings of a culture–nature opposition and sustain-
able ways of living. This transformation points to the lack of environmentally 
friendly residential urban areas, but in this process, paradoxically, more and more 
rural areas are domesticated by urban lifestyles (see Cadieux 2008). According 
to the socio-ecological planning system, where an ecologically oriented urban 
paradigm would dominate, city centres – rather than urban fringes – should 
be developed through ‘nature-oriented’ strategies; urban sprawl would be con-
sidered unnatural and reversed. In the nature-oriented strategy context, these 
former summerhouse cooperatives in their previous condition would already 
create examples of a new urbanity that should be promoted and planned in the 
city centres. 
In urban planning discourse, the unnatural is a generally implicit, but never-
theless significant idea underlying some of the differences between established 
and new paradigms. Processes and discourses concerning urban sprawl show 
how different versions of the unnatural (for example relating to accessibility, 
see Qviström 2015) are used strategically in environmentally oriented planning 
approaches to criticise established paradigms. Based on the planning ideals of 
this ‘new urbanism’, these approaches re-define modernist urban landscapes 
as unnatural and enlist the term for new meaning-making and the naturalisation 
of their own models for urban life. 
Claiming responsibility
As has become clear, a core claim that people make by calling something unnatu-
ral is that it has been altered from its original or essential state, most probably 
by human action. By pointing to this human manipulation of the phenomenon, 
people also bring this alteration into the social realm of exchange, ethics and 
responsibility. Most often, an unnatural phenomenon has an author, producer 
or transgressor behind it, someone who can be held responsible for an unnatu-
ral phenomenon with negative consequences, or can claim credit for one with 
consequences that are considered beneficial. For instance, if a seed variety can 
be proven to be sufficiently different from its natural occurrence, its producer 
can claim ownership of the ‘unnatural’ variety, and may even register a pat-
ent and seek compensation for the subsequent use of the variety (e.g. Fowler 
1994; van Dooren 2008). Conversely, events like hurricane Katrina have been 
called ‘unnatural disasters’ (e.g. Levitt & Whitaker 2009) to highlight the fact 
that floods, earthquakes and other hazards would be much less harmful had they 
happened in a ‘natural’ rather than ‘unnatural’ manner, i.e. if vulnerabilities had 
not been increased through specifically human acts. We shall illustrate this use 
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of the unnatural by referring to two water engineering projects, on the Murray 
River in Australia and on the Zambezi River between Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
Both cases illustrate that declaring something ‘unnatural’ amounts to assigning 
(or looking for) a human actor responsible for it; declaring it ‘natural’ respec-
tively equals denying (or at least playing down) human agency and responsibility 
in relation to the phenomenon.
David Hughes (2006) documents the process of redefining the hydropower 
reservoir on the Zambezi known as Lake Kariba from an environmental catas-
trophe to a conservation site between the 1950s and 1980s. Focusing on repre-
sentations of the water body in literature by white authors, Hughes traces the 
stylistic and metaphoric means that were used to highlight the naturalness of the 
reservoir and sideline its engineered artificiality. They include allusions to the 
‘water heritage’ of the British-origin settlers in a predominantly dry country, the 
establishment of various parks, safari areas and nature reserves along the affected 
river stretches, references to the biblical flood and an ‘Operation Noah’ designed 
to save some of the area’s animals threatened with drowning, and the likening 
of the present reservoir to an alleged ancient geography of Africa (turning an 
engineering intervention into an act of ecological restoration). By the late 1970s, 
the reservoir and its environs were described as a “wilderness”, where “man [...] 
has come to terms with Nature and Nature, perhaps, with him” as a contempo-
rary writer put it (Rayner 1980, 164-165 in Hughes 2006, 836). In this colonial 
context, the reservoir, which “displaced 57,000 Tonga-speaking inhabitants of 
the Zambezi Valley, killed all but a fraction of the animals and drowned all plant 
life” (Hughes 2006, 823), was “redeemed” as a feature of natural beauty by white 
settlers with British language and landscape imaginary, rendering Tonga inhab-
itants, their language, landscapes and interests invisible. The naturalising of the 
reservoir thus rid the colonial power of its responsibility for destroying tens of 
thousands of livelihoods, killing animals and plants and radically changing the 
hydrological regime of the Zambezi River.
Emilie O’Gorman’s (2010) account from the Australian Murray River in the 
1950s speaks of the flip side of the same relationship. An increasing number of 
affected people attributed recurrent floods to the expanding irrigation schemes 
in the catchment, claiming that these floods were ‘unnatural’. Dairy farmers 
particularly, whose land and animals were threatened by changing hydrological 
dynamics, blamed these changes on the problematic operation of dams, including 
a scheme that was to divert water from a neighbouring catchment into the Mur-
ray. The dams, they argued, not only brought more water into the river in general, 
but were also managed specifically for the benefit of irrigated agriculture rather 
than for the overall population in the catchment. Interested in full reservoir 
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capacity whenever possible, this management priority was accused of increas-
ing flood risks instead of using the dams in flood defence. While later research 
concluded that the dams did not directly increase flooding on the Murray, rather 
these floods were the result of higher precipitation years, the argument of a river 
turned ‘unnatural’ by hydro-engineering and causing ‘unnatural’ floods was very 
powerful at the time.
Greater government involvement in river flow through these centralised 
organisations [River Murray Commission and Snowy Mountains Hydro-
Electric Authority] and dam construction and operation had made them 
responsible for the river in many people’s eyes. Dam construction had altered 
the river and changed what were previously seen as natural systems. As a 
result floods were no longer natural disasters in the way they had been and 
were instead seen to come from a river controlled by officials. (O’Gorman 
2010, 102)
The relationship between the unnatural and the political is key in these contexts. 
As Latour (2004a, 2004b, 2005a) has argued, assuming the existence of a sphere 
of nature defined and judged by scientific experts precludes most of democratic 
debate, as it reduces decision processes to mere technical calculations based on 
known and clear facts. He asserts that “nature is the chief obstacle that has always 
hampered the development of public discourse” (Latour 2004a, 9). The problem, 
Latour explains, lies in taking the factuality of nature, as an essential realm of 
existence inaccessible to ordinary human beings, for granted, and opposing it 
to a politics conceived as a second-order phenomenon that can only debate 
opinions and representations, rather than proper facts. Conceptualising nature 
as ‘matters of fact’ only allow for an undemocratic ‘Realpolitik’ (Latour 2005a); 
speaking about the unnatural, however, means acknowledging and taking to 
heart the human involvement with these things, turning them into ‘matters of 
concern’ that open up a ‘Dingpolitik’ where the continuity of facts and values is 
acknowledged, and fundamental political debate possible. On the Murray, the 
inaccessible, factual sphere of expert-defined nature was pried open by the claim 
that the river and its floods were unnatural, thus simultaneously making space for 
political debate about responsibilities, different discharge regulation regimes, and 
state priorities for economic development. On the Zambezi, conversely, initial 
debates about the violence of the reservoir (and its champions) were closed down 
by redeeming it as a scene of natural beauty. 
Shifting the attention from classificatory systems to the practices of their 
performance and dispute, the question of what is unnatural becomes one of 
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people’s agency and their successful navigation of social and material relation-
ships. Philosopher Georgiana Kirkham (2006) has argued that common asser-
tions of particular biotechnological practices as being ‘unnatural’ ‒ in Australia, 
Europe and North America ‒ are based on a virtue ethics and are thus about the 
respective actors’ motivations and conduct, rather than on deontological ethics 
or a concern about rules. In her reasoning, the repulsion people feel about certain 
biotechnological advances, including those in xenotransplantation, genetic engi-
neering and artificial reproduction, is not so much about the products of these 
practices, or about possible conceptual boundaries between the human and the 
non-human; it is more about the behaviour and motives of the people pursuing 
the practices. She argues “that these objections arise from, and only make sense 
within, the long-running debate over the place of humanity, and the purpose of 
art and technology, within the natural world” (op cit, 175). 
Focusing on virtues rather than on rules, Kirkham illustrates how the 
unnatural can be an accusation of some humans against others “for mistaking 
a considerable amount of power, knowledge and foresight for omnipotence and 
omniscience, and as a metaphor for humans letting their power and knowledge 
exceed their caution” (2006, 176). It is their ‘unnatural’ behaviour ‒ acting unlike 
a human should ‒ that is criticised by calling the consequences ‘unnatural’. Juxta-
posing current biotechnology debates with 17th-century criticism of ‘unnatural’ 
gardening practices, Kirkham demonstrates the long history of these debates in 
Western thought, including their relation to virtue ethics, where “the suggested 
limits to human manipulation of nature based on the concept of the unnatural-
ness of the activity may best be understood as objections to the ‘unnaturalness’ 
of the agent’s motivations” (op cit, 189), “making a point about the use of art 
and artifice for the wrong purposes” (op cit, 190). Invoking the unnatural thus 
becomes not only an act to police conceptual boundaries (Douglas 1966) and an 
instrument to change matters of fact into matters of concern (Latour 2005a), but 
also a way to negotiate the proper position of human beings in the wider world.
To sum up, the concept of the unnatural implies a series of claims, not only 
about what is (un)characteristic, (not) according to laws of nature, and (outside 
of) a realm of real, material phenomena, but also about authorship, adequate 
behaviour and responsibility. Designating something as unnatural is tantamount 
to looking for or identifying a human actor responsible for it, and to opening up 
a political debate about the distribution of its costs and benefits, as well as the 
place of human agency in the world. Furthermore, these examples indicate that 
human meaning-making must not be considered a unilinear development, where 
‘new’ phenomena are first considered ‘unnatural’, and are gradually, through 
processes of domestication and integration, re-signified as ‘natural’. Rather, the 
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examples mentioned here suggest that re-signification processes are socially and 
politically situated, and may proceed both ways, including labelling a formerly 
‘natural’ phenomenon ‘unnatural’. What is called unnatural therefore does not 
simply describe things or practices that are foreign to a given arrangement of 
meanings or cross crucial categorial boundaries; the unnatural also emerges 
creatively out of strategic uses by particular political actors who foreground or 
downplay certain categories and meanings to make a statement forcefully.  
Conclusion
In exploring how the unnatural emerges and is used, this chapter has presented 
six excursions into different aspects of the concept and its efficacy in social and 
cultural life. Structurally, the unnatural exists as a derogatory or dangerous 
‘non-category’ beyond or between more clearly defined categories. It is precisely 
through this beyond-ness and between-ness, and the concomitant impossibility 
to pin it down semiotically or domesticate it, that the unnatural gains its power 
as a label. In order for people to recognise ‘monsters’ or ‘cyborgs’ as unnatural, 
their perception needs to conform to a particular framing that excludes or divides 
just those phenomena. At the same time, the moral implications of the unnatu-
ral ‒ as something wrong, abnormal or inferior ‒ work to police and maintain 
this particular framing. 
It has also become clear, however, that these categories and their framing are 
not over and above social life, but are constantly enacted, interpreted, challenged, 
defended ‒ and changed. Furthermore, this performance of categories is not 
a purely ‘cultural’ matter, it happens in correspondence with various non-human 
processes, including those of different materials, plant growth, animal movement, 
and the weather. Finally, this chapter has indicated that the performance of the 
unnatural embodies a claim that assigns responsibility for the unnaturalness 
of a phenomenon, and for its consequences. The unnatural thereby becomes 
a way of extolling ‘matters of concern’ out of a factual, un-cultural, pre-social 
nature, focusing on the relationships of its co-production and opening it up 
for debate. In the light of social practice, the unnatural emerges as a relatively 
flexible container with a powerful message, which different groups of people 
employ creatively to make sense of their position within a multifaceted and 
polysemantic world.
What are the implications of these considerations of the unnatural for cul-
tural theory? Out of the many possible avenues along which to develop this 
further, we would like to sketch three interconnected trajectories. First, we hope 
to have shown that the unnatural is a concept highly contingent on framings, 
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materialities and practices. Therefore, it must not be taken for granted as an 
analytical concept, for instance for studying cultural changes in the context of 
increasingly ‘unnatural’ habitats, but rather be approached as a rich source for 
empirical studies into its production, negotiation, and the assumptions and pro-
jects articulated through it.
Second, cultural theory needs to explore the relationship between the cultural 
and the unnatural more closely. Both of them are set in a contrasting relationship 
with an idea of nature; but to what extent do they overlap, and in what ways are 
they vectors with different trajectories? For instance, what are the relationships 
between ‘cultural landscapes’ and ‘unnatural landscapes’? Or, to what extent 
can we speak of a continuity between natural, cultural and unnatural, where 
the unnatural is a perverted or overly exaggerated form of cultivated nature? 
If the cultural, in similar ways to the unnatural, has been diagnosed as a highly 
contingent concept, subject and tool of various framings and enactments (e.g. 
Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), then what analytical purchase remains with the 
term ‘culture’?
This leads us to the third interconnected avenue of implications of an analysis 
of the unnatural for cultural theory, which we spelled out in the first excur-
sion above: that cultural theory must not limit itself to its historically specific 
focus on the ‘unnatural’ in the sense of those aspects of our world that are not 
covered by the natural sciences. As we have demonstrated above, steps towards 
such a broadening of cultural theory have already been made in various disci-
plines. Following these leads, and reflexively investigating the unnatural, cultural 
theory can be taken beyond its confines to the ‘unnatural’, and can be developed 
to account for human lives in a total world. In this world, ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’ 
are in dynamic tension, not as essential attributes of things, but as categories that 
emerge from people’s situated experiences and strategic uses. The ‘unnatural’ is 
a product of ways of classifying, of perception and action, of assigning respon-
sibilities, and of positioning human beings in their sociocultural and material 
environments. But it must not be a limiting principle for the advance of cultural 
theory.
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Unnatural. The distinction between Natural and Unnatural appears to be 
a powerful tool in the workings of culture, society and supposedly also in cul-
tural theory. But the self-evidence of this distinction is deceptive. Let us make 
the following thought experiment. In the opposition between nature and culture 
phenomena that cross the divide can be considered Unnatural. This position 
would establish a dichotomy between Natural (including nature and culture as 
separate categories) and Unnatural (including phenomena like suburbs, cyborgs, 
monsters that fall between these categories). If this dichotomy becomes a state of 
new discursive normality and will thus be considered Natural (including nature 
and culture as separate categories and phenomena that situate in between), the 
Unnatural needs to retreat one step further and become for instance the virtual 
reality between the cyborg and man, to develop into summ-urb between urban 
environment and summer dachas or to hide itself in some other form of the 
‘uncanny valley’. Although real and living culture is usually not eager to play 
this logic-based game very long, the principle what we have here is an infinite 
regression. Bridging gaps produces more gaps. Monsters multiply. And this is 
not due to the properties of the Unnatural, but rather because of the nature of 
our thinking.
Gaps. Culture cannot exist without gaps. Our thinking, our language and 
even our perception system operate by recognising, combining and applying 
discrete units. Discrete entities presume distinctions. Gregory Bateson (1979) 
argued that there is an inevitable need for a gap between the perceiver and per-
ceived. This idea is based on the understanding that to be autonomous and aware, 
the system (for example organism, human, culture) should not have access to 
its own boundary conditions. Michael Polanyi (1966) proposed another source 
of gaps with his concept of ‘tacit knowledge’. In Polanyi’s view, every learned 
skill, every general thought is based on the effect of numerous entities – single 
experiences, unrecognised bodily feelings and movements – that in themselves 
are not cognised (that is, they remain below the semiotic threshold). From this 
perspective, the articulate culture appears to be just a thin surface film covering 
the rich fabric of the Unnatural. Thus, monsters are everywhere.
Monster’s gaze. Bruno Latour (1993) has famously declared that “we have 
never been modern” or in other words, we have not succeeded establishing the 
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civilisation that would be wholly logically arranged. Logical organisation of the 
world or “modern constitution” in Latour’s words has always been counterbal-
anced by the rich practices of hybridisation and “translation”. From this view-
point, being what is considered Natural or being a monster are both possible 
ways of existence. It becomes legitimate to ask what would be the monster’s 
own Umwelt and ontology, or what could culture look like when seen through 
the monster’s eyes? Although the discursive normality of academic language is 
not a reliable companion here, let me try to roughly sketch the ontology of the 
Unnatural: 1. The Unnatural is a boundary phenomenon, it exists at inner and 
outer boundaries of culture. 2. The Unnatural is local and situated, it relates and 
bridges. 3. The Unnatural uses bits and pieces of cultural discourse, but alters, 
composts or rearranges them. 4. The Unnatural is a dynamic force – meanings 
in becoming or meanings in change. 5. The Unnatural acts, it has effects and 
consequence but not a centre or articulate identity. Consequently a monster’s 
gaze can probably be depicted as a glancing gaze without clear aim or fixed focus. 
Its eyes reflect culture in its particulars and in forming, and when looking into 
the monster’s eyes, we may find a distorted image of ourselves. 
Cultural theory. Where does this leave cultural theory in its attempt to work 
with the Unnatural? The main aim of this small commentary is to point out that 
the Unnatural is not just an issue of conceptualisation, framing and moral mis-
take, but that the Unnatural has its own ontological status and the right to exist 
as substantially different. The cultural perception of the Unnatural surely has its 
problematic aspects. Considered as Unnatural, some things, beings, or social 
groups can become stigmatised or alternatively silenced and cast out from cul-
tural discourses. The Unnatural can also be used to justify wrongdoings and 
lack of responsibility. These issues are legitimate objects of cultural theory to be 
scrutinised and criticised. But at the same time cultural theory should also be 
aware of the ontological status of the Unnatural and its existence in its own 
rights. The Unnatural is like the dark matter of culture, a counterforce that keeps 
the structures of cultural discourses in shape and is therefore inevitable for the 
normal dynamics of the culture. Understanding a monster is a challenge, but 
domesticating it is usually not a good idea.
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Systemic power and autonomy  
from the perspective of semiotic cultural psychology 
Maaris Raudsepp, Andreas Ventsel
Abstract. This paper focuses on the interrelations between habitus, social rep-
resentation, and semiotic autonomy. Such interrelations are conceptualised 
within the framework of power relations. The goal of the study is to show how 
the concept of autocommunication found in the semiotics of culture can be 
applied to the semiotic subject in order to present a theoretical account of 
the emancipation of the subject from social systems and, conversely, of the 
involvement of the subject in the transformation of social systems. Based 
on this framework, the authors outline different approaches to interrela-
tions with social systems. The theoretical framework is principally based 
on Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, Moscovici’s conception of social represen-
tations, Valsiner’s notion of dependent independence, and the ideas of the 
semiotics of culture.
Keywords: autocommunication, social representations, power relation, 
habitus.
The general topic of this paper is the power of social systems and the limits of 
this power. More specifically, the objective of the paper can be summed up in the 
form of the following question: how can the subject transform existing power 
relations, and what could be the role of semiotics in explaining these processes 
of transformation? Several clusters of definitions of power can be distinguished 
in the theoretical analysis of power: 
1) Power as domination and control (power over someone/something), where 
the person in power can make the subordinate person do something they would 
otherwise not do (Dahl 1957).
2) Power as agenda-setting, i.e. we gain power if we can influence decision-
making processes thanks to the ability to permit certain subjects to be included 
in the agenda, or to exclude them (Bachrach & Baratz 1962). 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 176–216.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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3) Power as a preference-shaping process, with power functioning through 
the ability to shape the preferences of subordinates in the direction desired by the 
power, in such a manner that the subordinates perceive their own preferences to 
be authentic (Lukes 1974; Bauman & Haugaard 2008). 
4) Power as the ability or capacity to influence, with emphasis on the idea 
that in addition to the prohibitory function of power we must also account for 
its productive, meaning-making function (Foucault 1982; Digeser 1992). 
Importantly, however, in all these cases, we can speak of the power of words 
and sentences, or in a broader sense, the power of discourses or ideas, both meta-
phorically and literally. The power of ideas is materialised through human activity 
inspired and guided by these ideas – ideas have power inasmuch as they create 
social reality. The question of how the transfer from one level of system to another 
takes place, how ‘theory seizes the masses’ and transforms into a certain kind 
of activity, continues to attract the interest of a variety of scientific disciplines.
Several authors have discussed the reproduction of the social system and the 
system of meanings as prerequisites to, and means of, power (see Haugaard 2003 
for an overview). For the purpose of this article a power relationship between 
the power holder, A, and the power receiver, B, can be described (in a gen-
eral sense) in terms of two dimensions: 1) structural hierarchy (status inequality 
between A and B) and 2) dynamic asymmetry (the directionality and strength 
of the influence from A to B is stronger than vice-versa; the ability of A to pos-
sess influence, to use a resource, is stronger than that of B). In this abstract 
sense, as a structural and dynamic asymmetry, usage of the term ‘power’ is also 
justified in when the power holder is diffuse, such as with the relationship of 
a systemic whole to its elements. From the point of view of an individual, the 
societal whole (social groups and the relations occurring therein) as well as semi-
otic wholes (semiospheres, fields of social representation) can be seen as such 
systemic wholes. In both cases, the whole serves to enable interrelations between 
individuals while, on the other hand, also serving to constrain them. Haugaard 
describes this process as the reproduction of the system, occurring as a process 
of interplay between two parties: the reproduction of the system is successful if 
structuration (attribution/realisation of meaning) meets confirming structura-
tion (affirmation given by B that the present behaviour is appropriate) and is 
unsuccessful if structuration is unconfirmed (Haugaard 2003, 90). 
By walking down this path, we will attempt to present a theoretical frame-
work in this article that demonstrates the most significant preconditions for the 
realisation of specific power relations. In the first part of the study, we will discuss 
two holistic and dynamic models that complement each other in describing the 
mechanisms through which societal and semiotic wholes exercise power over 
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their objects. The structural model of power is presented through the example of 
Bourdieu’s theory, with the (coercing) effect of potentially conscious collective 
representations discussed based on Moscovici’s theory of social representation. 
These models allow us to describe the transformation of a system of social rela-
tions into 1) an interiorised (mainly unconscious) habitus, and 2) social repre-
sentations mediating the power of systemic wholes over an individual as a part of 
the whole. The model of social representation also enables us to link the semiotic 
level – systems of meaning – with socio-psychological phenomena (intergroup 
relations, social identities), acting as a connection between Bourdieu’s theory of 
fields and the semiotic approach. 
This paper attempts to address the question of the relationship of the sub-
ject with such institutionalised social systems and power relations established 
through social representations, and how the subject could achieve a certain free-
dom, emancipation from these relations, using the semiotic approach to cultural 
psychology. We presume that the individual as the object of power is, at the same 
time, an active semiotic subject interpreting messages and constructing their 
own autonomous responses. The second part of the study focuses on a theo-
retical model created in the framework of cultural psychology, explaining the 
‘dependent independence’ of the subject in relation to external structural and 
semiotic power, and attempts to expand this model using the concept of auto-
communication as well as other terms of cultural semiotics. Numerous references 
to semiotics of culture, especially the works of Juri Lotman, can be found in the 
works of Jaan Valsiner, one of the leading figures of semiotic cultural psychol-
ogy (e.g. Valsiner 2007, 2009). The present article will further expand on their 
interdisciplinary relations. Whereas traditional theories of power tend to focus 
only on the subject’s obedience or resistance to power, the approach used here 
allows us to conceptualise a broad spectrum of responses, including the creative 
transformation of or distancing from social prescriptions. Thus, the third part 
of the study attempts to map the spectrum of responses of the semiotic subject 
in the framework of power relations, while the fourth part illustrates the frame-
work created through the analysis of reactive identity. The goal of the paper is to 
show that the description of the interrelations between different systemic levels 
(social, semiotic, and psychological) is necessary in order to understand power. 
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Social structure and ideas in the framework of power relations
Field and habitus 
In his description of the societal whole, Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992) takes as his starting point specific social (power) relations forming a cer-
tain dynamic ‘field’, a space of structured positions in their totality. Based on the 
structure of the field and the actor’s position therein, a certain internal structure 
(habitus) – a collection of durable dispositions and activity tendencies is formed 
inside the actor. The field (the whole) guides the actions of the actors as its 
parts through the habitus, which generates intentions and actions reproducing 
the same field. The field and the habitus are isomorphic; external and internal-
ised structures (habitus) are dialectically related to each other. Both are objec-
tive, although located on different ontological levels (Lizardo 2004, 394). The 
individual as a part of the system ‘falls’ within the respective habitus (Bourdieu 
1990) and acquires system specific patterns of perception, feeling, thought and 
behaviour, patterns of habit and disposition without any conscious effort in the 
course of socialisation. Unreflexive structures developed in this manner, such 
as homo nationis (see Pickel 2005) or homo sovieticus, are relatively durable. If 
the habitus and the social world are aligned (isomorphic), the individual is like a 
“‘fish in the water’: it does not feel the weight of the water, and it takes the world 
around itself for granted” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, 127). Symbolic power rela-
tions established in the field and the habitus (for example oppositions articulated 
in language, accustomed classifications) are extremely durable exactly because 
they are unconscious (Bourdieu 1989).
The habitus is characterised by relative durability and stability. In case of 
rapid social transformations, a temporary dissonance is created between the 
new structure and the old inert habitus (hysteresis). At the same time, the habi-
tus is a generative structure capable of change: from a small set of underlying 
rules, it can generate endlessly diverse forms of thought and action, which are, 
however, constrained by the historical and social conditions of their creation 
(Bourdieu 1990, 55).
Bourdieu’s theory enables us to describe the structural influence, external 
possibilities and limits of the field(s): i.e. how the political, social, and cultural 
fields determine the possible positions the individual can adopt; and how the 
structure of the field transforms into the individual’s habitus – durable disposi-
tions guiding perception and activity, thereby reproducing the conditions that 
have given them shape. The concept of habitus also enables analysis of the unre-
flexive aspects of power relations, for instance the way in which people tend to 
180
Maaris Raudsepp, Andreas Ventsel
naturalise the hierarchy of positions in their ‘familiar field’ and consider these 
natural and take them for granted; the way they do not notice routine instances 
of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1991); and how the habitus makes people recep-
tive and susceptible towards certain techniques of power. At the unreflexive level 
(of habitus), the individual is relatively helpless in front of structural power. Like 
a fish in water or a human breathing air, they do not even sense it, despite being 
in constant contact with it. The power of habitus can be compared to “power 
created by tacit knowledge”, as described by Haugaard (2003, 109). 
Social representations
The semiotic aspect of the society, made up of the totality of meaningful practices 
and resources of the particular social system, has similar guiding and coercive 
power over the individual. In terms of dynamics, it could be described as the field 
of social representations (usually) implicitly or (in the cases of conflict, discus-
sion, contact with the unfamiliar) explicitly guiding individuals (Marková 2003, 
143). According to Moscovici (2001, 24), social representations as integrated com-
plexes of ideas (and practices) act as a socio-cultural reality, guiding the thoughts, 
feelings and actions of individuals. In the broader sense, social representations 
create a common background of meaning for any interpersonal relations (shared 
understanding of reality, shared space of potential meanings) and in the narrower 
sense, serve as the basis for group identity and group worldview. As social repre-
sentations, commonly shared ideas, opinions and emotions form systemic wholes 
that are semiotically mediated and communicated, and expressed in discursive, 
symbolic, or behavioural forms (Harré 1998). The individual relates to social 
representations as a member of a certain group or community, a participant in 
certain social relations. Thus, thinking in terms of social representations is pri-
marily guided by social logic. The guiding principle is not the truthful reflection 
of reality, but communicability, being a part of a group, cooperation with one set 
of people and opposition to another.
Social representations are the means for creating, maintaining and transform-
ing social reality (Moscovici 1984); they are used to construct common social 
objects for the group. Through their common actions, people create a meaningful 
environment (common structures) enabling certain activities and mind-sets and 
limiting others. Representations express certain classifications, generalisations 
and explanations – in their totality, they function as everyday ‘theories’ (Mos-
covici 1988, 243). Social representations thus serve both a constitutive (creating 
a certain version of reality) as well as a regulative function. The constitutive 
function of social representations is expressed, on the one hand by creating and 
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maintaining groups and coordinating common activity, and on the other hand 
by understanding reality and symbolic adaptation to the new. The regulative 
role of social representations, however, is manifest in the (often implicit) direc-
tion of psychic processes and behaviour (Moscovici 1984, 9). “The crucial point 
in understanding social representations is to view them as molar-level mean-
ing complexes that do not simply exist in some “as is” form, but regulate human 
conduct as personal guides. They exist for that function. Social representations 
include encoded information about something that is to be utilized in some 
(rather than another) socially prioritized direction” (Valsiner & van der Veer 
2000, 409). Below, we will try to clarify the dynamics of these transformations 
in the framework of power relations. This will take us, in the second part of the 
study, to the autonomy of the semiotic subject and its function in explaining the 
dynamics of systems.
Social representations and power relations 
Public discussion and an exchange of ideas are a necessary precondition for 
the existence of social representations; indeed, social representations can also 
be consciously shaped, for example for political purposes. Historically related 
groups often rely on opposing representations of the same events (for example 
different conceptions of history), in which the victory of one group is the other’s 
loss. This creates symbolic interdependence between the groups (Sen & Wagner 
2009), which can come to light in the situation of conflictive re-definition of 
power relations. Social representations are produced and reproduced through 
dialogical processes in society; they become fully visible only in situations of 
dispute, in cases of activation of social conflict, in relation to a phenomenon of 
public interest. 
The strong influence of the immanent and implicit representations forming 
the basis of the coactivity of structured groups (Harré 1998) comes precisely from 
the fact that they appear as the self-explanatory and natural reality. Their influ-
ence can be circumvented only through recognition (reflexivity). To break free 
from the power of hidden knowledge, this knowledge must become discursive 
(Haugaard 2003, 101).
The transmission to reflexivity is facilitated by the disruption of the estab-
lished balance, which can take place through different mechanisms: contact with 
contradictory messages, a location on the boundary of different representative 
fields, upheavals disrupting the course of life, the perceived judgemental look of 
the Other, etc. (see Gillespie & Zittoun 2009, 15–16). The disruption of norms, 
which is a form of deviation from the socially self-evident, activates the process 
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of social representing as a mechanism of collective adaptation. Only after being 
successfully anchored can social representations become customary and form 
non-conscious tacit knowledge, unreflective common sense background. 
Customary social representations not subject to dispute can be characterised 
as hegemonic social representations. Inside a particular socium, these are ubiqui-
tous, stable and compulsory, creating a shared interpretative horizon (Haugaard 
2003). The regulatory coercion of dominant representations is effected, on one 
hand, through their self-evidence (the unconscious operation of habitual forms 
of thought), and on the other hand through meta-representational processes 
(see Elcheroth et al 2011). These meta-representational processes are guided 
by expectations of how other people think, the group’s imagined consensus on 
something, and so on. Social guidance through shared representation can be both 
explicit (through discourses shaped by institutions) as well as implicit, for exam-
ple by keeping individuals under the influence of a shared representational field.
 Polemical representations, on the other hand, can be disputed and are only 
spread in certain groups (subcultures) and related to narrow group interests or 
alternative ideas (Moscovici 1988; Liu 2004). Polemical representations are also 
more conscious, competing with each other on the representational field for the 
creation or consolidation of specific power relations. 
The regulatory effect of social representations (varying in the intensity of 
their influence) can be manifested in different ways: 1) in their guiding function 
(establishing a certain line of action, goals), 2) in their constraining function 
(excluding certain meanings or lines of thought, delineating semiotised (‘famil-
iarised’) worlds), 3) in their connecting function (enabling communication and 
certain kinds of relation, offering a certain collective identity), 4) in their dif-
ferentiating function (separation from other groups). This is also the level where 
we can speak of the power of ideas in the literal, rather than metaphorical sense 
(Moscovici 1991): ideas gain power through their extensive spread and consensual 
adoption. The power of ideas is manifest through guiding feelings, thoughts and 
actions, and through transforming these into practice. Collective ideas (ideol-
ogy, worldview, myth, collective illusion) as hegemonic representations have the 
power to guide and inspire their agents of influence – this is achieved through 
the imperceptibility of alternatives, and through perceived consensus. The power 
of consensus is supported by the social motivation to belong to a group, to be 
related to other people. Intra-group consensus can act as a ‘collective tyranny’ 
towards the individual (Alexander & Smith 2005, 399). 
 It must be noted, however, that since meanings are not rigid, the construc-
tion and reproduction of social representations are not automatic or inevitable 
but includes a choice. Those who have gained the right to exercise power inside 
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a certain system of meaning can also consciously contribute to the maintenance 
and reproduction of this system. Those, on the other hand, in the dominated 
position, can develop a counter-discourse as a certain form of resistance, to chal-
lenge the dominant system of meaning. Thus, in principle, it is possible to turn 
polemic representations into dominant ideas. The (re)production of dominant 




In their comparison of the concepts of habitus and social representation, Wag-
ner and Hayes (2005, 272–274) emphasise their fundamental difference: habitus 
is a pre-reflexive, non-discursive and non-articulated system of dispositions, 
whereas social representations are discursive, always potentially articulable and 
actively used in communication. It is difficult to speak of the habitus, to dispute 
it or argue against it, while social representations are essentially communicative; 
they are created and developed only through discourses and arguments. To put 
it more broadly, the habitus first and foremost represents the pre-reflexive level 
of customary tendencies; social representations, however, mainly function on 
the reflexive, semiotic level. The other main difference lies in their durability: 
whereas the habitus is a relatively inert and slowly changing structure, social 
representations are dynamic and contextual, constantly changing through inter-
group relations and communication. However, as the concepts show, these dis-
tinctions are mainly analytical and the borders between them are neither rigid 
nor constant. The social world, unlike the physical world, lacks determinism 
in the strict sense. Thus, habituality as the pre-reflexive and non-discursive level 
mainly characterises the inner perspective of the particular social system. 
From the summary above, we can distinguish between two levels of systemic 
power: the societal field guides the agents through the inert and unreflexive habi-
tus, while the more dynamic field of social representations guides social subjects 
through collective meanings. In both cases, subjects are guided and bounded: 
they define and organise the possible field of semiosis, guiding the interpretation 
of reality and sensitivity towards certain aspects of reality, accompanied with 
the direction of activity towards attaining specific goals. In the unreflexive form, 
habitus and social representations function as irresistible and coercive power. 
Both the habitus (the interpretive horizon of the practical consciousness) and 
social representations (systems of thought supporting a certain social order) cre-
ate the background and possibility for the realisation of specific power relations 
and practices of power (Haugaard 2003), defining legitimate hierarchies and the 
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directions and means of influence. Together, they create an interobjective reality 
(Sammut et al 2010, 458) reproduced as a routine and predictable social order 
(Haugaard 2003, 90, 93).
On the other hand the discussed models do not cover the processes taking 
place at the level of the subjects of power relations. Semiotic cultural psychology 
(Valsiner 1998; 2007) focuses on processes initiated through the interaction of 
the external semiotic stimulus with an active subject interpreting and creating 
meanings. The unit of analysis here is the individual in their relations with the 
socio-cultural environment, and the sign processes mediating these relations. The 
imperative effect of collective forms of thought is only realised through their per-
ception and interpretation of the subject. Systemic power in relation to the sub-
ject is manifested as various social suggestions, which try to guide and constrain 
the subject’s activity. The results of the influences of different systems depends 
on the interaction of social suggestion and the subject’s semiotic activity (see also 
Valsiner 1998, 139–45 and 156–57 for the origin of this term in psychiatry, sociol-
ogy and psychology). In other words, the operation of external regulators in the 
individual’s psychological system, where the external stimulus is interpreted and 
the individual response generated. A new phenomenon becomes apparent at this 
level, the semiotic autonomy of the subject and his or her freedom to generate new 
meanings, enabling us to pose the question: what are the sign processes making 
this autonomy possible? We adopted the term semiotic autonomy in order to 
distinguish this from Jesper Hoffmeyer’s (2010) semiotic freedom, which means 
the organism’s ability to interpret or express the depth or complexity of meaning.
In the following, we will attempt to map the borders of the autonomy of the 
semiotic subject.
Semiotic autonomy
The relationship between the external influence and the subject is mediated 
by a variety of semiotic mediators (inter- and intra-personal semiotic instru-
ments used for relating to the world). Humans use signs in meaning-making 
for individual and collective self-regulation (Valsiner 2004), which also means 
that individual and collective meaning-making serve as the basis for semiotic 
autonomy. The status of individuals as semiotic subjects means that in all life 
situations, humans will remain intentional meaning-makers (see Lamiell 2003, 
266–267). Social suggestions from outside (and carrying collective meanings) will 
be reconstructed by the subject and included in the system of individual semiotic 
regulators. In the following, we will attempt to expand the subject’s meaning-
making potential with the concept of autocommunication found in semiotics 
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of culture. This concept should help us shed light on this distinctive type of 
communication between the semiotic subject and the external environment that 
could serve as the basis for the transformation of power relations.
Autocommunicative meaning-making
Two inherently different types of communication are distinguished in semiotics 
of culture: ‘I’–‘he’ and ‘I’–‘I’ communication (Lotman 1990). In real communica-
tion situations, these two types are intertwined, although at the analytical level 
either type can be found to be dominant. The first type, ‘I’–‘he’ communication, is 
characteristic of classical interaction between different communication partners; 
both ‘I’ and ‘he’ can be taken here as more abstract categories, for example inter-
cultural communication. In this kind of communication, the sender transmits 
only a certain constant amount of information to the receiver. In the global sense, 
the message itself remains unchanged; what changes is the number of receivers of 
the message. In terms of power, Louis Althusser’s conception of the interpellation 
of the ideological field can be described through this model of communication: 
the function of ideology is the ‘constitution’ of individuals as subjects (Althusser 
1971, 171). This means that a specific ideology (liberal democratic, communist, 
neoconservative, etc.) socialises the interpellated individuals in a manner char-
acteristic to this specific ideology. The definition of the relationship can be rela-
tively one-sided, as according to Althusser, ideology interpellates individuals as 
subjects both before and after death (for example inheritance rights). 
We are, however, at present interested in ‘I’–‘I’ communication. According 
to Lotman, the message remains the same in the ‘I’–‘I’ system or autocommu-
nication, but it is re-formulated in the communication process and acquires 
a new meaning. Such transformation in the communication process is based 
on the addition of a new – other – code. In this case, information is formulated 
into new categories, although what is introduced is not new messages but new 
codes; the sender and the receiver are fused into one individual (Lotman 1990, 
22). The semiotic subject can be defined in this context as an individual selec-
tion of socially meaningful codes used to attribute meanings to the surrounding 
environment. Thus, if the subject transmits him/herself a message that he or she 
already knows (for example an earlier message from the system in a position of 
power), he or she can give a new sense to the message by re-encoding it using 
a new code. In this process, he/she will internally restructure his/her nature, 
as re-encoding the original message with a new code in ‘I’–‘I’ communication 
causes qualitative transformation of information, which “leads to a restructuring 
of the actual ‘I’ itself ” (op cit, 22). This restructuring of the ‘I’ is seen here as the 
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source of the autonomy of the subject. This process allows the subject to escape 
the one-sided pressure of established social systems.
Through the transformation of semiotic processes (for example re-interpret-
ing the situation), the person can transcend any context, creating a different 
social situation in the subjective sphere (Smolka et al 1997, 161). Thus, changing 
subjective distance to the present situation using semiotic means – from maxi-
mally distancing oneself to complete identification with the situation – is a flex-
ible instrument of adaptation for the individual. Internally distancing oneself 
from the situation and autocommunicativity allow new ways of reflexion over 
oneself and the situation, maintaining personal autonomy; at the same time, one 
is able to create intra-subject dynamics in meaning creation. However, semiotic 
mediation can also give rise to inflexible positioning, so-called semiotic self-
imprisonment (subjecting oneself to a fundamentalist thought system or rigid 
connection to a complex of ideas). Indeed, Lotman emphasises that systems ori-
ented towards autocommunication do not refrain from clichés but tend to turn 
texts into clichés and equate ‘high’, ‘good’ and ‘real’ with ‘stable’ and ‘eternal’ – 
i.e. a cliché (Lotman 1990, 32). In other words, cultures oriented towards auto-
communication are able to demonstrate great mental activity while often being 
less dynamic than the requirements of humanity (Lotman 1990, 34‒35). The latter 
is mainly a result of the limited nature of constitutive codes and the invariability 
of messages received from the outside environment. 
The relationship of the individuals to the collective field of meaning is two-
sided: on the one hand they are subject to the visible and invisible pressure of 
collective structures of meaning; on the other hand, they are relatively autono-
mous to use meaning-making resources for their own purposes, including the 
neutralisation of or resistance to social suggestions. 
Semiotic self-regulation takes place through a variety of mechanisms: selec-
tive attention to social suggestions (ignoring directions that are contradictory 
or impractical from the subject’s perspective); using cultural forms as personal 
resources of meaning, for example following the example of literary characters 
in making sense of and planning one’s life (Zittoun 2007); dialogical positioning, 
the choice of I-positions or perspectives in symbolic fields – e.g. ‘I’ as an observer 
or as an actor (Hermans 2010; Raggatt 2007); the creation of self-models shaping 
identification that the subjects (for example cultures) use to interpret the situ-
ation (Lotman & Uspenskij 1984). Any cultural object can become a symbolic 
resource for an individual or a group if it is used for a certain purpose, once it is 
included in a system of social representation or a discourse important to the 
group. 
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This is the context in which Valsiner (1994, 1998, 2000) describes the phe-
nomenon of dependent independence: an individual facing the limitations 
and regulations established by a social or cultural system is still relatively free 
to create their personal system of meanings and behavioural strategies inside 
the boundaries established by collective culture. Each individual is unique, even 
though this uniqueness arises from the shared background of collective culture 
(Valsiner 2008). Lotman has expressed a similar idea, describing the individual’s 
dual nature: they are isomorphic to the semiotic whole they are a part of, while 
being individualised parts of this whole (Lotman 1999, 46).
Instances of semiotic autonomy
In order for a subject to exercise their semiotic autonomy, at least partial aware-
ness, reflection on habitual patterns of thought and behaviour is required. The 
habitus and self-evident representations form the invisible basis that the con-
scious structure is built upon. The heterogeneity and contradictory nature of the 
semiotic environment on one hand and the semiotic autonomy of the subject 
on the other give rise to essential indeterminacy: each new moment opens up 
a spectrum of further actions (responses). Social suggestions try to guide this 
choice and constrain the variability born from the co-construction of meanings. 
The subject can choose which external stimulus to pay attention to and how to 
respond.
When encountering a semiotic challenge (a new idea, norm or rule; con-
tradictory social suggestions) the individual will find him/herself in a field of 
tension, facing the choice of whether to comply with the innovation or reject 
it, which social suggestions to follow, which type of response to choose, how 
to construct personal meanings. This situation is characterised by a determinate 
indeterminacy, the unity of stability and flexibility: the social suggestion creates 
a framework, within which at least two responses are possible, follow the sug-
gestion or transcend it (Valsiner 2007).
To describe the transformations converting the external semiotic stimulus 
into a response by the subject, we will characterise social suggestions and their 
corresponding internal actions as vectors (Valsiner 2007, 383). This permits us 
to define the types of potential internal actions as the modulation of the direc-
tion and strength of the corresponding social suggestions. The relationship of 
the external coercive influence can potentially give rise to a diverse spectrum of 
responses, starting from unconditional approval to complete negation. Several 
types of relatively stable response can be distinguished based on the two principal 
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(and interrelated) psychological actions in relation to external influence, the 
semiotic regulation of distance and direction: 
1) obedience – compliance only occurs if the internal and external regulation/
vector of power are identical in direction; 
2) resistance – occurs if the internal direction is opposite to the external 
regulation;
3) ignoring and/or leaving the field – increasing physical or psychological 
distance from the external influence; 
4) creation of new regulators, creative synthesis – integration of regulators 
with different directions. 
These options can be based on both unreflexive (habitus level) and reflex-
ive, semiotically mediated processes. At the reflexive level, further modulations 
of meaning-making are possible, for example minimising or maximising the 
stimulus, naïve vs gamester-like, opportunistic, cynical compliance, public or 
covert resistance, etc. 
This typology has much in common with empirical classifications of adapta-
tion to coercive external influence (e.g. Riesman 1950; Sztompka 2004; Todd 
2005; Hirschman 1970; Castells 1997; Maruyama 1991; Aveling et al 2010). It is 
also similar in structure and content to classifications of psychological coping 
strategies (Skinner et al 2003) and tactics of secondary control (Morling & Evered 
2006).
In the following, we will describe these four, relatively stable types of response 
in more detail in terms of the position of the response on the distance and direc-
tion scale.
Modulation of distance
Distancing is the central operation in the semiotic modulation of meaning-mak-
ing; it is the basis of reflexivity and semiotic autonomy. “The person creates a dis-
tance – by way of semiotic mediation – in relation to the here-and-now context… 
This… allows the psychological system to consider contexts of the past, imagine 
contexts of the future, and take perspectives of other persons…” (Valsiner 2007, 
33). Reflexive distancing can take place relative to both social suggestions and the 
personal habitus (see Hilgers 2009; Adams 2006, 515), enabling the individual 
to ignore systemic power. It is, thus, the creation of a primary semiotic situation, 
manifested as 1) separating oneself from the context and 2) recognising the situa-
tion of primary choice. From the subject’s internal point of view, we can speak of 
a semiotic situation if they are facing the recognition of the possibility of choice, 
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which distances them from the unreflective response to the external environment. 
Awareness of the habitus is one of the preconditions of the person’s freedom:
… agents fully become Subjects when, through the mediation of a reflexive 
effort, they identify and begin the work of gaining (relative) control over 
their own disposition. This reflexivity allows one, depending on the context, 
to give free rein, to temper, to inhibit, or even to oppose dispositions to each 
other (Hilgers 2009, 738).
Thus, from the subject’s point of view, unreflective behaviour guided by the habi-
tus is non-semiotic; the semiotic or conventional nature of this behaviour is only 
visible to the external observer. Distancing oneself from a particular system is at 
the same time self-positioning under the influence of another system.
Maximum distancing can be expressed as physical withdrawal, for example 
leaving the field, non-participation in the game through death, emigration from 
the state, etc., or mental withdrawal by either a) completely ignoring or disre-
garding the innovation (indifference), or b) consciously taking the position of 
a (critical or estranged) bystander. The latter can be characterised as a) internal 
emigration or “creating de-territorialized reality” (Yurchak 2005, 125), or b) ‘pri-
vatisation’, withdrawal to the private sphere, manifested as maximally ignoring 
the public sphere (Todd 2005, 442). Mental withdrawal was characteristic of both 
the early (for example the closed circles of the aristocracy maintaining the old 
habitus (see Chuikina 2006)) and late Soviet periods. This was expressed as the 
individual’s critical distancing and estrangement from society (Yurchak 2005). 
Distancing permits old habitus to be maintained in a changed field. Reflexive 
distancing allows one symbolically ‘not to see and not to hear’ certain social 
suggestions. 
Partial distancing takes place if withdrawal from the immediate situation is 
achieved with the help of certain cultural forms, for example by observing from 
a particular perspective, i.e. the dramatisation of everyday life, its romantic and 
poetic depiction, can occur through semiotic double play where a new layer of 
significance is added to everyday behaviour. From the perspective people are con-
scious of the chosen role, while at the same time practicing the role in everyday 
situations habitually (Lotman 1999). Nonreflexive distancing can be a response 
to excessive semiotic stimulation in the environment: for instance, it can take 
the form of ignoring ubiquitous advertising or the rejection of monotonously 
repeated social suggestions (e.g. Valsiner 2008).
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Modulation of direction
In the context of modulation of direction we differentiate the following 
possibilities:
1. Resistance, negation – choosing an opposite direction to the suggestion is 
realised in diverse resistance-responses: expression of discontent, protest, break-
ing norms, disobedience, counteracting social suggestions. The greatest resistance 
is the clearest indication of the effect of the power. Thus, different forms of resist-
ance to the Soviet regime have been described by Viola (2002), Hellbeck (2006), 
Kozlov, Fitzpatrick & Mironenko (2011), and others. Resistance could take the 
form of public (collective) struggle (dissidents, partisans) or passive everyday 
resistance (discontent, private criticism, disobedience). 
At the reflexive level, the individual can, in turn, consciously resist his or her 
habitus-level reactions (for example consciously overcoming fear during war). 
Creating an environment of fear and uncertainty is one of the preconditions of 
power based on structuration (predictable organisation) (see Bauman & Hau-
gaard 2008, but also the second page of this article). Resisting this requires the 
expansion of one’s ‘comfort zone’, disregarding the motive of ontological safety 
and the awareness of one’s habitus. Reflexive resistance presumes a conscious 
decision on the part of the individual not to accept the manipulation attempt 
(Duveen 2001), as well as semiotic support enabling such resistance, such as 
arguments, examples of resistance, supporting discourse or tradition (civil diso-
bedience, dissidence, maintaining counter-memory, etc.). Resistance may require 
catalytic conditions (Cabell 2010), for example metarepresentative support – the 
knowledge that someone else is resisting (for example discrimination, intimida-
tion). An example of this is Bulgaria’s unique non-compliance with the request 
to deport Jews during World War II (Todorov 2003). A specific type of resistance 
can be culturally supported, such as with the Russian intelligentsia’s traditional 
conscious resistance to power. Reflexive resistance creates a dialogical relation-
ship between the power holder and the receiver. 
At the nonreflexive level, we can speak of resistance-habitus, the unconscious 
tendency to resist external coercion, manifestations of power, or any kind of 
change (‘Estonian stubbornness’). This kind of resistance may be caused by the 
nonconformity (‘non-resonance’) of the new social suggestions with the exist-
ing habitus. The main mechanisms at work at this level are the inertness of the 
habitus (Bourdieu 1990), psychological reactance or counter-reaction to the 
perceived reduction in behavioural freedom (Brehm 1996). According to Kurt 
Lewin’s (1948) psychological field theory, resistance is created as a response to 
forces abruptly trying to change the dynamic balance of the field.
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2. Compliance, obedience, acknowledgement. When the vectors of external 
social suggestion and internal response are identical in direction, this can be 
characterised as the accepting (obedient, compliant) group of responses. The 
modulation of distance can take the form of the reinforcement or reduction of 
the social suggestion. Maximum acceptance occurs in the case of the combina-
tion of minimal distance and identical direction; the reproduction of the exist-
ing (power relations) structure and acknowledgement of the power relation is 
motivated by the search for ontological safety, which is achieved through the 
predictability of the social environment, its correspondence to the habitus (see 
Bauman & Haugaard 2008, 118). 
This acceptance can take a variety of forms. In the case of broad social changes, 
obedience takes the form of the adoption of new dominant ideas, compliance 
with these ideas, changing the organising principles of social representation (such 
as accepting the new structuring of the social field on ethnic or non-ethnic prin-
ciples) (see for example Elcheroth et al 2011, 751–752). Such compliance may 
be complete, i.e. conversion both in the literal and metaphorical sense leading 
to re-evaluation and replacement of governing ideas. An example of this is the 
complete adoption of communist ideology and conscious moulding of oneself 
to conform with the changed guiding ideas with full commitment, attempting 
to adapt oneself to the ideals of the Soviet ‘new man’ (see Hellbeck 2006), or vice-
versa, the adoption of liberal democratic ideas that accompanied the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in some post-Soviet countries. In semiotic terms, this could 
be characterised as a typical process of translation between different semiotic 
wholes (cultures/semiospheres). 
Compliance can be superficial and hypocritical. An example of such com-
pliance is a strategy of adaptation expressed, on the surface, in the (formal) 
acceptance of the new norms, while simultaneously remaining sceptical to them 
internally (Todd 2005, 442). Superficial compliance could be expressed in the 
simultaneous maintenance of the old and adoption of the new while isolating 
both from each other to enable the co-existence of mutually exclusive ideas/
versions of reality. Accounts of Soviet everyday thought often contain descrip-
tions of so-called doublethink, which allowed a person to use different forms of 
thought and language in the public and private spheres (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2009, 
25; Aarelaid 2000). The doublethinking strategy can lead to a situation in which 
the preserved old forms can reappear in favourable conditions, as happened in 
Estonia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
At the nonreflexive level, the obedient response is used if the habitus con-
forms to the external structure. The world seems ‘normal’, self-evident, the subject 
is ‘riding the wave’, emotionally resonating with the context (cf. the induction of 
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collective emotions with identical direction at mass events). Some social systems 
(for example Taoism and Confucianism) greatly value obedience to authority and 
the acceptance of reality. Religious socialisation in general is directed to shape an 
accepting habitus, cultivating humility towards reality (submission to God’s will). 
A different kind of mechanism leading to obedience is also possible. If the 
changes are gradual and slow, they will not cause nonreflexive resistance. This 
is how the gradual changes towards anti-semitism in Nazi Germany have been 
described (Grunberger 2005). One strategy for avoiding resistance is the gradual 
adoption of innovations and creating the illusion of consensus. The “soft despot-
ism” described by A. de Tocqueville (2004, 816–821) is an example of a strategy 
of power creating the preconditions for voluntary obedience. 
At the reflexive level, however, obedience can serve to hide calculated 
opportunism. Goffman (1974) describes conversion as apparent acceptance of 
the norms while repelling them in secret. Obedience can, however, be a con-
scious choice. “[T]he person can, actively, take the role of ‘passive recipient’ of 
cultural messages. This entails direct acceptance of [cultural inputs] as givens, 
without modifications… By active construction of the role of ‘passive recipient’ 
the person temporarily aligns oneself with the ‘powerful others’” (Valsiner 1994, 
255). An example of such obedience is the late Soviet phenomenon of ‘performa-
tive conformism’. People performed “social norms, positions and institutions” 
through the repetition of rituals and speech acts, thus recreating themselves 
as ‘normal’ Soviet people (Yurchak 2005, 25). 
In the above examples, the power of A over B is realised in the model of 
semiotic autonomy only if B ‘allows’ A to direct them (more specifically: B regu-
lates their own actions based on directing influence from A). Semiotic catalysts 
for this can vary (perceived consensus, charisma, etc.). Social suggestions only 
have power over people who have placed themselves under the influence of these 
suggestions. Both resistance and obedience take the form of unidirectional estab-
lishment/non-establishment of power relations. Meanwhile both the system and 
the subjugated subject remain stable in these cases (for example they completely 
adopt a political ideology). In the following, we will, however, focus on the mutu-
ally constitutive relationship between systems and the subject.
The modulation of direction and distance
Integration i.e. creative synthesis, realises the generative and creative potential 
of the habitus and the semiotic autonomy of the subject by modulating both 
distance and direction, and creating innovations in regulative symbolic tools. 
It resolves the tension between regulators with different directions through the 
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generation of a new semiotic structure, reorganising meanings and integrating 
semiotic vectors. Creative synthesis includes internal transformation – the com-
bination of different stimuli (old and new social suggestions, different interests, 
etc.) – through mutual dialogical changes. Mikhail Bakhtin, who, in turn, has 
influenced Lotman’s ideas of semiotics of culture, emphasises the special kind 
of relationship serving as the basis of the formal positions in dialogue. It could 
be said that in dialogue, primacy belongs to the potential response, the acti-
vating principle that prepares the ground for an active response. The primary 
precondition for dialogue is the existence of a communication partner who is 
simultaneously similar and different: dissimilarity of the systems enables them 
to produce different texts, while similarity ensures mutual translatability. Thus, 
interaction between different points of view, conceptual horizons, different social 
languages and emphases is created in dialogue. The speaker penetrates the lis-
tener’s unfamiliar conceptual horizon and constructs their utterance in alien ter-
ritory (Bakhtin 2001, 282). The possibility of dialogue simultaneously combines 
both the heterogeneity and homogeneity of the communicated elements (Lot-
man 1999, 26). The receiver (in this case, another system) is never just a passive 
receiver but actively constructs the sender’s (in this case, the sender’s own system) 
utterance, i.e. they are mutually constitutive. Similar dialogic relations also appear 
on the autocommunicative level – the ‘I’ must consciously distance itself from a 
familiar message by encoding it using a different code. In both cases, reflexion is 
based on the perception of the distance to an earlier, habitual situation.
In dialogical communication understood in these terms, the regulation of 
contradictions (reconciliation, compromise, consensus), the creation of a new 
meaning and placement in a meta-position takes place. Creative synthesis can 
take the form of modification of old meanings and stereotypes, reaching a new 
understanding, transformation of norms, paradoxical responses (turning the 
other cheek), and abandoning a normative framework and establishing an alter-
native interpretation. It is the path to generating innovation and diversity. The 
tactics of creative synthesis permits the power holding structure to neutralise 
specific acts of power by transforming them in some manner. It is, however, 
important to emphasise that a synthesis between two or more systems always 
contains a so-called untranslatable residue arising from the principally different 
structures and functions of the systems. The minimal structure of meaning thus 
must also contain a metaphorogenic tool, a module of conventional equivalents 
that enables the process of translation between the systems in a situation of 
untranslatability. Due to these translations, the original text is transformed irre-
versibly and a new text is generated (Lotman 1997, 10).
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To conceptualise dialogicality in the context of socio-political changes, we 
can distinguish, after Todd (2005, 443), a so-called assimilative strategy according 
to which identity is reshaped to combine the old and the new into a continuous 
whole. This strategy is characteristic to people who were already internally ready 
for change (for example the dialogical co-existence of the old Estonian-minded-
ness and the new Soviet consciousness during the Soviet regime – see Aarelaid 
2000). Another type of synthesis is “ritual appropriation” (Todd 2005, 443), i.e. 
accepting new forms of behaviour by filling them with old content so that, in 
spite of a change in external form, continuity of meaning is maintained. Unlike 
in the case of ‘superficial acceptance’, old and new are not kept separate here but 
are in contradictory interaction with each other. Creative synthesis in the context 
of late Socialism has been described by Alexei Yurchak as the ‘domestication’ of 
the official ideology as practices of everyday life: by reproducing the ideological 
system at the informal level, many Soviet people “creatively reinterpreted the 
meanings of the ideological symbols, de-ideologizing static dogmas and ren-
dering communist values meaningful on their own terms” (Yurchak 2003, 504).
Lotman (2002, 39–40) has described two possibilities for the integration of 
divergent systems: 1) creolisation (mixing), and 2) creating a third, meta system. 
In the first case, the principles of one language deeply influence another despite 
the completely different nature of their structures. In its functioning, this is 
imperceptible to the subject’s internal point of view and the hybrid system is 
perceived as a single whole. The creation of hybrid identities, multicultural ori-
entation and dialogue between different perspectives (Kasulis 2002), as well as 
the increasing diversity of representational fields (Zittoun et al 2003), are some 
examples of strategies based on creolisation.
It may be stated that the creation of a metasystem, i.e. metalinguistic descrip-
tions, is a necessary element of a variety of social systems. According to Lotman, 
any meaning-making structure has the ability to serve as its own input and trans-
form itself; in other words, it has an innate capacity for self-description and self-
translation to a metalevel. From its own perspective, it is just one system among 
others and as such is suitable for transformation (Lotman 1997). Metasystemic 
descriptions approach two different systems as one, forcing the system to take it 
as a certain whole from the internal point of view. As a result:
The system undergoes self-organization, orienting on the present meta-
description, casting aside those of its elements that should not exist from the 
point of view of the metadescription and emphasizing what is highlighted in 
this description. At the moment of the creation of the metadescription, it is 
generally present as a future, recommended description, but in course of the 
195
Systemic power and autonomy from the perspective of semiotic cultural psychology
following evolutionary development, it becomes the reality, serving as a norm 
for this semiotic complex (Lotman 2002, 2652).
Creating a metaperspective provides a dialectical resolution to the tension 
between different (and opposed) social suggestions – for instance, by ascending 
to a dialogical and metalogical point of view (Sammut & Gaskell 2010) or creating 
a metaidentity (the cosmopolitan identity of a global citizen, transculturalism). 
Creative transformation through the conscious establishment of a metalevel is 
implemented in meditation practices, existential therapy, etc. Humour and irony, 
changing speech and behavioural styles are universal meta-strategies rendering 
stressful situations more bearable and permitting the maintenance of internal 
freedom. Imaginary metalevel representations (art, religion) allow us to trans-
form the meaning of coercive situations into positive ones, for example turn 
routine work into a poetic experience (Zittoun et al 2003) or give existential 
significance to suffering (Frankl 1985).
 This response, too, involves both nonreflexive processes at the level of the 
habitus in addition to the subject’s conscious meaning-making; indeed, the habi-
tus may be used as a resource for the creative re-interpretation of the changed 
situation.
* * *
The same practice of power may encounter different counter-reactions and dif-
ferent strategies can be used in different areas and situations. A person may resist 
manifestations of power in one area (for example by opposing labelling) and obey 
them in another (for example by following fashions). The same person may have 
both a conformist self and a rebellious self. Similar external behaviour may hide 
different subjective and contextual meanings. Thus, the veil worn by Muslim 
women in the West may signify obedience to traditional norms, resistance to 
assimilative pressure, or it may be worn for other reasons depending on the 
context and reflexivity. External obedience to power may hide internal distancing, 
disguised resistance, latent generation of new meanings, etc.
Context here means both the habitus and the system of social suggestions that 
a specific response is related to, be it either implicitly or reflexively. The diversity 
of the ways of adaptation is partly caused by the logic of the trajectory of life and 
the position in socio-cultural fields, but also to the strength of outside pressure 
and the abundance of personal resources (for example education, health, social 
connections, personal characteristics, reservoirs of symbolic resources) (Todd 
2005, 453). The main strategy of adaptation may undergo changes throughout 
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the life in connection with changes in outside pressure or personal resources (for 
example resignation, giving up resistance and accepting what you have in old 
age).
The choice of response is based on the interaction between nonreflexive 
processes and conscious choices, structural constraints, and free will. Different 
internal mechanisms can lead to externally similar responses – nonreflexive pro-
cesses based on the habitus or conscious processes based on semiotic resources. 
Each individual response influences both the semiotic subject and the socio-
cultural whole, facilitating its maintenance or transformation (Lotman 1988). The 
“dependent independence” of the subject (Valsiner 1998, 386) is expressed in that 
their semiotic autonomy is constrained by the boundaries of the habitus and the 
field of meaning-making. The manner of expression of semiotic autonomy, the 
subject’s response to the system’s communication, depends on a variety of aspects. 
Below, we will attempt to provide three different explanations to the probability 
of different responses. 
Explanations for the spectrum of responses
To what extent can the probability of different types of response be predicted? 
Which meaning-making mechanisms lead to specific responses? We should not 
forget that external behaviour may be caused by different states of the subject, 
and an identical response may arise from different basic mechanisms and trajec-
tories of internal action. We will now attempt to use some explanatory models 
on two different levels: in the context of the interaction of the individual and the 
environment, and in the context of the individual’s internal semiotically medi-
ated action.
Explanation in terms of the relationship between control and resources
If we define power as dominance based on positional asymmetry and the uneven 
distribution of resources and capacity, then the probability of different response 
types depends on the level of structural and dynamic asymmetry. Structural 
asymmetry is related to the relative distribution of resources. Dynamic asym-
metry expresses the strength of (potential) influence. 
Different combinations of external control and internal resources in relation 
to response types have been discussed in Rosengren’s typology of the conditions 
of socialisation (1997). Thus, the relationship between the strength of external 
control (power holder) and the internal resources of the object of power can be 
characterised as conditions facilitating certain kinds of response. Rosengren’s 
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typology of the conditions of socialisation (1997, 18) describes the different types 
of response distinguished by Hirschman (1970) in different combinations of con-
trol and resources. In this model, distancing (exit) is related to the combination 
of strong structural control and the subject’s high levels of resources. This type 
of response presumes strong external pressure and an abundance of internal 
resources. A loyal response (obedience) is based on the combination of strong 
external control and scarce internal resources. High level of control may be 
expressed in authoritarian discourse (see Selg 2010), monological communica-
tion, and also in charisma. This kind of relationship between resources describes 
a so-called pure power relationship. Weak external pressure in combination with 
an abundance of internal resources facilitates active resistance-responses. 
This model characterises resources from an external point of view, as the 
amount of different types of capital (social capital, skills and education, health, 
personality). At the same time, this model can also be applied in a subjective 
framework. Thus, the strength of control may be interpreted as perceived control, 
a habitual sensitivity towards external coercion. Control may be perceived as 
being stronger in a sensitive area than it is in a less sensitive area. Thus, resist-
ance to learning new things or therapeutic changes can be caused by a sense 
of threat to personal identity. The form of external influence (communication) 
may also become important at the subjective level – a harsh and blunt style of 
communication may thus provoke resistance.
This scheme only indicates the probable direction of the response. The actual 
response depends on the structural possibilities and constraints arising from the 
specific position, as well as the individual’s autonomous decisions in the context 
of their available meaning-making resources, making it impossible to predict 
with complete accuracy. Cultural resources may support any strategy starting 
from obedience (for example in a religious context) to resistance (for example 
heroic resistance to oppression).
Explanation in terms of communication strategies
In addition to traditional political analysis, which primarily explains power rela-
tions through the distribution of resources, we can also connect the power holder 
and receiver to communicative forms of exercising power. Messages transmitted 
using signs can take the form of different genres, styles, and modalities (Marková 
2003, 197–199), and can change in time. Thus, in the modern consumer soci-
ety, ‘coercive’ power is replaced by “seductive” power (see Bauman & Haugaard 
2008). Moscovici (1988, 243), emphasises the essential relationship of collective 
forms of thought to communication. He postulates that the modality of public 
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communication is related to the structure of social representations, the relation-
ship between different ideas. Two general tendencies can be distinguished here. 
The strategy of diffusion (unbiased and unregulated dissemination of ideas and 
opinions) leads to the diffuse coexistence of different ideas in social representa-
tions. The strategy of propaganda (preferring certain ideas to others) leads to 
a binary and hierarchical worldview where some ideas are subjected to others and 
representations promote action (Moscovici 2008, 311–342). From the perspective 
of behaviour, the response to these two types of communication would probably 
be expressed in different strategies of obedience and resistance. 
Different functions can be distinguished in the semiotic means used in the 
communication process. Cabell (2010) distinguishes between semiotic regulators 
(that directly influence the course of subjective processes) and semiotic catalysts 
(that provide the necessary conditions for semiotic regulators, functioning as 
the contextual basis, the initial push). The manner of presenting social sugges-
tions probably acts as such a catalyst, initiating the internal processes that lead 
to certain kinds of reflexive or nonreflexive response. The external catalyst acti-
vates certain representative fields where the power relation is (re)constructed 
in a certain manner. At the most general level, this can potentially mean either 
accepting the power relations and recreating the existing structure in terms of 
these relations, “confirming structuration” (Haugaard 2003), or the refusal to 
accept the existing structure and the creation of a new structure. The recreation 
of the existing structure is a balanced homeostatic process, while the refusal of 
the existing structure and the creation of a new structure take place through the 
disturbance of balance and the establishment of a new balance.
The form and function of public communication can be said to be tied to 
the probability of certain kinds of response. Peeter Selg (2012) has attempted to 
present a typology of different forms of public communication based on Roman 
Jakobson’s functions of language (1960).1 We suppose that authoritarian phatic/
totalitarian emotive communication creates the best preconditions for passive 
obedience, i.e. nonreflexive submission (cf. Selg & Ventsel 2010 on resonating 
with the image of the singing revolution) or nonreflexive resistance and dis-
tancing (if the used images are ‘alien’). This form of communication recreates 
the existing balance and blocks reflexivity, supporting the established (habitual) 
affective and cognitive structures. Other forms of communication (for example 
metalinguistic, referential) destroy the balance of established habitual structures, 
encouraging reflexivity. The metalinguistic communication of radical democracy 
creates the best conditions for constructive resistance, while the rational com-
munication of deliberative democracy creates the basis for a dialogical relation-
ship and the creation of new meanings. In the last two cases, we can speak of the 
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prevalence of autocommunicative meaning-making in the relationship between 
the subject and the external environment. 
Likewise, the monological and dialogical manner of communication can be 
associated with significant differences in the results of the regulation (responses): 
the responses to monologue probably include conformism, resistance, or escap-
ing, while in case of dialogical interaction, a creative synthesis is also activated. 
The influence of the choice and direction of the forms of public communication 
on reflective and unreflective representational processes and, thus, on power 
relations requires separate analysis.
Explanation in terms of semiotic transformations:  
interaction of systems of meaning
Another explanation closely related to the communicative explanation is the 
one based on semiotics, focussing primarily on the different ways of modelling 
meaning. According to Lotman, meaning is created at all structural levels, from 
minimum semiotic units to the global; thus, in spite of their different material 
character, they are structurally isomorphic. The process of creating new meanings 
presumes that ‘external’ texts enter the system and that these undergo unpredict-
able changes on the way from the system’s input to its output (Lotman 2005). 
In reality, functionally unambiguous and definite systems do not exist in an 
isolated form and no system is functional in isolation; they only work as a part 
of larger semiotic system, the semiosphere (Lotman 2005). Systems in this con-
tinuum can greatly vary in their type and level of organisation (Lotman 1997, 
10). A continuous process of translation takes place between the systems in this 
continuum. The translation/filter function of the boundary is materialised in dif-
ferent ways on different levels; however, its main purpose is to separate the ‘own’ 
from the alien, to filter external messages and transform them into the language 
of the system (Lotman 1997, 15). Thus, the concept of boundary is closely related 
to the concept of individuality. The definition of personality as a historical and 
cultural phenomenon depends on the method of encoding used when distin-
guishing oneself from one’s opposite (Lotman 1997, 13).
The types of relationship between the different systems existing in the con-
tinuum are of vital importance here. According to semiotics of culture, each type 
of culture (each system) is associated with a certain system of ‘chaos’, which is 
not always primary, uniform and equal to itself but is just as much a result of 
active individual creation as the sphere of cultural organisation. “Each histori-
cally given type of culture has its own type of nonculture peculiar to it alone” 
(Ivanov et al 1998, 34). 
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Based on the above, opposites can be analytically construed as 1) isolated, 
unchanged contrasts, related with each other through strict opposition (the A vs 
(anti)-A dualism). This antinomy is structurally similar to the culture–anti-cul-
ture opposition, which presumes a self-contained system biased against outside 
influence. According to Lotman and Uspenskij, the modelling of meaning in this 
system is based on depicting the opposition, the other culture, using the minus 
sign (Lotman & Uspenskij 1984). From the perspective of one’s own culture, the 
anti-culture is considered a sign system, a structure dangerous to culture. It is 
isomorphic to culture and a part of culture, i.e. one’s own culture is unthinkable 
without its antipode (Lepik 2000, 742–744). From the point of view of one’s 
own system, it is natural to try to interpret all systems (cultures) opposed to 
the pre-existing right system as a common wrong system. The polarised ele-
ments of anti-culture and culture are both subjected to a symmetrical principle 
of reduction at both ends of the axis: the elements of anti-culture are synonymous 
with each other, just as are the elements of culture (Lepik 2007, 69–71, 74–76). 
If opposites are seen as mutually exclusive and isolated from each other, then 
in their interaction (mutual negation) they reproduce (and amplify) each other, 
meaning that no qualitative change takes place as a result of their interaction. The 
attempt of mutual elimination gives rise to a reactive response. Thus, promoted 
ideas tend to gather momentum through the censure’s attempts to silence them 
(Moscovici 1991). 
Another possibility is to see them as mutually induced and dynamically linked 
opposites that create an antinomy through a mutual tension (A–non-A dual-
ity). When opposites are seen as mutually constitutive and complementing each 
other, as elements of a common system in dialogue with each other, the tension 
and interaction between them may serve to preserve an existing dynamic bal-
ance (where the opposites reproduce and amplify each other within a common 
system), or give rise to innovation (the tension, i.e. antinomy, between opposites 
is resolved through the ‘leap’ to a new qualitative level). Such dialectical oppo-
sites include the basic structure or core ideas (themata) of social representations 
that are used to generate particular representations in a specific social context 
(Moscovici 2001; Marková 2003; Liu 2004). These core ideas are organised as 
mutually induced pairs that are relatively stable and by default self-explanatory 
in that particular cultural context. In times of social change when the generation 
of new meanings is initiated, these core ideas become visible and are included 
in inter-group dialogue (for example the rise of the opposition natural–unnatural 
in connection with the Civil Partnership Law). The inflexibility or flexibility of 
the boundaries between A and non-A is determined by the nature of their com-
munication i.e. whether it is dualistic or dual. Majority and minority groups, 
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tradition and innovation, memory and counter-memory, men and women, iden-
tity and counter-identity – these oppositions can be taken as strict antagonisms 
of isolated opposites, or as the mutually complementing elements of a common 
system. 
* * *
In any power relationship, the relations between A and B can be construed as 
either a dualism or a duality. Weberian approaches to dominant power relations 
construct a dualistic opposition, postulating that the interests of A and B are 
in contradiction (Haugaard 2010, 1051). In such systems, both obedience and 
resistance reproduce the existing power relations. Systems with isolated and fixed 
oppositions produce strict oppositions. Possible responses to manifestations of 
power include passive submission or inflexible resistance (for example in the con-
ditions of repressive autocratic power). Such opposites can repeatedly transform 
into each other (by reversing the balance of forces and the pattern of obedience 
and resistance), thus creating a closed and non-evolving system. Resistance sup-
ports the system just as obedience does; breaking the norm supports the norm.
Above, we conceived of the object of power as the indefinite opposite of the 
holder of power that had the potential for any type of response. As soon as 
a response is materialised, the power holder becomes the indefinite opposite that, 
in turn, can potentially give a different interpretation to the response and react in 
a different manner. The power relationship develops through such mutual influ-
ence. We may say that relationality is key to power relations conceptualised in 
this manner, as the subjects involved in power relations are not ‘complete entities’ 
prior to the communicative event but are only constituted thanks to this relation-
ship. This means we do not presume that subjects already have a defined position 
in the social structure. If we presumed this, we might, at best, speak of the recog-
nition of identities, not their construction. Social identities are constructed, not 
‘recognised’. Power is thus characteristic of the structure of all human relations 
(Elias 1978, 71–103; original emphasis). This concept is “best used in conjunction 
with a reminder about more or less fluctuating changes in power” (op cit, 116; 
original emphasis). This means it makes no sense to speak of the identities of the 
subjects in power relations; we can only talk about their identification to empha-
sise their processual and dynamic nature. Since the functions of individuals and 
systems in relation to each other are ultimately based on the pressure they can 
exert on one another on the basis of their mutual dependence (op cit, 118–119), 
social identities can only be reached through constant acts of identification that 
express this mutually constitutive power relationship. 
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This interaction, or power relationship, involves two types of tension. Struc-
tural asymmetry is an expression of the tension between different statuses 
(positions) that is based on the difference in the quantity and quality of certain 
resources. Dynamic asymmetry is an expression of the tension in the possibility 
(ability) of exercising power in the relationships between the power holder and 
receiver. The mechanism of autocommunication complements the conception 
of semiotic autonomy and also enables the explanation of the solution for the 
tension between the power holder and receiver.
Returning to the mechanisms of semiotic autonomy described above, we 
see now at what level the significant oppositions are constructed. The first step – 
distancing – permits the central choice to be made – the choice of a representa-
tional field to subject oneself to and to rely on. The nature (dualism or duality) 
of the oppositions shaping this field influences the inflexibility or flexibility of 
the subsequent processes. Positioning in a representational field in relation to 
specific social suggestions and other positions takes the form of different types 
of responses – obedience, resistance, ignoring, creative synthesis. Variation is 
increased by 1) individual preferences in using semiotic resources to support and 
justify personal choices, 2) the tendency of systems (cultures) towards multilin-
gualism (multisystemicity), and 3) the fact that culture does not encompass all 
texts, as it functions in the background of non-culture and is involved in com-
plicated relations therewith. These factors determine the working mechanism 
of culture as an information reservoir for both human collectives and humanity 
as a whole (Lotman 2010, 32). This means that in the framework of power rela-
tions, we can speak of different cultural models of organising information. From 
a methodological perspective, this basically means that we can study power rela-
tions in any social context without being able to or having to reduce our analysis 
to this (i.e. to power relations). To presume that all social relations possess the 
dimension of power means opening up the possibility to study power relations 
intertwined in all social institutions. This does not, however, mean the negation 
of the economic, cultural, social, psychological, etc., relations that are used to 
articulate these power relations. 
An example of reactive identity
The regulative entities of the different levels described above – the societal field 
(functioning through habitus), the common field of meaning (functioning 
through social representations and systems of meaning), and the individual field 
of meaning, functionally make up a hierarchical regulative system that allows 
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power relations to be realised. We will now examine the applicability of this 
model in describing the mechanism of reactive identity (Vetik et al 2006, 1085). 
Reactive identity is developed in the context of the power relations of groups. 
A power relationship established in the social field (for example ethnic domina-
tion) is expressed in various symbolic and discursive forms that convey assimi-
lative pressure. The majority group exerts pressure using a variety of semiotic 
means (language policy, symbols, etc.) with the goal of changing the identity of 
a minority group. In theory, the members of the minority group can take up dif-
ferent positions in relation to the pressure of the majority group: 1) submission 
(assimilation) or hypocritical submission (external assimilation combined with 
internal protest), 2) resistance, 3) distancing, 4) creative solution (see section 2). 
Reactive identity is described as a situational response in which, instead of fol-
lowing the social suggestion to change identity, the group reinforces its exist-
ing identity and increases the inflexibility of the boundaries of identity in ‘us 
versus them’ relationships (Vetik et al 2006, 1085). Based on the classification of 
responses presented above, reactive identity may be classified as both resistance 
and distancing responses.
Based on the balance of resources and control (strong control and abundant 
resources), this response is classified as a distancing response in our typology. 
If the distancing is strong enough to leave the boundaries of the power relation-
ship, all further attempts at influence are ignored. As a reflexive response, reac-
tive identity means self-determination through opposition to something and is 
a form of protest. 
What kinds of social suggestion act as catalysts for reactive opposition? What 
semiotic and communicative conditions are necessary for such developments? 
What kind of subjective interpretation initiates and maintains reactive opposi-
tion? What are the conditions that facilitate the consolidation and dissemination 
of reactive opposition? The answers to these questions are context-dependent. 
If a dichotomous reality is created discursively that does not recognise compro-
mises but uses the method of blaming and opposing and constructs inter-group 
relations as the kind of strict dualism described above, then a reactive response 
is highly probable. Strong, inflexible (monological, non-compromising), unex-
pected, negative, violent external pressure perceived as a threat may also serve to 
initiate a reactive response. Reactive responses are facilitated by a type of public 
communication that is monological in nature (Vetik et al 2006, 1085) and that has 
been characterised in the context of certain critical events as phatic, homogenis-
ing, and constructing antagonistic oppositions (Selg 2012). 
In specific contexts, reactive identity may take a variety of forms. If the per-
ceived social suggestion in the Estonian context is not only to obtain Estonian 
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citizenship and identify yourself with the Estonian state, but also to become 
an Estonian through the negation of your previous identity, then the reactive 
response of minorities to this suggestion is non-obedience. In the Estonian con-
text, reactive identity may take the form of a negative attitude towards the Esto-
nian language, reinforcing Russian ethnic identity, choosing Russian citizenship. 
But it can also take the form of a variety of extra-state identities (identifying 
yourself with the local place of residence or transnational entities – the Bal-
tic region, Europe, the world), de-emphasising ethnic self-determination (see 
Vihalemm & Kalmus 2008), new forms of collective identity (Baltic Russian) (see 
Vihalemm & Masso 2007), or psychological or physical distancing from Estonia 
(physical emigration or symbolic ‘internal emigration’, encapsulation), negative 
construction of the emotional significance of Estonia (“uninteresting, dull, pas-
sive, superficial” – see Priimägi 2012). Semiotic autonomy is expressed in the 
fact that the power relationship and representations conveying it (for example 
defining the minority group as immigrants or occupants) are not accepted and 
alternative systems of meaning are created for collective self-determination (for 
example Baltic Russian). The policy of assimilation by force is seldom successful 
precisely because it initiates reactive counter-mobilisation to the assimilative 
pressure, which is more likely to result in an increase in the difference between 
the groups (Brubaker 2004). According to the logic of bipolar systems, reactive 
identity supports that which it opposes through rigid opposition. 
The response can become free and flexible only if the pressure is not perceived 
as a threat and a significantly broad space of subjective choice is maintained. 
In his analysis of re-education as a means to democratise the German collective 
identity in post-war Germany, Kurt Lewin (1948) stressed involvement and the 
creation of a social atmosphere free of intimidation and coercion as necessary 
preconditions. The desired comprehensive change in identity must be reached 
through the individual’s cooperation and the voluntary adoption of the new hier-
archy of values. In this process, the person must feel free to criticise and express 
different opinions. New and old regulators, new sources of power and objects of 
regulation enter a dialogical relationship; only through this relationship is it pos-
sible to synthesise innovations and realise lasting changes. The perceived lack of 
such conditions has been highlighted as a significant obstacle in the integration 
of Estonian minorities (e.g. Roosalu et al 2013). 
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Conclusion
In this article, we analysed systemic power as the relationship of socio-cultural 
and semiotic wholes as they relate to the individual and his or her part. On the 
non-reflective level systemic power operates through the habitus, on the reflective 
level, through semiotic regulators. We relied on theoretical models dialectically 
analysing the relationship between the part and the whole, structure and agency, 
micro and macro levels, and objectivity and subjectivity (Bourdieu & Wacquant 
1992; Marková 2003). A person is subjugated to social and semiotic systems, and 
at the same time, relatively autonomous in relation to them. A person’s relative 
autonomy is based on his or her meaning-making ability (semiosis).
 This approach enables us to describe the spectrum of diverse responses to 
impersonal social suggestions or the manipulative activity of a personified power 
holder. Unlike traditional analysis of power, which only focus on obedience or 
opposition to power, we also discussed responses that involved distancing and 
creative transformation. 
The function of semiotic systems in relation to the subject is twofold: on the 
one hand, they have a guiding and constraining influence through collective 
forms of thought; on the other hand, they are a resource supporting the subject’s 
autonomy. Thanks to the autocommunicative ability, the subject has the free-
dom to take different positions in relation to external semiotic regulators. Each 
of these positions creates a new internal whole, a certain system of ideas and 
practices to which a person subjects themselves. The subjective (potentially infi-
nite) field of interpretations interacts with the external guiding and constraining 
influence coming from other subjects and the socio-cultural whole. Individual 
meaning-making allows the individual to create personal semiotic regulators of 
their own behaviour, turning from the power receiver into the power holder in 
relation to themselves. It is an infinite circular process where people create new 
meaningful situations (new ideas, semiotic means) and “enter into those, to let 
themselves be guided by those, and distance [themselves] from those” (Valsiner 
1998, 388).
The heterogeneity of semiotic systems on one hand and the semiotic auton-
omy of the subject on the other hand allow for a broad range of responses that can 
be classified relationally – through the relationship to the external (or internal-
ised) guide representing a general or specific Other. The four classes of response – 
distancing, resistance, submission, and synthesis – express different relation-
ships with social suggestions. Both the unreflective (habitual) level and conscious 
semiotic transformations participate in generating a response. The individual 
possesses a certain autonomy on both levels: “The freest individuals are those 
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who, aware of their determinations, end up either choosing them or transform-
ing them” (Hilgers 2009, 745).
In the article, we described the general semiotic mechanism of generating 
different types of response – the modulation of distance, direction and intensity, 
and the interaction between exclusive or inclusive opposites (A and non-A). 
We discussed the applicability of this basic mechanism in the context of inter-
group power relations. The described framework highlights important meta-level 
processes that form the background and serve as preconditions for any specific 
power relationship: habitus and collective forms of culture (including social 
representations) allow us to define the context as well as the participants of the 
power relationship, the legitimate means of exercising power, the interests of the 
participants, and other components of the power relationship in common terms. 
The individual reconstructs collective meanings in their subjective field of mean-
ing. Semiotic autonomy enables the subject’s capacity for power in the situation of 
any dominant power relationship, through the transformation of meanings and 
the indeterminacy of responses. The social, semiotic, and psychological levels 
are all necessary for the comprehensive description and explanation of the power 
relationship. Standing in complementary relationship to each other, they form 
a hierarchical system that serves to enable power relations. 
The presented framework enables us to analyse how (systemic) power func-
tions through the interaction with a subject conscious of, and interpreting it, how 
the autonomous subjects emancipate (or do not emancipate) themselves from 
the pressure of the ‘hidden power’ of collective forms of thought. Obedience to 
social suggestions is only one possible response. The approach presented here 
allows describing specific power relations as dynamic and context-dependent, 
constantly recreated or transformed in the process of collective and individual 
meaning-making.
The two aspects of power – domination and capacity – are manifested here 
as dialectical opposites mutually inducing each other: the dominating influence 
of A (who employs both semiotically mediated and non-semiotic means) meets 
the semiotic autonomy, or capacity, of B. The result of this interaction can only 
be predicted with limited certainty. According to the non-linear explanatory 
model, the response of B, in turn, influences A. Thus, for example, if B empow-
ers themselves through a new meaning and a consensus created on its basis, this 
enables B to establish a new relationship with A. The description of the power 
relationship as a dialogical process, the dynamic trajectory of power relations, 
was not a part of the scope of this article. Further analysis should focus on the 
relationships between specific power relations, response types and meaning-
making in specific contexts. 
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Reassembling the political:  
from mechanical to deep relational thinking about power
Peeter Selg
More than two decades ago Mustafa Emirbayer wrote “A Manifesto for a Rela-
tional Sociology”, which was published in one of the ‘holy grail’ journals of the 
social sciences, the American Journal of Sociology (Emirbayer 1997). This is the 
most influential meta-theoretical paper on relational social science to this day. 
What is meant by ‘relational’ varies, especially when it comes to power analysis. 
Andreas Ventsel and Maaris Raudsepp’s intervention in this volume could be 
seen as furthering the discussion within the confines of radical or deep ‘relational’ 
approaches to power. But what are the less, or non-, radical approaches? And 
what is the specificity of this radical approach?
Paraphrasing the opening lines of Emirbayer’s paper one could say that power 
analysis faces a crucial dilemma: whether to conceive power as an unfolding 
dynamic relation or as a static thing, a substance or a process (cf. Emirbayer 
1997, 281). Most of the approaches in political science, governance and inter-
national relations – the disciplines of power analysis par excellence – that have 
self-described themselves as ‘relational’ have what could be called mechanical 
understanding of power. Either intentionally or unintentionally they see power as 
a substance or a thing that somehow ‘circulates’ or is ‘distributed’ between various 
actors (equally or unequally). But since the actors are presumed to have relations 
(interactions) with each other, and power is an important thing for shaping these 
relations, then that thing itself is characterised as ‘relational’. The logic of the argu-
ment goes roughly like this. The substance or the thing in question is conceived 
to be either a capacity to do something or a resource for doing something. Usually 
the doing in question, in turn, is presumed to be some form of subordination or 
domination of someone or something.
This is a very traditional understanding of power that goes back to at least 
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), who defined power as one’s current means for 
obtaining some future goods. Actually power conceived in this manner does not 
need relations to exist; one can ‘have’ power even if one never exercises it. So it 
is somewhat peculiar to refer to this kind of power as ‘relational’. However, this 
is being done more often than might be expected. Let me just point to a couple 
of examples from recent decades. One of the contemporary giants in interna-
tional relations, Stephen Krasner, dubs his typically Hobbesian understanding 
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of power as “the ability to change outcomes or affect the behavior of others 
within a given regime” ‘relational power’ (Krasner 1985, 14). Similarly, in a more 
recent debate about political networks, one of the most influential authors of 
the younger generation of network analysts, David Lazer, argues that “power is 
intrinsically relational: it flows from the capacity to affect other actors” (Lazer 
2011, 66). One of the crucial aspects of this ‘relational’ perspective on power is 
that one can basically focus on the power holder alone to assess the latter’s power. 
For example having this or that many bullets left in your gun is an indicator of 
having power even if there is nobody to shoot, and no reason to shoot anybody; 
having eloquence is an indication of having power even if there is nobody to 
persuade; having this many friends, that much money…; etc. One can consult 
Hobbes’ Leviathan’s chapter X for a classical list of things that are (almost liter-
ally) presumed to be power. 
300 years after Hobbes’ Leviathan these things are still considered pertinent 
to power, and sometimes also equated with power, especially among the elitists 
of the 1950s (Floyd Hunter [1953], C. W. Mills [1956]). However, elitists were 
criticised by the later pluralist/behaviouralist school for equating power with 
the potential for control. The items listed in, for instance, Hobbes Leviathan as 
being power, are considered part of what the most eminent pluralist, Robert Dahl 
(1957), called the base of power. Dahl was also an important figure in taking the 
discussion towards another, far less mechanic understanding of ‘relational’ and 
its link to power: in addition to the base, which is merely an idle potential if not 
utilised, he also distinguished the means, the scope and the amount of power. 
The last two particularly make it impossible to draw inferences about the exist-
ence of an entity’s/person’s power without considering its/her/his action or more 
generally relations to other entities/persons. In other words, we cannot assess 
A’s power over B without considering B’s reactions to A’s action. Bachrach and 
Baratz, the most renowned critics of the pluralists from the elitist perspective 
(see Bachrach & Baratz 1962) make it clear “that power is relational, as opposed 
to possessive or substantive” (Bachrach & Baratz 1963, 633) and propose three 
‘relational characteristics’ for power: 
A power relationship exists when (a) there is a conflict over values or course 
of action between A and B; (b) B complies with A’s wishes; and (c) he does 
so because he is fearful that A will deprive him of a value or values which 
he, B, regards more highly than those which would have been achieved by 
noncompliance. (Bachrach & Baratz 1963, 635) 
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Characteristics (b) and (c) make it clear that considering A’s power without 
considering B’s reaction is nonsensical. At first reading Ventsel and Raudsepp’s 
contribution seems to further this kind of ‘relational’ approach to power. Take, 
for instance, their discussion of the ‘semiotic autonomy’ of B, its/her/his possibili-
ties to react in the face of A’s attempts at subordination and to do that in a manner 
not determined by A (through distancing from, resisting, creatively synthesis-
ing A’s subordinating action, etc.). The case seems to be even clearer given that 
Bachrach and Baratz are very explicit that freedom/autonomy is the precondition 
of the functioning of power relations. And it is exactly B’s lack of freedom that 
makes ‘force’ a non-relational phenomenon:
A person’s scope of decision-making is radically curtailed under the duress of 
force; once the fist, the bullet, or the missile is in flight, the intended victim is 
stripped of choice between compliance and noncompliance. But where power 
is being exercised, the individual retains this choice. (Bachrach & Baratz 
1963, 636)
But in fact, Ventsel and Raudsepp’s contribution could be located among the 
third family of ‘relational’ approaches that are, so to speak, “relational all the 
way down” (Emirbayer & Mische 1998, 974). Specifically, Bachrach and Baratz 
clearly highlight that A’s power is related to B’s reaction (and vice versa) and that 
there cannot be power (which is essentially a ‘relational’ phenomenon) if B has 
no freedom whatsoever. Still the identities of the As and Bs are presumed to be 
given outside their mutual relations. In fact, seeing power relations as being con-
stitutive of the very elements of those relations is the “relational approach” that 
has been adopted by various poststructuralist and process-oriented sociological 
perspectives on power, such as those of Michel Foucault (1978), Pierre Bourdieu 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992) and Norbert Elias (1978). This is the perspective that 
sees power relations “[…] as dynamic in nature, as unfolding, ongoing processes 
[…] in which it makes no sense to envision constituent elements apart from the 
flows within which they are involved (and vice versa)” (Emirbayer 1997, 89).
It is no coincidence that in his “Manifesto” Emirbayer saw the semiotic tra-
dition (both Saussurean and Peircean) as an important source of ‘relational’ 
approaches in the social sciences (among many others, of course) (Emirbayer 
1997, 300–302). Semiotics has been a ‘relational’ approach from its very incep-
tion and “a manifesto for a relational semiotics” would sound peculiar. How-
ever, in reality no enthusiasm was created for semiotic approaches in the social 
sciences. Arguably semiotics is far more marginalised for the social-scientific 
audience than it used to be a generation ago, and this even despite the fact that 
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‘relational turn’ has become the new buzzword in the social sciences (see Dépel-
teau 2013; Selg 2016; 2018). Some other approaches have colonised this new 
promising territory of ‘relational approaches’, most notably the huge industry of 
‘social network analysis’. Probably one of the reasons for the marginalised status 
of semiotic power analyses is their lack of dialogue with the respective tradi-
tions found in the social sciences. It is for this reason that the contribution of 
Ventsel and Raudsepp in this volume is an extremely important addition, even 
if it remains a purely theoretical reflection. To use, or misuse, Latour’s (2005) 
figure creatively: their contribution takes a step to further the discussion of reas-
sembling the political rather than treating it as a variable or an attribute of either 
society or the individual.
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Power relations  
in vernacular and institutional discourses on religion
Andreas Ventsel, Atko Remmel, Lea Altnurme, Kristiina Johanson, 
 Roland Karo, Maaris Raudsepp
Abstract. Using the Foucauldian understanding of discourse and power rela-
tions, the article analyses the interaction of these two elements of meaning-
making that serve to create social reality. Our data is based on the cultural 
context of Estonia and the examples include the relations between native 
religion, Taaraism, and Christianity, variations of (institutional) atheism, and 
the relations between magic practices, alternative and scientific medicine. 
As a result, we present an initial typology of power relations based on Norbert 
Elias’ conception of function.
Keywords: institutional and vernacular discourse, Robert G. Howard’s ver-
nacular authority, Michel Foucault’s concept of power, Norbert Elias’ concept 
of function, religious phenomena
Introduction
This article analyses the interaction of institutional and vernacular discourses as 
meaning-making elements that serve to create social reality. For the purpose of 
this study, discourse can be defined as an organising principle governing mean-
ing-making that enables us to speak about certain things and subjects (norms, 
language, etc.). Discourse always appears from a specific, often anonymous, point 
of view that allows us to conceptualise the different relationships between dis-
courses in terms of the (re)production of (potential) power relations. Although 
there are a multitude of different possible ways to distinguish between the types of 
discourse, in this article we divide discourses into institutional (in terms of power 
position) and vernacular. Just like American folklorist Robert Glenn Howard 
(2011, 7), we understand vernacular in its broadest sense, equating it to the non-
institutional, unofficial, every-day, popular, or folk. Thus, vernacular discourse 
in our study can be defined as distinct from the institutional, i.e. as something 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 220–249.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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based on tradition and institutionally uncontrollable, therefore not having to 
directly oppose institutional discourse. Both vernacular and institutional dis-
courses are intertwined with mutual and internal power relations. Considering 
this, our study was guided by the following question: how do different discourses 
emerge in religious phenomena, and how do they constitute these phenomena in 
the religion-related field, especially in the context of power relations? 
The theoretical framework of the article is based on the conception of ver-
nacularity and vernacular authority elaborated by Howard, which focuses on the 
distinction between institutional and vernacular in power relations. Howard’s 
conception is expanded using the Foucauldian concept of subjugated knowledge, 
which enables us to introduce the distinction between dominant knowledge and 
popular (common) knowledge within the discourses.
The power relations in the religion-related field in Estonia have generally been 
viewed in the context of church history (R. Altnurme 2001; Sõtšov 2008; Rem-
mel 2011; L. Altnurme 2013); but concerning religion, no analysis of the power 
relations between dominant and vernacular discourses in the Estonian context 
has so far been performed. Thus, the article relies on prior studies of Estonian 
culture, which we interpret from the perspective of power relations. Our exam-
ples include the relations between native religion, Taaraism, and Christianity, 
variations of (institutional) atheism, and the relations between magical practices, 
alternative medicine and scientific medicine. 
The analysis can be characterised as abductive logic: the actual work began 
from a comparison of illustrative cases and the mapping of tendencies present 
in these examples, which, in turn, posed a number of questions for the research 
group, along with the hypothetical answers to these questions. Formulating 
these hypotheses directed us toward creating a theoretical framework that could 
explain and summarise our data. 
This primarily theoretical article aims to aid in the conceptualisation of fur-
ther case studies within the framework of power relations. As a result of our 
analysis, we present an initial typology of power relations based on Norbert Elias’ 
conception of function: “[w]e can only speak of social functions when refer-
ring to interdependencies which constrain people to a greater or lesser extent” 
(Elias 1978, 78). A typology based on a relational approach should facilitate the 
understanding of the dynamics (dialogue, opposition, etc.) of the mutual power 
relations between institutional and vernacular discourses, and help us better 
understand discursive meaning-making. 
222
Andreas Ventsel, Atko Remmel, Lea Altnurme, Kristiina Johanson, Roland Karo, …
Theoretical framework
Discourse and power
The discourse theoretical tradition founded by Michel Foucault approaches 
power not only as subjugative but also as constitutive. “What makes power hold 
good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on 
us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces 
pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse […]” (Foucault 1992, 37). In other 
words, power relations serve both to create meanings and suppress other mean-
ing-making discourses. 
Meaning-making in this case could be considered soft power, contrasting with 
direct physical coercion by influencing the activity of people and their under-
standing of the surrounding world (Foucault 1982, 220). In principle, all aspects of 
meaning-making can be conceptualised in terms of power relations. “Power […] 
is a structural characteristic of human relationships – of all human relationships” 
(Elias 1978, 74; original emphasis). Power relations between discourses determine 
the understanding of things, a process through which identities also emerge. 
Therefore, identities are not something pre-given, but rather are temporary fixa-
tions of the processes of identification. The functions people have in relation 
to each other are, thus, based on “the compelling forces [they] exert upon each 
other by reason of their interdependence […]” (Elias 1978, 77).
Similarly, religious phenomena are not entities existing before the commu-
nicative event but are only constituted as a result of the interaction of discourses. 
Thus, the relationship between the ‘established’ discourses dominant in the com-
municative space and vernacular discourses can be characterised only as mutu-
ally constitutive. Below, we will present a short description of these discursive 
relations.
Institutional, dominant, and vernacular discourse 
Discourses, as discussed above, are the conditions of the possibility of speaking/
thinking about things. Certain discourses are institutionalised and these institu-
tions serve to (re)produce discourses. Institutional can be understood as official, 
for instance the education system as an institution distributes and controls the 
official discourse of knowledge. 
Institutionalised discourses are often in a dominant position and deter-
mine how things are understood. The position they represent is generally con-
sidered unquestionable: they determine what we consider normal, acceptable, 
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self-evident, right and good (Raik 2003, 25). A dominant discourse, being biased 
by nature, tries to naturalise a certain manner of speaking about things; the 
power of these more strictly institutionalised discourses is based on tacit author-
ity. However, this does not mean that institutionalised discourses are dominant 
per se – the institutional field also includes other discourses that have been forced 
to the periphery; for example, the psychoanalytic approach could be consid-
ered institutional (by psychoanalysts), but from the perspective of the dominant 
trends in psychology, it is forced to the periphery as it does not hold up to the 
criteria of validity of the dominant scientific discourse. 
Nevertheless, the institutional aspect is not the only path to domination as 
it excludes power relations from the diverse spheres of human communication 
that are not strictly institutionalised. “This assumption bars the way to asking and 
observing how and in what circumstances contests which are played out without 
rules transform themselves into relationships with set rules” (Elias 1978, 75; origi-
nal emphasis). One possibility for approaching non-institutional discourses is to 
discuss them in terms of tradition. Howard introduces the concept of vernacular 
authority in his treatment of tradition. “The concept of vernacular authority is 
based on the idea that any claim to being supported by tradition asserts power 
because it seeks to garner trust from an audience by appealing to the aggre-
gate volition of other individuals across space and through time” (Howard 2013, 
80). Thus, non-institutional discourses possess a specific resource – vernacular 
authority – for the (re)production of power relations. Unlike institutional author-
ity, however, vernacular authority is generally present when the individual trusts 
a statement precisely because it has not been brought into focus by an institu-
tional authority, be it any formal institution such as the church, media corpora-
tions, etc. (Howard 2013, 81).1 
Institutional knowledge and subjugated knowledge  
as special cases of popular knowledge
Each society has discourses that it considers acceptable and enacts as valid, devis-
ing control mechanisms for them – in short, society defines what is considered 
knowledge, what is true, what is false, what is heresy, etc. In relation to this 
Foucault uses the term subjugated knowledge. According to Foucault, subjugated 
knowledge refers to knowledge that is formally unsystematised, non-conceptual, 
insufficiently elaborated, naive, located low down in the hierarchy beneath the 
required level of specialist knowledge or scientificity (Foucault 1980, 82). It differs 
from common sense or popular knowledge, which does not pretend to explain 
something. For example, according to common sense, some herbs cure, a claim 
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that does not include any kind of explanation. This could be explained by (differ-
ent) subjugated knowledge(s) that these herbs have some kind of potency, or that 
a shaman is needed as a mediator, in which sense we can talk about different lev-
els of awareness. It could be also explained by institutional knowledge (for exam-
ple science) using complex understandings of chemistry, biology, medicine, etc. 
Thus, subjugated knowledge is part of a vernacular discourse. Vernacular 
discourse itself does not have to be essentially opposed to institutional knowledge 
(hierarchically structured and formally systematised knowledge), but subjugated 
knowledge always is. Subjugated knowledge also differs from everyday or popular 
or common knowledge (generally characterised by a lack of distinct hierarchies, 
taxonomies, etc.). 
Therefore, unlike vernacularity, which aspires towards differentiation from 
the institutional, subjugated knowledge involves an active relationship of domi-
nation. The subjugated position of knowledge may be determined either by the 
dominant discourse or by the self-description of the subjugated knowledge (for 
example, at the level of self-identification, the discourse defines itself as the object 
of the aggressive onslaught of other discourses).
Analysis
In the analysis below, we will take a closer look at the interdependent meaning-
making of different institutional (both dominant and peripheral) and vernacular 
(both common sense and subjugated) discourses. The examples derive from the 
Estonian cultural context, being more or less associated with religion. The first 
group of examples deals with the question of how institutional religious discourse 
relates to the vernacular religious discourse that has been forced to the periphery, 
and the complementary relationship between scientific medical discourse and 
folk medicine, especially in the context of booming New Age spirituality in con-
temporary Estonia. The second group of examples is related to the discourses 
that use aspects of Estonian nationalism in the struggle over dominance – native 
religion Taaraism to institutional Christianity and atheism. 
Magic and folk/alternative medicine –  
vernacular discourses making use of the institutional discourses, and vice versa
One of the most intriguing and fruitful approaches to characterising the interplay 
of institutional and vernacular discourses is to look at the ‘grey areas’ between 
the two. Within the Estonian context, these are nowhere more at the forefront 
than in how institutional and folk/alternative medicine relate to and conflict with 
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each other. This is true both historically and within the currently attested boom 
of New Age ideas. We shall start from a brief look at the premodern practices of 
magic and healing, showing how magic thinking actually combines vernacular 
authority with that of dominant discourse. We then move on to the 21st century 
context of New Spirituality showing that the previously discussed interdepend-
ence is still very much alive today.
Magical practices as popular knowledge. Oral tradition recorded in the late 19th 
century and at the beginning of the 20th century2 contains numerous refer-
ences to ‘magical’ vernacular practices. The best known of these are perhaps 
various spells, but also other activities, through which the practicing person tries 
to bring something about with the help of supernatural forces (good luck, fortune, 
health, physical attributes, etc.). From the perspective of the dynamics of power, 
the problem of institutional and popular knowledge is crucial to the discussion 
of magic. Theoreticians of religious history and anthropology have often con-
ceptualised magic as an inferior and overlooked phenomenon in comparison 
to official religion. Thus, religious historians and anthropologists (for example, 
James George Frazer, Marcel Mauss, Bronislaw Malinowski) have historically 
described magic and religion as deeply conflicting phenomena (for example 
manipulative vs supplicative; practical vs symbolic, private/secret vs public, or 
individual vs collective), presenting magic as an assortment of amorphously and 
loosely connected naive, secret folk beliefs. Indeed, from the point of view of 
institutional religion, magical knowledge is always depreciated or subjugated 
knowledge, outside the discourse of institutional religion, which does not fulfil 
the criteria established for this discourse. 
Adopting an emic viewpoint and considering magical practices from the per-
spective of their followers and examining these practices as common-sense or 
everyday knowledge allows us to better understand their function in late 19th 
century folklore recordings. In other words, from the practitioners’ perspective 
they rely on common sense to ensure success in different spheres of life.3
A great example here are the official church attributes being used in non-
official (magic) rituals, illustrated lucidly by a folklore account from 1896 of 
gaining good hunting luck, which involves secretly taking the sacramental bread 
from church and shooting one’s gun at the bread (Johanson & Jonuks 2015). The 
meaning of the sacramental bread in folklore is identical to its liturgical mean-
ing – it is the Body of the Christ. In both cases, it is taken to be a potentially 
powerful object. But whereas the liturgy only foresees a single activity related 
to the host – a clear indication of the strictly regulated rules of the dominant 
discourse – magic allows for a greater number of possibilities. At the same time, 
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the participants in magical rituals accept the meaning of the host and no sharp 
opposition to the institutional – something characteristic of subjugated knowl-
edge – takes place. What we see here is dialogue or hybridisation of institutional 
and vernacular knowledge, which emphasises the potency of the elements used 
for the ritual, without any concern for their discursive origin. One might suppose 
that institutionality itself is the reason why a supernatural effect is also ascribed 
to these elements in practices outside the institutional Christian discourse. How-
ever, the elements used remain attributes of the institutional discourse; they are 
used in the magical discourse, but no fusion or adoption takes place, as this 
would mean the loss of an effect important to the magic ritual. In addition to 
the sacramental bread, a number of other elements of institutional religion are 
also used in magical practices. Thus, according to records from the Estonian 
Folklore Archives soil from the churchyard or a piece of the bell rope have been 
used to calm children; and the Book of Psalms for fortune telling; a piece of an 
altar candle cut off in secret was thought to be good for treating jinxed animals 
or a child’s ear ache; a snakebite was to be dressed with a shawl or apron that 
had been worn to the church; and toothache could be cured by blowing through 
the hole of a church key. From the perspective of the institutional religion, these 
are manifestations of naive and inferior, irrational superstition. From the practi-
tioners’ perspective, however, one is simply exploiting all the available resources 
by following magical logic, with no actual conflict with or opposition to insti-
tutional knowledge.
While the number of archival accounts of the practices discussed above is 
rather limited, a similar, but much more common example is the Pater Noster, 
which was used both as a spell and as a prayer, depending on the context. The 
classification of a specific utterance either as a spell or a prayer is primarily related 
to linguistic aspects (poetics, intention, syntax, etc.); for the practitioner, though, 
such distinction was meaningless. Thus, Pihelgas has proposed that attempts 
to favourably influence circumstances through the use of a spell or the Pater 
Noster may have carried both a magical and a religious meaning for the lay per-
son (Pihelgas 2013, 31). Again, the power afforded to the prayer by the Christian 
liturgical background definitely plays an important role in the use of the Pater 
Noster. The Pater Noster may have also been used in an emergency situation as 
the only universal prayer one was likely to remember (op cit, 33). Even though 
being a good Christian was important to the country folk, magical devices were 
still used in parallel. Pihelgas suggests that the difference between a spell and 
a prayer may have been recognised at the level of poetics and tradition; on the 
other hand, both were acceptable methods for communication with the super-
natural world (op cit, 34). 
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These magical practices, as well as the majority of the rest of the practices 
recorded in heritage texts, are ‘soft practices’ – enhancing a personal quality 
(for example precision in shooting, strength, etc.), protective, defensive or healing 
magic. Such magical practices do not involve subjugated knowledge (black magic, 
jinxing or cursing, etc.), they are much more aptly characterised as universal 
associative devices, popular interpretations of official practices, adapting these 
for one’s own purposes and using them on one’s own terms. 
As far as individual practices are concerned, there are, without a doubt, those 
that were suppressed or subject to ridicule, or those that were not used at all for 
a variety of reasons, or were only seldom used. However, the attitude toward 
magic as a whole, as an amorphous collection of practices from various sources, 
is different. It would be more correct to consider magical rituals part of the sphere 
of everyday knowledge, which makes use of different, more or less widely spread 
and adopted, magical elements. In this sense, the practice of magic is ‘demo-
cratic’ – everyone can decide for him or herself the extent to which they use the 
elements of the dominant discourse, common or subjugated knowledge. People 
often move between the elements of alternative and official religion, using more 
of the former in some practices and more of the latter in others.
Folk and alternative medicine. If magic involves vernacular discourse in relation 
to the Christian church as the dominant institutional discourse, the examples of 
folk and alternative medicine distinguish themselves from institutional medicine. 
However, they use elements of institutional discourses for their own legitimation. 
Good examples of a ‘consensus’ between institutional and magical knowl-
edge can be found in folk medicine practices recorded in the late 19th and early 
20th century. Magic and the methods of folk medicine (which are closely related 
to magic) increasingly started to take the form of an alternative (or pseudo-) 
rationality (this tendency is well represented in the works of early cultural anthro-
pologists, for example Malinowski 1948, 116), although the Christian church 
retained its dominant position. 
Similarly, 19th and 20th century Estonian folklore accounts also contain 
numerous examples of practices involving elements that are clearly unscientific 
in terms of institutional medicine, even though the former does not contrast itself 
to the latter. This is illustrated by the example of the ‘ear stones’. These stones are 
the fossils of moss animals (Bryozoa) or coral (Tabulata). According to tradition, 
these fossils, sharp at one end and full of miniscule pores, fit into the ear and help 
alleviate ear ache. Examples (such as ERM k/r 101:211) that describe heating up 
the stone, pouring water into the pores and releasing vapour into the afflicted ear, 
are quite numerous. Ear stone treatment methods, as well as other means of folk 
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medicine comprise a certain system with a fitting place reserved for each element, 
including prayer, the cross, a piece of the host or any other Christian element 
used to achieve the best possible result. This includes giving an important role 
to methods accepted and even promoted by institutional medicine – in the case 
of ear stones, heating the ear. Indeed, popular protective and healing practices 
are characterised by the multiplicity of elements that are expected to work best 
when used together. At the same time, these elements can be swapped, added 
and removed, depending on the situation or the task at hand. It is clear that this 
system lacks the rules of the dominant institutional knowledge, but the use of 
elements is still regulated to a certain extent. Such formal institutionalisation of 
folk practices and ‘subjecting them to discipline’ is also considered important for 
increasing the potency of the ritual.
Considering the current Estonian New Age friendly context (see Uibu 2016), 
the logic of the previous example is still there in 21st century practices. Exam-
ples include reports of cases in which the doctor advises the patient to go and 
see a witch, i.e. a folk healer, after experiencing poor treatment results (placebo 
effect) or hospital-based acupuncture (Vainküla 2011). In the latter case the prac-
titioners are doctors with a Western medical education (the dominant discourse) 
who combine their knowledge with Chinese traditional medicine. The core idea 
is the same as the one behind the folk healing practices of the previous centuries, 
i.e. to achieve the best result, the discursive gap is crossed on entirely pragmatic 
grounds. 
Closer ties between the dominant discourses of medicine and vernacular, 
spiritual discourses are found in psychiatry and clinical psychology, for example 
certain forms of meditation are used in psychotherapy (especially the mind-
fulness-based cognitive behavioural therapy influenced by Buddhism – see, 
for example Crane et al 2014). The same applies to breathing exercises adopted 
from yoga. The use of different breathing exercises can be rationalised on the 
basis of Western medicine. This also applies to the use of meditation in psycho-
therapy (Kraemer et al 2016), which utilises meditation to the extent that it cor-
roborates the established practices prescribed by psychology. In this sense, cer-
tain forms of meditation validate therapeutic techniques, and vice-versa. At the 
same time, therapy does not take much interest in the deeply spiritual systems 
underlying meditation practices. Thus, the dominant discourse can adapt and 
integrate elements from vernacular discourses that fit into the dominant frame-
work, while ignoring the rest. Again, the decisive criterion is entirely practical.
The inherent tension between dominant and vernacular discourses is also 
clearly highlighted in so-called transpersonal psychology4. This is a quasi-insti-
tutional phenomenon structured similarly to institutional psychology (with 
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schools, specialised publications, associations). Advocates of this school define 
themselves explicitly as scholars (and often have relevant academic training). The 
non-acceptance and disdain in academic circles towards such discourses stems 
from the fact that the products of scientific thought are used in a manner that 
is found to be ‘unfitting’, often ideologically charged, appearing to be vernacular 
from the perspective of the dominant discourse.
 
* * *
The examples presented within this group imply that there are different types of 
dynamic between vernacular and dominant discourses, i.e. the opposition-based 
model clearly appears to be too narrow. 
In the case of the forms of meditation that are used in psychotherapy, it is 
clear that there is no conflict between the vernacular and dominant discourses, 
rather they should be considered dialogue partners, whereas in the cases of 
transpersonal psychology competence in institutional knowledge is used to give 
weight to a variety of statements and beliefs that are practically independent from 
their original context both in their content and their purpose. Thus the author-
ity of the dominant discourse is used to give weight to a vernacular discourse, 
something that is not accepted by institutional psychology. 
When it comes to magic and folk medicine techniques, vernacular and insti-
tutional discourses are also not in conflict. Neither can be considered subjugated 
knowledge in the Foucauldian sense. Elements adopted from institutional dis-
course add legitimacy to magical and folk medical practices. Rather than viewing 
vernacular and dominant discourses as in direct confrontation one might think 
of the above examples as elucidating something of our common everyday knowl-
edge. Unlike subjugated knowledge, which is disqualified consciously, common 
knowledge does not oppose the dominant discourse because it does not actualise 
the opposition. This means that the boundaries between discourses are more 
diffuse than one might expect. 
Between dominant and vernacular:  
the discourses of Taaraism, native religion, and atheism 
In the next sub-chapter we are going to discuss the power relations between 
nationalism, Christianity and atheism that emerged in the wake of the changes 
in the political background. 
The birth and spread of nationalist ideas in the second half of the 19th century 
slowly started to undermine the dominant ideological position of Christianity in 
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Estonia. Other secular currents also started to take hold in parallel with national-
ism – for example liberal, democratic, natural scientific, etc. Christianity, which 
had dominated after the Northern Crusades of the 13th century, came to be seen 
as alien or malevolent, in opposition to Estonian indigenous beliefs, which were 
claimed to have been kept alive for many centuries. The early 20th century in the 
Estonian cultural sphere also saw the introduction of the atheist tradition that 
later became state policy during the Soviet occupation. 
Taaraism and native religion as idiosyncratic nationalist discourses. Taaraism 
(Estonian: taarausk), a purposefully created religion relying on ancient Estonian 
indigenous beliefs, was founded in 1928. The foundation for its development was 
a position where Christian ideology had already lost its position in society as 
a hegemonic discourse and had been replaced with a nationalist ideology, which, 
under the influence of liberal and socialist ideas of progress and values, no longer 
considered religion important for the development of a modern people and cul-
ture. Nationalist ideologists with leftist and liberal inclinations started to force 
religion to the periphery of the socio-cultural world, although the dominant 
position of Christianity in the religious sphere remained strong – as a religion, 
it was considered self-evident by the people. 
To solve the problem of the propagation of internationalist ideas, which the 
nationalists considered were spreading at the expense of nationalist ones, as well 
as a dependence on ‘alien’ German culture, and especially Christianity, a religion 
the Germans had introduced, the founders of the Taaraism proposed a ‘return 
to the roots’, understood as following a national religion based on folklore. Its 
everyday practice was understood as simple quotidian life in the spirit of a natu-
ral sense of life, will of life and development of life (Vakker 2007, 17–19, 59), as 
an individually experienced and lived faith. 
Taaraism saw itself as the necessary religious complement to secular national 
ideology. Its credibility was constructed by using the dominant nationalist dis-
course, based on the idea that Christianity was forced upon Estonians by the 
German conquerors in the 13th century and was to be replaced by Taaraism, the 
status and authority of which were to be supported by its position as a religion 
based on local tradition. This tradition, in turn, was modelled on modern culture, 
which was supposed to make it more acceptable in light of the other nationalist 
goal of the time, the development of Estonian identity as a modern culture. Thus, 
whereas the founders of Taaraism saw it as an indigenous religion, in a Fou-
cauldian sense this is a clear case of subjugated knowledge.
Even though Taaraism had many supporters, it never gained mass popular-
ity. It met heavy resistance from dominant institutional discourses. Christians 
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accused Taara believers of the promotion of a pseudo-religion. The attitude at the 
level of state power was similar and Taara adherents had significant difficulties 
registering their religious organisation (Vakker 2007, 47–49). Meanwhile, nation-
alists influenced by liberal and socialist ideas saw no need for religion as such, 
while nationalists with Christian inclinations only saw a need for Christianity. 
Taaraists also failed to convince modernists, who perceived them as a sign of 
cultural backwardness (op cit, 82). Even though Taaraism was recognised as 
an attempt to restore the ancient religion of the ancestors as ‘our own’ religion, 
something genuine, it maintained only a marginal position in society. 
After the collapse of the Soviet regime at the end of the 20th century, nation-
alism once again became the dominant discourse in the Estonian socio-cultural 
environment. This had started in the late sixties when ideas of Pan-Finno-Ugric 
unity were developed in art, literature and music as an expression of national 
identity in opposition to Russian-centric Soviet culture (Kuutma 2005, 55–58). 
The focus on Finno-Ugric heritage, and especially Estonian folklore, led to the 
birth of Estonian native religion (Estonian: maausk), which started to take shape 
in the late 1980s (Västrik 2015).
Whereas the Taaraists had relied on nationalism, talking about Estonians and 
Estonian identity, the followers of native religion, despite also adhering to the 
main thread of the nationalist narrative, emphasise more specific locality and 
ethnicity. They use the term, maarahvas (country folk, native folk), evoking a way 
people discuss local ethnic cultural and language groups that requires assistance 
in preserving their unique culture. Today, institutional support is provided for 
the preservation of local customs, practices and cultures by the European Union 
in terms of a discourse on the protection of minorities and cultural diversity. 
Thus, native religion also relies on institutional discourses in the construction 
of its credibility and authority, while putting particular emphasis on locality 
(indigenous origin) as its principal value, in opposition to the alien, which also 
includes (institutional) Christianity.
Unlike Taaraists, the followers of native religion oppose modernism and 
defend indigenous identity and values. In this respect, global mass culture is seen 
as the main threat (although cosmopolitanism was also considered a problem 
by the Taaraists). This attitude indicates fundamentalism and defining oneself in 
terms of subjugated knowledge. Its followers rally to defend traditions, although 
not all tradition is acceptable, as the past generally also contains things fought 
against. Thus, fundamentalism should not be understood as simply old truths, 
but as the re-affirmance of old truths in an unstable situation that threatens 
identity. One of the features of fundamentalism is socio-political assertiveness 
in promoting one’s views, which is certainly also characteristic to the followers 
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of Estonian native religion (L. Altnurme 2012a, 211), as well as the attempt to 
ideologically involve as large a part of the population as possible, something that 
could also be construed as aspiration for power.
Due to their ambition to represent authentic tradition, followers of native reli-
gion have found themselves in conflict with academic institutions that preserve 
and study folklore and ethnology. Despite the emphasis on indigenous origin, the 
academic sphere treats native religions like Taaraism as a new phenomenon, and 
its followers construct their faith based on modern conceptions of indigeneity 
and authenticity. Thus, dominant institutional scientific discourse reduces the 
credibility of native religion. At the same time, by providing access to the data 
gathered about folk religion by the Estonian National Museum and the Estonian 
Folklore Archives that followers of native religion frequently use, academic dis-
course provides native religion with authentic content. 
Even though Estonian native religion is somewhat institutionalised – organ-
ised into houses (koda, a regional organisation) and its ideology published on the 
Internet – the number of followers is hard to establish, because in addition to 
locality, ethnicity and authenticity, native religion also emphasises individuality. 
Individual religious experience born from contact with living tradition is consid-
ered extremely important (L. Altnurme 2012b, 55). Thus, the boundaries of native 
religion are extremely diffuse: in a survey conducted in 2014, 4% of Estonians 
considered themselves followers of native religion. 20% claimed to have friends 
or relatives who could be considered to follow native religion (RTE 2014). 
Similar to Taaraism, a certain tension is present in the relationship between 
native religion and dominant institutional discourses of power; however, due 
to the greater value placed on tolerance and pluralism these tensions are much 
weaker today. On one hand, native religion is tied to nationalist discourse in the 
Estonian cultural sphere. In 2014, 61% of Estonians agreed with the statement, 
“Native religion is the true religion of the Estonian people” (RTE 2014). On the 
other hand, native religion is not an undeniable part of the dominant nationalist 
discourse, as the conception of Estonians as the world’s most secular people occu-
pies an extremely prominent position in the Estonian self-image (see below, the 
section on atheism). Even though Christianity could still be considered the larg-
est and most influential faith, it occupies a much more marginal position in the 
overall socio-cultural context than it did in the days of Taaraism, which means 
that it has less power to define what takes place in the religious sphere. Demands 
made by followers of native religion that undermine the position of Christian-
ity have been accounted for. They have actively expressed their opposition to 
introducing either denominational religious instruction or non-denominational 
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religious studies as an independent subject in school, on the pretext that Chris-
tianity is too dominant in these curricula. 
In 2001, the Round Table of Religious Organisations was founded at initiative 
of followers of native religion, with the goal of promoting the equal treatment of 
confessions and dialogue with the state (L. Altnurme 2012b, 54). They demanded 
changes to the law on religious organisations that was adopted in 2002, according 
to which only terms with Christian origin could be used for religious organisa-
tions, such as kirik (‘church’), kogudus (‘congregation’), koguduste liit (‘associa-
tion of congregations’) and klooster (‘monastery’) (op cit). The law was amended 
in 2004 to permit religious organisations to use self-designation – in the case of 
the followers of native religion, koda (‘house’) (op cit), copying thus the structure 
of the ‘dominant’ institution. 
A change in the attitude of the press is also noteworthy here. Whereas the 
activities of the Taaraists were often presented in an ironic mode, those of the 
followers of native religion are generally presented sympathetically. We can thus 
conclude that dominant institutional discourses were much more defiant towards 
Taaraism in the early 20th century than they are towards native religion today. 
Atheism in Estonia in the 20th and 21st centuries. The early 20th century saw the 
introduction of the atheist tradition in the Estonian cultural sphere. As part of 
the agenda of the Social Democrats it was not a goal in itself, but was used as 
a means to attract people to their ideas (Remmel 2004). Since it was associated 
with a political ideology challenging two dominant institutions – the state and 
the church – it was under constant pressure from both (Raid 1978). Meanwhile, 
the criticism of the ‘high church’ accompanying the Estonian national awakening 
was also perceived as (or at least, labelled) ‘atheism’ from the perspective of the 
Baltic-Germans who formed the majority of the Lutheran clergy and saw the 
Estonian nationalist awakening as some sort of socialist undermining of the sta-
tus quo. However, for Estonians, despite the development of a national narrative, 
church and religion were still important, which meant fighting on a new front to 
prove this accusation unsound. Nevertheless, according to contemporaries, some 
Estonians really started to believe the inherent associations between atheism and 
Estonian nationality (Remmel 2016). Thus, from the beginning, atheism in Esto-
nia has been in the middle of intermingled political, national and religious power 
struggles. From the perspective of the state and church it was a struggle for power 
between dominant and rising vernacular discourse that aimed to undermine 
their very essence. For Estonian nationalists, atheism was just a smearing word – 
their criticism of the dominant discourse (church) was interpreted in a way that 
had negative connotations for both parties.
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Disorder after the Russian Revolution in 1917 proved suitable for the birth of 
independent Estonia in 1918, soon attacked by Soviet Russia. To simulate civil 
war, a puppet government Commune of the Working People of Estonia was 
set up. Their violent religious policy copied the Bolshevik policy in Russia, later 
characterised as one of the most important reasons for the failure of the Com-
mune (Liebman & Mattisen 1978, 105), which discredited atheism as a political 
programme. Thus, violent overthrow of the dominant discourse doesn’t give good 
results when it has no support from vernacular discourse. 
During the Era of Independence, despite the fact that most of the intellectu-
als in general were regarded as rather critical towards religion, the visibility of 
atheism was low. In most cases it appeared in public in association with religious 
education at schools, fighting for its right to be acknowledged. Nevertheless, even 
in the final years of independence, according to analysis of newspaper articles 
(Remmel 2016), atheism was still associated with communism and Russia, and 
there is no reason to claim that it was a part of the Estonian identity in any way. 
Still, one has to mention the tradition of criticising Christianity within the Esto-
nian national narrative.
After the Soviet occupation in 1940, in the religious field, atheism became 
a dominant discourse, but there were many inner discourses that were in mutual 
tension. For example, atheism as a facet of the party’s ideological upbringing of 
the populace often contrasted with the (personal) interests of lower level propa-
ganda units, who saw this as an accessory obligation; the same happened with 
the local authorities, who were given the task of looking after the lawfulness of 
local churches (Remmel 2011). This indifference toward the sphere of religion 
and atheism even reached the higher state and party officials (Smolkin-Rothrock 
2010), and, at least in Estonia, the reason boiled down to a lack of a problematic 
religious situation. Thus, the dominant discourse of atheism, founded in party 
program and state policy, was perceived necessary by nobody except the athe-
ism activists, because in the popular understanding the low visibility of religion 
was equal to atheism. This aside, the reputation of (official) atheism was not too 
high due to its direct connection with official Soviet ideology, which had a very 
negative reception, although this was not openly shown. 
The popular interpretation of the essence of atheism proved to be one of the 
most problematic for the atheism activists, since it undermined the basis of their 
fight against religion and the militant atheist attitude, i.e. ‘conscious’ atheism. 
Thus, it created a new power struggle between officially promoted “scientific 
atheism” and “spontaneous atheism that emerges as a result of life experience” 
(‘ateism’ – ENE 1, 1968, 227-8), which has all the characteristics of subjugated 
knowledge as a ‘lower’ form of atheism that needs to be rooted out (just like 
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religion) through ideological upbringing.5 Nevertheless, since the topic of atheist 
upbringing was secondary, this goal was never achieved. 
Meanwhile, in many ways, institutional atheism tried to make use of the ver-
nacular authority of the national narrative. The anti-religion campaign (1958–64) 
initiated under Khrushchev gave rise to the establishment of secular Soviet rituals, 
which became the main tool in the war on religion in Soviet Estonia. In the devel-
opment of new rites (weddings, funerals, initiation rituals, etc.), atheism activists 
and developers of rituals cooperated with scholars (for example folklorists). Fol-
lowing the principle of ‘national in form, socialist in content’, the development 
of these rites was based on Estonian folk traditions, with attempts made to inject 
them with a new content. Thus, substitution rather than direct opposition was 
used, which proved to be very successful – new rituals in Estonia are considered 
to be one of the main means by which religion was repulsed to the periphery of 
culture by the late sixties. 
The same tactics were used in the change in content of the national narrative. 
Past accusations of ‘atheism’ from the Baltic-German perspective, and criticism of 
the ‘high church’ from the Estonian perspective, were interpreted as an Estonian 
national ‘predilection for atheism’ (or atheism as a characteristic of the Estonian 
mentality) and widely used in atheist propaganda.6 Ancient Estonian religion 
as an important element in the national narrative was also placed in an anti-
Christian context and thus should have carried positive value. Nevertheless, from 
the point of view of institutional atheism, it was considered an unscientific frame 
of mind, like any other religion, which in practice meant that the complicated 
situation was solved by taking a generally neutral stance while trying to avoid 
the subject. Thus, in the Soviet context, atheism used vernacular authority, actu-
ally representing the dominant institutional discourse, i.e. the ideology of the 
Communist Party.
After the restoration of Estonian independence in 1991, atheism lost its domi-
nant position and was shunned in subsequent years because of its connection to 
Soviet ideology. However, presenting itself in the nationalist context has enabled 
atheism to significantly improve its position at the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury. One such opportunity was provided by the 2005 Eurobarometer survey, 
which showed that only 16% of Estonians believe in a personified God (the lowest 
in Europe). According to the popular interpretation that soon took hold, Esto-
nians are ‘the most atheist nation in the world’, i.e. atheism has become a part 
of national identity, a clear indicator of the successful insertion of atheism into 
the Estonian national narrative during the Soviet era.7 This is apparent in cases 
where still peripheral religiousness finds itself in the public sphere and atheism 
actualises, i.e. the implied atheist national character is used as an argument: 
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“Who the hell needs a Christian school?… Estonians are the least religious people 
in the world” (Remmel 2013, 101). 
Even though there is ample reason to do so,8 connection between nationalism 
and atheism has not been challenged too much – probably because atheism also 
appeals to ‘scientificity’, which has high social standing in Estonia. Thus, athe-
ism uses both dominant discourse (science) and vernacular authority (appeal 
to national character) to improve its position, to construct its elitist reputation, 
claiming to be both ‘rational’ and associated with ‘erudition’, the same elements 
are also present in the Estonian national narrative. This kind of atheism, of course, 
is very vaguely associated with atheism as a philosophical position – in a survey 
conducted in 2010, 23% of the respondents self-identified as atheists, while only 
4.5% of these (less than 2% in total) held strictly materialist positions (LFRL 2010). 
* * *
In conclusion: Taaraism, native religion and atheism have all staked claims to be 
something real, true and indigenous, etc., contrasting themselves to something 
imposed, false, alien, inauthentic, first and foremost referring to Christianity. 
All of them have utilised both vernacular authority and institutional discourse 
in the establishment of authority and reliability (for example science). The goal of 
all three has been to move towards the status of dominant institutional discourse, 
as they have seen themselves closely related to the Estonians’ faith or mental-
ity. To improve its position, atheism as a dominant discourse during the Soviet 
period also relied on the vernacular authority of nationalist narrative. 
As a result of the dominant nationalist discourse that it was intended to com-
plement, Taaraism was subject to a greater tension than native religion. Native 
religion, however, has met much greater recognition as a religion, as the socio-
cultural situation itself has changed. Even though in the years after the restora-
tion of independence, atheism suffered from negative associations with Soviet 
ideology, these connections seem to be weakening and atheism has become 
a legitimate element of the renewed national identity. 
A typology of power relations in religion 
In the following, we will attempt to typologise the above examples in more general 
terms. For the cultural semiotic approach, the main goal of creating typologies is 
comparing the functions of divergent phenomena in the contexts in which they 
appear (Lotman 2010, 121). The same phenomenon can have different functions 
in different contexts. Thus, it is important to distinguish between the viewpoints 
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of different institutions, social groups, etc., i.e. from where, for what, in relation 
to whom and with whom these discourses are articulated. Because of this, func-
tions can’t be reduced to the tasks of one component of the system, which are 
‘good’ for the system, i.e. help to preserve and integrate it (for example Durkheim’s 
functionalism or Freud’s sexuality). We can talk of social functions only in the 
regard of a more or less coercive mutual relationship (Elias 1978, 77–78). 
This relational approach allows us to conceptualise religious phenomena 
in mutual relation to the centre and the periphery as hierarchical and asym-
metrical, and to show how this dynamic of meaning-making can be explained 
in terms of power relations. The central elements of religion-related discourses 
can be described as more institutional and structured, stable and normative; 
while the peripheral discourses can be described as vernacular discourses that are 
less clearly organised, more changeable and ambivalent. The normative pressure 
of the centre and the resistance of the periphery form the basis for the dynam-
ics of meaning-making – innovation is more likely to appear in the periphery, 
away from the influence of normative pressure. Both dominant and vernacular, 
structured and non-structured are involved in general meaning-making through 
their mutual relations. Considering vernacular religious discourses as peripheral 
in relation to official religious discourse, then an initial typological classification 
could be made based on their formation:
 
1) Actively forcing a previously dominant discourse to the periphery. This is illus-
trated by the opposition of the Taaraists to the institutional church in the 1920s, 
or the antireligious policy of Soviet Union vs Christianity, or the sudden rise of 
religious movements at the end of the 1980s and the decline of Soviet atheism. 
Both Christianity and atheism were seen as continuations of a previous dominant 
discourse, which not only functioned inside their own discursive boundaries 
but hindered the emergence of a new, politically motivated (national) discourse. 
Thus, the two opposing discourses – atheism and Christianity – are connected by 
a dual relationship. In the 1920s and 1950s, Christianity as a dominant discourse 
was being forced to the periphery, while in the 1980s Christianity forced Soviet 
ideology to the periphery. 
Although we cannot regard magic as ever being a part of a dominant dis-
course (at least in the context of Western Christianity), its explicit humiliation 
to a primitive, inferior stage in human religious development started with the 
Enlightenment and continued especially with the works of the religious histo-
rians published since the 18th and 19th centuries. The idea of the stages of reli-
gious development is no longer on the agenda, but magical practices of modern-
era Europe as well as of present-day indigenous peoples around the world are 
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commonly viewed as naive and primitive examples of subjugated knowledge, 
with the Western European scientific worldview being the dominant discourse. 
2) A previously dominant discourse falling out of active use as (temporarily) unnec-
essary. These developments can be observed in situations where the moment 
of social upheaval has passed and the society is characterised by greater stabil-
ity. From the perspective of the new dominant discourse, active efforts are not 
required for certain discourses to be abandoned. Their abandonment is mainly 
considered to result from other social processes. The 1980s saw a religious boom 
in Estonia, although starting from the mid-90s Christian discourse became mar-
ginalised again. This was not due to an anti-Christian attitude, but could rather be 
associated with the churches’ inability to hold its social capital and the emergence 
of a neoliberal governance policy (Ringvee 2013). 
In the case of this function, we can distinguish between two possibilities: the 
dominant ‘falls’ 1) to the status of a peripheral institution, as is the case of the 
churches in the 90s, or 2) falls to the vernacular level, thereby losing its institu-
tional status, as is the case of atheist discourse after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
3) Attempts to improve the position by using (another) dominant discourse. In both 
cases described in the previous function, the discourse is retained in cultural 
memory and under the right circumstances has the potential to re-establish itself 
as an active counter-discourse to the new dominant discourse. For instance, in 
the 1980s, in the wake of the rise of national consciousness, the churches pre-
sented themselves as a vehicle of this newly found consciousness. Or, as with the 
case of atheism after the Eurobarometer survey in 2005, which revealed the very 
low percentage of belief in God among Estonians, by relying both on dominant 
scientific and dominant national discourses to establish itself strongly in the 
Estonian national consciousness. 
Vernacular discourse using the elements from the dominant discourse is 
exemplified by the magical practices of folk medicine, which clearly try to legiti-
mise or enhance the effect and credibility of practices by exploiting single ele-
ments deriving from dominant discourse, for example the Pater Noster in magic 
spells or church attributes in folk medicine remedies. 
4) Attempts to institutionalise vernacular discourses and to increase vernacu-
lar authority. Vernacular discourses may unite against dominant institutional 
discourse(s). Thus, the rise in the popularity in esoteric forms of knowledge, 
striving towards the status of institutional discourses to a smaller or greater 
degree, can be observed in Estonia starting from the late 1980s. Therapeutic 
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methods falling outside the dominant medical discourse try to achieve perma-
nent recognition (for example forms of meditation that are used in psychotherapy, 
‘healing waters’, etc., seeking marketing permits from the Estonian State Agency 
of Medicines). The same can be said about Taaraism and Estonian native religion 
(maausk). 
5) Conscious transformation of the dominant discourse to a vernacular one. The 
important thing to note here is the goal this conscious activity serves. For exam-
ple, due to the low quality of propaganda, atheism was perceived only as the 
negation of religion, which seemed even more peculiar due to the fact that the 
visibility of religion in society was minimal. Realising by the end of the 1960s that 
this does not lead to the initial goal, a conscious atheist worldview, Soviet ideolo-
gists started to change the paradigm. In the hope that it would have positive effect 
on reputation, direct opposition to religion was discarded and an attempt was 
made to associate atheism with everyday life and to emphasise its life-affirming, 
positive nature. Although proven to be useless, this tactical move did not imply 
the end of the fight against religion but rather its restructuring. The transforma-
tion still functioned within the framework of the reproduction of power relations 
while attempting to find mechanisms to make it more effective. Another example 
that falls into this category was the (quite successful) attempt to insert atheism 
into the Estonian national narrative, associating thus vernacular authority with 
official ideology. 
6) Creation of a meta-discourse. Meta-systemic descriptions are used by the 
system for “self-organization, orienting itself on this meta-description, cast-
ing aside those of its elements that should not exist from the perspective of 
the meta-description and emphasizing what is highlighted in the description” 
(Lotman 2002, 2652). Initially existing as something desirable and yet to come, 
this description may evolve to become “the reality, becoming the norm for this 
semiotic complex” (op cit). The development of a meta-perspective dialectically 
resolves the tension between different (and opposing) discourses, by rising to the 
meta-level – for instance, through the creation of a common meta-identity. Thus 
the increase in the status of vernacular religion relies on the values of the protec-
tion of minorities and cultural diversity, both elements of the EU meta-discourse, 
such as the case of protecting holy groves (hiis) in the rhetoric of representatives 
of native religion. The important aspect of meta-identities is that initially the 
divergent identities are not fused together: the political discourse of minority 
protection does not add a political dimension to native religious identification 
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(at least from the perspective of the followers of native religion); on the contrary, 
it allows them to distance it from the political as something authentic. 
 
7) Dialogue and hybridisation. In this type of relationship, the independence 
and self-determination of the dialogue partner, of the other, is taken into con-
sideration, allowing the inclusion of the alien into the cultural space of the self 
as something meaningful and capable of dialogue. In this case, the perspec-
tive of the self is, in principle, open to the changes it manifests as it enters into 
dialogue with the external. This model could be dubbed the model of dialogical 
self-description (Madisson & Ventsel 2012). Thus, dialogue facilitates the creation 
of interaction between different points of view, conceptual horizons, social lan-
guages and emphases (Bakhtin 2001, 282). The central aspect here is the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the discourses. Creative synthesis manifests 
itself in the transformation of old meanings and stereotypes, the development of 
a new understanding, the transformation of norms9. Different contexts, activi-
ties and relations support different rationalities and people are able to utilise 
them complementarily (Wagner & Hayes 2005; see also Raudsepp & Ventsel 
2020 in this volume). 
Thus, everyday knowledge uses different magical techniques that seem suit-
able at the moment, although their institutionality or vernacularity may not be 
important to their user at all. In the same manner, vernacular discourses adopt 
techniques from institutional discourses, combining these with their own prac-
tices (for example the usage of the Pater Noster in magical practices mentioned 
above, or a doctor advising a patient to see a folk healer, etc.). A new discourse 
is created, certain aspects of which may resemble institutional knowledge while 
others resemble vernacular. In both cases, dialogues can be observed between 
different thought systems of institutional, magical, and everyday knowledge; 
hybridisation takes place, often unconsciously. At the same time, it is important 
to note that the more dominant a discourse is, the less open it is to dialogue, as 
this might result in a change in the dominant paradigm. Using Foucault’s con-
cept of power, this can be seen as an instance of the strong delimiting effect of 
discursive discipline.
The typology presented above is not conclusive. The analysis of different kinds 
of example is sure to yield even more types of relationship; however, this study 
only aimed to present an initial approach to the understanding of religious phe-
nomena in the context of power relations. 
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Conclusion
The purpose of this article was to conceptualise meaning-making in religious 
phenomena on the basis of Michel Foucault’s discourse theory and Robert G. 
Howard’s conception of vernacular authority. This allowed us to analyse the 
relationships between discourses as a mechanism that guides meaning-making 
in terms of power relations. We must note, however, that even though power 
relations are potentially omnipresent, reducing all social processes to nothing 
but power mechanisms is not rational. This means that in the cases studied here, 
the analysis of power relations is only one of numerous possible approaches; 
for a better interpretation of the material, the study should be based on interdis-
ciplinary principles, i.e. also cover other aspects (for example economic, legal, 
etc.) of the establishment of social relations. 
As a result of the study undertaken here, we presented a typology of power 
relations based on Norbert Elias’ conception of functions. Based on the above, 
we may conceptualise meaning-making in religious phenomena in the follow-
ing terms: 1) Actively forcing a previously dominant discourse to the periphery; 
2) A previously dominant discourse falling out of active use as (temporarily) unnec-
essary; 3) Attempts to improve the position by using (another) dominant discourse; 
4) Attempts to institutionalise vernacular discourses and the increase in vernacular 
authority; 5) Conscious transformation of the dominant discourse to a vernacular 
one; 6) Creation of a meta-discourse; and 7) Dialogue and hybridisation.
These functions of power relations should be viewed as relational and mutu-
ally dependent; hence, an instance of meaning-making is never determined by 
a single function. It is much more accurate to speak of the domination of a cer-
tain function in a certain stage of meaning-making. This classification of func-
tions based on interactions should also allow us to see similar relations in the 
analysis of other fields.
The important thing to note in the above is that the dynamics between 
the vernacular and the dominant are always complex and involve many levels. 
An opposition in one aspect does not rule out hybridisation in another and 
conformity in third. In this sense, the ‘grey areas’ between the dominant and the 
vernacular in the Estonian religious landscape are perhaps the most interesting 
and informative. For one, they definitely deserve significantly more intensive 
interdisciplinary research than they have enjoyed in the past. Hopefully, the 
present article has contributed towards this goal.
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Notes
1  Leonard Primiano has also adopted the term vernacular religion, which refers to 
a “religion as it is lived: as human beings encounter, understand, interpret, and practice it” 
(Primiano 1995, 42), but unlike Primiano, who focuses on individual religion, our focus is 
on the mutual relations between religious discourses at a more abstract level.
2  The collection of Estonian oral tradition and folklore began in the second half of the 
19th century, creating a number of collections that are today gathered into the Estonian 
Folklore Archives. 
3  In their descriptions of the rituals of indigenous peoples, several anthropologists 
and religious historians have concluded that in pre-literary cultures, experiences tend to 
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overlap and intertwine, forming a symbolically complete and systemic universe for the 
practitioners (see, for example Douglas 1970; Wax & Wax 1962). Indeed, folk belief systems 
are flexible and open and the addition of new ‘operable’ elements is context-dependent 
(ad hoc); however, the system is still made up of elements structured to follow a system-
specific logic. 
4  see http://www.transpersonaalne.ee/.
5  As an example, see the 1981 book by Kuulo Vimmsaare, Ükskõiksus – on see hea või 
halb? (Indifference: Is it Good or Bad?). 
6  As examples of such ambitions, see, for example Hajutatud müüdid: eesti kirjamehed 
religioonist (Dissolved Myths: Estonian Authors on Religion), eds Vaime Kabur, Helmut 
Tarand (Tallinn, 1961) and Kelle peale sa loodad? Valimik usu ja kiriku vastaseid rahvaluule-
tekste (Who do you Count on? A Selection of Antireligious and Anticlerical Folklore 
Texts), eds Selma Lätt, Ingrid Rüütel (Tallinn, 1963). 
7  Considering this, Tamm (2003, 60) is mistaken by stating that after the final polish 
of national narrative at the end of the era of independence it has remained relatively intact.
8  The same 2005 survey showed that Estonians were also the most willing (54%) 
to believe in some kind of a ‘spirit or life force’.
9  The distinction between the monologic and dialogic is mainly analytical. Applying 
the relational view to the ontological level, monologue is the tendency in interrelations 
to preserve an earlier identity and ‘not listen to the other’. 
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Knowledge/power in belief
Ott Puumeister
The truth is not out there.1 It is produced in discourse. And this means that we 
should understand truth as socially accepted and legitimised knowledge. The 
classic definition of knowledge as justified belief puts us on the track to turn our 
attention to the mechanisms according to which beliefs are justified and made 
justifiable. Conversely, what types of knowledge are constituted as non-justifiable; 
that is, what knowledge is doomed to the level of ‘mere’ belief.
This is not at all a question of the properties of sentences and statements 
and of how they conform to the objects they describe. When speaking of social 
knowledge, justifiability or legitimacy is not produced in the correlation between 
language and the object it refers to. Instead, we are dealing with different dis-
courses, contesting each other, in their attempts to speak the truth, that is, form 
a body of knowledge rather than belief. Which manner of speaking becomes 
dominant – accepted as knowledge – is the result of power relations and not 
of appropriate description. This becomes especially evident when dealing with 
discourses that very apparently create their own objects.2
The paper “Power relations in vernacular and institutional discourses on 
religion” presents to us an opportunity to get a glimpse of the agonistic field 
of discourses all loosely classifiable under the term ‘religious’. In analysing the 
interplay of dominant and subjugated knowledges, the authors have opted for 
a path that does not correlate dominant with institutional3 or subjugated with 
vernacular. This opens up a richer field of possibility to analyse the relationality 
of discursive formations.  
One of Michel Foucault’s primary methodological principles was, in fact, 
to not presuppose the existence of that which is put under analysis. Whether it 
was madness, the clinic, the prison, or sexuality, he sought to analyse how certain 
definitions of those institutions became dominant. This sort of constitution of 
a position of power always entails that some forms of knowledge are declared to 
be non-knowledge, or mere belief. For example, the understanding that madness 
is first and foremost a mental illness is not an ahistorical fact but a contingent 
result of interplay between different discourses and social actors all striving to 
speak the truth about madness (Foucault 1972b). 
There is thus no truth of religion outside discursive practices defining this 
very truth and claiming to represent the true knowledge of religious beliefs. Every 
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particular discourse has its “will to truth”, to use a term of Foucault’s (1972a, 218). 
That is, every discourse strives toward its manner of speaking being recognised as 
the one through which knowledge of religion and religious practice is achieved, 
and thus not merely ‘beliefs about beliefs’, but ‘true beliefs’.
To understand this will to truth, it is not enough to juxtapose institutional 
(church) practices with those that lie outside, that are external to it. Taking this 
perspective would already presuppose entities that can be defined as dominant 
and subjugated independent of the actual relations constituting them as such. 
We could then take the church as that which is disseminating the dominant 
beliefs and religious meanings and state that popular beliefs are always those 
that are subjugated. To take a Foucauldian relational approach to the power of 
discourse 
is not to analyze rule-governed and legitimate forms of power which have 
a single center, or to look at what their general mechanisms or its overall 
effects might be. Our object is, on the contrary, to understand power by look-
ing at its extremities, at its outer limits at the point where it becomes capillary 
[…]. (Foucault 2003, 27)
Popular beliefs that are not ordered according to an institutional set of rules can 
become dominant exactly because they contest the beliefs set out by institutions. 
Thus it would not only be too simplifying to concentrate on the institutional 
centres, but also quite erroneous. Here we come to an understanding that concep-
tualising power as institutional domination, that is, as a property of institutions, 
misses very significant points about what it entails to speak the truth.
To speak the truth always entails being constrained by the rules of a particu-
lar discourse, rules that are constituted not only from within this discourse but 
also in relation to other discourses that are relegated to the status of pseudo-
knowledge. To take two rather radical examples, we can see efforts, in the United 
States, to constitute the theory of evolution as an untruth; or to delegitimise the 
scientific understanding of climate change as if it were just a political ideology. 
The notion of belief, then, is not simply a question of religious thinking but of 
all knowledge(s), including scientific.
Scientific knowledge, the supposed cornerstone of Western modernity, can – 
and indeed, has – been (more or less) successfully contested in disciplines that 
exhibit the constructivist aspect of knowledge more clearly. If we think of medi-
cine, the knowledge based on biological evidence is constantly put under ques-
tion by manners of speaking that simply refuse to believe in this evidence. Think 
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of the anti-vaccination campaign (Kata 2012), for example, which has as long 
a history as the practice of vaccination itself (Durbach 2005).4
In addition, any type of knowledge’s will to truth is stronger and more perva-
sive if it manages to tie knowledge directly to the questions of (social, national, 
etc.) identity. It is not simply the case that when we follow the rules of certain 
discourses, we know the world through them, but also that our identity is formed 
through this knowledge. Any type of knowledge – whether scientific or reli-
gious – structures the possibilities for identification since it incites the subject 
to speak in a certain manner and accept certain shared viewpoints. Thus, the 
operations of power relations are not detectable only in the communication and 
conflict of discourses but also in how the discourses in their will to truth function 
as the producers of social identities.
It is in this complex of knowledge–power–identity that the paper “Power 
relations …” operates and it is the recognition of the complexity of these rela-
tions that render it useful and, in the Estonian context, novel in approaching 
religious discourses.
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1  Richard Rorty (1989, 5): “Truth cannot be out there – cannot exist independently 
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2  It is not, of course, so simple to divide discourses into those that deal with “real 
objects” and those that create their own. In a certain sense we must understand all dis-
courses as producing their own objects. But this is not the place to discuss this further, 
to get a better overview of discursive objects, see Foucault 1972a, 40–49.
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The role of communities in the politics of cultural heritage: 
examples from Estonia 
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Abstract. The chapter uses the community perspective in order to analyse 
heritage management and politics in contemporary Estonia. The authors are 
interested in how community and cultural heritage, both as concepts and 
practices, are understood in varied social contexts and what roles commu-
nity/ies may be given in varied heritage politics. The empirical examples are 
composed of three case studies that refer to two major issues relevant also in 
international heritage management – the democratisation of heritage politics 
on the one hand and the problems related to community engagement on the 
other hand. Firstly, the problematic issues related to heritage management 
in the Rebala heritage protection area, in a community that lives the heritage 
against their own will. The disengagement of local community in the process 
of heritage management has resulted in the misrecognition of and resistance 
to institutionally defined heritage. The second case highlights the problems 
related to the adaption of the UNESCO heritage regime and traces the chal-
lenges related to the democratisation of intangible heritage when creating 
a national inventory. There is a danger that the multivocality inherent in 
every community may be lost if too clear a voice is found for the inventory 
inscriptions in cooperation with administrators and experts. The third exam-
ple questions issues of sustainability and ruptures in the community steward-
ship of an old tradition – cross trees in southeast Estonia. The process of their 
heritagisation shows the need for external heritage experts who would have 
social capital as well as a competency to be intermediaries between multiple 
authorities and local people. 
Keywords: community, cultural heritage, intangible heritage, heritage policy
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‘Community’ and ‘heritage’ are words as well as concepts that can be seen in pol-
icy documents, academic texts, media as well as everyday contexts. “For many 
people ‘community’ and ‘heritage’ are comfortably self-evident, defined by place 
and shared histories and often ethnicity and nationality, and redolent of shared 
values and their celebration” (Smith & Waterton 2009, 12; emphasis added). 
The two notions are often used together, especially in the policy discourse that 
relates to community participation in heritage management or attributes herit-
age a crucial role in the making of cultural communities. However, it is difficult 
to say who constitute a community for a particular heritage as well as what is 
understood as heritage by a community. Both ‘community’ and ‘heritage’ can be 
interpreted quite diversely by different people and in different contexts. 
In our article we consider three Estonian cases of heritage management 
looking at them from the community perspective. We are seeking to know how 
community and cultural heritage are understood in varied social contexts and 
in particular heritage processes, and how corresponding understandings affect 
cultural practices, including political decisions related to heritage management 
and maintenance. How community can become an instrument and a device 
in heritage politics and what roles community/ies might be either explicitly or 
implicitly given in varied heritage processes?
Entanglements with community in heritage discourses
In national as well as international heritage discourses ‘community’ often remains 
undefined, being open to various interpretations and ideological manipulations 
(De Cesari 2013; Kuutma 2013). The tacit assumptions in such discourses propose 
an idealised image of community as something related to belonging, togetherness, 
closeness, shared values, civil initiative and socio-cultural sustainability; whereas 
heritage is often seen as something communities value and want to preserve, 
often confirming and expressing their identity, and sometimes also as a devel-
opmental and economic resource. But the relationship between community and 
heritage is not always unproblematic, especially if it comes to issues of heritage 
politics and management.
Policy documents often use community synonymously with any social group, 
and especially in neoliberal ideology “community appears simultaneously as 
the site of governing (where it takes place), the object of governing (to pro-
duce communities), and the mode of governing (through which it takes place)” 
(Clarke 2014, 55). However, community is not an unequivocally definable refer-
ent – communities are often weakly bounded and may stretch over locality or 
common interests – two main criteria by which communities are often defined. 
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Community leaders are not often easy to be “discovered, enrolled and sustained 
in the ‘business of governing’” (op cit, 58–59). 
Cultural heritage does not exist “out there”, it is produced and re-created by 
various local as well as international “heritage regimes” through policy docu-
ments, legislations, nominations, lists, etc. (Bendix et al 2013). ‘Heritagisation’ 
can be considered a process that honours and dignifies a cultural phenomenon 
(and excludes others) as something that should be preserved; historically herit-
age status has been given by expert organisations and institutions (Bendix 2009). 
In approaches that see heritage as something material, related to the conservation 
and preservation of architectural and archaeological monuments and objects, the 
term ‘community’ is seldom used. This authorised heritage discourse privileges 
“expert knowledge and values over that of non-expert communities and other 
groups” (Smith 2013, 390). Such understanding originates in the modernist idea 
of heritage as something that needs to be preserved by professional experts. Fur-
thermore, authorised heritage discourse “not only closes down notions of per-
sonal, local and community heritage in an attempt to mitigate conflict and dissent, 
but also attempts to focus on heritage at a distance, out there or ‘back there’ in the 
past” (Urry 1996, 148 in Smith & Waterton 2009, 30). Such heritage discourse is 
evident in the heritage management agendas of many European countries and 
has often led to hegemonic heritage interpretations (Smith 2006, 4–11). 
Since the 1990s a paradigm shift in heritage politics and discourses has taken 
place. Instead of rigid standards of authenticity and monumentality that domi-
nated in the public administration of cultural heritage, during the recent decades 
heritage has become interpreted as a process of identity production, as something 
communities and groups constantly re-create and re-use (Harrison 2010; Smith 
2006; Bendix 2009; Harvey 2008). 
The new conception of heritage gives importance to the role of community 
based heritage management in sustainable development of local cultures (Van der 
Auwera et al 2015, 7–10). Participatory heritage culture has also been supported by 
the growing impact of digital technologies and social media. The role of heritage 
curators and conservators is currently seen as “facilitators rather than authorita-
tive scripters and arbiters of authenticity and significance” (Silbermann & Purser 
2012, 13–14). This people-centred understanding of heritage is expressed most 
powerfully in the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (2003, hereafter, ICHC)1, which defines intangible cultural 
heritage as:
the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as 
the  instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated 
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therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recog-
nize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural heritage, trans-
mitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities 
and groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature 
and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity, 
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity (UNESCO 
2003, article 2.1).
Expressing the constructivist understanding of heritage, the Convention affects 
heritage politics and authorities, their understanding of heritage, its stakeholders 
and maintenance. 
The definition and interpretation of intangible heritage proceeding from the 
community and its needs, and compiling inventories also constitutes part of 
a wider democratisation process concerned with history and cultural heritage, 
in which the key role is played by the Internet and digital technology and the 
broader development of civil society (Giaccardi 2012). Although the new “her-
itage regime” gives communities a key role in heritage management and safe-
guarding, the compilers of the document explicitly do not provide the definition 
of ‘community’. Such open use of the term has become a subject for varied and 
sometimes conflicting interpretations at national levels. Furthermore, it leaves 
unclear who, in the practice of heritage politics, has the right to represent the 
cultural community with whom the state actors are supposed to consult and 
communicate2 (Blake 2009; Hafstein 2014). 
Community remains “a warmly persuasive word” (Williams 1983, 76) not just 
in policy discourse but also in academic research. Social and cultural anthropolo-
gists have been especially concerned about the problems and paradoxes related 
to the use of the term ‘community’ (see discussions in Amit & Rapport 2002; 
Amit 2002). Gerald W. Creed suggests using “community as the focus of analysis 
rather than simply an empty category of heuristic of descriptive convenience” 
(Creed 2006, 6; emphasis added). Communities are constituted by and constitu-
tive of different regimes of knowledge (op cit, 11). Thus, it is necessary to look 
beyond the “seductions of community” (op cit) and to ask in each specific case – 
who defines the community? and who speaks for the community? Choosing the 
community focus for our case study materials we want to regard the roles that 
are given to the community in Estonian heritage politics.
Laurajane Smith and Emma Waterton call for a more critical community 
agenda. Reflexive and critical use of ‘community’ in academic inquiry has not 
yet become accepted in heritage policy and in spite of increasing “pressure for 
community involvement [in preservation and conservation discourse, there is 
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still] “a distinct one-sidedness to how this is carried out in practice” (Smith & 
Waterton 2009, 36). Communities are not comfortable homogenous unities – 
“the diversity and social difference, both between and within communities, must 
be recognized not just by policymakers and professionals, but also by communi-
ties themselves” (op cit, 12).
Cultural heritage, whether material or intangible, is always related to the issue 
of property both in a direct and more symbolic sense. Transforming a cultural 
phenomenon into heritage gives it an additional value, both in the symbolic and 
economic senses. The heritage status becomes a political or economic means for 
those who ‘own’ it creating confrontations and conflicts between different stake-
holders (Bendix & Hafstein 2009; Kuutma 2009a; Kuutma 2009b). Who profits 
and who loses from the heritage ownership? What kind of management duties 
heritage as property brings along to the community, especially if it is defined 
by the authorised heritage discourse?
Heritage as a property involves varied groups of stakeholders with differ-
ent interests and intentions. Community/ies may be considered stakeholders 
as well as custodians whose participation is considered essential in effective her-
itage management, especially if it involves commercial interests (Millar 2006). 
Especially in case of intangible cultural heritage traditional local communities 
are expected to be the ones who recognise as well as take care of their heritage. 
It is hard, however, to say what is traditional and who is the local community 
in today’s world of mobile lives and multiple interactions. What does it mean 
to be a custodian if in everyday practice a heritage phenomenon cannot be sepa-
rated into tangible and intangible realms? 
The professionalisation and bureaucratisation of heritage in the 20th cen-
tury has given power to professional heritage experts (Harrison 2013; Smith & 
Waterton 2009). However, the democratisation of heritage in recent decades has 
expanded the notion of expert to individuals and communities who have knowl-
edge about and interest in local heritage. Yet, how can communities as ambiguous 
entities act as experts? Who are the experts who represent the community in the 
process of heritage governance? 
The following empirical examples from Estonia focus on particular herit-
age practices and communities in their specific socio-cultural contexts. Firstly, 
Helen Sooväli-Sepping examines the problematic issues related to heritage 
in a community that lives the heritage against their own will, in other words, 
inhabitants whose property is in a cultural heritage protection area. The second 
example, by Kristi Grünberg, highlights the problems related to the adaption of 
the UNESCO heritage regime to the Estonian context and traces the challenges 
related to the democratisation of intangible heritage using the local inventory 
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as a case in point. The third example, examined by Marju Kõivupuu, questions 
the issues of sustainability and rupture as it relates to the tradition of cross trees 
and examines the process of heritagisation.
Community as a heritage custodian:  
the case of Rebala heritage conservation area
Landscape geographer Gunhild Setten (2012) describes what happened when 
on the southwestern coast of Norway a traditional 150-year-old jaerhus, a rela-
tively small wooden residential house, was demolished. This particular house was 
highly valued by the local cultural heritage authorities, as it was quite authen-
tic and well kept and set in a historical landscape. The house was of low value 
to the farmers who owned it and they decided to demolish it, claiming that it 
was in poor condition. For the authorities and some private owners of cultural 
heritage the demolition of the house was a shattering experience (Thu 1996 in 
Setten 2012). They wrote several reports in local newspaper articles, portraying 
the farmers as vandals. At the same time the farmers received support from their 
farming colleagues, who commended their courage in exercising their private 
property rights. 
The conflict between heritage stakeholders described by Setten is universal 
in the sense that a similar house could also be situated somewhere else. The 
author demonstrates that as a heritage object a historical farmhouse may have 
“double ownership”: it is private as well as public property, i.e., it belongs to the 
nation (Setten 2012, 148–154). Although it belongs virtually to everyone, the leg-
islation exerts moral pressure on the private owner who is expected to be a good 
custodian, although at his/her own expense. Such conflicting understanding 
of what cultural heritage is and how it should be maintained leads to the ques-
tion: what is the role of communities as stewards of local heritage if the value 
of heritage and the rules for its preservation are defined by external authorities 
and experts? 
In Estonia the protection of cultural heritage is regulated by the Heritage Con-
servation Act, which became effective in 2002 and was drawn up in the context of 
the great changes, especially the property reform, which took place in the 1990s. 3 
The National Heritage Board4 was established in 1993 with the aim of preserv-
ing heritage of national importance and value. That decade has been described 
as ten years of rapid changes in which “society was characterised by materiality, 
pragmatism, cynicism and jungle rules”; it was a period that endangered the 
“viable sustenance of traditions and customs” (Trummal 2007, 17–18). Thus, as 
in the period of modernisation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which 
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established an important connection between heritage and nation building and 
nostalgia for the past (cf Olwig 2001), post-socialist conservation ethics in Esto-
nia aimed to preserve valued patrimony in the context of rapid socio-economic 
transformations (cf Murzyn 2008). The current role of the Board is to safeguard 
cultural memory and national identity in the globalising world (Alatalu 2012). 
As of 2014 there are 26,578 registered monuments in Estonia.5
The Act represents a centralised conservation discourse setting normative 
rules for owners of cultural monuments and for those who have a property in her-
itage conservation areas. Without a written permit from the National Heritage 
Board restoration, construction and changes are prohibited.6 The concept of 
‘community’ is not used in the Heritage Conservation Act and community is not 
involved in negotiating the decisions made by professional heritage management 
experts. Therefore the private owners of heritage objects in Estonia often regard 
the National Heritage Board as an authority that limits their rights to maintain 
property. 
The processes that take place in the Rebala heritage conservation area 
in northern Estonia7 clearly demonstrate how national heritage politics has been 
shaped. The heritage conservation area was established in 1987 to impede the 
expansion of a phosphorite mine, essential to the economy of the Soviet Union 
(i.e., of all-Union importance). The statutes of the Rebala heritage conservation 
area stipulate the cultural heritage values of the region and the necessity to coor-
dinate any building activity with the municipal administration and the National 
Heritage Board. But how do local people perceive cultural heritage and the values 
mentioned in the statutes of the reserve? This is a problem to be addressed from 
the viewpoint of sustainable maintenance of cultural heritage objects. 
In the case of Rebala the usage of heritage in the village community is related 
to the issues of everyday life: as the community members live in a heritage con-
servation area, their private property is subject to certain restrictions. Because 
of the unique architecture and landscapes, several constraints and requirements 
have been imposed which insist that the restoration and repair of the buildings 
can be carried out only on the basis of an engineering plan and under the super-
vision of a heritage specialist; this also applies to the demolition and erection of 
buildings. The use of building materials and colours has to be coordinated with 
experts as well. Real estate plot boundaries can be changed only with the permis-
sion of the local authorities and the National Heritage Board, which is a long and 
bureaucratic process. In addition, the costs of the engineering plan and expert 
supervision service have to be covered by the owner.
In in-depth interviews, the village people residing in the heritage conservation 
area were asked how they perceived cultural heritage and the values mentioned 
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in the statutes of the heritage reserve.8 One of the villagers summarised local 
people’s ideas of heritage protection, pointing to the practical, so-called down-
to-earth peasant understanding of the value of the buildings and emphasising 
that historically the most significant factor had been the purpose of the building 
rather than any aesthetic pleasure derived from it: 
It is typical of the countryside that dwellings and outbuildings keep moving 
around in the yard. And if one of them collapses or gets too old, a new one 
is built next to it and the old one is demolished. And this is again replaced 
by a new one. But as one day the barn dwelling type of house, which even 
had rooms, became too small for the whole family, father built this house 
here. And then we didn’t have a sauna anymore, and that’s why I rebuilt the 
sauna after some time, but this is a second one already; the first one collapsed. 
(A man in his seventies)
Thus, generation after generation, members of the village community have 
worked hard to expand their holdings, apply new methods of agriculture and, 
by erecting new buildings, improve their living conditions.
The villagers were asked what they thought about old buildings, barn dwell-
ings unique to Estonian vernacular architecture, as symbols of family farms from 
the mid-19th to early 20th centuries, which still exist in the village scenery. The 
interviewees explained that the land they own, the dwelling house and the nearby 
area were the most meaningful for them. Ancestral heritage carries a personal 
and emotional meaning as a home for the current inhabitants rather than a value 
in need of state protection (cf Grubbström & Sooväli-Sepping 2012). Although 
the emotional bonds to a place may positively affect its maintenance (cf Jörgensen 
& Stjernström 2008) the unanimous opinion was that house owners faced prob-
lems particularly due to the statutes of the heritage conservation area. One of 
the interviewees said that during the Soviet period stone fences were knocked 
down to build roads, and quite a few barn dwellings were demolished as the law 
stipulated only one house per plot. Therefore, local people cannot understand 
why today they are expected to preserve what decades back was worth nothing. 
Several villagers pointed to difficulties in the renovation process and costs that 
were higher than expected because of restrictions in the use of building materials. 
They believe this has had an adverse effect on the villagers’ general quality of life. 
The heritage values established in Rebala by the authorities do not address 
the community as the community fails to perceive the heritage under protection 
as their ‘own’ heritage. So we face a situation in which the values of the land-
scape defined by heritage experts, scholars, and planners, and thereby rendering 
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meaning to heritage, have been formalised by the authorities. The top-down 
approach in defining heritage excludes private owners’ stances on cultural herit-
age. Local people are of the opinion that the authorities take it for granted that 
heritage must be maintained by the owners themselves, as stipulated by law. 
Furthermore, if we speak about heritage in the case of buildings and landscapes 
in rural areas, we encounter the normative understanding of the relationship 
between the landed property and family succession. It is thought that long-term 
land ownership automatically means obligations and taking responsibility to 
protect some past traditions. However, traditional farm architecture in Estonia 
has been a problematic heritage since the beginning of the 20th century as the 
processes of modernisation, political rupture and socioeconomic change have 
considerably influenced the meanings and values related to it. 
The Estonian Heritage Conservation Act is currently being revised and the 
new draft Act initiated in 2014 is supposed to replace the centralised heritage 
politics with more decentralised heritage maintenance. Not all the restrictions 
introduced in the cultural situation of 1990 fulfil the expected aims and the entire 
sphere of cultural heritage requires reorganisation and revision. The revised ver-
sion of the Act requires several changes, the most significant of which, in the 
context of this empiric example, are two moments: monuments shall be viewed 
as parts of the cultural environment and the process of social change, and owners 
shall be provided with considerably more feedback and advice in collaboration 
with heritage protection specialists. These changes are related to the international 
democratisation of heritage politics and the emergence of dialogic approaches 
to heritage interpretations that give increasing importance to the social aspects 
of heritage, especially those that concern engaging local people in the process of 
heritage definition and management (cf Harrison 2013). 
The community as heritage expert:  
the case of the Estonian intangible heritage inventory
The heritage regime based on the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguard-
ing of the Intangible Cultural Heritage focuses on communities and their role 
in defining, preserving and conveying cultural phenomena as intangible heritage 
(for example Labadi 2013, 132–133; Bortolotto 2013, 269). Communities as heritage 
stakeholders and experts have a central position in drawing up inventories that 
support the continuity of intangible heritage. Specifically, each state party shall, 
“with the participation of communities, groups and relevant non-governmental 
organisations” (UNESCO 2003, Article 11, b) ensure “the identification with 
a view to safeguarding the intangible cultural heritage present in its territory” 
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(UNESCO 2003, Article 12, 1). The inventories can be drawn up by each state 
“in a manner geared to its own situation” (UNESCO 2003, Article 12, 1) yet, it is 
necessary to ensure “the widest possible participation” (UNESCO 2003, Article 
15) of the communities and to involve them actively in the heritage manage-
ment, which is deemed important by the UNESCO, who sets standards and 
provides that they are observed (UNESCO 2009; Torggler & Sediakina‐Rivière 
2013, 33–34). 
Thus, a heritage regime based on the ICHC praises the audibility of the com-
munity’s voice, and its participation (UNESCO 2003, Article 11, b; Article 15) 
in the process of safeguarding intangible heritage; on the basis thereof the appli-
cations submitted for inscription on the Representative List of the Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage of Humanity as well as national inventories of intangible heritage 
are assessed. Community involvement in defining and safeguarding intangible 
heritage and the wider democratisation of heritage politics bring about new role 
expectations: communities should be interested in and willing to construe their 
heritage and people engaged in the sphere of heritage management are expected 
to provide support and counselling (see Bortolotto 2013: 269).
How community participation is understood varies by states: the interpreta-
tions of the ICHC are culture-specific, depending on the socio-political back-
ground and the existing institutions and practices of heritage protection (see 
Bendix et al 2013). A state may delegate the task of identifying the elements of 
intangible heritage to experts and/or officials or organise it as a campaign, leaving 
the relevant communities the task of providing information about heritage and/
or the role of the authoriser and/or implementer of the regulations concerned 
with its protection. On the other hand, the state may also appeal to communities 
to define their intangible heritage, to argue about its interpretation and the ways 
to support its vitality, and integrate these ideas into planning cultural politics. 
When, in 2006, Estonia acceded to the ICHC, a decision was made in favour 
of compiling a national inventory based on community initiative and interpre-
tation. When drawing up an inventory, what problems are encountered in this 
seemingly ideal democratic solution? How can a balance be found between insti-
tutional expectation and the requirements of imaginary communities?
The task of coordinating the implementation of the ICHC, as well as respec-
tive notifications about and compilation of the inventory of intangible herit-
age, were delegated to the Folk Culture Centre9 under the administration of the 
Ministry of Culture. As a specialist in the field of intangible heritage at the Folk 
Culture Centre, I participated in this process of heritage creation.10 The round 
table meetings initiated by the Ministry of Culture, with the participation of 
scholars, specialists and officials, as well as community representatives, agreed on 
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the basis for compiling the inventory. Founded on the community-based defini-
tion of intangible heritage (UNESCO 2003, Article 2, 1), the inventory was seen 
as a means to enthuse communities to notice, appreciate, maintain and transmit 
their living heritage (knowledge, skills, customs and practices) (Porila 2012, 10). 
The decision was made to compile “a completely new inventory, which would 
feature bottom-up approach and interest in the current knowledge and skills” 
(op cit). The elaboration of the structure of a web-based inventory of intangible 
heritage started in 200811. The technical solution was completed in 2009, and 
in 2010 a corresponding home page12 became accessible to the general public.
By means of this inventory, all the communities in Estonia – people who are 
united by a common intangible heritage (Porila 2012, 8–9) – can introduce and 
evaluate their knowledge, customs, skills, and practices along with the people, 
establishments and locations associated with them. “Inscriptions on the inven-
tory could be born in collaboration between community members, the same 
way as the entire intangible heritage should be maintained and protected” (op cit, 
12). An inscription should include the descriptions and analyses of the current 
situation of the cultural phenomenon, its historical background and future per-
spectives, bibliography, sources used; if possible, also photographic, sound and 
video materials and other supplementary information. 
This institutional attempt to democratise cultural heritage inspired by the 
ICHC, involves quite a few paradoxes. The compilation of the inventory, based 
on community initiative and heritage interpretations, certainly implies relevant 
information, including introducing the concept of intangible heritage and gener-
ating interest in the inventory, i.e., state intervention in the heritage production 
process13. 
The inventory focuses on the idea of a strong and active community that 
makes decisions about their intangible heritage and the ways to maintain and 
protect it, thereafter starting the compilation of the inscription. During training 
courses and information days participants are encouraged to use the concept of 
intangible heritage in a broad sense14 to express subjective interpretations and 
to regard themselves as experts in their own heritage. These training courses 
emphasise that the scholars or officials do not prescribe what the community 
could introduce as intangible heritage (Porila 2012, 10). However, the compiler 
of the inscription is aware that the text is checked before publication and, if nec-
essary, it has to be revised. Inscriptions are edited by specialists from the Folk 
Culture Centre, who in this context could be regarded as mediators of author-
ised heritage discourse from the administrative (the Ministry of Culture) to the 
local level. The author of an inscription is also aware of the fact that the text is 
published on the inventory home page only after the Estonian Council for the 
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Intangible Cultural Heritage has approved it.15 Therefore, the inscription has 
to follow a certain procedure, the rules of representability and authoritative-
ness, as well as the expectations for the structure of the text. Such restrictions, 
along with other factors, have influenced some people who started compiling 
inscriptions to eventually discontinue them. Hence the question of whether the 
inventory is a project for (academically trained) heritage experts rather than for 
communities at grassroots level, as has been publicly announced (see UNESCO 
2014, 7).
An aggravating factor for community participation in heritage politics and for 
being an expert in one’s own culture is the fact that the compilation of an inscrip-
tion presumes enquiry, dedication, time, and also financial means.16 A commu-
nity that wishes to draw attention to their intangible heritage by means of the 
inventory would need experts both from the inside (for example advocates of 
a phenomenon and compilers of the inscription) and from the outside (for exam-
ple counselling museum workers and specialists in folk culture). However, the 
main factor is the interest in the (public) interpretation of intangible heritage 
and an inner urge to write separately to/instead of other forms of expression 
(contribution to museums and archives, publications, websites, etc.) an inscrip-
tion for the inventory. Despite the notification work to spread the idea of the 
usefulness of the latter (as a supportive means for evaluating, maintaining and 
transmitting the traditional skills and knowledge, sustainable development and 
creative industry) and the offered training courses, new inscriptions have not 
been added as quickly and smoothly as was expected by the Ministry of Cul-
ture. 17 The same tendency can also be observed in the case of websites for sharing 
memories, irrespective of whether they are official or created on private initiative 
(websites created spontaneously by people with similar experience or interests 
attract more active collaboration) (see Arthur 2009, 72; Affleck & Kvan 2008, 275).
The Estonian intangible heritage inventory is still trying to find its place 
among other databases, websites, and lists of local traditions as part of a wider 
process of evaluating cultural heritage and cultural diversity. Institutional and 
popular ideas of the need for an inventory are not compatible: people are not 
eager to contribute to its compilation, as they might not need such a channel 
to be heritage experts and maintain their heritage (Labadi 2013, 137). More often 
than not, they have different outlets for that. Yet, the idea of building the inven-
tory on community initiative does not oblige its compilation from top to bot-
tom – people should realise themselves that they have a heritage phenomenon 
to safeguard and feel the need to inscribe it.
It is difficult to assess the immediate role of the inventory as UNESCO sees 
it – as raising cultural awareness and supporting the sustainable development of 
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intangible heritage – as there are several other socio-cultural factors that influ-
ence the preservation of heritage. Counting inscriptions and the number of visits 
on the inventory homepage might prompt intervention at the institutional level. 
A local heritage expert contributing to the inventory explained: “perhaps the 
inscription should not be an aim in itself, but rather that we speak about these 
issues locally. To raise interest, to look for one’s own, to remember, to value – this 
is what should be deemed important.” (e-mail, November 5, 2013) 
From community stewardship to complex heritage management:  
cross trees in southeast Estonia
Cross trees in southeast Estonia are related to tangible as well as intangible her-
itage maintenance. For various reasons cross trees, as an object and as related 
to a practice, are a case of liminal, “hybrid”, and in some respect also “dissonant 
heritage” (cf Kõivupuu 2014; Kuutma 2013). A ‘cross tree’ is a tree (pine, spruce, 
birch, etc.) beside the road into which the closest male relatives of a dead per-
son has cut a cross on the way to the cemetery – even today, in the 21st century. 
It is a commemorative practice and a way to signify a conscious or unconscious 
line that the deceased has crossed when being excluded from the living world. 
Cross trees are an expression of “vernacular religion” (Primiano 1995), probably 
a combination of pre-Christian and Christian beliefs (Kõivupuu 2009; Kõivupuu 
2014). Cutting a cross into a tree has been part of the funeral tradition, especially 
in historical Võromaa18, which according to earliest records dates back to the 17th 
century and has survived, although only in southeast Estonia (op cit). Cutting 
a cross into a tree is still part of local funeral custom. Cross trees and cross tree 
groves are considered sacred by locals, although only a few of them are protected 
by the Estonian Nature Conservation Act.
Internationally, cross trees belong to sacred natural sites and objects; there are 
many native groups in the world for whom certain trees and groves and related 
customs may have strong spiritual or religious meanings. Sacred natural sites 
connect people and nature, personal and collective memory; they may confirm 
cultural identity for a family, community, or the whole nation. Religious land-
scapes and places related to cultural memory often emerge as a result of a practice 
or with the help of oral traditions, folklore and narratives that support collective 
remembering (Fox 1997, 8–9; Siikala 1998; Rønnow 2011, 225). 
Edmund G. C. Barrow points out that traditionally sacred trees have been 
under community stewardship, which has saved them from being cut down or 
damaged. Today, local communities as well as their ways of life have changed con-
siderably and modern socio-economic values tend to dominate over traditional 
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spiritual values (Barrow 2010). Therefore a question arises: why should sacred 
trees be safeguarded for the future, and by whom if they are no longer part of all 
community members’ everyday lives. What happens if community stewardship 
does not function the same way as in the past? 
Cutting crosses in trees was still a living tradition in Soviet Estonia and 
although officially the forests belonged to the state, they were managed by local 
people who respected this custom. Cutting a funeral cross was also considered 
a compensatory act relating to a Christian funeral; local clergymen accepted 
the ritual, and sometimes even participated in it. After Estonia became re-inde-
pendent in the 1990s, forest management was centralised and local community 
stewardship practice was disrupted. During the transition period in post-socialist 
Estonia several cross trees and cross forests, still related to the lived practice, were 
chopped down – partly because of forest managers’ ignorance, partly because 
of disregard. Over the last decades policies like privatisation and state forests 
and roads management policies and practices have resulted in extensive cutting 
of cross trees, especially next to highways. Forestry companies and sometimes 
also forest owners (especially those to whom land had been restituted) have not 
acknowledged breaking of any official laws, as the majority of cross trees were not 
under heritage or nature protection. For instance, the State Forest Management 
Centre has cut down cross trees in production forests or expanded roads through 
cross tree groves, which in several cases has caused deep disappointment among 
locals (see Kõivupuu 2009). These developments have led local communities 
who wanted to preserve cross trees to seek support from external authorities 
(including heritage officials and academic scholars) who would legitimise the 
importance of the tradition by giving it the value of cultural heritage. 
Natural heritage, including sacred natural sites, is regulated by several inter-
national and national “heritage regimes” (Bendix et al 2013): for example, Man 
and the Biosphere (1970), the UNESCO World Heritage Convention (1972), and 
the Intangible Cultural Heritage Convention (2003). The guidelines for protect-
ing natural sacred sites were formulated in collaboration between the Interna-
tional Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and UNESCO in 2003–200819. 
According to the IUCN definition, “sacred natural sites are areas having special 
spiritual significance for peoples and communities”, and they are often “commu-
nity conserved areas”20. However, the meaning of ‘community’ in the document is 
somewhat problematic, because it is related to the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention (1989). As in the case of the Intangible Cultural Heritage Conven-
tion, community involvement in conservation and community participation 
in the development of national heritage politics is given a crucial importance. 
Stakeholders of sacred natural sites are defined as natural resource users and 
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managers; yet, stakeholder identification and analysis based on understanding 
different interests, characteristics and circumstances is stressed in order to better 
manage sacred natural sites (Wild & McLeod 2008, 46–47). 
The definition of sacred natural sites in Estonia is based on the IUCN docu-
ment. Today about 500 historical sacred sites and objects (sacred groves, trees 
and springs; sacrificial stones, etc.) have been located, mapped and designated 
as monuments under natural or cultural heritage protection21. Among these 
two categories the following can be distinguished: sites that relate to cultural 
memory and not to lived practices, and sites or cult objects that are currently 
related to certain groups’ cultural heritage and lived practices (Kõivupuu 2009, 
224). Cross trees belong to the latter. Furthermore, they belong to natural and 
cultural, tangible as well as intangible heritage. Despite the IUCN guidelines for 
protection, there is a lack of legal regulation in Estonia that would define sacred 
natural sites as unique objects of both natural and cultural heritage, reflecting 
diverse values for varied groups (see Kultuuriministeerium 2008). Seven hundred 
cross trees are currently included in an inventory, although only a few of them 
are under protection as natural monuments. In the Estonian introduction to the 
IUCN guidelines cross trees are defined as part of “community heritage”, whereas 
the ‘community’ remains undefined in the local context. A stakeholder group 
related to the maintenance of sacred natural sites, such as neo-pagan organisa-
tion Maavalla Koda (Estonian House of Taara and Native Religions), relies on 
and exploits a romantic ideal of the native Estonian community that has its roots 
in the national movement of the late 19th century and does not correspond to 
actual communities and their practices in 21st century Estonia.
Although traditional community stewardship of sacred sites has changed, 
there are various communities of interest or heritage stakeholders who have 
become involved in the issues related to their protection and preservation. 
For example, during roundtable meetings discussing the protection of cross trees 
along with other sacred natural sites, participants have been NGOs as well as state 
institutions22. Throughout the past few years the collaboration between different 
stakeholder groups (for example local administration, scholars, officials, and 
forest managers) has increased with the aim of better protecting the cross trees. 
However, the current practice of forest management in Estonia clearly shows 
that the state forest management bodies should show more respect towards the 
religious relationship that locals have with nature and heritage practices.
The implementation and intervention of international heritage regimes 
(for example UNESCO; IUCN) exerts a noticeable influence on local heritage 
politics and management as well as on people’s everyday lives. Like several other 
local traditions, cross trees as a funeral custom in historical Võrumaa have been 
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included in the Estonian inventory of intangible cultural heritage analysed in the 
previous example.23 Being in the inventory certainly dignifies a cultural tradition 
nominated as (intangible) heritage (cf Bendix 2009). Participation in defining 
cultural heritage, may in turn, increase the community’s self-awareness and self-
consciousness, and through this also visibility and social, economic and political 
capital, thereby marshalling the community (cf Silbermann & Purser 2012: 20–21). 
For instance, in 2014 a traditional bathing practice – smoke sauna customs in 
Võrumaa – was inscribed on the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage of Humanity as a result of community initiative. This may also 
indirectly influence the status of cross trees as valuable regional cultural heritage. 
External recognition may change how the local people value their customs, and 
draws state and international attention to a particular custom, although the nega-
tive impact of this attention to the viability of cultural heritage cannot be over-
looked either (see Labadi 2013: 141–142). Heritagisation is inevitably a process of 
cultural intervention – if traditions that have formerly been part of everyday life 
become seen as heritage it may force people to see them as something separate 
from the mundane, which in turn may change the meaning of the traditional 
practice (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004; Kockel 2007).
Concluding discussion
Our study brought out the different roles given to communities in the process of 
heritage management, as well as the impact of heritage politics in shaping com-
munities. Different cases showed explicitly that community is understood quite 
differently in varied policy discourses and practices. Furthermore, our research 
demonstrated that it is difficult to speak of a particular community; rather, 
there are either different communities or multiple dimensions of a community 
involved in heritage processes. At the institutional level of heritage management, 
the notion of community is neither conceptualised nor problematised, although 
governing requires certainty. Communities as heritage authority partners should 
be “visualised, surveyed and mobilised” (Hafstein 2014, 49). The Estonian cases 
highlighted two major issues that are currently also relevant in international 
heritage management – the democratisation of heritage politics on the one hand, 
and the problems related to community engagement on the other hand. 
Heritage regimes generated by nation states have traditionally given the 
power to authorities (such as heritage experts) who either consider or disregard 
local community members as subjects in the heritage process (Kuutma 2013). 
Here Estonia is no exception. The Estonian Heritage Conservation Act repre-
sents the modernist understanding of heritage management in which objects 
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are emphasised over the people who live the heritage. Such an understanding 
of heritage management is caused by the rapid changes that took place in the 
post-socialist society, where economic values became dominant over cultural, 
social and historical values (cf Ochman 2013). As the case of Rebala heritage 
conservation area demonstrated, the local community is not engaged in the pro-
cess of heritage management and this has resulted in the misrecognition of and 
resistance to institutionally defined heritage (cf Waterton & Smith 2010). The 
case likewise pointed out the complexities involved when certain communi-
ties interpret their heritage, memory and identity, and how these communities 
communicate and engage with each other (see Lowenthal 1998; Krauss 2008). 
The attitude of the inhabitants of Rebala towards institutionally defined heritage 
cannot be generalised to other heritage processes in Estonia, where we can find 
several examples of the communities that are interested in the interpretation, 
evaluation and preservation of their heritage and are efficient in doing so24. 
The democratisation of heritage politics and dialogic approaches to heritage 
is related to the shift from an essentialist and elitist conceptualisation towards 
a constructivist understanding of heritage – i.e. towards the importance of people 
(as active agents) and meaning makers of the past in the present (cf Smith 2006; 
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 2004). This includes a transition from authorised heritage 
discourse towards a more varied local and personal interpretation of heritage 
and celebrations of “small heritages” (Harvey 2008, 33). The cultural heritage 
valued by the community constitutes one of the pillars of regional identity, which 
is also cultivated by the community members of the Rebala heritage conserva-
tion area, depending on the necessity and situation. However, these are cases of 
community-defined heritage. According to local understanding, cultural heritage 
is often a social and cultural process rather than a physical object to be preserved 
(cf Mydland & Grahn 2012).
When creating the national inventory of intangible cultural heritage Estonia 
choose a very democratic method, relying on the UNESCO ICHC guidelines. 
However, this attempt to institutionally coordinate community heritage intro-
duced several problems. People contribute to the inventory only if they feel the 
necessity. Currently they get encouragement, and education about the need for 
the contribution and thereafter consultations, motivation and support. This her-
itage production process, even though indicated to be a community project, is 
inevitably also a governing project – a state funded institution (Folk Culture 
Centre) is simultaneously in the double position of being an authorised herit-
age expert as well as a supportive body for community-based heritage experts. 
Thus, authorised heritage experts likewise have to adapt to a new role that is less 
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related to identifying the authenticity of heritage and more to helping people to 
articulate their heritage (cf Silbermann & Purser 2012, 13–14).
The democratisation of heritage politics relates to the broader developments 
of participatory culture facilitated by digital media as well as by the development 
of civil society: heritage may be expressed and discussed at many levels and 
vernacular manifestations of it may find forms other than a state funded website 
platform (cf Giaccardi 2012; Edensor et al 2009). If the community is regarded 
as an expert of intangible heritage, the institutional level has to come to terms 
with the fact that people make their own decisions about whether and how they 
want to take care of their intangible heritage. It is a fact beyond denial that one 
should also respect their right to regard the inventory as part of officialdom 
(Tauschek 2013).
As concerns communities as experts in their own heritage, we would like 
to reiterate that there have always been some community members more con-
cerned and aware of the sustainability of traditions than others, however, they 
have transmitted their knowledge orally to the new generation. Creating the 
national inventory of intangible heritage means making this knowledge public 
and, before it is made public, getting the approval of trained heritage experts. 
Not all communities have heritage enthusiasts who would have the resources to 
conduct the inquiry needed to describe a heritage phenomenon according to the 
rules set for inscription. Community empowerment in increasingly democratised 
heritage politics may lead to the danger that the multivocality inherent in every 
community may be lost if too clear a voice is found in cooperation with admin-
istrators and experts (Hafstein 2014, 55–57). This, in turn, can create hegemonic 
interpretations of community heritage (cf Annist 2013).
Likewise heritagisation process can influence the emergence and essence of 
communities. The case of cross trees in southeast Estonia sheds light on problems 
related to community heritage and community stewardship in contemporary 
society. A common goal such as fighting for the survival of a perishing tradition 
can make people with otherwise different interests and origins feel and act like 
a community that has shared values. Thus, heritagisation – the process of naming, 
possessing and regulating something as heritage – could drive people to act as 
a community or give rise to community activists (cf Harrison 2010). However, as 
this case showed, shared locality may not automatically mean that people feel and 
act like a community. The discontinuities and ruptures in the tradition related 
to the cross trees showed the need for intervention by state authorities. If there 
is no community stewardship for cross trees in everyday life it must be created 
from the outside in the forms of legislation, supervision and sanctions. External 
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heritage experts are needed who would have the social capital as well as the 
competency to be intermediaries between multiple authorities and local people. 
While cross trees may be officially recognised as cultural heritage objects 
in need of protection, the continuity of the tradition depends on people who 
are familiar with and respect it, even if they do not see themselves as part of the 
(heritage) community.
Prioritising and making meaning of cultural heritage is a contextual and 
situation specific process. Likewise, communities are not fixed entities, but 
change according to a social configuration. “A community is often constructed, 
produced and maintained through its heritage work and incorporates the very 
active concerns, tensions and anxieties that drive community projects in the first 
place” (Dicks 2000, 97 in Smith & Waterton 2009, 37; emphasis added). Some 
institutions may have high expectations of communities as experts in their own 
heritage, whereas the results of heritage projects initiated by communities might 
not lead to expressions or interpretations acceptable to authorities and external 
heritage experts. Engaging the community in the process of heritagisation as well 
as heritage management might turn to be a complicated and inconvenient task 
because people might not wish to participate in it for various reasons. 
In conclusion we want to ask a question that stems from the point recently 
raised by Valdimar Hafstein in regard of the communalisation and vernacularisa-
tion of heritage governing – if communities should safeguard their heritage, who 
will safeguard the communities, and how? (Hafstein 2014).
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Notes
The study was supported by the European Union through the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund (Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory, CECT) and Estonian Research 
Council grants PRG398 and IUT34–32.
1  Along with the Convention for the International Protection of the Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Herit-
age is one of the most popular UNESCO cultural conventions: 177 states have acceded 
to the latter (as of 22 February 2018), and 193 states to the former (as of 31 January 2017). 
UNESCO has 195 member states and 11 associate members.
2  During the preparation of the experts’ draft of the ICHC, a Glossary of relevant 
terms was produced by an expert meeting held at UNESCO which defines a ‘community’ 
as: People who share a self-ascribed sense of connectedness. This may be manifested, for 
example, in a feeling of identity or common behaviour, as well as in activities and territory. 
Individuals can belong to more than one community. Further definitions are also given for 
‘cultural community’ and ‘local community’. It was on the basis of these understandings 
that the term is employed in the Convention text.
3  The property reform (1991) has restituted or compensated to the former owners 
the nationalised private property that during the Soviet occupation was moved into the 
ownership of the state. 
4  In Estonia the predecessor of the National Heritage Board was the Estonian Herit-
age Protection Society, a movement launched on civic initiative in 1987 and which played 
an important role in the national movement in Estonia, then still part of the Soviet Union, 
and which was aimed to preserve national heritage and historical objects as well as increase 
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awareness of heritage protection issues. Thus, cultural heritage acquired national-political 
value and its protection constituted part of the national resistance movement.
5  Source: http://www.kul.ee/et/tegevused/muinsuskaitse.
6  The Heritage Conservation Act. Source: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/
eli/520012015008/consolide [accessed 31 October 2017]
7  The purpose of the Rebala heritage conservation area is “to maintain and protect the 
uniqueness of northern Estonian agricultural landscape with its elements (villages, farms, 
land plots, arable land and their historical borders, archaeological, technical, art and 
natural monuments) that have high scientific and cultural value”. The idea of the reserve 
is to preserve the present environment as genuinely as possible, to protect the numerous 
historical remains against tampering and destruction as well as to provide information 
for visitors. (Source: http://www.joelahtme.ee)
8  This fieldwork investigation was carried out mainly among the core village popu-
lation in the Rebala heritage conservation area in the years 2010–2012, and is based on 
21 in-depth interviews as well as personal observation. The fieldwork has focused on the 
Rebala heritage conservation area since 2006. Since 2008 I (Helen Sooväli-Sepping) have 
been involved with the reserve: apart from being an expert (compiler of special condi-
tions for the 2005 statutes of the heritage conservation area) I have also become a herit-
age custodian. Our family owns a barn dwelling complex under renovation, with 40 ha 
of land; according to records, the ownership of this farmstead by the same family dates 
back to at least the 17th or 18th century. So I am an active user of heritage, a creator, and, 
depending on the circumstances (whether I am accepted as such or not), also a member of 
the local community, as well as an interpreter of heritage (compiler of the book Parasmäe 
talude lood (Tales of Parasmäe farms 2012)) and a heritage expert (both as a researcher 
at the academy and in day-to-day heritage protection activities).
9  The Folk Culture Centre with its regional network of folk culture specialists par-
ticipates in the process of developing and implementing cultural policy in Estonia. The 
Centre organises various training courses, arranges state support programmes for the 
cultural regions of Estonia, and other cultural activities. 
10  In the years 2008–2009 I (Kristi Grünberg) participated in the elaboration of the 
structure and operating principles of the inventory. From 2012 to 2016 I was responsible 
for the editing of inscriptions thereof. The present analysis was written in 2014 while I was 
working as a specialist of intangible cultural heritage at the Folk Culture Centre. Thus, 
it reflects the daily hesitations and observations triggered by the “ethnographic present” of 
that time. As a mediator of heritage discourse based on the ICHC, I was obliged to direct 
people to draw up these inscriptions. It could be said that, as an official administrating 
heritage, I urged them to enter a borderline area: they would have to start to interpret 
their way of life (and everything self-evident therein), identify their heritage, consciously 
mediate it to others by way of the inventory, and perhaps even acquire a different writing 
style to compile the inscription. As a researcher, I was not comfortable in this role: I would 
have preferred to observe cultural processes rather than interfere in them. On the other 
hand, as a participant in cultural policy, I involuntarily influenced the idea of what herit-
age is. While editing the inscriptions, I also affected the style of writing. Could I interfere, 
and to what extent; for instance, should I propose altered wording or direct the writer 
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to more critical or complementary sources if the inventory “puts in the foreground the 
community’s knowledge and vision of its own culture” (Porila 2012, 10)? 
11  It was compiled in cooperation between experts from the Estonian Literary 
Museum, the Estonian National Museum, and the University of Tartu, as well as special-
ists from the Folk Culture Centre.
12  The Estonian intangible heritage inventory: www.rahvakultuur.ee/vkpnimistu. The 
structure of the inventory is based on the example of the Québec intangible heritage inven-
tory, created on the initiative of ethnologists from Laval University (www.irepi.ulaval.ca).
13  In order to find contributors, as well as inspire and support them, the Folk Culture 
Centre has organised training courses and information days; in order to compile inscrip-
tions, financial support can be applied for in the cultural programmes administered by 
the centre.
14  In addition to the unique and conspicuous (e.g. folk music and folk dance, wear-
ing of folk costumes) people are encouraged to pay attention to everyday knowledge 
and customs, which could be valued as heritage as well (e.g. rocking in a rocking chair, 
extracting birch sap, mowing with a scythe, etc.). 
15  This body of experts established at the Ministry of Culture in 2009 is not responsi-
ble for the inscriptions relating to establishments, associations, people or locations.
16  The compilation of inscriptions has been supported by the UNESCO participa-
tion programme, the Ministry of Culture, and the Folk Culture Centre. This support is 
essential, as inscription requires voluminous research that cannot be based merely on 
voluntary work. 
17  While in 2010 the inventory included inscriptions of 25 items relating to knowl-
edge, skills, customs or practices, 5 relating to establishments or associations, 19 to people 
and 3 to locations, then as of December 2016 these figures have grown to 87, 17, 44, and 
5, respectively. In December 2016 the number of authors of inscriptions amounted to 46.
18  Historical Võromaa is a separate cultural region in southeast Estonia, which, 
according to the contemporary administrative division, covers areas in Võru, Põlva, Valga 
and Tartu Counties. The region features several enduring traditions and a dialect used 
in everyday life. The Võru Institute, which was established on the basis of the so-called 
Võru Movement, originating in the 1980s, actively investigates, maintains and advocates 
the cultural heritage of historical Võrumaa. 
19  Source: https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/9201.
20  Source: http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/pa_guidelines_016_sacred_natu-
ral_sites.pdf. 
21  According to historical sources there are about 2,800 historical sacred sites known 
to researchers.
22  The organisations and institutions that have taken part in roundtables are the Hiite 
Maja (House of Sacred Groves) Foundation, Maavalla Koda (Estonian House of Taara 
and Native Religions), representatives of different disciplines from the University of Tartu 
and Tallinn University, including the Centre of Sacred Natural Sites at the University of 
Tartu, and representatives from the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Interior, the 
Environmental Board, Estonian Fund for Nature, etc.
23  See http://www.rahvakultuur.ee/vkpnimistu/. 
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24  Furthermore, a local community may use institutional heritage policies for its own 
advantage and take an active role in defining its heritage. For example, the community 
initiative to safeguard the smoke sauna as a valuable part of local heritage in Võrumaa, 
southeast Estonia, lead to its inscription into the UNESCO Representative List of the 
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2014.
278
Ester Bardone, Kristi Grünberg, Helen Sooväli-Sepping, Marju Kõivupuu, Helen Kästik
Communities, politics and cultural heritage
Kristel Rattus
The article, authored by Ester Bardone, Kristi Grünberg, Helen Sooväli-Sepping, 
Marju Kõivupuu and Helen Kästik, deals with heritage politics and management 
in contemporary Estonia and the role of communities in these processes. The 
authors direct attention to currently relevant issues such as what the character 
of the ruling heritage paradigm is and how this affects both cultural practice 
as well as political discussion. Their aim is to elucidate the characteristic processes 
of heritagisation in contemporary Estonia, for example the democratisation of 
heritage politics and problems related to community engagement. The topics are 
addressed via three empirical cases focusing on the action-taking and decision-
making capacities of (local) communities in varied heritage processes.
What counts as a case for analysis is not self-evident. Cases are not natural 
phenomena, they are constructed as such by the analysers. The five authors come 
from different fields of study: ethnology, human geography, and folkloristics and 
the research underlying the analysed examples was conducted by them inde-
pendently. Yet, in the article, the cases manage to create a stimulating dialogue. 
The authors are specifically interested in the social processes of heritage crea-
tion by which meanings and values of heritage are negotiated and established. 
These processes are treated as situated practices that take place between specific 
actors in a particular time, space and social context. In each case, each compo-
nent (time, space, actors, social context) is an active participant in the case and 
what it can become. Focusing on a social process, they manage to shed light 
on different practices emergent under a variety of constantly altering circum-
stances that are integral to any social relationship.   
The first example focuses on the controversy between Rebala heritage pro-
tection area and local inhabitants. Local people feel that they are forced to live 
“heritage against their own will” (p. 256), since the rules and restrictions of the 
conservation area have been imposed on them without their consent. Although 
the content of local heritage has been defined by professional experts outside the 
community, the community is regarded as (co-)stewards of the heritage, which 
means that they are obliged to bear the costs of its maintenance. The policy of 
heritage experts is considered rigid and authoritarian by local people. In addition 
to this, it seems that the values given to local heritage by experts do not coincide 
with the values of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Thus communication 
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between the parties is characterised by misconceptions and distrust. The local 
community feel that their voice is not heard enough, and in heritage discussions 
they are not considered to be in a legitimate position to make decisions.
Secondly, the inventorying of Estonian intangible cultural heritage 
is observed. A former heritage expert reflects on how various (local) communi-
ties have been encouraged and educated to be able to compile inscriptions that 
would meet the aims of the UNESCO heritage regime. In this case, in contrast 
to the first, heritage experts act as advocates for democratic heritage politics 
that involves the community. The UNESCO way of thinking is people-centred, 
seeing the communities both as stakeholders and experts in their own cultural 
heritage. This has introduced the expectation that communities should be will-
ing to construe their heritage. Yet, in reality, local communities have appeared 
to be rather passive in inventorying. The reason, as the authors imply, may be 
that today there are many other forms of expressing one’s heritage (than writing 
an intangible cultural heritage inscription). 
Similarly to the first case, the third example deals with the question of which 
group or institution has the legitimate power to define heritage. The preservation 
of cross trees – an element of an old tradition – has become problematic since 
many of the trees are under threat of being cut down (because of the economic 
interests of both private forest owners and the state). Unlike the Rebala case, this 
one demonstrates a situation in which a national heritage preservation regime 
is considered desirable by the community of stakeholders. Although cross trees 
have been inventoried as intangible cultural heritage, not all of them have been 
listed as objects of national heritage preservation. To legitimise cross trees as 
cultural heritage, the local community has sought help from various heritage 
experts and authorities. In this way, the stakeholder community has expanded 
into a much larger and more varied group of interests (including, for example, 
local administration, scholars, officials, different NGOs, etc.) than merely local 
inhabitants. 
The authors of the analysed examples relate to their cases personally, either 
belonging to the community of stakeholders or being involved in the described 
situations as heritage experts (or simultaneously occupying both positions). 
Communities
Communities and their roles in the politics and management of heritage is the 
topic that interests the authors most. Yet, as they point out, it is also a compli-
cated topic because of the diverse usage of the notion ‘community’ in heritage 
discussions. The crucial question here is who makes up a ‘community’. Current 
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approaches tend not to explain the term well enough. In heritage policy docu-
ments, everyday speech and academic texts, ’community’ is often treated as some-
thing “comfortably self-evident” (p. 253), defined by locality, shared histories and 
interests, and often ethnicity. Communities are taken tacitly as homogenous units 
and idealized as something inherently coherent and positive. Even within the 
framework of UNESCO’s people-centred heritage paradigm, which attributes 
communities the key role in heritage management and safeguarding, the notion 
of ‘community’ is explained rather vaguely and open-endedly as “people who 
share a self-ascribed sense of connectedness” (p. 274). The multiple interpreta-
tions of the notion in different contexts makes it difficult to understand who con-
stitutes a community in a specific situation, and who, in the practice of heritage 
management, has the right to represent a cultural community. 
Such open use of the term has made it complicated to use as an analytical 
tool. In the article, community has been chosen as the main focus of analysis. 
The risk of indistinctness has been avoided by a careful outlining of who makes 
up the community. Slightly disappointingly, the authors stick only to describing 
and do not provide a more theoretical reflection of their own use of the concept. 
The need to notice and address the diversity and social difference both 
between and within communities has also been recognised by the authors. The 
inherent multivocality of a local community is best manifested in the case of cross 
trees. Generally, however, different voices and opinions become visible more in 
the communication between the stakeholder groups and heritage experts than 
inside the communities of stakeholders. 
Rival heritage paradigms 
On the basis of empirical cases, two kinds of heritage paradigm are juxtaposed. 
On the one hand, there is the tradition of heritage preservation that focuses 
primarily on material culture in which, in defining what should and should not 
be regarded as heritage, non-expert groups and communities have had little to 
say. This “authorised heritage discourse”, as Laurajane Smith (Smith 2006) has 
put it, sees heritage as something that belongs to the past and should be pre-
served by professional experts. On the other hand, today this modernist idea of 
heritage is increasingly contradicted and complemented by a more democratic 
understanding, mainly promoted by the heritage policies of UNESCO as well as 
by participatory culture facilitated by digital media. This sees heritage as some-
thing that is actively used and (re-)created by groups of people as part of their 
identity formation. This paradigm prefers to speak rather of “heritage curators” as 
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mediators between communities and heritage institutions than “heritage experts” 
as the only evaluators of heritage (p. 254).
The authors maintain that within heritage politics and heritage definition 
in contemporary Estonia, one can observe a gradual replacement of the ‘top-
down’ approach with a more democratic one. However, as the examples also 
show, in the heritage management and politics of current Estonia, the role of her-
itage expert is still noteworthy. The Rebala and the cross tree cases demonstrate 
explicitly that stakeholder communities lack the power to participate in heritage 
discussion on an equal basis with heritage experts. The case of inventorying 
intangible cultural heritage also demonstrates the decisive role of heritage experts 
both in spreading ideas about the policy of involving communities in heritage 
policy via regular consultations, and in accepting the inscriptions. By structur-
ing and editing the inscriptions to make them meet the demands of UNESCO’s 
Convention for the International Protection of Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
heritage experts affect heritage policy immediately. According to the situations 
described, we can witness an on-going process of rivalling heritage paradigms, 
in which at one moment the modernist, and at another the democratic, para-
digm acquires the stronger position. The preference of the authors clearly belongs 
to the democratic community-engaging understanding of heritage. 
The examples analysed provide thought-provoking insights into real-life situ-
ations and current problems of heritage management in Estonia. The central 
question that becomes evident in all three cases is: who owns heritage and who 
has the right to make decisions about it? In essence there is a problem with the 
dual ownership of heritage in that it is simultaneously private as well as public 
property – it belongs to the nation, and therefore to everyone. This ambiguous 
situation leads to problems of ownership both in the material as well as the sym-
bolic sense and raises questions about who decides what can and what can’t be 
done with heritage, and how it should or shouldn’t be interpreted. The research 
cases show controversies surrounding heritage protection and living heritage 
perspectives. Moreover, they refer to inconsistencies in different state policies.
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Mapping celebration practices in Estonia:  
which days of importance  
actually influence societal rhythms?
Halliki Harro-Loit, Triin Vihalemm, Kirsti Jõesalu, Elo-Hanna Seljamaa
Abstract. The aim of article is to provide an analytical model with which 
to analyse how celebration practices relating to different days of importance 
in the Estonian calendar – among different societal groups – influence social 
rhythms. For this reason this study applies an actor approach to the under-
standing of various celebration practices as ‘rhythms machines’. The authors 
distinguish active and passive celebration-actors, days of importance that 
are celebrated by most people, and anniversaries that initiate a break in daily 
routine for only a particular small group in Estonian society. The article 
combines a sociological approach to ethnological and folkloristic studies and 
is therefore based both on qualitative and quantitative analyses of empirical 
evidence.
Keywords: days of importance, anniversary, holiday, celebration practices, 
calendar, rhythm
Introduction
To access the layered temporalities embodied in the cultural practices of Western 
societies, one can focus on rhythms derived from the clock, calendar, and vari-
ous schedules and timetables (for example Durkheim 1965 [1915], 23; Sorokin 
& Merton 1937, 620; Birth 2012, 99). Annual cycles are calendrically regulated, 
containing both seasonal and weekly rhythms that are interrupted by various 
days of importance: secular and religious holidays, anniversaries and festivals. 
The Gregorian calendar – as an empty container to be filled (Birth 2012, 73; 
2013) – is particularly good at incorporating different calendric layers: the folk 
calendar, the calendars of different churches, the academic calendar, the fiscal 
calendar, etc. Most of these calendars include specific days of importance aimed 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 284–331.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
285
Mapping celebration practices in Estonia
at commemoration or celebration, or at extolling (identity-bound) values. While 
some holidays are celebrated widely, with public holidays a particular example 
meant to interrupt the daily routine of the masses, others carry a more symbolic 
meaning or are significant only to members of particular groups (while being 
ignored or even disapproved of by other groups).
The first aim of this study is to provide one possible analytical model with 
which to analyse how celebration practices of different days of importance in the 
Estonian calendar – among different societal groups – influence social rhythms. 
For this reason this study applies an actor approach to the understanding of 
various celebration practices as ‘rhythm machines’.
By asking who has been, or is, creating, transforming and giving meaning 
to holidays, anniversaries, days of importance and festivals, the actor approach 
enables us to focus on various catalyst actors (state, church, school, various inter-
est and identity groups; the media and news journalism) that have the power or 
the means to create days of importance as well as introduce and disseminate 
celebration practices. Concurrently, celebration practices that demand different 
amounts of time and attention, either lighting a candle or participating in a day-
long parade, depend on the meaning of this particular day participants.
For this analytical purpose a two dimensional schema is proposed. 
The vertical scale is related to the individual–crowd dimension. On the one 
hand, the schema aims to identify the days of importance that are celebrated 
by many people who belong to various social groups, and, on the other hand, 
enables us to identify the days of importance that many people might recognise 
Figure 1. Theoretical schema for actor approach and size of celebration/involvement
Large population 
involved
Few individuals,  
specific groups involved
Recognition, noticing, 
not  actual interruption  
of daily routines, 
 recognition takes little time
Actual, physical celebration, 
interruption 
of private everyday routines
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(for example because these days are mentioned in the media) but which few take 
the time to celebrate.
The horizontal scale focuses on selected days of importance in the Estonian 
calendar and on the ‘intensity’ of celebration by asking how much the celebration 
interrupts daily life1. The intensity and/or magnitude of celebration is linked to 
physical celebration, i.e. to rituals that take place in specific places.
Hence, the upper right sector describes the days of importance that greatly 
interrupt daily rhythms; the lower right sector describes anniversaries and holi-
days that are celebrated via rituals that take time, but in which few people or small 
societal groups are involved. The lower left sector covers days that are mentioned 
in the calendar but which neither get attention nor include celebration practices. 
The upper left sector is reserved for days that get wide attention, for example 
in the mass media, but are not celebrated with specific activities – people recog-
nise them by watching the TV news or through other media.
Meanings and significance attached to these different layers and cycles vary 
across time and societies, as does their relationship to power and the intensity 
with which they are used in the construction of identity and collective memory. 
One of the main functions of the calendar, according to Eviatar Zerubavel, is 
to solidify “an annual cycle of commemorative holidays” (Zerubavel 2003, 46). 
States rely on the calendar to engender national integrity; various societal groups 
use it in a similar way to “mnemonically socialize” (op cit) their members into 
a particular understanding of their past and present. While changes in govern-
ment or regime tend to be accompanied by a reorganisation of the annual cycle 
of holidays, previous practices and the significance attached to particular dates 
or times of year are not easily erased. Moreover, once-suppressed holidays can 
be rehabilitated and disregarded practices undergo a renaissance through initia-
tive from below. 
The focus of this study is on selected days of importance: 1) days that are given 
the meaning of anniversary in the current Estonian official calendar 2) Soviet 
anniversaries that are still celebrated by certain people 3) some folk calendar 
anniversaries.
The Estonian calendar underwent radical transformation after the 1944 
Soviet takeover, and again after the 1991 restoration of independence. In select-
ing past moments to be fused with the present, post-Soviet policy-makers have 
favoured the interwar era and World War II, dates and moments that support 
and strengthen the idea of legal as well as cultural continuity between pre- and 
post-Soviet statehood (on Estonian restorative politics see more Pettai 2007, 
Pettai & Pettai 2015; on memory politics Tamm 2013). The current official holi-
day calendar, however, contains fewer religious holidays, which dominated the 
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interwar calendar (for example Kreegipuu 2011). The celebration of some days 
of importance (for example Mother’s Day, Independence Day (24th February)), 
interrupted during the Soviet period, began again as early as the late 1980s, with 
the restoration of the Estonian Republic bringing them back to the official cal-
endar. At the same time, the gradual removal of Soviet anniversaries from the 
list of official holidays and celebrations began in 1990 and could be regarded as a 
means of educating people about the values of the Estonian state and the behav-
iour expected of its citizens. For example, in addition to political anniversaries, 
numerous days dedicated to distinct professions lost the institutional status and 
attention they had received since the 1950s (Kreegipuu 2011). However, a small 
number of holidays initiated by the Soviet regime are still observed informally, 
some of which have the capacity to mobilise large crowds. These holidays consti-
tute a particular and complex phenomenon in contemporary Estonia, not least 
due to their ethnic and national identity connotations and continued official 
status in the Russian Federation and some other former Soviet republics. Fur-
thermore, there are calendar traditions deriving from Estonian peasant society 
as well as the feasts and celebrations of other ethnicities living in Estonia2. Many 
of these folk festivities have lost their initial economic, social and religious mean-
ings and fulfil instead educational and entertainment purposes, serving also as 
markers of ethnic identity in a multicultural consumer society. 
In order to take a closer look at celebration practices inside particular social 
groups, we will draw on ethnographic data on two days of importance – 9th May 
and 23rd April. Both are multi-layered holidays, loaded with different meanings. 
The 9th May marks the end of World War II and, depending on the point of 
view, is celebrated as Victory Day in the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War, or as 
Europe Day dedicated to European unity. In this article, we focus on Victory Day 
celebrations associated with Russians and Russian-speakers in Tallinn. In the case 
of 23rd April we will look at how a new holiday, Veterans’ Day, is in the making. 
We will investigate what kinds of memory actor are active here, and how earlier 
layers of this day, St George’s day, are used or not used. 
Anniversary celebration itself shows that community members share a cer-
tain time. Usually it is accompanied by some kind of direct, physical experience 
(Noyes & Abrahams 1999; Noyes 2003). Considering a particular day important 
indicates respect for and recognition of certain values and symbols that may 
vary from warm support to rigid tolerance. Anniversaries that create resistance 
and negative feelings point to conflicts between political or cultural layers or 
regimes in society.
Collective memory researchers have emphasised the importance of con-
troversial interpretations in the process of legitimation of social relationships 
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( Tileaga 2009, 339). As mentioned above, in Estonia the most contradictory of 
these are the interpretations and celebrations of World War II events (see Appen-
dix 1). Halloween represents a smaller-scale controversy (see Appendix 1) because 
it is oft en interpreted as an ‘imported’ day, therefore resisting it can signify evalu-
ation of ethno-cultural authenticity.
In combining quantitative data and qualitative case studies, we aim to give 
a more complex picture of the workings and uses of the calendar as a means of 
societal synchronisation. Of particular interest to us are the bodily and sensory 
aspects of celebration practices and their capacity to build a sense of community 
or an impression thereof. 
Sociological and cultural studies of time 
combined with ethnological and folkloristic studies
Because the calendar and related practices are embedded in society and partici-
pate in the construction of social realities they are of interest to scholars from 
Figure 2 Calendars with ‘red days’ from diff erent periods: 1851 (under Czarist Russia), 1951 
and 1989 (Soviet period), and 2015 (contemporary calendar).
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different fields. Much has been written in sociology and cultural studies about 
time as an element of social organisation and about calendars as means of man-
aging time and establishing as well as performing power (for example Zerubavel 
1981; Katovich 1987; Spurk 2004; Cicchelli, Pugeault-Cicchelli & Merico 2006; 
Syring 2009; Macnamara & Crawford 2013; Mughal 2014).
More specifically the current study has introduced ideas from rhythm analysis 
introduced by Lefebvre (2004). Rhythm analysis has been widely used in time-
geography and can contribute to the development of the temporal understanding 
of place and space (for example Kärrholm 2009; Edensor 2010a; 2010b) and the 
temporal analysis of seasons (Krause 2012). One can find quite specific analysis, 
for example by asking how the life of children is influenced by shifting environ-
mental, social, and technological rhythms (Kullman & Palludan 2011). Rhythm 
analysis has also been applied in media studies, for example Sorensen & Pica 
(2005) used the concept of rhythm for the analysis of interaction through and 
with mobile technologies in the virtual contexts of work. Obert (2008) elabo-
rated on rhythm analysis of television in order to highlight its relationship with 
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embodied eurhythmy. Media programmes that organise viewing, reading and 
listening schedules have been regarded as creators of certain simultaneity and 
synchronisation (Edensor 2006, 535). Hence, rhythm analysis has been used 
in various disciplines, although the dominant disciplinary approach had been 
more of space and everyday life.
Numerous ethnological and folkloristic studies zoom in on a specific holiday 
or anniversary and the practices and meanings related to it a particular society 
or community (for example Selberg 2006; Scully 2012; Macnamara & Crawford 
2013; Mughal 2014; Kõiva 2013; Fox 2006). There are folkloristic and ethnological 
studies that seek to reconstruct the bygone notions of time and annual festive 
calendars of pre-industrial societies (for example Hiiemäe 1998; Vilkuna 1950; 
Vahtre 2000 [1991]). Yet more recently, folklorists’ attention has shifted to bodily 
aspects of calendar customs (Noyes & Abrahams 1999) as well as to their social 
and political effects in societies ridden with ethnic, political and sectarian divides 
(Hiiemäe 2003, Seljamaa 2010, Šaknys 2015). The study of holidays overlaps with 
the study of festivals and other periodic events as well as with the study of com-
memoration (Anepaio 2003; 2009) and memory politics. 
In addition to ethnology and folkloristics, media and communication studies 
have paid attention to anniversary journalism and its role in the construction 
and articulation of collective memory (Hoskins 2001a; 2001b; Winfield et al 2002; 
Kitch 2003a; 2003b; 2007; 2008; Edy & Daradanova, 2006; Le 2006; Carlson 2007; 
Ebbrecht 2007; Winfield & Hume 2007; West 2008; Harro-Loit & Kõresaar 2010) 
and how anniversaries are constructed over time via the mass media (Kõresaar, 
Müür, Kreegipuu 2013; Miil 2013; Vihalemm & Jakobson 2011). Methodologically 
this approach brings in the text and discourse analysis used by various disciplines. 
As Katriel (2005, 721) writes in an introduction to the special issue of the journal 
Text: “Representing a range of sub-disciplines and research traditions in com-
munication and discourse studies, […] all attest to the complexity, richness, and 
dynamic nature of human communication as well as to the potential value of 
studying anniversary celebrations as intriguing social sites.”
Active and passive actors
When discussing the idea of how different actors (institutions, organisations and 
individuals) influence celebration practices relating to days of importance, four 
different roles (or actions) can be outlined:
• the initiator of an anniversary (state/parliament; church; specific lobby groups)
• the active institutional communicator and interpreter of an anniversary 
(the media and news journalism; state, church, school and organisations)
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• the active celebrator of an anniversary (those who carry out and transmit the rit-
uals physically, take time and/or carry out a ritual or special action)
• the passive celebrator of an anniversary (people who recognise the day of impor-
tance via news, calendar or just by acknowledging any physical commemora-
tion symbols or ceremonies)
This distribution of roles is best suited to well-known holidays and anniversaries 
observed at the national level or by larger groups. From the point of view of 
folklore studies and ethnology, fields of research dealing with on-the-ground 
processes, active celebrators are also active interpreters and communicators and 
ordinary people engaged in a particular holiday can assume these roles alongside 
institutions and activists. 
The differentiation between active and passive celebrators, on the other hand, 
is comparable to the classic distinction between active and passive tradition bear-
ers first made by the Swedish folklorist Carl Wilhelm von Sydow (Sydow 1948). 
While active tradition bearers keep a particular tradition alive and pass it on in 
performance, passive tradition bearers are aware of its existence and can recall 
it partially, but do not practice or spread it intentionally. Every person is active 
in relation to certain traditions but passive in relation to others, whereas the 
selection of traditions to be performed actively is open to change and dependent 
on social conditions, among other things. Similarly, traditions themselves can 
be in an active or passive state or become active or passive: living traditions can 
lose their significance and dormant traditions can be brought back into active 
use in order to serve particular functions (Sydow 1948; Pentikäinen 1998, 802). 
In our study we use the survey data to explore the repertoire of active and 
passive celebration practices, and how widely and in what configurations these 
celebrations are performed among social groups. In addition, the connections 
between the frequency of interruption to everyday rhythms, and the repertoires 
of celebration practice are explored. Data collected by means of ethnographic 
methods is used to zoom in on particular holidays and practices that cause a rup-
ture in the celebrators’ daily routines.
When applying the actor approach to celebration practices from the point of 
view of rhythm analysis, various institutions (school, church, government and 
news media) play important roles as catalyst agents. Institutions can be therefore 
considered not only active but also powerful actors that can cultivate universal 
simultaneity (Anderson 1998).
The most powerful actor concerning synchronisation of social time gener-
ally is the state, which governs the organisation of weekly, calendric and also 
ceremonial time. While “[…] the state synchronizes much nation-wide practices, 
regulating the times spent at school, work […], governing drinking hours, and 
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so on […]” (Edensor 2006, 534), parliament holds the more specific power to 
introduce or re-define anniversaries, marking some historical turning points that 
enable society to reclaim its national history.
The media is the second powerful institution that synchronises many social 
activities. Specifically news journalism has a special interest in promoting anni-
versaries (Harro-Loit & Kõresaar 2010). As Schudson says: 
The newspaper not only uses time but keeps time for its readers […] journal-
ists take their cues about rhythm from social institutions beyond the news-
room and from cultural calendars widely shared. There is always a New Year’s 
story, a Halloween story, a set of Christmas season stories … the special 
character of the Sunday paper comes in part because readers have more time 
to read on Sundays, in part because Sunday is a day in our culture for reflec-
tion […] Anniversaries, beginnings (debuts, openings) and closings (deaths 
of people or institutions) provide an opportunity to exercise some kind of 
self-conscious sense of history. (Schudson 1986, 101–102.) 
In the Estonian case there are in addition memorial days, which are always com-
memorated (activated) through the media, such as the deportation story, on 14th 
June and 25th March, or the story of the resistance, on 22nd September (on the 
creation of 22nd September as Resistance Day, see Miil 2013).
Schools and other education establishments have historically been quite pow-
erful interpreters and disseminators of ideologically important days. English 
(2006, 248) provides a case study of how the Empire Day festival, introduced into 
the British state education system, was aimed at nurturing a sense of collective 
identity and imperial responsibility among young empire citizens. According 
to Cote and Deutsch Thanksgiving became a ritual in the early 20th century, 
encouraging and helping immigrant families become Americanised, as parents 
acceded to their children’s requests for the turkey dinner that they had learned 
about in school (Cote & Deutsch 2008, 217; see also Noyes & Abrahams 1999). 
The proportion of anniversaries linked to different institutions differs in vari-
ous countries and is linked to the division of a country’s secular and religious 
culture in particular. For example in Poland there are 12 state anniversaries, eight 
of which are related to the church (Kaftan 2007, 302). In Estonia, of 11 national 
and public holidays three are directly connected to the Church and/or the Chris-
tian calendar, and in addition to that three Christmas Days are public holidays3.
The ecclesiastical calendar usually defines the specific order and number of 
working days and holy days. In Estonia the state co-exists peacefully with dif-
ferent churches, although occasionally discussions arise as to whether Russian 
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Orthodox Christmas should be included in the list of public holidays (for exam-
ple Leas 2015). 
The multi-ethnic context of celebration practice in Estonia 
The multi-ethnic context of Estonia is one important factor to be considered 
in the analysis and interpretation of empirical data. Out of the country’s total 
population of 1,312,300 (Statistics Estonia 2015), ethnic Estonians form 69.7%, 
ethnic Russians 25.2%, Ukrainians 1.7%, Belarusians 1% and Finns 0.6% (Tiit, 
2014). The current ethnic composition of the Estonian population has a rather 
complicated historical background. In the past, Estonia was a colony of both Ger-
many and Sweden and later a part of the Russian Empire (1721–1917). The crea-
tion of the Republic of Estonia in 1918 brought ethnic Estonians into power for 
twenty years, until World War II. Many of today’s national holidays derive from 
that period. The period of Soviet control (1944–1991) also meant the ‘cleansing’ 
of the culture (for example celebration of religious holydays was prohibited) and 
the re-writing of history, including the introduction of Soviet days of importance 
and the prohibition of celebration of anniversaries related to independent Esto-
nian statehood4. 
Most Russians and Russian-speakers who settled in Estonia did so during 
the Soviet period, coming in different waves and for different reasons (Kulu 
2005). Their customs, identities and values were formed during socialisation 
under Soviet rule. The social structure was greatly separated: there were schools 
with Estonian and Russian as the language of instruction, Estonian- and Russian-
language mass media, and separated residential regions. All of which has shaped 
interethnic relations to the present day. The political and economic involvement 
and identity development of contemporary local Russians is complex and multi-
directional (see for example Integration Monitoring 2011; Vihalemm & Leppik 
2015), although the wish to (re)discover, maintain or negotiate collective cultural 
identity is apparent among Russians and many other Russian-speaking Slavs5. 
Among the features that are regarded as important connections with one’s ethnic 
group Russians mentioned language, common history and holidays most often 
(respectively 70%, 33% and 32%) by Russians (Integration Monitoring 2011, 136–
137). Holidays thus play a crucial part in their identity (re)construction. The role 
of church and religion in shaping the identity, values and social relations is con-
siderably more significant among the Russian-speaking community compared 
to ethnic Estonians. While among ethnic Estonians only 21.5% regard themselves 
as religious, among Russian-speakers the percentage of religious people is much 
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greater – 47.5% are Orthodox and 6.8% follow another religious confession (Tiit 
2014, 61). 
One factor that probably also shapes awareness and celebration is the infor-
mation relating to holidays, anniversaries and days of importance that circu-
lates in Estonian- and Russian-language media and language spaces. Although 
knowledge of Estonian is gradually improving among Russian-speakers there is 
still a considerable number of people who cannot participate in the Estonian-
language public sphere. Only 28% of Russian-speakers are reported to under-
stand everything when following the Estonian language mass media, 51% under-
stand partially and 21% understand nothing (Integration Monitoring 2011, 161). 
An overwhelming proportion of the Russian-speaking Estonian population fol-
low Russian-language media, especially audio-visual media production from the 
Russian Federation (see for example Vihalemm & Hogan-Brun 2013), and this 
shapes their everyday rhythms and celebration practices.
‘Days of importance’, note on terminology
In this article, we are concerned with public holidays, holidays, anniversaries, 
commemorations and days of importance, all of which are covered by the Esto-
nian term tähtpäev. The distinction between public holidays and days of impor-
tance comes from Estonian legislation. While public holidays are days of rest, 
days of importance are working days dedicated to a particular concept, event, 
institution or group of people. However, holiday – in Estonian püha, or holy 
time – can be understood in a broader sense as a period of time invested with 
significance and exceptionality. Holidays in this broader and informal sense can 
be defined and created by actors other than the state. The distinction between 
public holidays and holidays is useful in the Estonian context where the public 
holidays of the previous regime continue to be observed informally under the 
new government.
The following definition by Nicole Gilbert Cote and Francine M. Deutsch 
(referring to Katz 1998) captures different aspects of holiday: 
A holiday is: (1) a consensual interruption of the everyday round-of-life 
in which people divest themselves of everyday roles and assume a festive 
stance, (2) a way to commune with some value or concern which is central 
to the society or culture, (3) a means of ritual and symbolic activity, and 
(4) an occasion when participants are aware that everybody else is doing the 
same thing at the same time. Holiday rituals may extol patriotic values (e.g., 
July 4th, Memorial Day), express religious beliefs (e.g., Christmas), or reflect 
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political agendas (e.g., May Day, Earth Day). Holiday celebrations can also be 
occasions for claiming valued identities (Cote and Deutsch 2008, 215– 216).
Anniversaries, according to Katriel, 
[…] ritually acknowledge the passage of time and insist on the continued 
relevance of past events. […] Anniversaries are themselves cultural texts 
performed by and for social groups, real and imagined. […] Anniversaries – 
as well as mass-mediated reports about them – can also be part of cultural 
projects of group formation and identity negotiation (Katriel 2005, 719, 720).
Hence, holidays and anniversaries partly overlap, but anniversaries tend to be 
more linked to past events, to commemoration and therefore could interrupt less 
the everyday ‘round-of-life’. The physical meaning of commemoration of various 
anniversaries (for example fiftieth, hundredth, etc., anniversary) can be found 
in various forms. Zerubavel points out, on a more general level, that for example 
postage stamps and street names are specifically designed to commemorate major 
historical figures and events (Zerubavel 2003, 29). Commemorations include 
public ceremonies, parades, exhibitions, special church services and public enter-
tainment events. Posters and mementos, as well as media publicity, are also used 
to promote an anniversary.
Methodology
This study is based both on the qualitative and quantitative analysis of empirical 
evidence. The quantitative empirical evidence comes from the sociological survey 
Me. The World. Media carried out in 2014 on a nationally representative sample 
(n=1500), partly as a self-administered questionnaire and partly as an interview. 
This is a survey of media use, values, political attitudes, consumption, personal 
social space, etc., and is carried out regularly by a research group (Halliki Harro-
Loit and Triin Vihalemm were members of group) from the Institute of Social 
Studies, part of Tartu University. The celebration of holidays and anniversaries 
was first included in the 2011 survey and a somewhat shortened version was 
used again in 2014. The days of importance used in the Estonian- and Russian-
language questionnaires were not identical – the Russian version contained 
some days that are celebrated in the Russian Federation, such as Defender of 
the Fatherland Day, and some Russian folk calendar days like Troitsa. In addi-
tion, a question block about ways of celebration was used in 2014. This analysis 
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mainly draws on the latest data, i.e. that from the 2014 survey, to maintain focus 
and avoid scattering.
For the purposes of this article, the annual cycle of holidays and anniversa-
ries in Estonia can be said to comprise, first, public holidays and anniversaries 
fixed in legislation, as well as, second, days dedicated to institutions, concepts 
and groups of people deemed valuable to society and the state. The evolution 
of the official holiday calendar in particular reflects the efforts of various actors 
to synchronise societal rhythms as well as fix the meaning of particular historical 
events and dates.
In making a selection the authors used combined criteria: historical ori-
gin, the main actors who (re)established the celebration tradition and rhythms, 
belonging to the different historical, cultural and political ‘layers’ of social time 
and the social resonance and spread of celebration practice among the popula-
tion (see also Appendix 1). The selected days on the list appear in the order of 
the Gregorian calendar.
1. New Year’s Day was included on the list because of its universality – its 
celebration has not been interrupted by historical ruptures, it is a free day and 
most widely celebrated among all population groups (see Appendix 1). 
2. The Anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty, on 2nd February, represents 
a commemoration event important to Estonian independent statehood. Except 
for some special meetings this day is generally echoed in the mass media without 
widespread personal and family celebration practices (see Appendix 2). 
3. Valentine’s Day (‘Friend’s Day’ in Estonian) is selected as a representative 
of an international day of importance that reached to Estonia after the fall of 
the Soviet Union. Following folk traditions is analysed via the celebration of 
Shrovetide. 
4. Defender of the Fatherland Day in Russia is included on the list because 
23rd February was the Anniversary of Soviet Army. It is still a national holiday in 
Russia under the new name and is echoed in television broadcasts of the Russian 
Federation that are followed intensively also in Estonia.
5. The next day, 24th February, is Estonian Independence Day, the anniver-
sary of the first public declaration of the Estonian Republic in 1918, which was 
included in the selection as the main national holiday.
6. Women’s Day, on the 8th March, was widely celebrated during the Soviet 
period, and less publicly celebrated during the first decade of Estonian re-inde-
pendence, although it is currently back on the public agenda.
7. In asking about celebrations of Easter no reference was given to Orthodox 
or Lutheran traditions, so interviewees where free to interpret this day as they 
wished. 
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 8. The two anniversaries of mass deportations in Estonia, 25th March and 
14th June (the latter is in the official calendar as the Day of Mourning), reflect 
an Estonian commemoration tradition that was introduced into the official cal-
endar after the restoration of the Estonian Republic. Although Russians, too, 
suffered from deportations during the Stalinist period, today’s Russia does not 
support the relevant commemoration traditions (Khazanov 2008). 
9. Mother’s Day (and also Father’s Day) both represent days of importance 
dedicated to ethno-culturally and politically neutral social roles and relations. 
Education and media institutions, as well as business organisations, help to dis-
seminate the relevant information and presents (especially flowers on Mother’s 
Day) and arrange special events (celebrations in kindergartens and schools, pub-
lic concerts, etc.). 
10. As mentioned above, the 9th May carries a double meaning. In the Soviet 
Union it was celebrated as Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War, and it contin-
ues to carry this meaning in contemporary Russia. In the European Union, the 
9th May is celebrated as Europe Day or Schuman Day, and is dedicated to Euro-
pean unity. In the Estonian and locally produced Russian-language media this 
anniversary has opposing interpretations (Vihalemm & Jakobson 2011). 
11. Midsummer’s Day can be found in one or another form in many folk 
calendars. In Estonia this is celebrated on St John’s day, the 24th June, with 
the 23rd, Estonia’s own Victory Day a national holiday that celebrates victory 
in the Landeswehr war in 1919 (Brüggemann 2015; Tamm 2008). Parades are 
arranged in different counties, covered by the media. As both the 23rd and 24th 
are days off, the celebration often includes both days: in responding to the mass 
survey people do not much differentiate between them. 
12. The 20 August, Day of Restoration of Independence after Soviet rule is 
also a national holiday and its celebrations are initiated mainly by the state or 
local institutions. In 2008 and 2014 large song festival-like open-air concerts were 
held, and were transmitted on TV, turning them into media events. 
13. St Martin’s and St Catherine’s days represent a folk tradition that has been 
rather vital and has adapted to modern urban lifestyles. Together with Shrove-
tide, these days were tolerated or even encouraged by the authorities during the 
Soviet period, thus their celebration practices have not undergone interruptions 
for political reasons but rather gradual transformation due to urbanisation. 
14. Halloween represents an ‘imported’ day that arrived in Estonia after re-
independence and is celebrated mainly by the young people by means of special 
clothing, food, parties and door-to-door visits. 
15. In the Estonian folk tradition, the 2nd November was celebrated as All 
Souls’ Day. Unlike Shrovetide, St Martin’s and St Catherine’s days, which are 
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celebrated collectively and publicly (often in schools and kindergartens), the 
activities of All Souls’ Day – lighting candles, going to the cemetery – are done 
alone or with family members. 
In reporting their relationship to these selected holidays, anniversaries and 
days of importance people could choose one of the following variables: I con-
sider this day important, and always celebrate it; I consider this day important, 
but usually do not celebrate it myself; I know this day but I am indifferent; I am 
negative about this day; I do not know this day.
The answers to this question block were analysed using descriptive statistics 
(distribution of answers on the variable scale) in order to show how widely cer-
tain days are known and linked with special rituals and contrast with everyday 
time-use patterns and activities. Mass surveys by their nature inform research-
ers about what informants think to be usual, or what they think to occur (in-)
frequently, and how they construct – via answers to the questions – are their 
individual and collective normalities. A survey study can highlight evidence 
first of all about the cohesion and spread of norms in a given society. By compar-
ing different social groups our analysis aims to point out moments when social 
cohesion is more or less tight and which actors and historical–cultural meanings 
contribute to these moments. 
In addition to the descriptive analysis the variations in social groups’ relation-
ships to different days of importance was analysed with the help of regression 
analysis. The personal celebration of a certain day was taken as a dependent 
variable and socio-demographic variables – age, gender, ethnicity, education 
and having under 18-year-old children in the family – as independent variables. 
Regression analysis makes it possible to establish a direct connection between 
two variables, such as the celebration of Mother’s Day and ethnicity, controlling 
the possible mediating impact of other factors, such as age, education and gender. 
The statistically relevant connection between the celebration of a certain day 
and a socio-demographic variable was calculated on three levels of statistical 
significance: strong connection (p≤.001), medium connection (p≤.01) and weak 
connection (p≤.05). The connections between the celebration of a certain day and 
social group belonging can indicate how universally the establishment of symbols 
and actors focused on the particular day to ‘recruit’ celebrators. 
The other block of questions in the survey specified the practices of celebra-
tion. After informants had reported whether they know, and do or do not cel-
ebrate, particular holidays and anniversaries, they were asked, “What do you 
usually do on holidays and days of importance?” Informants were able to indicate 
twelve activities either done frequently, sometimes, rarely or not at all. The vari-
ables were developed to reflect the interruption (for example going to church) 
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or continuation of everyday practices (working during the holidays); the private 
(having a family party) or public (participating in public events) nature of the 
celebration; the active (going to the cemetery) or passing interest in celebration 
(following topical news or special mediated broadcasts). Apart from the descrip-
tive analysis that provides the frequency of performance of various celebration 
practices, authors also aimed to find patterns of practices and how they are poten-
tially related to the time organising structures of social groups. For that reason 
factor analysis was utilised in order to interpret more latent, social structural 
variables, not just single indicators. Factors bind together indicators according 
to the logic of answering and thereby represent more general sets of social prac-
tices that intertwine with ways of signifying particular moments in the calendar. 
The factor scores were saved as new variables in order to correlate them with 
socio-demographic indicators. The factor analysis was run by using the principal 
components method with Varimax rotation and the criterion of eigenvalues over 
one, rather than a fixed number of factors, in extraction. The analysis resulted 
in four factors that were compared to the conceptual frame of the analysis.
In addition to the sociological survey we are relying on empirical fieldwork. 
While the survey provides information about celebration practices in general, 
ethnographic fieldwork makes it possible to focus on particular holidays, on 
concrete instances, places and practices carried out by specific actors. Starting 
in 2009, Elo-Hanna Seljamaa has been conducting ethnographic fieldwork in Tal-
linn, focusing on ethnic interactions and the implementation of Estonian inte-
gration policy. In addition to communicating with Russian-speaking residents 
in Tallinn, Seljamaa has taken part in various events that were organised by or 
featured national minority cultural associations as well as in the celebration of 
various official and vernacular holidays. The main method for gathering data was 
participant observation, although she also conducted interviews with representa-
tives of national minority cultural associations, officials, activists and ordinary 
residents of the capital. The present article draws on observations of Victory 
Day or the 9th May celebrations in Tallinn between 2010 and 2013. The aim is 
to describe specific practices people engage in on this occasion and to analyse 
how these practices bring about a rupture in spatial, visual, behavioural, sonic 
and other routines, on the one hand, and a synchronisation of the actions and 
movements of celebrators, on the other. 
For the analyses of the creation of Veterans’ Day on 23rd April Kirsti Jõesalu 
participated in the events, which took place around that date in 2013, 2014 and 
2015. She took part in various events, including the opening of exhibitions and 
informal gatherings at the Estonian War museum (in Viimsi). She participated 
at the main event in the evening of 23rd April, a rock concert in Freedom Square 
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(Tallinn) where popular rock groups performed in all three years. In 2014 and 
2015 she visited the memorial service at St George’s Church in a village close 
to Pärnu, in western Estonia. Hence, the main data of gathering information 
was participant observation, although she also spoke several times with actors 
involved in the political side of veterans and Veterans’ Day. Furthermore she ana-
lysed documents connected with policy relating to veterans. In September 2014 
she interviewed a person who worked for the We Salute! campaign (Anname au!, 
see http://annameau.ee). She also followed social media events and comments 
relating to Veterans’ Day events. 
This article is a kind of methodological challenge in which we combine quan-
titative surveys with two small qualitative case studies in order to provide a more 
complex picture of celebrations. 
The celebration of holidays and anniversaries  
in the main social groups
Using regression analysis we first examined socio-demographic variables that 
best differentiate the celebration of the selected days of importance. Figure 3 
gives a schematic overview of the number of statistically significant connections 
between the celebration of a particular day and socio-demographic variables. 
Ethnicity appeared to be the feature that most frequently explained the diverging 
celebration of the selected days of importance and anniversaries. The anniversa-
ries that relate to the (restored) independent statehood of the Estonian Republic 
(Independence Day, the Day of Restoration of Independence, the Anniversary 
of the Tartu Peace Treaty) and commemoration days (the anniversaries of mass 
deportations) are unknown to 50–75% of Russians and other ethnic minorities 
living in Estonia. There is no resistance to these days – people who claimed 
to know these days also recognised them or celebrated themselves. 
Anniversaries of mass deportations raised some resistance (13% said that they 
are negative about those days). The old Soviet days of importance that have now 
acquired new significance in today’s Russia, such as Defender of the Fatherland 
Day, are celebrated widely and recognised among Russian-speakers in Estonia. 
Likewise Estonians were negative about the celebration of 9th May as the Soviet 
Union’s Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War. 
Anniversaries relating to Estonian statehood are celebrated more widely 
by ethnic Estonians than by Russian-speakers. The anniversaries that are public 
holidays are more widely celebrated compared to those that are working days. 
The folk calendar is not supported by holidays from work, with the exception 
of Midsummer, although the selected days of importance are celebrated among 
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one part of the ethnic Estonian population and to some extent also taken into the 
celebration practices of the ethnic minorities. Shrovetide, which belongs both to 
the Estonian and Russian folk calendar, is the most popular. 
The affect of the religious calendar (Christmas and Easter) on everyday 
rhythms is significant among both ethnic groups. Religiosity was also included 
in one regression model. As expected, this feature was connected with the more 
frequent celebration of Easter, notably in the Russian-speaking population.
Figure 3. Connection between celebration of selected anniversaries/holidays and 
socio-demographic variables in 2011 and 2014
The table summarises the results of regression analysis. The pluses mark statistically 
relevant connections (+++ p≤.001; ++ p≤.01; + p≤.05) and the empty cells show no statis-









New Years’ Day + +
Anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty 
(2nd February) +++ +++
Valentine’s Day +++ +++ ++
Shrovetide +++ +++
Women’s Day +++
Commemoration of deportations (25th 
March), day of mourning (14th July) +++ +++
Easter +++ +++ +++ +++ +++
Victory Day of Great Patriotic War 
(9th May) +++ ++
Mother’s Day +++ +++ +++
Midsummer’s Day +++
Day of Restoration of Independence 
(20th August) +++
Halloween +++ +++
All Souls’ Day (2nd November) +++ ++ +++
Father’s Day +++ +++ ++
St Martin’s, St Catherine’s Days +++ +++ ++ ++
Christmas ++
* The cross-ethnic analysis across compares two groups: ethnic Estonians and ethnic 
Russians. The remaining group of other ethnicities was too small in number to analyse 
separately.
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Days of importance relating to social roles and relations are celebrated or 
recognised widely among all ethnicities in Estonia, regardless of which histori-
cal–cultural layer these days belong to. Ethnic Estonians, Russians and others 
celebrate or at least consider important the Mother’s and Father’s days, which 
were (re)introduced by the Estonian Republic, as well as Women’s Day, which 
was celebrated during the Soviet period, and Valentine’s Day, which came with 
Western cultural influence at the beginning of the 1990s. Ethnic differences in the 
celebration and recognition of holidays and anniversaries are shown in more 
detail in Appendix 1 and below in Figure 5. 
Gender differentiates celebration practices, for example women celebrate 
more frequently than men. Age too can be used to mark a population group’s 
active or passive relationship with the holiday calendar. The younger genera-
tion celebrates Valentine’s Day, Shrovetide, Halloween, Midsummer’s Night, and 
Mother’s and Father’s Days more often than the older generation, which in turn 
is more likely to observe All Souls’ Day as well as the anniversaries related to 
deportations and World War II. Among Russian-speakers older people cele-
brate religious holidays more often. Kindergartens and schools are influential 
actors in creating and maintaining celebration practices. Following folk tradi-
tions (Shrovetide, St Martin’s and St Catherine’s Days) and holidays dedicated 
to family relations (Mother’s and Father’s Days) is connected with the presence 
of children in the family.
Figure 4 displays these selected anniversaries, holidays and days of impor-
tance using the two-dimensional schema that was introduced above. 
The upper right sector marks anniversaries or holidays that are recognised 
and celebrated by many participants and which thereby have the most power 
to shape people’s everyday routines. In doing so they also generate, maintain or 
transform certain cultural and political values and identities. Speaking about 
the whole population of Estonia, only religious holidays and days of importance 
related to the social (family) roles that unite the different ethnicities have enough 
symbolic power to shape social rhythms (see Figure 4).
The upper left sector on the graph in Figure 4 marks days of importance that 
acquire wide public attention through the mass media as well as institution-
alised events or representations. Apart from media and education institutions 
this part of the graph represents use by various shops and businesses that sell 
relevant special items. However these days lack most people’s personal involve-
ment in the form of private celebration practices. These days can be noticed in 
passing through the media, when walking in the street, in shopping centres, 
etc., without interruption of daily routine. The very modest involvement of the 
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Russian-speaking population in the celebrations explains why national holidays 
do not touch collective daily rhythms to a great extent (see also Figure 5). 
In the lower left sector are anniversaries celebrated in certain spaces with 
specific rituals, but which are meaningful for a few communities and individuals 
only. For example, the anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty is celebrated almost 
Figure 4. Public recognition and celebration of  
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exclusively among ethnic Estonians and Victory Day among ethnic Russian. Hal-
loween is celebrated mainly only by youngsters.
When Figure 4 is compiled on the basis of shares in the total population, 
Figure 5 gives comparative positioning of selected days among ethnic Estonians 
and ethnic Russians. Some days, such as Independence Day and Victory Day, as 
well as Women’s Day and Mother’s Day, are in mirror positions with each other 
Figure 5. The recognition and actual celebration of selected holidays, anniversaries 
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enjoying a large number of celebrants among one ethnic group and only casual 
attention or passive recognition among the other. Among Russian-speakers a 
great many more days of importance belong to the category of marginal public 
attention and sympathy among ethnic Estonians.
Celebration practices
What do people do when they celebrate? The survey sought to answer this ques-
tion by asking people what they do on holidays, anniversaries and days of impor-
tance. The question addressed days in general and did not specify a particular 
holiday or anniversary. Thus, the answers reflect what people regard as normal 
and habitual ways to celebrate special moments when they take time out from 
their daily routines, and do not describe the celebration customs of particular 
days. The results are shown in Figure 6 in the breakdowns of total population as 
well as ethnic groups. In general celebration practices are related to the time fam-
ily members spend together. Food-related rituals, meeting family members who 
are usually separated spatially and travelling together somewhere are important 
markers of interruptions in daily routine. “Coming together” gains more and 
more meaning in today’s transnational context, taking into account the fact that 
Estonians have a high percentage of commuters (Scientific report 2009, there 
are 15.8 cross-border commuters per thousand inhabitants in Estonia). So a large 
festive family meal, especially those at Christmas and Midsummer’s Day, are 
occasions when family and friends come together. 
Holidays are widely used simply to take a rest from normal duties. However, 
some people do not break the everyday routines but continue to working dur-
ing these days off. The holidays are also used pragmatically for housework and 
gardening. These activities can be combined with specific celebration activities 
during the holidays. In general, the survey confirms the thesis that holidays 
interrupt (to some extent) daily routines and are related to specific activities, and 
that holidays are used to strengthen social relations (meeting family members, 
sending greeting cards, etc.).
News journalism plays an important role in framing and constructing the 
meaning of the days of importance. The anniversary of the founding of the Esto-
nian Republic is the high holiday of television and is a media event (Dayan & 
Katz 1994): usual television programming is interrupted and many people watch 
either the military parade (which takes place regularly in Tallinn and in other 
cities like Tartu, Pärnu and Narva) and/or the President’s reception. In addition, 
the Victory Day parade can be followed on television. Commemorative anniver-
saries such as the anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty (Uusen 2010; Harro-Loit 
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& Kõresaar 2010) and the anniversary of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact (Kõresaar, 
Müür & Kreegipuu 2013) are mainly mediated as commemorative events with 
the news usually showing and talks about them as such (quite often news value 
comes from VIPs participating in these events, for example the president visit-
ing the grave of Jaan Poska, the man considered most important at the signing 
of the Tartu Peace Treaty) (Boikov 2010). Hence, every year via daily news such 
days of importance are constructed for the national news media audience, even 
if sometimes coverage lasts no longer than three minutes.
Figure 6. Practices of celebration of holidays among the population of Estonia 
in 2014
Family come together, 
and we serve dinner
Just relax
Watch media, read news concerning 
the day of importance
Buy something to celebrate the day 
(decorations, candles, presents, cards etc.)
Go to the cemetery*
Do domestic work or gardening
Travel somewhere (to visit somebody, 
to a summer cottage or abroad)
Communicate with friends 
via (social) media
Participate in public ceremonies 
at schools or kindergartens
Participate in public ceremonies
Go to church, 
participate in religious rituals
Do my usual job or work





































* The “go to the cemetery” variable means in the local context going to the graves of family members, 
leaving flowers and lighting candles. This is especially customary at Christmas and on All Souls’ Day.
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One way to approach the question of to what extent different days of impor-
tance interrupt daily routine is to look for celebration activities that would take 
time and need special attention. When people visit certain places and/or partici-
pate in certain ceremonies this is clearly an interruption of rhythm. 
Only occasionally are celebration practices linked to an interruption to 
in being in their normal location, in other words leaving home and travelling 
somewhere (summer homes or cottages, a visit to other family members, watch-
ing or participating in a ritual that takes place in other town, county or country, 
etc.). Usually this movement in space is linked to public celebration events like 
parades, meetings, concerts, etc. 
Of the socio-demographic variables age and ethnicity again appeared to be 
the most differentiating, as the correlation analysis revealed. Figure 7 presents 
the results of the correlation analysis.
Ethnic Estonians’ celebration is more frequently shaped by institutionalised 
practices and anniversary journalism – they celebrate anniversaries and days of 
importance by following the related verbal and visual representations from the 
mass media, or by participating in public events and meetings. Visiting family 
graves at a cemetery is also more widespread among ethnic Estonians. This can 
also partly be explained by the disrupted family ties among Russian-speaers – the 
ancestors of the older generation of ethnic Russians are buried outside Estonia. 
The church-related rituals of celebration are more widespread among this group 
too. 
If very many people from different societal groups interrupt their daily 
rhythm on a particular day, this day (whether anniversary or holiday) has the 
power of synchronisation, as with other, state-imposed, rhythms (working hours, 
resulting traffic patterns, etc.). But there are also many celebration-connected 
activities that take little time and are carried out by very many people individu-
ally: sending cards and holiday wishes, shopping (for special gifts), lighting can-
dles and decorating homes, cooking particular dishes, and also just not working 
as usual. We would say that from the point of view of synchronisation of daily 
rhythms these activities are ambivalent. On the one hand, any symbolic ritual, 
even if it takes less than a minute, is a celebration, giving this day it’s meaning 
through this minute. On the other hand, if many people just take time off and 
rest regardless of the meaning of the free day, this is also a sort of synchronisation 
because social rhythm is slowed down.
In order to find the patterns of celebration practices and their connection 
with other sets of social practices factor analysis was used (the results are given 
in Appendix 2). Empirical grouping showed the ‘active’ celebration practices 
connected with family gatherings, travelling, participation in public events, with 
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church and cemetery visits belonging to different factors. If shopping and buying 
special goods belong to one factor along with other ‘secular’ celebration prac-
tices, consumption of topical mass media forms a separate factor. The fourth 
factor represents a situation in which the celebrations are used to prepare for 
the next period (housework, paid work) and no special celebration activities 
are undertaken.
Family and institutionalised celebration practices, for example a family party, 
sending cards, or participation in public collective rituals, are more practiced 
among the younger and middle age groups (see Figure 8). The oldest age group 
Figure 7. The connections between celebration practices, ethnicity and age
The table displays the existence and statistical significance of correlations on two levels, 
++ (p≤.001) and + (p≤.01) with verbal characterisation of the connection. An empty cell 
shows no statistically significant difference between ethnicity or age groups.
Ethnicity Age
Family comes together, 
we have a festive meal
Just have a rest, relax
Follow related broadcasts, 




Older people more frequently
Buy something topical
Go to the cemetery ++Estonians more frequently
++
Older people more frequently









23% of ethnic Russians 
not at all
++
Older people more frequently
Send greetings to friends
Travel somewhere ++Younger people more frequently 




40% of ethnic Russians 
not at all
Go to church ++Russians more frequently
++
Older people more frequently
Do paid work +Youngest group less frequently
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attends church and the cemetery and is thereby more involved in religious and 
spiritual celebration practices. In addition, following media coverage of the anni-
versary is more widespread among the older generation.
Celebrations as a withdrawal from daily routine is related to the life cycle – 
active working people aged 30 to 54 deal frequently with paid work or housework 
during a holiday, or just relax without any doing any special activity (see Figure 8).
Celebration practice also shows which actors are re-inventing and main-
taining the days of importance and thereby shaping social time rhythms. The 
secularisation of celebration practices and the diminishing importance of the 
church in shaping social time goes with the generation replacement. Somewhat 
surprisingly the mediatised ways of (passive) celebration are spread less among 
the younger generations, and therefore we can ask whether the role of the mass 
media as a ‘rhythm machine’ – at least when considering days of importance 
– is diminishing with the transformations that are going on in media markets 
and the development of ICT. The usage of free days for paid work rather than 
Figure 8. Age differences in celebration patterns 
The vertical scale shows the relative difference of the factor scores of certain age groups 
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for celebration is also a certain form of (unconscious) resistance to the institu-
tional ‘rhythm machines’. 
Qualitative take on celebration practices:  
Victory Day on the 9th May and Veterans’ Day on 23rd April
In this section we shift focus from quantitative to qualitative discussion of cel-
ebration practices in Estonia by looking at two days of importance dedicated 
to veterans and the remembrance of war: Victory Day on the 9th May and Vet-
erans’ Day on the 23rd April. The former comes from the previous regime, where 
it marked the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War. As such, Victory Day lost 
the status of official holiday soon after Estonia regained independence, although 
its observation continues informally. Veterans’ Day, on the contrary, is a new 
day of importance created only very recently to show appreciation for Estonian 
citizens who have taken part in military missions on behalf of the Republic of 
Estonia. Although the two days share thematic features and, as we seek to show 
in the following discussion, celebration practices, they are mutually exclusive 
at the ideological level. 
The 9th May
According to survey results, the Soviet-era Victory Day celebration on 9th May 
constitutes the most controversial and polarising anniversary in contemporary 
Estonia: observed actively by Russians and Russian-speakers, it is ignored and 
disapproved of by most ethnic Estonians. Together with Women’s Day, the 9th 
May is a Soviet anniversary that has experienced a vernacular renaissance in post-
Soviet Estonia and has the capacity to move masses. 
Tens of thousands of Tallinn’s residents celebrate the 9th May by visiting the 
Defence Forces Cemetery and laying flowers at a World War II memorial known 
as the Bronze Soldier. The centrepiece of this monument is the bronze statue of 
a soldier standing with his head bowed in grief. Until the end of April 2007 this 
memorial was located in the centre of Tallinn. It was one of the very few Soviet 
war monuments in the capital that had not been removed upon the restora-
tion of independence, although it had played a central role in Soviet Victory 
Day celebrations. The monument was initially dedicated to Red Army soldiers 
who, according to the Soviet historical narrative, liberated Tallinn from fascists, 
in addition to which the memorial served as the last resting place of 14 unknown 
soldiers. It was unveiled on the 22 September 1947, the third anniversary of the 
‘liberation’ of Tallinn. 
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Informal small-scale gatherings at the memorial and the custom of bring-
ing flowers to the bronze soldier lived on through the 1990s, especially among 
Tallinn’s elderly Russian-speaking population. By the mid-2000s, the popular-
ity of commemorating the liberation of Tallinn and celebrating the 9th May 
appeared to be on the rise again with gatherings at the bronze solder growing 
bigger, noisier, more spectacular and attracting ever younger participants. The 
small triangular square squeezed between a bus stop and busy downtown streets 
could no longer contain all the celebrators, their flowers, flags and other accesso-
ries and practices. With most other Soviet monuments removed from the public 
sphere, people observing Victory Day and the Day of Liberation of Tallinn had 
few other places to go but the bronze soldier.
These developments coincided with the renewed significance attached to 
World War II in the Russian Federation. The 60th anniversary of the ‘Great Vic-
tory’, in 2005 in particular, was celebrated with much pomp in Moscow. However, 
the increased visibility of periodic gatherings in Tallinn spoke of a new situation 
in comparison to the 1990s when the position of Russians and Russian-speakers 
was too precarious to allow for public commemoration of Soviet-era anniversa-
ries. The fact that these people could now meet in public could be regarded as 
a sign of stability and a growing sense of trust towards the Estonian state. Soci-
ologists have found that Estonia’s rapid economic growth at the beginning of the 
2000s contributed to a mutual accommodation between ethnic Estonians and 
Russian-speakers and led to a joint shift towards consumerist values (Kruusvall 
2005; Kalmus & Vihalemm 2004). Furthermore it has been argued that the con-
sequent fear of the weakening of ethnic identity prompted radical nationalists on 
both sides to mobilise people on the grounds of ethnicity (Ehala 2008).
A detailed account of what happened next is beyond the scope of this article. 
It is important to note that between 2005 and 2007, gatherings at the bronze 
soldier memorial came to be framed as an issue of ethnic group rights and as 
a question about the right to use and define public space. Debates grew particu-
larly heated in the run-up to parliamentary elections in March 2007, with several 
political parties promising to remove the monument from the city centre. This 
statue emerged under these circumstances as the symbol of Soviet occupation 
and what looked like its continuation in the independent Republic of Estonia. 
Towards the end of April 2007, in anticipation of yet another massive 9 May 
gathering, the Estonian government prevented people from accessing the memo-
rial by having it surrounded by a fence and erecting a tent that blocked the view 
of the statue. These steps were taken shortly after parliamentary elections. The 
officially stated aim, however, was to exhume the remains buried on the site of the 
memorial. Russian-speaking residents of Tallinn responded by gathering around 
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the fenced-off memorial6. In the course of the evening, this protest spilled over 
first into a confrontation between demonstrators and the police and later into acts 
of vandalism and looting in downtown Tallinn. One young man was stabbed to 
death and the police made several hundred arrests. The monument was disman-
tled the same night and erected anew a couple of days later in the Defence Forces 
Cemetery, the last resting place of over 5,000 soldiers of different nationalities. 
Mass visits to the memorial on the 9th May have grown so large since these 
events that it is not uncommon for people to have to queue to reach the monu-
ment. Many bow in front of the statue and cross themselves; some address the 
statue directly by uttering a loud expression of gratitude. Moreover, the 9th May 
provides parents with a setting in which to socialise children into culturally 
specific bodily practices of showing respect. Children observe and rehearse how 
to move and stand, what to do with flowers and how to pose for the camera in 
this particular situation. 
Flowers play a key role in several 9th May practices that are carried out 
by individuals, but need to be repeated over and over again by very many peo-
ple in order to achieve their full force. First, almost everybody coming to the 
cemetery lays flowers at the statue. On the 9th May, as on Women’s Day and the 
1st September (the day when schools traditionally start in Estonia) temporary 
flower stalls pop up on the streets of Tallinn. Thus, Tallinn looks different around 
the 9th May, if only for a day or two. Vendors stock up with carnations, although 
other flowers are deemed suitable as well. Many make sure to bring an even 
number of flowers, which defines the gesture of laying flowers at the monument 
as an act of commemoration rather than celebration. However, what really mat-
ters is the fact and act of visiting the memorial in person. Some prefer to do so 
on the 8th or 10th May, or whenever they can; some go to the cemetery repeatedly 
around this time of the month. 
Flowers are laid not only at the feet of the statue, but distributed across the 
graves of Red Army servicemen buried in the cemetery. Flowers are also stuck 
into the ground, into little holes made with the help of special sticks brought 
along for this purpose. This is slow and laborious work because the holes need 
to be made and the flowers ‘planted’ one by one. The area cowered by the flow-
ers grows gradually through the input of many individual celebrators. The sea of 
flowers created in this way does not carry an explicit political or other message, 
but is a token of a joint effort and the coordinated actions of countless people. 
Flower blossoms are used to ‘write’ and ‘draw’ slogans and symbols that refer to 
Soviet victory in World War II on the grass (for example in 2010 a red star made 
of red carnations with the number 65 in the middle). 
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Arranging flowers in front of and around the monument is similarly a con-
tinuous self-regulating process that goes on for several days. Many people return 
to the cemetery on the 10th or even 11th May to admire the flowers as well as take 
photos; strangers strike up conversations or comment on the amount of flowers, 
the way they have been arranged and how they looked the day before or last year. 
All in all, the conventional commemorative gesture of laying flowers at a memo-
rial has given rise to new practices that are as much as about creating beauty as 
about remembrance and veneration of those who fought and fell in World War II. 
However, the 9th May at Tallinn Military Cemetery is not only a visual, but 
also an auditory experience. Loudspeakers blast out Soviet and Russian patri-
otic songs over and over again, while small groups of middle-aged and elderly 
celebrators gathered around the memorial break into song spontaneously. Some 
bring accordions and stand or sit playing it in the middle of the other activities 
surrounding the monument. Orthodox memorial services held in the cemetery 
add another layer of sound, image and possibilities for participation (as well as 
interpretation). 
There are also many flags, small and large: Russian tricolours, red flags and 
the flags of various Soviet military units and institutions. While veterans are 
wearing their uniforms, some children and teenagers come dressed as Red Army 
soldiers or wear military hats or other accessories referring to World War II. 
The orange and black St George’s ribbons can be seen everywhere and are dis-
tributed by volunteers, sometimes together with ribbons in the colours of the 
Russian flag. As a military symbol uniting Imperial Russia, the Soviet Union and 
contemporary Russia, the St George’s ribbon stands for Russia’s military history 
and for victory in World War II in particular. Campaigns distributing these rib-
bons have been carried out every spring since the 60th anniversary of the ‘Great 
Victory’ in May 2005. It was estimated in 2014 that some 100 million ribbons had 
been given out worldwide since the first campaign in 2005 (Okolo 100 mln…). 
Although people of Tallinn can and do wear St George’s ribbons as an act of 
commemoration and remembrance, these items tend to have strong pro-Moscow 
and anti-Estonian connotations in the Estonian context. By wearing a ribbon 
in Estonia, one is often seen, from an Estonian point of view, as making a state-
ment about one’s loyalties in today’s Estonia. The situation is similar in Latvia 
and in post-Maidan Ukraine, where proposals to ban the St George’s ribbon 
were recently discussed (Taylor 2014). In Belarus, the ribbon was banned in 2014 
in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity (Smok 2014). 
For the period of the 9th May celebrations, the Bronze Soldier monument is 
decorated with Soviet symbols and also with dried autumn leaves evoking 22nd 
September. Solemn teenagers in retro military uniforms take turns throughout 
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the day standing as a guard of honour on either side of the statue. The periodic 
changing of guards makes a striking spectacle that onlookers like to capture 
with their cameras. At the same time, guard mounting interrupts the free flow 
of other activities in front of the monument and creates a hierarchy of actors and 
practices. While sticking flowers into the ground and spreading them around the 
cemetery come across as practices accessible to anybody, the guard of honour 
is a performance put on by an institution or organisation. It requires planning, 
training and resources of various kinds. Setting up loudspeakers costs money, 
as do ribbons and costumes.
Celebrations in the Military Cemetery on the 9th May have been associated 
with several organisations. The Estonian Security Police have described some of 
these groups as tools of Russian foreign policy and soft power (Security Police 
of the Republic of Estonia 2011). For the purposes of the current article, it is 
important to take note of how various actors seek to fix the meaning of the 9th 
May and how this meaning is constantly undone, redone and multiplied through 
vernacular practices of celebration and commemoration. 
April 2007 was still fresh in peoples’ mind when Elo-Hanna Seljamaa began 
fieldwork among Russians and Russian-speakers in Tallinn. A few of the people 
she met had been on the streets to protest; some were arrested and many more 
knew somebody who had been. Others had stayed at home but felt insulted and 
hurt nevertheless. Interviewees would bring up this topic, and in less formal set-
tings people would use the bronze soldier and April 2007 as a point of reference 
to reflect upon life in Estonia. The sudden rise in the number of people visit-
ing the monument on the 9th May was seen as a response to the government’s 
actions. It was a statement in the form of an act of commemoration. In addition 
to commemorating World War II and honouring veterans, visiting the monu-
ment was a way to recall what had happened in April 2007. Many commented 
that after 2007, more families with young children started to visit the memorial. 
People were relying on whatever cultural resources and tools were already avail-
able to them, putting old traditions to new uses. In reference to the distinctions 
presented above, it could be argued that many passive celebrators and tradition 
bearers became active, bringing dormant traditions to life while also creating 
new ones. A violent rupture in social life was dealt with by means of calendar 
customs intended to bring about an interruption in daily routine. 
The cemetery is located close to the city centre but in a secluded area one 
would not otherwise go to, which means that the process of going there in itself 
forces a diversion from daily personal trajectories. In addition, waving Russian 
and Soviet flags, singing in public, playing loud Russian music, dressing up as 
a Red Army soldier – these are all activities most Tallinn residents would and 
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do refrain from under normal circumstances and in other settings. The large 
territory of the cemetery accommodates more people and, moreover, provides 
opportunities for different kinds of activity to be carried out simultaneously. The 
custom of sticking flowers into the ground, for example, came from the monu-
ment’s previous location but has been adopted in the cemetery. Laying flowers, 
walking around the cemetery, observing and listening to others, not to mention 
the time-consuming practices surrounding flowers are all physical activities and 
sensory experiences that occur in a particular place and can be repeated on an 
annual basis. These practices can also be carried out alone, while at the same 
time seeing and feeling that other people are doing the same things. However, 
it would be erroneous to conclude from this that these tens of thousands of 
people also think the same way and constitute a homogenous mass or ‘Russian-
speaking community’ (see also Kuutma, Seljamaa & Västrik 2012; Kaprāns & 
Seljamaa 2017). 
Veterans’ Day 
While the 9th May celebrations in Tallinn illustrate how a celebrations of a date 
that is marginal in official calendar can be brought back to active use, the recently 
established Veterans’ Day serves as an example of a celebration that is still in the 
making, and which is initiated by state structures. In discussing such emergent 
practices, we can only follow the practices that memory agents offer7. Since 2013, 
on 23rd April, St George’s Day, veterans are celebrated in Estonia. Among vet-
erans are Estonian citizens who “[…] have participated as part of the Defence 
Forces in either an international or collective self-defence operation on the basis 
of the International Military Cooperation Act” (Estonian Ministry of Defence 
2012, 5). The day is mainly meant to celebrate soldiers who fought in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and were active as peacekeepers in the Balkans, Lebanon and the 
Central African Republic. It also includes the men and women who will par-
ticipate in forthcoming missions. Celebrating Veterans’ Day is just one part of 
Policy regarding veterans of the Defence Force and the Defence League. Close to 
2,500 people have participated in international military missions since the 1990s, 
meaning that this remembrance day touches many more people when families 
are taken into consideration. (In these military operations, 130 people have been 
wounded and injured, 34 of them severely; there have been 11 fatalities). 
The idea of celebrating military veterans was raised in public during Esto-
nian military mission to Afghanistan by members of the Defence Forces and 
Defence Ministry in December 2012. One reason to create such a new day of 
importance was to bind Estonian soldiers more tightly with the international 
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military community (i.e. the Western allies), who also celebrate their veterans – 
at least so the memory agents argue. Another aim is to make Estonian soldiers 
more visible in their home society, to draw attention to the young men and 
women who have fought in wars that are alien to a significant part of society. For 
Estonian society the term ‘veteran’ is still associated with World War II and with 
people celebrating the 9th of May, as described above. According to new veterans’ 
policy the men who fought on either side in World War II – in the 8th Estonian 
Rifle Corps (Red Army), or in Estonian Legion or other regiments within Nazi 
German armies – are left out of official policy documents and are also almost 
excluded from official celebrations of that day. 
The selection of St George’s Day, the 23 April, as a new day of importance 
was very intriguing. St George’s Day is an old date in the folk calendar and 
the important of the spring feasts (see Berta: Eesti rahvakalendri tähtpäevade 
andmebaas, Hiiemäe 1996). It is still celebrated today, mainly in schools and 
kindergartens. In contrast we can barely make a connection with previous events 
in independent Estonian (military) history, except with a 14th-century uprising 
that is commemorated on that day. Until recently this uprising was interpreted 
in Estonian and especially in Soviet historiography as an uprising of Estonians 
(i.e. peasants) against the ruling Germans/Livonian Order, which, with its failure, 
ushered in centuries of German domination. Both meanings are still alive among 
specific memory communities: St George’s Night is celebrated more in schools, 
although some families making a bonfire. The uprising is particularly commemo-
rated in Jüriöö park (St George’s Night Park) in Tallinn, and also in some other 
places in Estonia with commemorative runs on St George’s Night. Adding new 
meaning to previous days of importance is quite common in various calendars 
(Zerubavel 2003: 48), for example commemoration of Veterans’ Day has had 
a new layer added. 
St George is an internationally known Saint of soldiers, although he is less 
widely known in secular Estonian society, which had followed the Lutheran tra-
dition for centuries, wherein saints have lower prominence than in the Catholic 
or Orthodox traditions. According to fieldwork done in 2013 and 2014, during 
celebration practices barely any notice is taken of St George, with the exception 
in 2013 of the Chief of the Defence Forces mentioning him in the connection with 
the commemoration service at St George’s Church in Tori village. This church is 
an interesting place from the commemoration perspective because while policy 
documents draw a strict line between the new veterans and World War II veter-
ans, this distinction becomes blurred in practice. This is especially visible at com-
memoration service, which is dedicated to all fallen soldiers of World War II.
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As in the case of 9th of May, flowers and colour symbolism play an important 
role in celebrating Veterans’ Day. The visibility of veterans in society is created 
and increased through the distribution of lapel pins in the shape of hepatica, 
a spring flower native to Estonia. The new symbol uses the blue-black-white 
colour combination of the Estonian national flag and is handmade by disabled 
people in Estonia. Already a couple of weeks before the 23rd April one can 
buy this symbol from members of the Women’s Voluntary Defence Organisa-
tion (Naiskodukaitse), from the Defence League (Kaitseliit) and from different 
branches of the supermarket Selver (see Anname au 2014; since 2015 there are 
more outlets). The hepatica is indeed visible at events connected with Veterans’ 
Day, as well in social and traditional media. A clear model for the introduction 
of the new symbol was the British poppy, a widely known symbol in Britain, 
used in commemoration ceremonies and of veterans. The practice of wearing 
the hepatica in Estonia is still developing. For example, there was no consensus 
in 2014 and 2015 as to when the campaign should start, close to St George’s Day 
or at some other point in the year8. In any case, using a flower as a symbol is 
an attempt to increase people’s awareness of veterans. The hepatica campaign 
takes place just a couple of weeks before St George’s ribbons become a frequent 
sight and although unrelated, the two symbols could be looked at together. Both 
serve a commemorative purpose and both are intended to be worn and shared 
by as many people as possible. St George’s ribbons in particular serve as tokens 
of membership of a group that appears united and homogeneous by virtue of 
those very symbols. 
Another bodily activity connected to Veterans’ Day celebration is the Hepat-
ica Run, which was first held in 20149. The distance is 3.2 km and the run can be 
taken into account as part of the general fitness test for military personnel. The 
run is a public event so whole families run the distance, which can be seen as 
another possible way for this new day or importance to gain visibility.
As with the case of 9th May, taking control of a space and turning it into 
a place filled with people engaged in celebratory practices is also an impor-
tant part of celebration in the case of Veterans’ Day. The main event of that day, 
a concert titled Veterans’ Rock, takes place in Tallinn’s main square, Freedom 
Square, were official parades are held and where a Freedom Cross dedicated to 
the Estonian War of Independence (1918–1920) was erected in 2009. Veterans’ 
Rock is a popular event, and so the musicians who perform are popular, mainly 
performing Estonian folk metal, hard rock or punk. The music is generally noisy 
and the musicians encourage active participation from the audience. Among 
those who attend are veterans, their family members (including children) and 
friends, serving soldiers, and townspeople and other random visitors. There are 
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usually also several speeches, although the main focus is on the music, so we 
could say that participation is a bodily and auditory experience. Veterans’ Day is 
also a media event with the role of media transmission becoming quite remark-
able, for example the concert in Freedom Square has been transmitted by public 
TV (10). Veterans’ Day has also been widely promoted through Facebook, where 
a special event page was created allowing participants to share their emotions. 
Despite the celebration practices surrounding Veterans’ Day being very new 
(we cannot yet say which will establish themselves), we could suggest that this 
day of importance has established itself as a kind of break in routine for serving, 
retired and veteran military personnel. 
In this section we have used ethnographic data to describe celebration prac-
tices related to two distinct days of importance dedicated to veterans. We found 
some similarities in practice, which tends to stress visibility, audibility and bodily 
activity. In terms of ideology, these days of importance are mutually exclusive 
with one of them enjoying support from the state and the other having a rather 
problematic relationship with it. However, the 9th May and Veterans’ Day can 
both be said to constitute a break for people actively involved in celebrating these 
days and what they stand for.
Conclusions
The aim of the current article was to explore the influence of celebration prac-
tices on social rhythms. So far most academic studies have deconstructed the 
cultural and temporal influence of various calendrical anniversaries and holidays 
on the whole of society. This empirical sociological survey shows the scale or 
magnitude of celebrations throughout the year in a contemporary multi-ethnic 
society. By taking into consideration various days of importance one can see 
the complexity of the celebration practices that different layers of the Gregorian 
calendar bring to contemporary life. The survey also explains how individuals 
actually perform celebration practices and reveals the variety of these practices 
among social groups in contemporary Estonia. Some celebration practices take 
more time and require special actions (for example sending a postcard, etc.), 
while some celebration rituals interrupt daily rhythms. Asking who is celebrating 
various days of importance, and how, enables us to ask how celebration-oriented 
Estonian culture is, while the sociological view enables us to go further and 
identify how age and gender, and the existence of material and time resources, 
contribute to participation in celebration activities. 
The two-dimensional approach – days-of-importance and celebrators as 
actors – enables us firstly to distinguish the days that create greater consonance 
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(or eurhythmia if we use the expression created by Lefebvre) of the social 
rhythms associated with breaking of daily working routines. Secondly, the two-
dimensional approach enables us to reveal how different social groups celebrate 
or acknowledge slightly different days of importance, and therefore one can 
find in addition to eurhythmia days of importance that create polyrhythmia, 
a form of which is evident between Estonian- and Russian-speaking communi-
ties in Estonia.
The survey enables us to show empirically how a variety of celebration prac-
tices carried out either passively or actively, partly generate massive eurhythmic 
waves and therefore also cohesion in society. For example, many holidays are 
recognised or/and celebrated by the majority of inhabitants. Concurrently, other 
days of importance create polyrhythmia and in some cases even arhythmic tem-
porality in society. 
The survey identified celebration practices that have strong controversial sym-
bolic meaning and therefore differentiate parts of the population (some celebrate 
while others continues everyday actions without pausing). By taking the actor 
approach, this survey also enabled us to get some ideas about the influence of 
various institutions (media, church, school, state) on the commemorative and/
or celebration activities of certain social groups in Estonia. It is important to 
keep in mind that institutions have the power to create and interpret various 
days of importance – in the first instance the state provides ‘free days’, but also, 
as this study revealed, the media as well as school/kindergarten and church also 
influence the way people celebrate days of importance. The news media and 
the church play more important roles for older people, and the church is also 
more important to the Russian-speaking community. Younger Estonians more 
often celebrate days of importance in connection with school or kindergarten, 
while the older generation more actively participates in public celebrations of 
anniversaries.
This survey binds the macro (sociological) with micro (ethnographic) levels 
of analysis. The limitation of the sociological macro approach is that the reper-
toire of celebration practices is far wider than this sociological study was able 
to cover. Ethnographic case studies enabled us to demonstrate the complexity 
of celebration as a spatially and temporally specific practice and cast light on 
how people as celebrators actively use both the old and new resources avail-
able to them. Ethnography helps to take a closer look at bodily rituals that are 
related to commemoration anniversaries. These rituals are different from rituals 
associated with the holidays of the traditional folk calendar or rituals that are 
linked to religious days of importance. Ethnographic data on the celebration of 
9th May and Veterans’ Day, two days of importance dedicated to members of 
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the armed forces, suggest that practices carried out to mark these occasions tend 
to be bound to a particular space and call on people to move in unison. Bod-
ily practices of celebration can result in a visual or auditory display or appear-
ance of unity, which may or may not translate into a sense of community and 
shared views. Furthermore, ethnographic case studies illustrate how passively 
recognised, even seemingly forgotten days of importance can be filled with new 
contents and used for purposes that speak to contemporary society, prompting 
passive celebrators or tradition-bearers to take an active role. 
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1  The explanation what days of importance were selected is provided below.
2  The days from the folk calendar were also celebrated during the Soviet period, 
except religious holidays like Easter and Christmas.
3  See: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/Riigikogu/act/513112013017/consolide. 
In Estonia Christmas is, apart from a religious holiday, also important in the folk calendar.
4  Although the activities of churches were not banned totally under the Soviet Union, 
attending church at Christmas and Easter was checked and sanctioned at schools and 
workplaces. Participation in celebrations of Soviet anniversaries – such as the parades 
on the 1st May and 7th November (the anniversary of the October Revolution) was also 
checked and sanctioned. The practice of control varied in different parts of the Soviet 
Union, as did the intensity of control, although it shaped the celebration practices of 
people in general. Holidays not tolerated by the Soviet state were celebrated at home 
within the circle of family members, while Soviet anniversaries were celebrated publicly 
and collectively either in strictly institutionalised, or in freer, forms.
5  The active protests of the Russian-speaking population towards Estonian state out-
burst on the removal of the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet war monument, in April 2007, which 
will be discussed further on in the article (see also Brüggemann 2008; Brüggemann & 
Kasekamp 2008). 
6  Also the activities of external agents, like support for the Nochnoi Dozor, contrib-
uted to the accumulation of tensions and protests.
7  In this case under relevant memory agents we understand officials from the Defence 
Ministry, from the Office of the Estonian President, and military personnel from the 
Defence Forces, who are behind resources made available for commemoration and cel-
ebration of veterans. In addition, under memory activists here are understood to be people 
who are working voluntarily or on a regular basis for the We salute! campaign.
8  At 2018 the campaign started with 5th of April.
9  The initial run was just in Tallinn, other runs In Tartu and Tapa followed during 
next years. Tapa is a home for Estonian central military base, and also NATO troops are 
stationed there.
10  In 2014 the concert was broadcasted by ETV2, the second channel of national 
public service broadcaster ERR. According to ERR the concert gained an audience of 
24,000 (with a rating of 1.9%) and was the second most popular programme of the week. 
The number of spectators in the square was as many as 15,000.
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Mapping celebration practices in Estonia
Days of importance in Estonia:  
traditions and transformations
Pirjo Korkiakangas
The article “Mapping celebration practices in Estonia: Which days of impor-
tance actually influence societal rhythms?” explores the annual rhythm of days 
of importance, holidays, and anniversaries in the Estonian calendar. In Estonia 
the history of holidays, and especially the history of anniversaries, has witnessed 
many ruptures, transformations, and changes in celebration practice. The study 
problematises and analyses connections between particular periods in Estonia’s 
national history and the meanings of holidays and anniversaries. Questions of 
celebration practice among different ethnic and social groups, and questions of 
‘catalyst actors’, are essential.
Celebration of anniversaries and holidays is multifaceted and influenced by 
cultural, national as well as ideological factors. Many holidays are characterised 
by long-standing national and cultural traditions. The more static a culture and 
society is, the more firmly traditional holidays are rooted and their celebrations 
established and enculturated. In peasant societies, the annual cycle of holidays 
and special days was determined by the working year and its tasks. In addition 
to work celebrations, everyday life was interrupted by celebrations rooted partly 
in folk religious tradition, partly in Christian tradition, such as Soul’s Visiting 
Time, St. Martin’s and St. Catherine’s Days, as well as Christmas, New Year and 
Midsummer. Changes were slow and celebration was characterised by the per-
manence of customary traditions. 
National and socio-political changes and disruptions have also affected 
the celebration of holidays and anniversaries and their increasing significance. 
The dichotomy between private and public celebration that prevailed in Soviet 
Estonia (1940–1991) would be a noteworthy question for a cultural researcher. 
On the other hand, this period helped in the preservation of holidays and anni-
versaries that were important to Estonians. After the collapse of the socialist 
system and with the restored independence (1991), the celebration of holidays and 
anniversaries was yet again constructed in new circumstances. The re-definition 
of what used to be privately commemorated meant it could now be publicly 
displayed. For example, the deportations of Estonians in 1941 and 1949 were 
silent family memories during the Soviet period; however, along with restored 
independence deported people were rehabilitated and deportation remembrance 
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anniversaries could be publicly celebrated. However, according to the results of 
the study it seems that deportation anniversaries are important only for older 
Estonians. The changes have meant different things to Estonia’s different ethnic 
groups: making the past visible has both strengthened and changed the subjects 
of recollection and memory culture. With restored independence, Estonia’s devel-
opment into part of Western Europe and the European Union has been relatively 
fast, which is also connected to the culture of remembering.
Celebrating the anniversaries of the Second World War in today’s Estonia is 
associated with political-ethnic tension. Some anniversaries have ever-increasing 
significance among certain groups (for example Victory Day, commemorated 
from the Great Patriotic War, for the Russian-speaking population). On the other 
hand, a new anniversary has been created: Veteran’s Day, celebrated in honour 
of Estonian veterans of international acts of war and military efforts. In this way, 
increasing internationality and multiculturalism have their own effects on the 
celebration practices of anniversaries that are thought of as traditional, and influ-
ence the formation of new holidays.
The article “Mapping celebration practices in Estonia: Which days of impor-
tance actually influence societal rhythms?” is divided into two parts. There is 
a combination of quantitative and qualitative research material, and the analysis 
produced is an innovative experiment, although at the same time methodologi-
cally and analytically problematic. The first part of the article is a descriptive 
quantitative analysis of the anniversaries and holidays of contemporary Estonia. 
The analysis clearly conveys the different emphases of anniversaries celebrated by 
Estonians and Russians in Estonia. These differences are especially clear in cel-
ebrations of (Russian-speaking Estonians’) Victory Day and (Estonians’) Veteran’s 
Day.
From the viewpoint of cultural memory, it seems to be far more compli-
cated to compare for example the celebration of Mothers’ Day and Women’s Day: 
it would have been worth considering how significant Mothers’ Day is to Rus-
sian speakers, and how Women’s Day, which originates in and has spread from 
Russian culture, affects Estonians. In the article these kinds of similarities and 
differences are not considered in relation to cultural memory and its changes or 
permanence.
The second part of the article consists of examples of commemoration and 
celebration of Victory Day (9 May), important to the Russian population, and 
Veteran’s Day (23 April), which in the folk calendar is St George Day and is still 
celebrated in schools and kindergartens, and in turn is important to Estonians. 
This part of the article is a justified description of how Victory Day, celebrated 
among the Russian population since 1945, and its political–ideological tensions 
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have come to prominence, as well as being connected to the Bronze Soldier 
memorial in Tallinn and interpretations of its significance in the history of Esto-
nia. The celebration focuses on past events, while at the same time being used 
to strengthen the Russian population’s ethnic identity. New Estonia, on the other 
hand, constructs and develops its subject of cultural memory (Veteran’s Day) as 
a new West European nation, orienting itself towards internationality. The day 
has been celebrated since 2013 as an expression of Estonia’s commitment to the 
international military community (of Western allies) and as a thank you to the 
Estonian men and women who have taken part in international military opera-
tions. The holiday is still developing a solid form.
Even though deep cultural structures are rather permanent and change 
slowly, increasing internationality helps with the adoption of new holidays and 
anniversaries (for example Mothers’ Day, Fathers’ Day, Valentine’s Day, Hallow-
een) as well as strengthening traditional holidays in order to emphasise national 
identity and ethnicity. Throughout the article, holidays and anniversaries also 
generate new research approaches and questions on cultural, national, ethnic, 
generational, age, and gender connections to the significance of holidays and 
anniversaries and their celebration. 

Urmo Raus “Nimeta III” (“Untitled III”) 1997.  
Monotype, drypoint, artist’s technique, paper. 56 x 39.5 cm.
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A plurality of pasts and boundaries:  
evidence from Estonia’s last one hundred years
Raili Nugin, Tiiu Jaago, Anu Kannike, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang, 
Anu  Printsmann, Pihla Maria Siim, Kati Lindström
Abstract. The focus of this study is on how temporal boundaries are experi-
enced and how everyday lives are shaped in a particular space with reference 
to shifting boundaries and perceptions of centres and peripheries, continui-
ties and discontinuities. Drawing mainly on the theories of semiosphere and 
boundaries devised by Juri Lotman, and social space by Henri Lefebvre and 
other theorists, our research makes an interdisciplinary contribution to the 
existing theories of borders and boundaries. Based on various case studies 
from different disciplines, it exemplifies how borders are perceived, con-
structed, negotiated and contested in everyday practices, as well as how eve-
ryday practices maintain the borders vanished in other spheres. We argue that 
abrupt political changes are sensed and experienced as boundaries in time, 
yet mechanisms of coping and adapting seem to be preserving day-to-day 
continuities. Even if ruptures in lives are sharp and definitive, people try 
to create coherent narratives and use linguistic means as cultural tools to 
negotiate the ruptures. In some cases, the rupture emerges when trying to cre-
ate continuity. People use conceptions of continuity as cultural tools, creating 
thus a perceived space, which symbolises continuity for them but causes rup-
ture in their lives and/or in space. Thus, people make sense of space by creat-
ing their own boundaries (and sharing them to various extents), which are 
tightly tied with the boundaries of time. In the case of both urban and rural 
landscapes, different layers of landscape can develop at different speeds and 
can display different boundaries, or no divisions at all. Our examples have 
shown that even when the political borders in space stay the same, their 
meaning can shift when the overall political atmosphere and international 
relations have transformed. Change of regime does not create sharp bounda-
ries, but rather, creates an environment for change in which a crucial role 
is also played by continuities based on memory, dispositions and practices.
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 334–375.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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Introduction
The current article aims to contribute to theoretical discussion on the phenom-
enon of boundaries in culture and the processes related to establishing, maintain-
ing and perceiving divisions in space and time. Being interdisciplinary in nature, 
the article wants to raise awareness of the complexity of cultural boundaries. 
Rather than analysing empirical data sets about specific boundaries or politi-
cal borders, it uses multidisciplinary examples to illustrate its main theoretical 
points. We will argue that people draw boundaries in space and time that seem 
to be rather rigid and clear cut at a first glance. However, analysing these cultural 
boundaries through a variety of research methods, it appears that the mecha-
nisms of adjusting or creatively reworking these divisions in everyday practice are 
much more complicated; in fact, as our research shows, boundaries are constantly 
being shifted, redefined and renegotiated.
To illustrate our theoretical starting point, we begin with an example.
On the 5th of September 2014, at 9 in the morning, unknown armed men kid-
napped Estonian Internal Security Service officer Eston Kohver at Estonia’s south-
eastern border with Russia. The Russian side argued that Kohver was on Russian 
territory, whereas Estonia claimed that he was taken from the Estonian side of the 
border.1 All this happened just half a year after Russia and Estonia had finally 
signed a border treaty and only two days after the visit of the president of the 
United States of America (USA), Barack Obama, to Estonia, to confirm the sup-
port of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and to assert NATO’s 
presence at its eastern borders in the increasing atmosphere of tension between 
Russia and the West after the Ukrainian conflict. 
What at first seemed clearly an act of violating Estonian, the European Union’s 
(EU) and NATO’s border, presumably with the symbolic purpose of creating inse-
curity, led journalists’ attention to the border and spurred wider public debate. 
It appeared that Estonia, EU and NATO did not actually have an eastern land 
border in the sense of a fence or a wide earth strip – the most important border 
for the semiotic subject called the West was more a symbolic than a physical 
entity. Subsequent days brought visual images of what was considered Estonia’s 
de facto border, a dense bush without visible manned surveillance. 
The history of the border between the Russian Federation and Republic of Estonia 
has been diverse. Estonian independence was restored in August 1991 on the basis 
of its legal continuity with the pre-WWII Republic of Estonia (1918‒1940), which 
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would have given independent Estonia rights to somewhat larger territories than 
were under the jurisdiction of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR). 
Estonia’s legal commitment to the border drawn by the Tartu Peace Treaty on 2nd 
February 1920 and Russia’s reluctance to recognise its continuous validity were 
reasons that led to the situation in which several attempts to sign and ratify the 
border treaty failed. From 1991 the Russian–Estonian border was defined by 
a temporary control line, generally following the borders of the former Estonian 
SSR. This de facto border, however, had had a strong symbolic importance for 
the country as well as a decisive practical effect on the livelihoods of the local 
communities in the border zones. The impenetrability of this most decisive bor-
der was further underlined by media coverage of queues to cross the border or 
footage of smugglers or people caught illegally crossing. Yet, a combination of the 
symbolic power of the imagined absolute divide between Russia and Estonia, and 
the intricacies surrounding a legal but non-existent border and de facto control 
line, resulted in the physical control line becoming more and more overgrown.
The Estonian government insisted that Kohver was abducted within Estonia’s 
borders, however, this did not deter Russia from convicting him of espionage. 
As illustrated by this story, borders and boundaries are not just lines of divi-
sion in a spatial world; they are equally discursive practices used in the political 
sphere and having dramatic consequences in everyday lives. Moulding and shift-
ing boundaries happens in continuous dialogue with past divisions, constantly 
building on previous change – even turbulent socio-economic and political 
changes such as the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union do not wipe the 
previous boundaries out completely. Every shift in political and spatial borders 
leaves a trace in the discourses, landscapes and daily practices of the local people. 
Sometimes, these experiences last subconsciously through generations. 
Boundaries are not just mechanisms of creating separation and difference, 
they are also tools for creating continuity and cohesion. They both restrict and 
enhance communication. They are mechanisms of conflict avoidance, and the 
reasons for conflict. Every boundary both separates and unites depending on the 
perspective one chooses. The same boundary can function differently in differ-
ent spheres of society. In addition, the boundaries have different meanings and 
are shared only to a certain extent. For one, there are different political angles: 
in Russian, Estonian, EU and NATO policies the issue of the Russian–Estonian 
border has been addressed radically differently depending on the aims of the 
political body. Yet, at the level of private lives, these political tensions trans-
late into different practices that mould the political meanings. For people living 
in the frontier areas, the border has specific meanings, and, as in the case of the 
Estonian minority living on the Russian side of the border, this separation may 
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have influenced them to act together as a community, thus, actually uniting 
them. In narrated stories and lives the boundaries and division lines appear to 
be at different places at different times. 
The aim of our article is to show how the boundaries in space and time cre-
ated by some political turns in Estonia over the last century manifested and were 
translated into (boundary) discourses and (everyday) practice. In doing so, we 
do not concentrate further on the state border, but rather on the divisions caus-
ing (dis)continuities in perceived space and time. By presenting the version of 
hegemonic history on the one hand, we illustrate how political changes that are 
conceptualised as ruptures in history text books can translate into negotiations 
of continuity in everyday lives, and vice versa on how discursive continuities 
can turn into ruptures in practices. Drawing on the theories of semiosphere and 
boundaries devised by Juri Lotman (1990; 2009 [1992]), Henri Lefebvre’s social 
space (1991 [1974]), and work by other theorists, the article will show through 
various case studies how political, administrative, and discursive borders are 
perceived, constructed, negotiated and contested in everyday practice, as well 
as illustrating the opposite, i.e. how everyday practices maintain borders that 
have been wiped out politically, administratively or discursively. To fulfil these 
purposes, we found it useful to focus particularly on the concepts of continuities 
and discontinuities and decided to scrutinise how they have influenced Estonian 
landscapes and the perception of time. Commonly, boundaries in landscape and 
time are considered fixed and stable, yet, as we aim to show, they are influenced 
by discursive practices and political turns. In doing so we use examples from the 
Estonian-speaking part of the Estonian population, recognising the fact that for 
people coming from other ethnic groups, the boundaries may appear in com-
pletely different locations. In addition, by using empirical examples from differ-
ent fields of research, and different analytical methods, we hope to contribute 
to the cultural theories that analyse borders and boundaries, spaces and their 
interrelations.
Theoretical background
The present article is an interdisciplinary endeavour, uniting theoretical perspec-
tives and research methodology from semiotics, sociology, ethnology, human 
geography and folkloristics. The underlying theoretical concept that binds these 
approaches is Juri Lotman’s concept of semiosphere, the basic premises of which 
have then been further developed through Henri Lefebvre’s theories of social 
space, as well as theories from landscape studies, contemporary boundary and 
memory studies. While we are aware that the concepts relating to, and debates 
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about, borders in each discipline differ, we aim to create an interdisciplinary 
dialogue about cultural border concepts (cf. Kurki 2014, 1067) relying on these 
theorists.
Semiosphere and its contingent notion of boundary are one of Lotman’s most 
important contributions to the theory of culture for describing the functioning 
of a cultural space (developed extensively in Lotman 2005 [1984]; 1990; 2009 
[1992]). While on one hand semiosphere is the whole space and web of semiotic 
activity that makes meaning-making and sign activity possible (in the same way 
that biosphere is the sum total of ecosystemic relations), each culture (and sub-
culture, for that matter) can also be approached as a semiosphere. Semiosphere 
has several important characteristics. While it is a semiotic unity perceived as 
a culturally uniform space, it is dynamic, principally uneven and heterogeneous, 
consisting of various subsystems. Yet, it is also a bounded space, which is defined 
through constant self-reflection: memory and constant negotiation of past and 
present cultural structures are an important function of culture as a semiosphere. 
We will come back to each of these moments in relation to other theorists.
While Lotman illustrates his theories abundantly with examples from Rus-
sian culture, literature and history, he does not really theorise how everyday 
lives in fact become a semiotic unity. For that end, we turn to Lefebvre’s notion 
of social space, and landscape studies.
In Lefebvre’s (1991 [1974], 74) approach, space always embraces the imaginary, 
the symbolic, but also the practical and material. According to him, each human 
practice and production takes place in space, it occupies space and circulates 
in it, engendering and fashioning the space (op cit, 77). Social space is constantly 
produced, reproduced and ‘laboured on’; however, this happens not in a void but 
in an environment influenced by physical processes (like climate) and imagina-
tive processes (such as representation of that space in discourses) and social 
structures (such as the labour system). Social change can transform these social 
spaces but never erase them; rather, space is always defined via networks, path-
ways, interrelations with other social spaces (op cit). However, it is not enough 
to acknowledge the interrelatedness of different aspects of what constitutes social 
space, one must also analyse how different spaces and their boundaries interact, 
form networks and negotiate borders. Each object we encounter is a product of 
such relations and negotiation processes.
Landscape studies2 has approached this production of social space in even 
more concrete terms through the analysis of the way people shape their sur-
roundings, focusing on the interplay of customs, everyday life, belonging, kinship, 
corporeality and territory (Haber 1995; Olwig 1996; 2002; Widgren 2004). Land-
scape is a holistic phenomenon the natural and cultural components of which 
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are taken together, yet, like semiosphere, it is essentially a heterogenic, contested 
and inter-acted notion, with a territorial and physical aspect. 
According to Mats Widgren (2004), when analysing landscape it is impor-
tant to distinguish the following aspects: (1) form, that is, landforms, built 
environment, etc.; (2) function; (3) processes that maintain form and function; 
and (4) the socio-cultural context in which the landscape is set. While every 
socio-economic formation creates its own landscape with its own symbols and 
values (Cosgrove 1984), the semiosphere and culture are internally heterogene-
ous. At moments of change, different layers and structures can change at differ-
ent speed. What is important for the following analysis is that during gradual 
development the new outcome is normally the result of a constant negotiation 
and intertwining of these four components. During times of rapid development 
they may change at different speeds: the form can stay the same, but the function 
change (for example old manor houses turned into schools); or the form changes 
while function is preserved (for example dwellings), etc. 
As stated repeatedly by Lotman (1990, 131), semiosphere is an essentially 
heterogeneous phenomenon, which means that its internal space is unified but 
uneven, uniform but asymmetrical. The closer to the semiotic core of a culture – 
the centre, which decides dominant, hegemonic meanings – the less diverse 
and more stable the structure of that culture is; whereas further towards the 
cultural periphery the greater is the variety of different meanings and the greater 
the intensity and rate of change. By far the most important element of each 
semiosphere is its boundary, which unites semiotic space, “one of the primary 
mechanisms of semiotic individuation” (Lotman 1990, 131). According to Lotman, 
“every culture begins by dividing the world into ‘its own’ internal space and ‘their’ 
external space” (op cit) by a boundary. Its negotiation and the creation of a unity 
called ‘us’ are the foremost tools, as well as products, of cultural self-reflection. 
At the same time the boundary is the place where alien, that is, external, semiotic 
structures are introduced into the system, and reinterpreted and translated into 
the internal ‘language’. Thus, boundaries are sources of new meaning, innovation 
and change; it is at the boundary where culture’s semiotic activity is the most 
active (Lotman 1990, 136). The boundary simultaneously unites and separates 
different semiotic spaces and is constantly reinterpreted. The boundary is also 
the mechanism through which unnecessary semiotic structures are excluded 
from a culture (Lotman 2009, 115). On the other hand, semiotic space includes 
lacunae: passive traces of previous semiotic structures that can regain meaning 
in some later constellation (Lindström et al 2011).
Contemporary border studies in the social sciences and humanities coincide 
with Lotman’s model in that boundaries are processes rather than fixed entities. 
340
Raili Nugin, Tiiu Jaago, Anu Kannike, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang, Anu Printsmann, …
Boundaries are phenomena on multiple levels, as administrative and social bor-
ders are always influenced by historical development (see Paasi 1996, 15–16; New-
man 2003, 13–14; Custred 2011). Coinciding with the work of Lefebvre, David 
Newman (2003, 13) emphasises the importance of studying both territories and 
people in those territories, focussing on the role of “networks of groups, affilia-
tions and identities”. According to Newman’s approach, for a satisfactory analysis 
of borders one has to be attentive to spatial borders, as well as acknowledging the 
different characters that borders have: socio-cultural, environmental, economic, 
subjective, imagined, etc. Positioning human lived experiences and narratives 
in the focus of research, it is possible to analyse the interrelations of the adminis-
trative and geographical–political borders on one hand and subjective perception 
and narratives on the other. In other words, it is important to ask how the borders 
are experienced and expressed (in narratives and visual representations) as well 
as how these borders are used in constructing meaningful others.
When concentrating on how boundaries are constructed and interpreted in 
everyday life, one of the most obvious research objects is the home. Spatial mean-
ings arise from moving, practicing and inhabiting built space (Certeau et al 1994; 
Rose et al 2010). Always stretching beyond the physical boundaries of the dwell-
ing, home is constructed “out of movement, communication and social relations” 
(Massey 1992, 13). Home extends from the private space to the neighbourhood, 
country, or even abroad (in the case of transnational practices or migration). 
Likewise, home-making involves negotiating borders on the temporal dimension: 
through objects serving as ‘anchors of memory’, historical (or ‘historical’) interior 
design or just memories associated with the lived space, the home can ignore 
or highlight ruptures in the public sphere. Thus, the notion of home as a fixed 
and stable structure demarcated by walls is increasingly challenged and home 
is instead explored as a permeable spatial and temporal intersection (Johansson 
& Saarikangas 2009, 10). The boundaries of the home are continuously negoti-
ated through the encounter of private and communal and their multiple layers 
of meaning. On the one hand, parts of home are being transferred to shared 
public spaces, and on the other hand, rules from the public world extend to the 
home. At the same time, diverse identities (gender, status, etc.) are manifested 
and contradictory meanings can emerge within the domestic space.
Boundaries in time are points of remarkable unpredictability and multiple 
possibilities. Lotman, undoubtedly influenced by the events leading to the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, developed a theory about the role of explosive 
change in history in his last work, Culture and Explosion (initially published in 
1992, English translation 2009). Historical development occurs through two types 
of change: gradual and explosive. In gradual change, central semiotic structures 
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undergo change through processes of constant but gradual negotiation, wherein 
the core transforms to a new state without losing its identity. What interests Lot-
man more is explosive change that ruptures the whole system, removing the exist-
ing constructions and opening countless opportunities for future developmental 
paths. In the subsequent consolidation process, when developmental choices are 
made, these multiple developmental possibilities (potential paths) are excluded 
one after another. Any new element can become the new core, and having been 
singled out it starts to create its own developmental path. Thus, when moments 
of explosive change are examined in hindsight, they are constructed as turning 
points from which the clear path to the present day emerged. As pointed out 
by the famous metaphor ‘the past is a foreign country’ (cf Hartley 1953; Lowen-
thal 1988), moments of explosion function as boundaries in time, beyond which 
lies a different semiotic space. We need to keep in mind, though, that culture 
(as semiosphere or landscape) consists of multiple layers that can have differ-
ent speeds of development (Antrop 2000), and that not all explosions cause 
a complete rupture in all semiotic structures: it can easily be that only parts of 
the semiotic space are affected whereas other structures continue on the gradual 
development path giving rise to zones of transition.
After each explosion, a consolidation process follows, where remembered 
facts are retransformed into a continuous line of development and acceptable 
meanings are attributed to the events (Lotman 1990, 16–18, 114–132). Creat-
ing retrospective continuity is the role of memory. That the construction of 
the past – attributing meaning to what has happened and establishing a moral 
agenda for the present and the future with the help of the past (Poole 2008) – is 
a complex and multilevel process is well documented in contemporary memory 
studies. Collective memory is constructed in political, academic, public and pri-
vate circles; these treatments interact and are interdependent. Interpreting the 
past depends on generational as well on social dynamics (Misztal 2003). Thus, 
research about memory tends to be multidisciplinary with memory treated as 
a process (Denzin 2012; Thomson 2012; Pickering & Keightley 2013). These pro-
cesses are studied both in cultural memory studies and oral history, and despite 
methodological differences, both emphasise the social aspect and the representa-
tive nature of memory and remembering (Erll 2008, 4; 2011, 120–126; Abrams 
2010, 78–82). However, the mediums studied with either of the methodologies 
differ: while cultural memory studies focus on the general schemes and pro-
cesses of remembering, the oral history tradition concentrates on individuals 
and small groups (Pickering & Keightley 2013, 4). Therefore, as past events are 
bound into a continuity through an individual life in oral history, her life story 
might position the boundaries differently from the written history of the same 
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culture. Dialogue between these two visions enables us to see the diversities and 
interconnectedness of images of history. 
An important part of our article is dedicated specifically to these temporal 
boundaries in the last century of Estonian history and their combinations with 
other existing semiotic boundaries, both spatial and non-spatial, with the nego-
tiation of boundaries analysed both at the individual and social level.
Estonian explosions: historical background 
In the following, we are trying to sketch the main points of Estonian history while 
remaining aware that this treatment is closely connected to and derived from the 
hegemonic and political history of Estonia, reflecting the version of the ‘centre’ 
in Lotman’s treatment of semiosphere, i.e. the version where there is little or no 
variety. By presenting this past, we aim to give a hegemonic framework against 
which we position the examples that provide heterogeneous interpretations of 
that past. 
Estonia is situated on the shores of the Baltic Sea. On the north and west it 
has sea borders with Finland and Sweden, on the east and south, land borders 
with Russia and Latvia. Its attractive geopolitical location has been one of the 
reasons why, throughout history, the Estonian territories have been governed 
by numerous other reigns and regimes (sometimes partly simultaneously). Each 
of these has left its marks in Estonian culture and landscapes through different 
administrative, political and proprietary boundaries. Differences created through 
administration between northern versus southern, and eastern versus western 
Estonia are very much alive in many contemporary practices. Each new regime 
has been preceded and sometimes followed by conflict (direct physical as well as 
discursive), including the large 20th century wars. These conflicts left numerous 
boundaries on the national as well as the private level, since forceful relocation 
and recruitment by fighting powers divided communities so that political borders 
have often run through individual families. This perception of Estonia as a bor-
derland has had an impact on the way its national identity has been culturally 
constructed: being not only on the crossroads of East and West3, but at many 
boundaries of different kind. 
One of the important boundaries (landmarks) in 20th century Estonian 
history is the Russian Revolution, in 1917, the aftermath of which led to the 
withdrawal of Russia from the First World War. In 1918, in the hectic post-war 
atmosphere, Estonia used the political situation to fulfil its political ambitions 
as an independent state. Statehood was not achieved, however, without human 
losses during the War of Independence which quickly followed between 1918 and 
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1920, ending with the Tartu Peace Treaty which brought Setomaa in the southeast 
and Narva, together with extensive areas behind the Narva River, in the northeast, 
into Estonian jurisdiction. Land reform shook proprietary relations and existing 
social hierarchies to the core: most of the land that had belonged to Baltic Ger-
man manors and other big land owners (58% of arable land before the reform) 
was nationalised and 55,000 new individual farmsteads were given to Estonians, 
relating the idea of Estonian statehood tightly to individual farmsteads. 
The next important landmark was the 1940s, when Estonia was occupied 
by the Soviet Union as an outcome of the secret Molotov–Ribbentrop pact 
between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in 1939. After the Soviet Union 
entered the Second World War against Germany, Estonia was occupied by Nazi 
Germany between 1941 and 1944. Fifty thousand people perished in the war 
while about 80,000 people fled to the West in fear of the returning Soviet regime. 
Later, these people formed strong national communities abroad, thus creating 
some sort of continuity with the homeland and with the independent Estonian 
Republic; a government in exile was even formed. 
In 1944, Estonia was once more incorporated into the Soviet Union. Harsh 
post-war economic conditions were worsened by Stalinist political repressions 
and deportations. 1947 brought the beginning of collectivisation which once 
again redrew land ownership borders. The mass deportations of 1941 and 1949 
sent about 30,000 people to Siberia. After Stalin’s death in 1953, the political and 
economic conditions improved somewhat. Although many deportees did not 
survive, most of those who did returned to Estonia, but were often not allowed 
to live in their former homes or in major cities. In addition, a special border 
restriction zone was established on the islands and within 20 km of most of the 
northern Estonian coast, limiting access to the sea and abolishing private sea-
faring. Closed towns like uranium enrichment town Sillamäe became off-limits 
to the remaining local population.
Throughout most of the Soviet period political freedom was suppressed 
until Mikhail Gorbachev launched perestroika at the end of the 1980s, which 
ultimately led to Estonia regaining independence in 1991. This is a landmark 
of sudden change in the narrative of Estonian history. The Republic of Esto-
nia was restored on the basis of legal continuity, creating a grey area between 
imagined (i.e. pre-war) and factual borders. Land ownership reform returned 
confiscated farmsteads to their pre-war owners or their legal heirs in an attempt 
to re-establish the mosaic farming landscapes of the imagined past. On the other 
hand, local administrative borders did not undergo rapid change. Since regaining 
independence, Estonia’s political agenda has been to (re)integrate into Europe. 
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The institutional aims were thus joining the EU and NATO, both of which were 
achieved in 2004. 
Discursive constructions concerning the Soviet past
Since re-establishing independence the official public discourse in Estonia has 
chosen to emphasise the country’s political continuity with the pre-war repub-
lic, which, according to the changed hegemonic discourse, was disrupted by 
Soviet occupation for 50 years.4 In the narrated life stories told in the 1990s and 
2000s, a lot of attention is paid to the events of the 1940s (forceful incorpora-
tion, deportations). In public discourse, the first period of independence gained 
prominence in mnemonic culture, interpreted as “giving the nation its history 
back” and “filling in the white gaps with memories”5 (Hinrikus & Kõresaar 2004, 
209; Kõresaar 2005, 17–26). Discourse on “criminal communism” appeared on the 
official memory policy level immediately after regaining independence (see also 
Tileaga 2012, 265). The political repressions – stories that had been available only 
in private conversations at the family level during the Soviet period – surfaced 
in the hegemonic treatment of the past. The 1990s public memory culture in the 
Baltic states can be characterised by extensive condemnation of the Soviet era, 
or the “unconditional denial of the socialist past” (Jõesalu & Kõresaar 2013, 177). 
In these accounts, the past is presented via the discourse of rupture (op cit, 183): 
the pre-war independence era is perceived as a period of harmonious develop-
ment that was cut through by harsh Stalinist policies in the aftermath of World 
War II. Such narrative constructions were also prevalent in private stories at the 
time (see EKLA f 350). Often, the treatment of the Stalinist period as criminal 
and full of repression was generalised to the entire Soviet era (Jõesalu & Kõresaar 
2013, 183). 
However, since the turn of the 21st century, a more heterogeneous treatment 
of the Soviet era has emerged, even in public discourse (Jõesalu 2012). The rea-
sons for this are probably (as always) complex, but along with a change in the 
political environment the change of generations that shape the discursive field 
plays a role (Jõesalu & Kõresaar 2013, 178). Together with a shift towards het-
erogeneity, mature socialism (as defined in Yurchak 2003) has surfaced on the 
discursive field, favouring stress on the everyday level of the system (Jõesalu 
2005). This does not mean, however, that the overall hegemonic treatment of the 
communist past has been changed towards a positive evaluation of the regime. 
Rather, dealing with that period has become multi-layered. This development 
has not happened overnight and the heterogenisation of Soviet narratives that 
started at the beginning of the 2000s is on-going (Jõesalu 2012). Nor has this 
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trend happened without battles on the field of discourse. In addition, for dif-
ferent ethno-cultural, social, and age groups different perceived ruptures gain 
prevalence: what could be continuity for one might be discontinuity for another. 
The analysis of memory through oral history has demonstrated that politi-
cal context influences the way in which events are conceptualised. In addition, 
subsequent historical events tend to influence the (re)conceptualisation of pre-
vious events. Generational aspects too play a role, i.e. whether the experience 
is immediate or mediated, or in which life stage these events were experienced. 
Furthermore, a person’s life stage also influences how social events are addressed – 
with increasing age, time perspectives also change and accumulated experience 
of events makes people re-evaluate previous events and contextualise later ones.
Lived continuities and broken lives: the rupture of the 1940s 
Becoming Soviet: from private farmsteads to collective farms
Political upheavals create the conditions for landscape change. After the explo-
sion, in its attempt to stabilise its new central position, the new political power 
creates its own representations of the new, desired landscape, using different 
media, planning, economic instruments such as taxes, and other tools. Subse-
quently, the desired change – land ownership, borders, land use patterns, monu-
ments, etc. – are carried out, and patterns and practices change in ‘real’ land-
scapes. Only gradually does the new landscape become accustomed to the new 
power constellation; at the same time people adapt to the changes and the pat-
terns also adapt. However, there is a stabilisation period (or lag time) involved – 
no change can be enforced instantly; old patterns and practices “glow” through 
the new ones – people still remember “how it was before” and not all screens 
are removed (Palang 2010), at least not from memory (see also Maandi 2009). 
This diversity reduces the readability of landscapes, creating miscommunication 
and a transformation of meanings (Palang et al 2006). Finally, as part of retroac-
tive history writing, former innovations become heritage and features that were 
once fought against as the unwanted new are taken under protection after a suf-
ficient period. One such explosion that rearranged the everyday practices and 
landscapes in Estonia was the political change of the 1940s (World War II and 
its aftermath). The following section will explore the ruptures and continuities 
during the 1940s in rural areas in the light of the post-war policies of collectivisa-
tion and political repression. 
Soviet propaganda glorified the collectivisation of agriculture and collec-
tive farm life in many ways. Placards called on people to join collective farms. 
346
Raili Nugin, Tiiu Jaago, Anu Kannike, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang, Anu Printsmann, …
 Scientists were mobilised to carry out research that described how a collectivised 
landscape would function so much better than a privately managed one. News-
paper articles described the advances of collective farming in other parts of the 
USSR. However, in real life, the desired change of collective land use was far more 
complicated than expected and for the majority of people the decision to join 
the kolkhozes was taken out of fear or plain economic necessity in a changed 
socio-economical context.
Land use data from state registers (Mander & Palang 1994)6 indicates that 
there was a decrease in the share of agricultural land use during the 1940s. In the 
western part of the country the share of agricultural land fell from more than 
65% to less than 15%, although in other parts of the country the decrease was less 
dramatic. The main reasons for rapid change in the west were, first, population 
loss due to war casualties (including fleeing overseas) and deportations, and 
second, establishment of a border zone with restricted access and limited range 
of permissible activities, which in turn lead to a decline in population. The paral-
lel process of urbanisation had an additional impact. The decrease in the share 
of agricultural land happened mostly at the expense of grassland (pastures and 
hay meadows) while the share of arable land remained about the same. In addi-
tion, most of the agricultural activities in the western part of the country were 
more extensive in character because the land used included wooded pastures and 
hay meadows on less fertile soil, marginal areas that are usually the first to be 
abandoned during hard times. In other words, policies of change were imposed 
on particular socio-economic conditions shaped by local specifics (the nature 
of arable land) and previous political developments (war casualties, emigration). 
Ideally, collective farms were supposed to be about collective spirit, common 
ownership and socialist ideology; they were large-scale, mechanised and oriented 
towards the future. In reality the processes of collectivisation gave rise to prac-
tices that were not seen as such by those living in those kolkhozes. Often, in eve-
ryday life people tried to preserve the private agricultural practices that were 
there before these substantial changes, although perhaps not everyone succeeded. 
This was often the only means to guarantee some food security. One example is 
keeping one’s own (private) cow at the collective farm, and making hay on the 
verges and in semi-abandoned meadows that the collective farms did not use. 
Although the land used for haymaking belonged to the collective farm, people 
could use these for a longer period and thereby retained a feeling of ownership. 
These landscapes were subsistence-minded, past-oriented, private, hand-worked, 
and personal. They contained the remnants of a past lifestyle, they took place 
covertly, and they kept up traditions. Possibly, for many Estonians, maintaining 
the old traditions had, apart from necessity, the symbolic meaning of opposing 
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the ideology of the prevailing socialist order. In the late Soviet period when food 
security was less of a problem, private cow ownership became a matter of lifestyle 
rather than necessity, especially among the elderly people. Quite often, the hay 
fields used coincided with the family’s pre-war property, creating an additional 
sense of continuity (Palang & Sooväli-Sepping 2012). 
At the beginning of the kolkhoz period having more than one private cow 
per family was officially not allowed, or at least not encouraged. Later, when 
industrial agriculture proved unable to feed the population, this activity was seen 
as an auxiliary branch of production and became semi-legal – it was not forbid-
den, but it was given a low priority. Private farming (milk production and other 
forms of private farming, i.e. garden plots) was intertwined with Soviet political 
and moral ideology. Thus, local practices of continuity were not only preserved, 
but also shaped the imposed policies of collective farming. Even if these private 
farming practices were initially preserved as a method of opposition, they were 
gradually integrated into the system and probably lost their counter-cultural 
meaning for those taking them over in later periods (i.e. the 1970s and 1980s). 
Even though the political context, functions and processes (Widgren 2004) had 
largely changed, some of them very abruptly, new forms of landscape came along 
very slowly, carrying in themselves many traces of the earlier political systems 
which rather than disappearing moulded the system that followed them. 
Despite the continuity indicated by land use statistics at a macro level, conti-
nuities with previous practices are rarely highlighted at an individual narrative 
level. In family stories, the events of the 1940s are often depicted as traumatic, 
a period of rupture or a sort of decisive temporal boundary. One example is the 
story of the Küpress7 family (first published in Palang & Paal 2002). 
The family had fled to Kazakhstan to escape mobilisation for World War I, 
then returned to Estonia in 1921 and had built up their farm by the time World 
War II started. Linda and Andres had three sons and a daughter. The daughter 
Lea’s family also lived in their house with their three lively children. In the 
turmoil of the war, the fates of the family members were scattered: one of 
the sons went to fight with the Finnish army against the Russians, while the 
other two fled to Sweden in 1944. The family lost all their land and shops, and 
most of their property was nationalised. In 1948, during the harsh post-war 
years, when threats of political repression were accompanied by economic 
scarcity, Andres shot himself. His death was followed by the deportations of 
his son Lennart (who had returned from the Finnish army) and son-in-law 
Henrik in 1950. In a place that had once been so crowded and full of life, only 
Linda, then 66 years old, remained with her daughter Lea with her three small 
348
Raili Nugin, Tiiu Jaago, Anu Kannike, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang, Anu Printsmann, …
children (who later moved to a township called Kadrina). Finally, in 1951, 
Linda joined the collective farm, which cultivated the surrounding land until 
the end of 1950s. However, as the place was remote and not too fertile, the 
fields were gradually turned into grasslands and in the early 1960s other peo-
ple’s calves destroyed Linda’s small garden. In 1964, Linda finally gave in, took 
her goat and moved to Lea’s place in Kadrina. The house stood empty until 
1973, when Linda’s son dismantled it and transported it to Rakvere. 
This story represents a narrative of rupture – in this tale, even the house, which 
could have represented some sort of continuity, was removed and the family was 
scattered in different countries. However, as shown by this story, this rupture did 
not appear in the same abrupt way that it is depicted in hegemonic discourse. 
While the development of a happy family story was cut through by political 
developments, in actual lives, the boundaries were not drawn overnight but were 
a process; neither does the perceived division coincide with documented land use 
dynamics. Thus, in private lives the boundaries of rupture are not as clear, and 
are definitely not simultaneous with the boundaries depicted in the hegemonic 
discourse. 
When the socio-political system changes, the “right historical context” might 
get lost, in which case people might no longer be able to understand how the 
previous landscape worked (Lowenthal 1988). On one hand, the ‘objective num-
bers’ suggest that the physical pattern of lands use for the whole country did not 
change much in the 1940s. On the other hand, the memories, representations 
and life stories speak of a drastic change. It appears that the explosion occurs 
first in social/cultural/political/economic processes, only then does the physical/
material layer react, dragging along a number of remnants from the older system 
that should not really be there. 
“Fate” and the “white ship”: the portrayal of the 1940s in hindsight8
As mentioned, the context of regaining independence in the 1990s brought the 
description of the events in the 1940s to the forefront of the narratives. Stories like 
that of the Küpress family, which concentrate on collectivisation and repression 
and the overall changes in society, were recurrent among the life stories written 
and told in the 1990s. The time when these stories were told – the collapse of the 
Soviet system and the quest to re-establish the pre-Soviet environment – directs 
the storytellers to treat the 1940s as a rupture in the natural developmental path 
of Estonian society. 
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At the same time, the other possible ruptures within the frame of the Soviet 
period are presented in an inconsistent way. For example, the boundary between 
war and peace is not clearly marked in life stories, as can be seen in the Finnish or 
Estonian Russian-language stories (Jaago 2007). The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact 
and the establishment of Red Army bases in Estonian villages in 1939 introduce 
the topic of World War II to the life stories, differing obviously considerably from 
how the war starts on the global arena. Similarly, the events that demarcate the 
end of the war are percieved differently by Estonians and the rest of the world. 
For example, a man, born in 1925, explains it in the following way:
The war ended. The world breathed a sigh of relief. People were hoping that 
now they could continue working and building their homes from where they 
had left off in 1940. Unfortunately, the winter of 1944–1945 brought something 
else. (EKLA f 350, 1728 [2005])
The breaks and boundaries that are taken up in the stories are not only drawn 
on the scale of global, local, physical and symbolic, but are also reflected in figu-
rative speech. In a cumulative reading, repetitive phrases like “fate” and “white 
ship” acquire additional meaning that captures the perceived symbolic ruptures 
and continuities.
The meaning of the concept ‘fate’ in Estonian life stories has been studied by 
the Finnish researcher Leena Huima, who has noted that Estonians, unlike Finns, 
tend to describe their stories through the prism of ‘fate’ rather than their own 
choices. “One of the most important stereotypes seems to be that the Estonian 
nation has a fate, i.e. a life path determined by some foreign, external force, that 
can be contested to some degree with bravery” (Huima 2002, 73). Judging from 
the language used in the life stories, she concludes that people use the word ‘fate’ 
when things don’t go the way they “should have”. According to Huima, such a dif-
ference between Estonian and Finnish life stories stems from the experience of 
occupation with the term ‘fate’ used to structure the collective memory of the 
past (op cit, 93). One could suggest that fate in life stories refers to the phenom-
enon where people have surrendered to an outside force called fate and see no 
role for themselves in what has happened. 
However, in the life stories from the 1990s, the concept of fate is rather used 
to tie historical and personal life events. Consider the history of the Tamm family, 
as recounted by a woman born in 1947:
Coming from a big family, my grandfather could not go to school much, but 
he was very eager to learn. He was employed at the Port Works, where he 
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started from the simplest work and ended up being a director. He had good 
technical insight and the qualities of a leader. Unfortunately that decided 
his fate, as the Port Work factories became military objects during the Ger-
man time. In 1944, the factory was evacuated to Germany and grandpa went 
too … He didn’t have an option to stay in Estonia anyway, people with far 
more modest positions were deported to Siberia. (EKLA f 350, 1343 [2001])
The grandfather’s background (from a big family) and his personal qualities tie 
him with his job at the Port Works. The Port Works is placed in a certain political 
and military situation: the factory had a specific position in respect of military 
action from the Nazi (evacuation), as well as from the Soviet (potential imprison-
ment), side. The narrator tells us that her grandfather started a new family abroad, 
emigrating further to the US. Thus, the story juxtaposes geographical–political 
(US versus Soviet Estonian) and family borders (families both in Estonia and the 
USA). However, more important than the divisions and borders is the function 
of the word fate: with this concept, singular events (ruptures in time) are tied 
into a coherent story in the individual’s life.
Fate, thus, is not a single intervention; it is rather something that ties events 
and situations together. This is further suggested by the tendency that the more 
specific the story (describing the events and situations very thoroughly), the 
less fate as a figure is used in the story. Fate is also not always used in a negative 
sense (when not everything turned out as expected). Often people conclude 
their life stories by thanking fate.9 Fate as a word has neither negative nor posi-
tive connotations in Estonian; the meaning depends on how it is used in a spe-
cific context and attached to certain phrases. Therefore, fate in the Estonian life 
stories written and told in the 1990s is not tied to specific time periods such as 
occupation. Rather, it is a linguistic–cultural concept that enables a person to tie 
single elements together into a big picture and pull together pieces left behind 
after an explosion.
Another, more specific, concept to describe the post-war years and the Soviet 
period is “waiting for the white ship”. The white ship is a culture-specific meta-
phor (cf Hinrikus 2008, Tammela 2009) linked to the 1860s emigration from 
Estonia to Russia with the hope of receiving land for cultivation. Members of 
a religious sect had gathered at the seashore in a place in today’s Tallinn and were 
waiting for a white ship that was supposed to come and take them to a better 
land. The symbol has been used in several literary works and through them has 
passed into common use. 
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In post-war rumour, the white ship metaphor symbolised the expectation 
of local people that Western countries would soon forcefully intervene and put 
an end to the Soviet occupation.10 
In hindsight, when looking back to the 1940s from the end of the century, the 
metaphor is used in everyday as well as academic language: “The long-awaited 
White Ship did not arrive and it was evident that the Soviet rule would remain 
stable for a long time” (Tannberg 2009, 5). In the life stories narrated in the 1990s, 
the motif of waiting for the white ship serves as a definition of a time period. 
After World War II people were hoping for political changes in the course of 
which Estonia could regain independence:
We were all convinced [after the war] that this ‘new period’ was a temporary 
one; that the ‘White Ship’ could be seen already, there were conversations 
and discussions, anxiety and fear, that it all was just a matter of time (EKLA 
f 350, 1333 [2001], woman, born in 1929).
When narrations state that “people no longer waited for the ‘white ship’”, 
it denotes a time when wartime attitudes and everyday behavioural strategies 
had changed – people had understood that one had to adapt to the Soviet system 
and wait to regain freedom at some point in an indeterminate future.11 
The third way of presenting waiting for the white ship as a temporal adverb 
appears in the context of waiting for the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the 
end of the 1980s: 
In 1988 it was felt that something was about to change in the political land-
scape of Estonia. People started to believe that the White Ship really was 
approaching the Estonian coast (EKLA f 350, 1365 [2001], woman, born 
in 1955). 
Fate and the white ship do not seem to be directly connected to one of the most 
central traits of border narrative: the otherness or the separation of one’s own 
cultural space from that of the other. Instead, these metaphors draw boundaries 
in time and represent the retroactive transformation processes of the moment of 
explosion, symbolically drawing lines of separation and continuity on the past 
by attributing value to the previous period. On the one hand, metaphors describe 
a socio-politically, territorially and behaviourally limited time–space. On the 
other hand, these phrases bind the presented period with other similar periods, 
thus forming a continuity of cultural space.
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The continuities and discontinuities of the 1990s
Rural space: negotiating the shifted boundaries in everyday practices
As pointed out in the theoretical section, after sudden change (explosions, 
as defined by Lotman) different spheres of society recover (or develop) at differ-
ent rates. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant abrupt change which, among 
other things, brought about economic downfall in Estonia, with its GDP drop-
ping 22% and consumer price inflation reaching 1069% (Saar & Unt 2008, 327). 
Yet, there were spheres of the economy that recovered from this sharp decline 
relatively quickly and some of the new economic branches developed quite rap-
idly (i.e. those that were almost non-existent before, such as banking, marketing, 
etc.). While there were areas that took off immediately, there were others that 
developed more gradually, and yet others that lagged behind or continued their 
downfall. This uneven progress also meant that the physical space and its percep-
tion changed at different rates. While urban space (especially the centre of the 
capital city Tallinn, see Gentile & Sjöberg 2006) quickly changed its appearance 
with new modern buildings emerging, the development of rural space had quite 
a different character. Restructuring the rural economy and dissolving the collec-
tive farms brought with it an out-migration from the countryside and abandoned 
buildings in many places (often connected with the cessation of agricultural 
production in former collective farms). This, for its part, changed the meanings 
of rural areas and their perceptions and representations. Some of the former 
kolkhoz facilities changed their functions (Widgren 2004), others were left aban-
doned; the blossoming of modern building witnessed in cities didn’t emerge 
in countryside until after joining the EU. 
The way the rural is represented in the hegemonic political arena usually 
frames the process of (re)structuring the rural economy (Halfacree 2006, 51). 
In many societies, rurality is constructed in connection with national identity 
(Juska 2007, 239), depicting it as rooted in traditional ways of living and a kind 
of “haven of primitive innocence” (Krange & Skogen 2005, 215; Matthews & 
Tucker 2007, 95). This romantic construction can, and actually has, affected the 
development of many post-communist rural areas under reconstruction in the 
1990s. As land ownership has been at the centre of Estonian national conscious-
ness since the National Awakening in the second half of the 19th century, it is no 
wonder that the mosaic landscape of private farmsteads functioned as a symbol 
of independence. 
In Estonia, the ideological ideal for rearranging the rural economy in the 
1990s was the interwar republic period. Grounded largely on the ideological 
353
A plurality of pasts and boundaries: evidence from Estonia’s last hundred years
principles of this mnemonic discourse, the large collective farms (kolkhozes) 
were dissolved and small-scale single farm production was promoted again 
during the reconstruction of the rural economy.12 At the grass-roots level this 
dissolution in reality meant massive decline in agricultural production and 
unemployment causing economic difficulties that lasted throughout the 1990s. 
Because this structural development did not turn out to be effective or competi-
tive in the market economy, agriculture was gradually reconstructed, refocusing 
mainly on gross production (for example, in 2011, 20% of the farms produced 
85% of the milk; Ministry of Agriculture 2012, 8). This development, driven by 
the ideological discourse of rupture, is a good example of how discontinuity 
and continuity are in fact different sides of the same coin: in order to establish 
continuity, discontinuity appears.
A characteristic example of such paradoxical attempts to produce continuity 
at the everyday practice level is seen in the story of Tiina Lepp (b. 1960), who 
lived in a town all her life until her husband got back a farm house that had 
belonged to his grandparents. Ownership reform13 returning private properties 
to the descendants of the pre-World War II owners, from whom the properties 
had been taken during the period of Stalinist collectivisation and repression, was 
one way to establish legal, economic and moral continuity with the 1920s and 
1930s in the 1990s.14 These political decisions had a real affect on many individu-
als’ everyday lives, causing new ruptures. Tiina tells (2010):
Yes, I am a total city girl and when we came here … then all the legal pro-
cedures were taken care of and we got the land back and then we decided 
… and we started to run a farm house. And a city girl as I was… When we 
bought our first cow, then I went to choose a cow like a fool… dressed up 
in a way that I normally did in our city apartment. I was strolling with my 
child… wearing a hat and high heels and then my husband and brother-in-
law came… they had heard that there was a cow somewhere to be sold, and 
they invited me to go with them and see… and then we brought this cow 
home and … and then I milked it, a mug in my hand, and I approached the 
cow before milking, saying: can we get this over with, friendly… I was so 
scared, but had to start milking… then we had four cows and then eight and 
then we got ourselves a milker. (000729_ERM_Fn_302)
This is a good example of how social change and romantic construction of the 
past created an urge for the persistence of some previous period which, in reality, 
for these people meant a sudden change. Tiina went on with her story:
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… luckily, this time has become the past. It lasted for ten years and I am 
convinced that we actually built here a prison for ourselves… we got our-
selves everything… we sold everything: our city apartment, garage, car… and 
bought agricultural equipment for this money… so it was a pretty crazy job 
that we all did.
In short, Tiina admits that the enthusiasm that was caused by the political atmos-
phere of restoration of justice (returning private property to owners) made her 
and her family’s lives into a prison. After ten years of small scale farming, Tiina 
and her husband decided to go “back to work” – that is, back to office jobs in the 
town. As she put it, they now try to keep the home for their family, not for the 
cattle. “That makes more sense,” she concluded. 
Putting together the everyday practices and the discourses that construct the 
future via a romanticised version of the past in restructuring policies, we can 
see that continuities and discontinuities are intermingled: by trying to establish 
continuity with the pre-war way of life and with one’s forefathers (for example 
through grandmother’s farmhouse) actually created a rupture. For Tiina and her 
family, the 1990s were no longer retrospectively the time in which they built up 
a ‘new’ republic from a rural haven, to them it now signifies an era of imprison-
ment that does not make sense. 
The treatment of the 1990s as a rupture is also common in other interviews 
in rural areas. The stable development of the rural economy did not begin until 
the 2000s, which was also the time when the Lepp family decided to quit their 
farming. Their example shows that the boundaries created by ruptures are lived 
and negotiated at the level of everyday lives and the meanings given to changes 
depend on the practices established during times of change. While in some dis-
cursive fields the 1990s is still seen as the start of the (re-)building of Estonia 
as an independent state, in private lives the meaning can retrospectively be re-
evaluated. Land reforms and privatisation created many kinds of development 
trajectory: some farms were privatized and succeeded in the agro business, some 
collective farms continued as cooperatives, some people got their land back and 
cultivated it, some people became large land owners by buying up the land 
from the rightful heirs (who had escaped back to the city from their returned 
land), some established rural tourism farms, and some private farms were sold 
to become housing development plots on city fringes15.
These policies did not only change everyday lives but also the rural space and 
its perception. In addition, the perceptions of boundaries might have changed 
in many rural areas, as the now abandoned collective farm centres changed the 
perceived relations between the hubs and the peripheries. In Lefebvre’s terms 
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(1991, 74), the imaginary, the symbolic and the practical have merged: imagining 
the continuity of interwar agricultural policies, people started to reorganise space 
and practices, giving them symbolic meaning. The boundaries of the private and 
collective farming were shifted, reconceptualised, and consequently the networks 
and identities changed (Newman 2003). However, these boundaries were experi-
enced and expressed in narratives in various ways, depending on the point in the 
everyday practices of the people: what was considered returning home in the 
1990s could have resulted in some cases in building a prison.
Domestic space: negotiating ‘going to’ and ‘returning to’ Europe
A number of studies on contemporary home-making practices (Cieraad 2006; 
Miller 2001; Johansson & Saarikangas 2009) emphasise that home is not just 
a physical space with clear-cut boundaries shaped by successive social upheavals, 
but rather a flexible setting in which mobility and change are negotiated. In Esto-
nia, all the periods of transition in the 20th century have been characterised 
by intensified attention and attempts to shape lifestyles and the domestic sphere 
according to new ideals. In the following, some aspects of interior home design 
after re-independence, will be explored.
As a result of the ownership reform launched in 1991, by the year 2000 94% of 
the housing stock in Estonia was in private ownership and more than 75% of Esto-
nian residents had become homeowners (Paadam 2003, 11). During the Soviet 
period, all building materials as well as furniture were in short supply. When they 
became available in a wide variety in the 1990s, a home-decoration boom broke 
out that was largely associated with wider processes of de-Sovietisation and West-
ernisation in both public and private discourse. Importantly, the new everyday 
life was supposed to be a means of simultaneously ‘going to’ and ‘returning to’ 
Europe. The home decoration campaigns and competitions initiated by opinion 
leaders, for example by president Meri in 1998 (reviving a similar campaign 
launched by president Päts in 1936), not only encouraged a new type of personal 
creativity, but also served as a ritual way of confirming cultural continuity with 
both Western and national ideals. The reprinting of housewives’ manuals from 
the 1930s and a nostalgic wave of reproducing ‘Estonian-period’ (i.e. the 1920s 
and 1930s) domestic interiors in Soviet-period houses that might have seemed 
anachronistic in the modern world were similarly used as cultural capital to help 
people cope with new challenges. 
In uniform Soviet period apartments in blocks of flats walls were often pulled 
down and new living standards were established both in the physical and meta-
phorical sense. In new homes open plan interiors also dominated, incorporating 
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ideas of openness, mobility and change. Often priority was given to the renova-
tion of bathrooms and toilets since hygiene requirements acquired symbolic 
significance as ritual cleansing for (an imagined) European way of life and as 
a way to differentiate one’s private space from the still largely Soviet-style, i.e. 
uncultured and dirty, public spaces. Thus purity in everyday space was perceived 
not only as an aesthetic, but also as a moral category through which cultural 
change was discussed and experienced (cf Runnel 2003). 
These socio-economic changes were accompanied by increasingly diverse 
mentalities, lifestyles and quality of everyday space. The restrained Nordic mod-
ernism promoted by arbiters of taste in the 1930s as well as in the period of 
relative political liberty in the 1960s, re-surfaced as aesthetic and national ideals 
in the public discourse of the 1990s. In the first home decoration journals of the 
mid-1990s generally the homes of the new elite were displayed with the key-
words such as stylish, expensive and international. Here everything was usually 
designed by professionals and the modern minimalist interior reflected the own-
ers’ wish to change their image quickly and totally. Family histories together with 
their ruptures were ‘forgotten’ as they were not ‘noble’ enough to be displayed; 
signs of the Soviet period were also eliminated as quickly as possible. So, for 
example a prominent interior designer describes the process of furnishing the 
new house of a bank manager:
In the living room a painting of greenish-bluish colours was the starting point 
before any furniture. Only the old black piano had the honour of being taken 
to the new home (Kadalipp 1996, 37). 
However, despite the dominant discourse of ‘modern’ and ‘European’ ways of life, 
home-making practices remained heterogeneous and elements of the new trends 
were usually merged with traditional habits and understandings of homeliness. 
Only a small segment of the population wished and/or could afford a totally 
minimalist and exclusive home without any reference to the past, while most 
domestic spaces displayed an eclectic mixture of different layers: ‘euro renova-
tion’, inherited antiquities, Soviet-period mass-produced or homemade furniture, 
and craft items. The following account of the home-making process in a private 
house in Tallinn is quite typical of the mindset of the 1990s:
Our home consists of objects that are close to the heart and connected with 
memories; things that are associated with our hobbies, pieces of furniture 
that have travelled with us from one place to another… The wicker furniture 
comes from the pre-marital period of the lady of the house. The old buffet 
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set was saved from the dump. The chest that serves as a table was bought at 
a craft fair… The renovation started gradually and in a way that the previous 
atmosphere of the house would be preserved. There will still be work to do 
for years (Kodukiri 1998, 10‒12). 
Style experts interpreted such ‘incompetence’ as a relic of the Soviet mentality 
and cultural disorientation caused by a sudden abundance of goods. Yet, a simi-
lar critique of tasteless homes relying on modernist principles had been articu-
lated in previous periods of socio-cultural rupture. The same visions of the ideal 
homogeneous (and timeless) design have thus been used by different ideolo-
gies (national-modernist, Soviet-modernist, Euro-modernist) to reinforce their 
legitimacy. On the other hand, since these principles were articulated by local 
intellectuals they provided a framework of cultural continuity as modernism 
was gradually nationalised. 
In private life Estonians met the everyday challenges of the post-socialist tran-
sition period by reviving traditional practices and experiences: shortages could 
be overcome by repairing, recycling, economising, and handicraft skills that had 
been kept alive from peasant culture through the deficit economy of the Soviet 
times. Gradually these skills and do-it-yourself practices started to merge into 
new trends of ecological lifestyles, anti-globalisation and novel interpretations of 
cultural heritage. While the 1990s are mainly referred to as a decade of rupture, 
it also witnessed the emergence of new home-making practices inspired by the 
search for ‘roots’: for example, moving to a farmhouse or a manor in the country-
side to live in a natural environment, not farming but working, either by retaining 
jobs in town and commuting, or by introducing urban forms of entrepreneur-
ship to the countryside. Towards the end of the nineties the revival of village or 
urban district societies started and thereby the boundaries of home gradually 
re-extended to the neighbourhood (Kannike 2009; 2013). With the explosion of 
consumption culture and new technology both real and virtual spaces became 
expandable and the boundaries between public and private spaces increasingly 
blurred. While people experience the permanent pressure of ever-changing and 
fragmentary time, renovating a historical building to become a home or spend-
ing time in a country house is often perceived as a way of keeping memory alive 
and maintaining cultural continuity at the personal level. 
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Contemporary negotiations  
concerning (dis)continuities and borders 
Transnational space: home and away16
Estonia was a country of immigration during the Soviet period: significant num-
bers of Russian and other ethnic groups from different parts of the Soviet Union 
settled in Estonia, especially during the large-scale industrialisation of the 1960s 
and 1970s. After re-establishing independence, Estonia became instead a country 
of emigration. In the 1990s emigration from Estonia was mainly return migration 
to the original homelands of the different Soviet nations, in addition to which, 
Western countries once again became accessible to Estonian migrants (Lager-
spetz 2007, 87). Emigration from Estonia to the older EU member states has 
increased significantly in the 2000s as compared to the 1990s, with the relative 
proportion of labour migration increasing substantially. Furthermore, it has been 
pointed out that Estonia is one of the major countries of origin for travelling 
workers in Europe – there are 15.8 cross-border commuters per thousand inhabit-
ants in Estonia (MKW Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH 2009). In 2013, 14% of Esto-
nian population aged over 15 had worked or were currently working abroad, the 
EU average being 9% in the same year (European Commission 2013). The most 
popular destination for Estonian migrants since 1991 has been the neighbouring 
country Finland. Finland is also the most popular destination among people 
wishing to work abroad and among those already working abroad (68% in 2013). 
The cross-border working and migration of Estonian residents has been strongly 
influenced by two events – EU accession in 2004 and the global economic crisis, 
which started in 200817. In the 1st quarter of 2010 the unemployment rate reached 
an all-time high (17.4%) in Estonia. (Tarum 2014, 3, 9)
Migration and commuting across borders could be regarded as one of the 
main reasons for perceived discontinuities in contemporary Estonia. It not only 
changes the lives of the people who relocate, but also affects the people who stay 
behind, and might also introduce a fear of discontinuity in the nation. Family 
life is often extensively modified in light of transnational practices (see Vertovec 
2009, 61). Interestingly, the mobility of the (transnational) ‘elites’ (for example 
scholars moving for financial or status reasons or in order to gain symbolic capi-
tal) is often regarded as something desirable, even as something indispensable, 
while at the same time migration is seen as something blameworthy (Bryceson 
& Vuorela 2002, 7–8). In the Estonian media, emigrants are often seen as traitors, 
or, as put by an ex-minister: “emigrants for convenience” who just look for higher 
incomes and a better life.
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When some family members relocate and families thus live spatially sepa-
rated some or most of the time, the importance of discourses in creating and 
maintaining a feeling of unity, “familyhood” across national borders is empha-
sised (see Bryceson & Vuorela 2002, 3; Huttunen 2010, 240). Family stories can 
create continuity through space (with relatives staying in other locations) and 
time (family history), and establish connections to certain people and places, 
allowing a location to be transformed into a place that is meaningful for them 
(Tuan 2011, 6). People are not only shaped by places in their lives, they also work 
on this relationship to make a place feel ‘their own’ or ‘home’, to narrate and also 
to justify the importance of certain place(s) in their lives (see Siim 2013). Studies 
on transnational and multi-local lives show that people can have meaningful rela-
tionships with several places at the same time (Rolshoven 2007; Huttunen 2010).
According to this line of research, stories are produced situationally, in a 
certain societal context. Negotiating family, relationships and their relation with 
places is an on-going process. Stories are thus not so much depictions of facts 
as they are construals of happenings (Ochs 1997, 193). People also have to take 
into consideration the discourses of surrounding societies as they negotiate the 
political landscape with publicly recognised and repeatedly validated versions of 
who they are and what it means to be them (Knowles 2003, 168). 
It is also important to remark that people do not only create and strengthen 
continuity and ties, but stories can also be used to break the bonds that seem 
meaningless. In a new situation in life, people might put more emphasis on the 
homely qualities of their current place of residence. This attitude also makes cop-
ing in the new environment easier, as one woman (b, 1974, interviewed in 2013) 
said: 
I think, that the place you live in is nevertheless always your home. At times 
I also feel my home is here [in Finland]… I think it is really sad that some of 
the Estonians live here, a hundred people together, not even wanting to create 
some kind of home here. They come here only to work, I couldn’t imagine 
living like that, ever.
For the relocated family members, the need to distance oneself from the for-
mer homeland can be a part of the emotional distancing necessary when build-
ing bonds with a new homeland. The landscape and everyday practices of the 
past can become foreign; one might have to break loose from one place, at least 
to some extent, to be able to build a relationship with another.
Descriptions of transnational family life given by people who have relocated 
are quite different when compared to those of the relatives who stay behind. 
360
Raili Nugin, Tiiu Jaago, Anu Kannike, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang, Anu Printsmann, …
Family members who stay in Estonia might have the strong feeling of being left 
alone, which also reflects the importance of the emotional and social side of 
people’s place-related experiences: in the absence of the right people, things and 
places are quickly drained of meaning (Tuan 2011, 140). In addition the feeling 
of lost connections and of silenced or untold stories can create or reinforce the 
idea of discontinuity. As an interview with Heli Mänd, an older woman (b. 1933, 
interviewed in 2004) shows, the loneliness followed by the relocation of her 
only son and his family is reinforced by the idea that no-one is interested in her 
stories. Heli says:
No one has asked anything. I have even made a comment several times. 
It happened to me also, when I was young and my mother was still alive… 
I could have asked her so many things but I didn’t. But now there are so many 
things, my mother died long ago, all the things I could ask, but there is no one 
to ask. I told them that you also waste all this time, my ‘tree of life’, all my 
kin have gone like that, no one knows anyone anymore. Everyone remains 
strange. And my, about my youth, nobody knows anything, they are not inter-
ested at all, they don’t ask. This is very painful for me, of course… But now 
people have started to change, and they ask, show interest. Well, as a matter 
of fact, during the Soviet time absolutely no one was interested in anything. 
Every one was just busy with, working around, wherever they could find 
work or something and, had their own lives and that’s all. But now you start 
to think… Who was the father, who was the great great grandfather, like that, 
following the generations. Now people start to be interested. And then begin 
to fight for their rights for the premises. Earlier there was no need for that. 
Heli thus traces the tradition of untold stories to the Soviet period, when people, 
according to her interpretation, were not keen to listen to family stories. Also she 
regrets not asking her mother to tell her about the family history. On the other 
hand, Heli currently feels that silenced stories strengthen the perceived bound-
ary (Newman 2003) between her and her family members in Finland: on top of 
being far away, no one is interested in hearing her narratives. Heli is also worried 
about the family graves in Estonia. Who will take care of them, when she dies? 
Some aspects of family life – for example care-giving – call for the immediate 
presence of family members and thus bind people to places in a very concrete 
fashion (see Zechner 2008).
On the other hand, as the following citation from Juhan (b. 1974, interviewed 
in 2014) shows, from the perspective of a relocated family member the distance 
between Estonia and Finland does not seem so overwhelming. 
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Well, what can I say. My mother-in-law surely didn’t like [the fact that we 
moved]… She thought about her grandchildren going so far away; she doesn’t 
travel by ferry and, I don’t know, has problems with her health… But after all, 
we haven’t disappeared anywhere; we are not that far away really… I would 
understand had we moved somewhere like Australia. But here it’s not a huge 
endeavour [to travel], I just have to go to the harbour, buy a ticket and take 
the ferry across and I’m in Estonia, right.
When family members who remain in Estonia discuss questions of belonging 
and (dis)continuities experienced, the emphasis is often on different aspects 
as compared to their relocated family members. However, being grounded does 
not necessarily mean being fixed; and being mobile is not necessarily about being 
detached. The work of negotiating borders and belonging is an on-going process 
and all the family members have their own stories to tell. Movement does not 
always take place “away from home”, and staying behind also includes movement 
(see Ahmed et al 2003, 1, 10). It should also be kept in mind that crossing borders 
in the physical world might be secondary as compared to other perceived and 
imagined boundaries (Newman 2003).
Home but away: boundaries embodied in the Estonian northeast
As mentioned in the theoretical introduction, the semiosphere is heterogene-
ous and semiotic activity greater towards peripheries and boundaries. In the 
Estonian case, the cultural periphery coincides with the region near the Russian 
border in the northeast, where the otherness and boundaries between present 
and the past, us and them, are politically much contested. Currently, this is the 
area with the highest percentage of Russian-speakers in Estonia, the country’s 
main industrial region, hegemonically often treated as an embodiment of the 
Soviet period, yet historically also Estonia’s industrial and natural pride and 
a pillar of today’s economy – all of which makes shifts between what we have 
called socio-economic formations, after Cosgrove (1984), even more dynamic 
and contested. Analysing the development of Kohtla-Järve’s urban landscapes 
according to Widgren’s (2004) differentiation between the forms, functions, pro-
cesses and contexts, we can see how different aspects react with different speed 
and intensity to overall socio-economic and discursive change.
One of the reasons Kohtla-Järve has been witness to sudden turns in its 
symbolic appreciation from outside is, apart from its geographical location, the 
fact that its forms and functions are shaped principally by its natural resources: 
the region has been home to oil shale mining since 1916. As more than 90% of 
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Estonian electricity comes from oil shale, its symbolic position for non-residents 
depends on the position of this industry in their discursive and political fields. 
Depending on the socio-cultural context, oil shale mining, electricity production 
and chemical works have been praised as progressive or damned for its impact 
on the natural and social environments. 
Although landscape is in a constant state of becoming, the forms and func-
tions in Kohtla-Järve have remained motivated by mining activities. The pro-
cesses behind them have differed, depending on the socio-economic formations 
that produced their socio-cultural context. Even the administrative borders are 
highly contested, being redrawn according to ideological settings rather than 
for practical reasons. At present, Kohtla-Järve consists of six administrative 
units in seven separate areas that are scattered up to 30 km apart. Between them 
lies the town of Jõhvi, the historical regional administrative capital of Ida-Viru 
county, which was subordinated to Kohtla-Järve rayon during the Soviet period 
(for details and a map, see Printsmann 2010; 2015). With the changes that have 
occurred since the Soviet period, each of the parts of these towns has been re-
evaluated and new mental boundaries drawn, even if the forms of the landscape 
have remained by and large the same.
This can be clearly seen in a comparative analysis of two iconic residential 
districts, Kohtla-Nõmme and Järve. 
In 1931, the UK company New Consolidated Gold fields Ltd founded a gar-
den town, a completely new type of settlement in Estonia, for workers at what is 
today Kohtla-Nõmme. The Soviet period officially favoured communal housing 
and Kohtla-Nõmme’s status changed when it was included in the rapidly grow-
ing new urban conglomerate of Kohtla-Järve. For ethnic Estonians, the garden 
town represented an ideal home as it consisted of individual households with 
gardens – an urban equivalent of the single household farmstead that symbolised 
Estonianness and the pre-war republic. In 1990, Kohtla-Nõmme settlement was 
separated from Kohtla-Järve and became one of Estonia’s smallest municipalities 
(around 1,000 inhabitants in 4.65 km2). Even today, the municipality asserts its 
principal difference from the rest of the industrial mining area, claiming to be 
a green oasis. 
Kohtla-Järve as a mining town was established in 1946, shortly after World 
War II, and industrial urban space was seen as embodying the symbolic values 
of the new political regime. According to life stories told by ethnic Estonians, 
Kohtla-Järve was initially “quite a neat little Estonian town” (as opposed to the 
notion of ‘the Soviet town’). Soon, the land in Järve village, previously inhabited 
mainly by locally born residents, was nationalised and filled with classical Sta-
linist houses. It had a clear and modernist town layout with parks and streets 
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running radially from small squares (on the development principles of Soviet 
cities, see Gentile & Sjöberg 2006). Squares were foreseen as accommodating 
communist parades, not spontaneous gatherings. Streets were hemmed with 
non-native species of poplars that grew quickly; assemblages of blue spruce 
show now where obligatory statues of Lenin once stood. Today, although Järve 
urban district still forms the central part of Kohtla-Järve, it has lost much of this 
momentum. According to architectural heritage specialists, the authentic Soviet 
milieu was ruined by so-called cowboy-capitalism of the 1990s when ground 
floor apartments were made into shops with separate entrances and new own-
ers only painted their own parts of the building. In a way, a development in an 
urban space can never stop but the holistic feel (see Rose et al 2010) is replaced 
with eclectic engineering.
For the Estonian inhabitants of the town, however, the Soviet urban devel-
opment contains several internal temporal boundaries. Many life stories reflect 
how there was a specific turning point at the end of the 1970s and beginning of 
the 1980s, well after the first Stalinist Kohtla-Järve was born, when the atmos-
phere was ruined by the growth of oil shale production and an influx of Russian-
speaking immigrants who were accommodated in pre-fabricated mass-housing 
projects (see Gentile & Sjöberg 2010). The symbolic meaning of industrial urban 
space was high in Soviet discourse, as it served to symbolise the progress of the 
communist state. For example, a retired person from Kohtla-Järve wrote the 
following:
There is no old Kohtla-Järve anymore. Most of it was destroyed by the nitro-
gen fertiliser factory (the houses fell into a sanitary buffer zone); some of it 
was destroyed by expansion of the oil shale plant, and part was just aban-
doned when a chance appeared to get an apartment in Sotslinn [‘Socialist 
Town’] with central heating, running water and a bathroom (MK: L3 2003).18
During periods when there was a shortage of goods, these modern block-house 
neighbourhoods, or micro-rayons (‘micro districts’), where highly credited in the 
official system and considered to be self-contained; whereas now public opinion 
of these “dormitory districts” is lower. Ideological boundaries drawn between 
different ethnic groups and time periods have been applied to landscape forms 
(sensu Widgren 2004) in hindsight, even if the processes in the history of the 
landscape were much more varied. For example people made shopping trips 
to Kohtla-Järve because the shops were better stocked with every kind of product, 
although today domestic tourists see no point in stopping there. Needless to say, 
the non-Estonian immigrants saw these Soviet urban industrial landscapes as 
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very familiar and in many cases probably lacked the capacity to read these (time) 
boundaries at all (see Jaago et al 2008; Printsmann 2010).
Re-independence is another boundary encountered in Kohtla-Järve-Estoni-
ans’ life stories, although according to them the downward spiral started after the 
establishment of the town. After re-independence the ‘good life’ of Kohtla-Järve 
ended. Oil shale production volumes were cut by half as export to Russia was 
obstructed for political reasons and the opening of Sosnovy Bor nuclear power 
plant in Leningrad/St. Petersburg. The oil shale industry lost the privileges it had 
enjoyed before leaving Kohtla-Järve to suffer from all the effects of former min-
ing and industrial towns, called rust-belt zones, i.e. economic, social, ecological 
and cultural problems. The population shrank by half compared with the 1980s, 
many buildings are now empty and the town’s non-Estonian-speaking population 
has found itself on the margins of society. All the normal adaptive and renewal 
processes of an urban landscape have come almost to a halt in Kohtla-Järve and 
it is now a shrinking town in a slow demise. No new houses have been built in the 
last quarter of a century and the town has received funding only to demolish 
some of the pre-fabricated houses that stood empty, attracting drunkards and 
drug addicts. Yet, since the area produces electricity for all of Estonia, it has not 
become a total ghost town. Recently there have been signs of new awakenings 
as four new shopping centres have been erected. The Estonian government in its 
turn has made efforts, due to EU-regulations, to ‘rehabilitate’ the ‘Soviet’ min-
ing landscape by recultivating the ash hills formed of mining waste products. 
For local residents who do not see their landscapes as the ‘other’, this can be quite 
a problematic, alienating experience, since for them recultivation destroys the 
hills’ identity and heritage value.
The hundred-year-old mining and urban landscape of Kohtla-Järve repre-
sents all the ups and downs of Estonian socio-economic formations over the 
past century. The prioritised development of natural resources during the Soviet 
period earmarked this mined-out landscape and also its community to be per-
ceived today as an embodiment of that detested time in Estonian public discourse 
(Printsmann 2010). The golden times of Estonia’s pre-war oil shale industry, and 
the earlier tsarist times, are conveniently forgotten in the othering process. The 
re-evaluation of Kohtla-Nõmme exemplifies how people see previous ideals when 
the historical symbolic order loses its appeal. It is often the last-but-one forma-
tion that is idealised, while the previous is frowned upon, as the perception of 
Järve urban district shows. These ‘Soviet landscapes’ do not fit hegemonic ideas of 
Estonian rural culture according to the symbolic structure of the outsiders, and 
thus they are today often neglected and left to develop at their own speed in their 
own space. On the other hand, from the insider’s perspective, Kohtla-Järve has 
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always been a home to many people with very differentiated evaluations showing 
that inhabitants draw boundaries in space and time according to the continuities 
of their own lives. 
Conclusion
Boundaries are created in space and time. People share, negotiate, contest and 
make sense of these boundaries in their everyday practices. The case of Eston 
Kohver is a vivid example of how the borders that have been changed in time 
can cause conflict in particular physical space, yet are negotiated and represented 
differently by different parties. 
The focus of this article has been on how temporal boundaries are expe-
rienced and how everyday lives are shaped in a particular space, shifting the 
boundaries and perceptions of centres and peripheries, continuities and dis-
continuities. Abrupt political changes are sensed and experienced as boundaries 
in time, yet the mechanisms of coping and adapting seem to come as part of 
preserving day-to-day continuities. Such practices are often symbolic and have 
a rather small socio-economic weight from the hegemonic point of view: they 
are tiny conceptual islands of the past that people preserve to foster continuity 
and to contest change. Such examples were the single-cow farming practices 
that continued throughout the Soviet period in Estonian agriculture. In several 
cases, these practices became integral parts of the new system so that what once 
served the purpose of creating continuity and symbolising resistance, lost its 
initial meaning and became part of the existing stability. 
However, at times the ruptures that the political changes brought were 
so overwhelming that people trying to negotiate continuities had to give up and 
the political rupture became a sharp break with the past with little or no chance 
to create continuities in the long run. Such an example is the Küpress family, 
whose members were scattered across the boundaries of East and West and 
whose attempts to create continuity were futile: in fact, even the physical house 
was removed from one location to another. Yet, even if the ruptures in lives are 
sharp and conclusive, people try to create coherent narratives and use linguistic 
means as cultural tools to negotiate the ruptures. The metaphors, such as fate or 
the white ship, are used to cope with storylines that are not linear and have been 
traumatic, as shown by the example of the Tamm family.
In some cases, though, the rupture emerges when trying to create continuity. 
People use conceptions of continuity as cultural tools, creating thus a perceived 
space that symbolises continuity for them, causing actual rupture in their lives 
and/or in space. This is illustrated by the case of the Lepp family, who moved 
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from the town to the countryside to establish continuity with their forefathers 
and create a single-farm agricultural unit as part of building an ideal from 
the interwar period. In a similar vein, the home-making practices of the 1990s 
reflected the aim of re-discovering local and personal roots as well as a ‘return 
to Europe’, although in reality these practices reveal increasing diversity as people 
negotiated ideas of rupture with the Soviet everyday in their own way. Estonia’s 
political choice to be part of Europe (returning to Europe) and creating continu-
ity across its borders with the European labour market, created bitter separation 
and new living and care arrangements for many families in Estonia. As is the 
case with many historical explosions in Estonian history, this too has left families 
and local communities divided. 
Thus, people make sense of space by creating boundaries (and sharing them 
to various extents) that are tightly tied with boundaries of time. According 
to Lefebvre, spaces are as much physical as they are ideational and social. Our 
examples have shown that even when political borders in space stay the same 
their meanings can shift when the overall political atmosphere and international 
relations (Widgren’s context) transform, an example of which could be the phe-
nomenon of transnational commuting and migration. While during the Soviet 
period Western countries were behind the Iron Curtain, now people work in Fin-
land and often migrate or commute across borders. The perceptions of these 
borders have changed, but as moving across them is easy, the modes of belonging 
are also changing. In addition, those who stay might feel more disconnected from 
the place than those who have moved away or who commute. 
In urban and rural landscapes, the form of the landscape (fields, buildings, 
etc.) might change at a very different speed to its functions, the processes that 
maintain it and the political context in which it resides. Looking back at the 
1940s we can see that a change in the political system did not cause an immedi-
ate change in land use, even if we know that in family stories – like that of the 
Küpress family – it represents a major perceived boundary, and that the politi-
cal context and processes through which these landscapes were sustained, had 
already changed. The same holds true for Kohtla-Järve’s once celebrated urban 
development, which fell out of love with the new cultural context. Even if the 
urban forms remained the same for some time, their negative appreciation and 
the disappearance of processes and functions that sustained them (that is, people 
who lived there) have resulted in their degradation. Different layers of landscape 
develop at different speeds and may display different boundaries, or no division 
at all.
Rupture as a metaphor is commonly used when the political and social situ-
ation surrounding the storyteller is tense, for instance during the rebuilding of 
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re-independent Estonia. However, rupture and continuity tend to be different 
sides of the same coin: the same story may be told using either the notion of rup-
ture or continuity, as politics is not usually in the forefront in personal narratives. 
In Juri Lotman’s terms, this is a retrospective transformation that tries to review 
the moment of explosion from the point of view of a new established order and 
interpret the events so that they make sense. Politics can change landscape and 
environment, everyday lives and relations between people, but stories always 
focus on an individual and his or her activities against the background of these 
powerful events. The change of regimes can alter situations in a wide-ranging 
way, although this does not necessarily affect people and their dispositions and 
traditions. In other words, a change of regime does not necessarily create sharp 
boundaries, but rather creates an environment for change in which a crucial 
role is also played by continuities based on memory, disposition and practice. In 
addition, landscapes exhibit a time lag in their response to change at the politi-
cal level. Even if the political context, macro-economic land use processes and 
function have been forcefully changed, landforms remain the same, changing 
only comparatively slowly, acting as a mechanism of cohesion. Nevertheless, this 
continuity may not be perceived as such by the community, as is the case with 
the post-war landscapes.
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Notes
This research was supported by the European Union through the European Regional 
Development Fund (Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory, CECT, Estonia and ASTRA 
project 2014-2020.4.01.16-0049, Estonian National Museum), and by research grants 
IUT2–44, IUT3–2, IUT2–43,  PUT PSG48, ETF9130, ETF8190, ETF9419, AU/10713, 
ETF9271, PRG314, and Wenner-Gren Stiftelserna.
1  Kohver was prosecuted and convicted in a Russian court. On 26 September 2015, 
he was given amnesty by the Russian president and consequently exchanged for a former 
Security Police officer convicted in Estonia of transferring secret data to Russia.
2  Landscape is a term used very differently even within geography. Landscape stud-
ies here refers to the tradition of Scandinavian, Germanic, and some Anglo-American 
authors whose works speak of landscape as a simultaneously physical and social phenom-
enon, as also specified in the European Landscape Convention.
3  It is not always clear, though, which of the two is more desirable, the urge to be 
European alternatives with a strong emphasis of the profound non-Europeanness of the 
Estonian nation (being Finno-Ugric and not Indo-European).
4  Parts of Russian speaking minority might consider it the due course of history 
wherein the present state of independence is an unnecessary interruption (see for example 
Paklar 2009).
5  It is also good to remember that private life stories did not form a part of official 
history during the Soviet period. Only after re-independence were private citizens entitled 
to their own histories (see also Lotman 1984).
6  Due to turbulent times and possibly differing data collection methods there might 
be differences in interpretation of land use categories. In addition, data was available 
at county level, which might cause further problems because the number of counties had 
risen from 11 in 1939 to 39 in 1955.
7  All family and first names in this article are pseudonyms. Where the researcher 
who carried out the field work received informed consent to use real names, these might 
be used in other articles.
8  This section is based on the collection of Estonian Life Histories, housed in the 
Cultural History Archives of the Estonian Literary Museum (EKLA f 350). The collection 
was started in 1989 and continues to grow, mainly through annual collection campaigns. 
Today there are roughly 3,000 life histories in this collection.
9  For example in EKLA f 350, 741 where the narrator states that she has been lucky 
and that fate has been kind to her.
10  Soviet propaganda was conscious of the metaphor: for example, in 1970 the KGB 
commissioned a movie from director Kalju Komissarov depicting a young couple who are 
fooled into escaping to Sweden, hoping to have a better life. The movie was called White 
Ship and in this instance it also alludes to the naivety of the people who wait for the arrival 
of something better, while they already have everything at home.
11  For examples, stories like EKLA f 350, 540 (1997, man, born in 1926) or 1120 (2001, 
woman, born in 1934).
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12  There are some exceptions. Some collective farms, such as Aravete or 9th of May, 
did not dissolve into private farmsteads and were reorganised into modern cooperatives. 
Today these modernised farms are some of the biggest and most successful agro businesses 
in Estonia. Here continuity is constructed simultaneously with the agricultural coopera-
tives of the interwar period, as well as with the collective farms.
13  It is interesting to note that the decision “to restore ownership continuity” was 
taken on 19 December 1990, by the Supreme Council of the Estonian Republic – that is 
to say, about nine months before re-independence was officially declared and sovereignty 
recognised by other states. Later hegemonic narrations of history prefer to draw a much 
harder separation line, using re-independence day, 21 August 1991, and thus underplay-
ing all earlier moves.
14  Obviously, taking property away from people who lived there during the Soviet 
period and who knew how to tend the land was traumatic for them.
15  Development of new suburban areas in Estonia frequently follows the cadastral 
borders of pre-World War II farms (see Palang & Peil 2010).
16  This section is based on fieldwork material collected among transnational families 
in Finnish, Estonian and northwest Russian contexts during the 2001–2004 period, and 
in the Estonian–Finnish context in 2013–2014. The material consists of field diaries and 
66 interviews.
17  Estonia joined the EU in 2004, however not all countries opened their borders 
to the new work force immediately. The UK, Ireland and Sweden were the first countries 
to open up to Estonian workers; Finland accepted Estonians unconditionally from 2006. 
Since 2011 no EU country has had the right to place any restrictions on workers from 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 (the so-called EU-8).
18  The collection of life stories at the Chair of Estonian and Comparative Folklore, 
University of Tartu, are referred to hereafter as MK, followed by the ID of the text and 
year it was written. 
374
Raili Nugin, Tiiu Jaago, Anu Kannike, Kalevi Kull, Hannes Palang, Anu Printsmann, …
Multiperspectival approaches to boundaries
Tuulikki Kurki
Borders are not only territorially bounded entities but increasingly immaterial, 
invisible, and ubiquitous (Brunet-Jailly 2011; Balibar 1998). As the notions of bor-
ders has changed, demand for new ways of conceptualising and understanding 
borders has increased in multidisciplinary border studies (Rumford 2012; Brunet-
Jailly 2005; 2011; Johnson et al 2011; Parker & Vaughan-Williams et al 2009). 
According to this demand, research must go beyond the obvious and established 
concepts and move towards ‘different’ and multi-perspective understandings of 
borders (Rumford 2012). Conceptualised understandings of borders are increas-
ingly based on multidisciplinary approaches in research. One of the recent new 
concepts that are created for greater understanding of borders is the borderscape, 
which “allows for the study of the border as mobile, perspectival, and relational, 
thus pointing in the direction of multiperspectival border studies” (op cit, 894).
“Plurality of Pasts and Boundaries…” provides a multidisciplinary and multi-
perspective conceptualisation of borders that combines the cultural, social and 
territorial aspects of borders. It thus creates an interesting dialogue with the 
concept of the borderscape. The article highlights the border as a boundary of a 
semiotic space, although the border emerges in social action and is connected 
with territories, landscapes and places (such as home). The conceptualisation of 
borders that the article presents is based on three theoretical elements: Juri Lot-
man’s ‘semiosphere’, Henri Lefebvre’s ‘social space’ and the frame of landscape 
studies. In this way, the article inspiringly combines the imaginary, semiotic, 
practical, material and territorial aspects of a space and its delimiting borders.
In the article, the borders are approached from various viewpoints ranging 
from the micro level to the macro level. On the micro level, borders are individual 
and social as they become tangible in everyday life, in life experience, and in 
personal history narratives. On the other hand, borders are administrative and 
political and emerge, for example, in the so-called grand history narratives of 
Estonia. The essential border, which connects various viewpoints and examples, is 
the border of the semiosphere, which is understood as a cultural space and a web 
of semiotic activities. On one hand, the border demarcates the inside and outside 
of the semiosphere from each other. This becomes apparent, for example, when 
the otherness of a foreign culture is highlighted. On the other hand, the bor-
der enables a dialogue across it when the systems of meanings are, for example, 
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translated from one semiosphere to another. The border of the semiosphere does 
not exist only in relation to a foreign culture but also in relation to the past, 
which also appears as a foreign semiosphere. This also stresses the temporal 
sedimentation of borders: already vanished borders and historical significances 
of borders still influence contemporary people and their ways of understanding 
their surroundings and the social, spatial and temporal dimensions of those sur-
roundings. This theoretical formulation is the key element in the analysis of the 
various border narratives and border related experiences in the article.
“Plurality of pasts and boundaries…” is a very good example of a multidis-
ciplinary and multiperspectival approach to borders. It provides an inspiring 
conceptualisation of borders which stresses the human experience, intellectual 
activity, and emotional reactions connected with borders; however, at the same 
time it shows the territorial, political, and administrative realities that influence 
the bordering processes. Due to its multi-perspective approach, the article pro-
vides an important contribution to the theorisation of borders, to the discussion 
of the ontological nature of borders and to the discussion of the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of borders.
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Constructing and deconstructing boundaries  
in cultures of the past
Pikne Kama, Valter Lang, Maarja Olli, Katre Pärn, Tiit Remm, Maria Smirnova
Abstract. The aim of this article is to study the internal and external bounda-
ries of cultures of the past. Boundaries here include spatial and temporal, as 
well as functional boundaries. The exemplary cases analysed here include the 
archaeological cultures of tarand cemetery and long barrows. 
We will discuss the concept of archaeological culture and describe the 
features and boundaries that have frequently been used to distinguish the 
cultures of tarand cemetery and long barrows. In order to move closer to the 
lived culture that existed in the past along with its external and internal bor-
ders, we supplement the notion of archaeological culture with the semiotic 
model of culture and its notion of boundary. We test the applicability of 
semiotic theories to archaeological empirical material and develop a micro-, 
meso-, and macro-level system of description. The proposed theoretical and 
methodological scheme should highlight the cultural boundaries expressed 
within an individual grave, between graves, and between larger areas and eras. 
Having a sufficient amount of empirical material together with the system of 
description would enable tentative reconstruction of the self-model of cul-
tural entities on different levels. Burial places are one of the possible semiotic 
systems that can be analysed in this manner. 
In this article, we did a micro-level description of a single burial 
in a  tarand cemetery and in a barrow cemetery and mapped the analysed 
cases on the meso- and macro-levels. In the macro-level analysis, distinct 
boundaries can be observed in the burial rites and grave goods, but the great-
est internal boundary is probably the one between the elite and the com-
mon people: the former buried their dead in monumental structures, while 
the majority of the people treated their dead in manners that have not left 
any archaeological traces. The macro-level analysis of graves also displays 
intentional transgressions of boundaries, such as mixing bones or the re-use 
Kannike, A., Pärn, K. & Tasa, M. (eds) (2020) Interdisciplinary Approaches to Cultural Theory. 
Approaches to  Culture Theory 8, 378–431.  University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
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of older burial sites, which appear to be features shared widely among the 
discussed cultures.
Keywords: archaeological culture, tarand cemetery, long borrows, spatial 
boundaries, temporal boundaries, cultural boundaries, modality of cultural 
boundaries, semiotic analysis
Introduction
Archaeologists construct their object of study on the bases on the fragmentary 
remains of the past. Due to the inevitable limitations of archaeological finds as 
the dataset, reconstructing ‘culture’ as an object of study of the highest order is 
always problematic. There are numerous ways to (re)construct such an object. 
Moreover, it raises the question of the meaning we assign to the reconstructed 
‘culture’. 
The aim of this article is to explore the potential of the semiotic model of 
culture in reconstructing past cultures, particularly their boundaries, on the 
basis of archaeological material. We will use the archaeological cultures of tarand 
cemetery and long barrows to enquire into the prospects of re-evaluating the 
internal and external boundaries of these cultures from the semiotic point of view. 
What are traditionally understood as ‘archaeological cultures’ are tempo-
rally and geographically distinct clusters of archaeological finds. Whether these 
boundaries of distribution area are cultural boundaries in the semiotic sense – 
that is, whether they functioned as such from the perspective of the historically 
given past culture – is a different matter. With this problematic in mind, it is 
useful to ask, what is culture as a semiotic system as well as what purpose does 
the boundary serve for the culture and how are cultural boundaries expressed 
in different sites and artefacts?
The traditional concept of archaeological culture also entails an ethnic dimen-
sion, as it connects the ‘culture’ delimited through clusters of artefacts with par-
ticular ethnic groups/peoples. While this has been an important as well as prob-
lematic aspect of the meaning attributed to archaeological cultures, the semiotic 
approach is different, since it defines culture neither through particular artefacts 
nor ethnos. Instead, it views culture as “a mechanism for organizing and preserv-
ing information in the consciousness of community” (Lotman & Uspensky 1978, 
214), a mechanism that establishes cultural identities and boundaries on multiple 
levels through a system of relevant differences and similarities expressed in mate-
rial culture. Ethnicity might be one of the aspects that establishes boundary, but 
does not have to be, nor is it the only one or necessarily the most relevant one. 
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We propose a framework for progressing from the comparative analysis of 
boundaries found on the micro-level to those found on the macro-level, so it 
becomes possible to reconstruct cultural boundaries within or beyond the dis-
tribution areas outlined by the archaeologist. Moreover, the semiotic perspec-
tive allows us to move closer to the reconstruction of actual past cultures, since 
the semiotic boundaries of culture are connected to a community’s self-model. 
Thereby it becomes possible to interpret archaeological artefacts as signs of the 
self-model of past culture. Needless to say, the reconstruction will always be 
conjectural.
One of the aims of the current study is to provide a theoretical and meth-
odological framework with which to re-evaluate existing archaeological data and 
interpretations. Since data, as well as interpretations, are always constructed from 
a particular theoretical perspective, an alternative approach can offer a fresh look 
at existing data and the relationships established between them, and perhaps 
reveal disciplinary habits of interpretation and suggest new ways of relating and 
interpreting existing data. For example: what kinds of difference between finds 
could be considered manifestations of cultural boundaries, of cultural distinc-
tions? Would such an approach enable us to interpret the diversity and variety of 
sites as manifestations of cultural boundaries? Could these cultural differences 
provide a way to reconstruct past cultural communities and their worldviews 
on a smaller scale than those which the traditional conception of archaeological 
culture allows for? 
The first section of the article will focus on the presentation and the historical 
background of the concept of archaeological culture. Next, we will give an over-
view of the archaeological cultures of tarand cemetery and long barrows. We will 
examine how they have been (re)constructed and spatially and temporally delim-
ited. The third section will present the semiotic model of culture, focussing on 
the core semiotic mechanisms of culture that could be used in the interpretation 
of archaeological sites. Central is the semiotic conception of boundary as not 
merely a spatiotemporal cultural parameter but also an aspect of a culture’s self-
model. After that, we will propose a micro-, meso-, and macro-level scheme of 
analysis to facilitate the description and outlining of the relevant cultural unities 
and distinctions in archaeological finds. The scheme is tested by case studies 
from both above-mentioned archaeological cultures. For practical reasons, we 
will delimit our test cases with re-evaluation of data pertaining to one burial 
site site from each archaeological culture, although the analytical scheme is also 
designed to include comparison between sites within the same archaeological 
culture. However, in the last section we will try to overcome the limitation and 
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discuss the issues and new questions emerging from the theoretical perspective 
in broader context.
Archaeological culture
The concept of archaeological culture began to develop in the second half of 
the 19th century, in parallel to the idea of culture developed in ethnography, 
more particularly the concept of Kulturkreise. The ethnography of that period, 
especially in Germany, promoted the idea of cultures and cultural circles that 
could be connected to the way of life of specific ethnic groups (Brather 2004, 59). 
In addition to living cultures, this theory was also applied to ‘dead cultures’ which 
were believed to be distinguishable on the basis of archaeological finds. Thus, 
the development of the archaeological approach to culture largely relied on the 
increasing number of observations made in Scandinavian and central European 
archaeology regarding the fact that certain types of item and site tend to be more 
widely spread in certain specific areas and in certain specific combinations, and 
that analogies to this phenomenon are found in ethnographic cultures (Trigger 
1989, 161ff). 
This gradually developed into the tradition of calling temporally and geo-
graphically distinct clusters of archaeological finds ‘cultures’. Even though the 
seeds of this tradition can be found simultaneously in many places all over 
Europe, it first became the most widely spread and prevalent in Germany, espe-
cially in the works of Gustaf Kossinna (see Eggers 1959, 199ff). In Kossinna’s 
works, ‘cultural area’ or ‘cultural province’ stood for a geographical region where 
similar types of item, similar types of grave and similar types of settlements were 
common in a certain period of time. Kossinna used a rather strong wording of 
the understanding of the relationship between ethnos and culture that had begun 
to form before him: “archaeological cultures (cultural provinces) have always 
overlapped certain peoples or tribes” (Kossinna 1911, 3). This definition gave the 
scholars of that time the chance to observe the development of modern peoples 
through prehistoric periods using a retrospective method. Owing to the parallel 
developments in comparative linguistics and comparative anthropology (espe-
cially craniometrics), the spread of cultural manifestations was connected and 
equated to the spread of languages and anthropological types (Adams et al 1978). 
This concept quickly took hold all over Europe, especially after the publishing of 
Vere Gordon Childe’s The Dawn of European Civilization in 1925.
Analogously to ethnographic cultures, archaeological cultures were thought 
to be internally uniform and compact, and externally clearly distinguishable from 
other cultures. Establishing the boundaries between different cultures and the 
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observation of the subsequent changes in these cultures through different periods 
became an important goal. Evolutionist ideas led scholars to believe that regional 
differences arise from different stages of development; in other words, it led to 
the concept of superseding cultural periods (Brather 2004, 60): in addition to 
functional and geographic boundaries, culture was also attributed chronological 
limits. Cultural continuity also meant ethnic continuity. 
One of the first to oppose this approach was Aarne M. Tallgren (1937), who 
emphasised, on one hand the heterogeneity, variability and internal incoherence 
of any culture or nation, while, on the other hand, also considering it a grave 
error to associate different forms of ‘cultural phenomena’ or material culture with 
uniform nations. At the time, his argument went unheeded; positions critical of 
Kossinna’s approach, however, rapidly gained in popularity after World War II 
(see Eggers 1959).
The “discovery”, that is, the construction, of archaeological cultures was easy 
and fruitful when archaeology was still in its infancy, the amount of archaeologi-
cal evidence was small and easily manageable, and its variability relatively limited. 
It is certainly easy to define an archaeological culture based on a single category 
of finds – such as pottery (any potential difficulties are limited to whether the 
classification of pottery should be based on morphology or decoration, the ingre-
dients of the clay or surface finishing; the maps of the spread of ‘cultures’ based 
on these features can be rather different). If, however, one was to add a second 
category of finds (for example, tools), a third (weapons), a fourth (jewellery), 
a fifth (for example everyday items), then a sixth or a seventh and so on, the 
map on the archaeologist’s table will be quickly covered in a large number of 
disparate borders. Similarly, one has to draw completely divergent lines when 
mapping the spread of different types of grave and burial custom, settlement and 
building type, and mode of livelihood. Distinguishing any archaeological cultures 
in this clutter of lines is, mildly put, extremely difficult, and completely impos-
sible if one was to remain objective. Thus, where the concept of archaeological 
culture is still upheld, it is usually defined in terms of the spread of a principal 
site or settlement type; in the case of Stone Age finds, it is generally a pottery 
making and/or lithic technique, while in the case of Metal Age finds, it is based 
on burial places and customs, as these have generally been the most thoroughly 
studied by archaeologists. With some generalisation and exaggeration, we might 
thus state that archaeological cultures do not reflect individual peoples in their 
homogeneity and historical development but only certain aspects of the world 
of either the pottery makers or the dead.
The two archaeological cultures discussed below represent problems related 
to the latter, the world of the dead. Both are distinguished based on the type of 
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burials, but it should be kept in mind that both are so-called princely burial types, 
meaning that another burial custom (or burial customs) had to exist simultane-
ously. The boundaries between these two burial traditions within their respective 
archaeological cultures seem extremely clear today – one of these materialised 
in the form of monumental burial sites, the other did not. Back in the day, how-
ever, this boundary was not necessarily as sharp and as insurmountable. We 
know extremely little of the other manifestations or materialisations of both cul-
tures, such as building type, traditional mode of livelihood, etc. However, based 
on available evidence, it is quite likely that in these spheres, the boundaries were 
rather different than those marked by dominant burial type.
The culture of tarand cemeteries
The Roman Iron Age in Estonia (50–450 AD) has been characterised as the 
period of the spread and use of typical tarand cemeteries. These cemeteries are 
monumental and collective rectangular stone burial sites consisting of joint stone 
enclosures or tarands (see Figure 1 for an example) where fragmentary, burnt 
and unburnt bones and items are commingled (Lang 2007a, 192, 203, 206). These 
cemeteries, along with local ornaments similar to provincial Roman ones, are the 
principal elements characterising this period. The question of why such burial 
places were adopted and why people began to wear such ornaments and place 
these in cemeteries, has not been analysed as thoroughly. They have been con-
sidered to be burial sites for the elite; in addition to their monumental nature 
and the abundance of items, this is also based on the fact that not all members 
of society were buried there, since according to demographic calculations the 
population of the area of modern day Estonia should have been larger in the 
Roman Iron Age (Lang & Ligi 1991, 225; Lang 1996, 469‒473; Ligi 1995, 222‒223).
 
Spatial boundaries. The area of distribution of tarand cemeteries is generally 
considered to be a zone that is ‘culturally’ rather uniform and is distinguished 
from the neighbouring areas by burial rites and grave construction. This type 
of burial is common in the main part of the territory of modern-day Estonia, 
northern Latvia, the Izhorian plateau, and the south-west coast of Finland (Lang 
2007b, 126; Jushkova 2011, 102) (Figure 2). Different spatial boundaries of the 
Roman Iron Age and their uncertainness, as well as areas of communication 
and transportation routes within and outside the area of distribution of tarand 
cemeteries, have been discussed by numerous scholars, both past and present 
(see for example Moora 1938; Schmiedehelm 1955; Vassar 1956; Jaanits et al 1982; 
384
Pikne Kama, Valter Lang, Maarja Olli, Katre Pärn, Tiit Remm, Maria Smirnova
Laul 2001; Lang 2005; 2007a; Banyté-Rowell & Bitner-Wróblewska 2005; Olli 
2013, etc.).
Spatial boundaries, smaller and larger sub-areas have been defined based on 
different item types, grave structures, burial customs and modes of livelihood. 
This allows us to outline rather different areas, the larger of which have been 
interpreted as consisting different ethnic and/or cultural areas, while the smaller 
are interpreted as different tribal areas (for example Jaanits et al 1982, 243ff). 
For instance, in south-east Estonia, the most common type of fibula is the cross-
ribbed fibula, while in north-west Estonia, crossbow fibulae are most common; 
in central Estonia, burials are more likely to contain finger rings, in south-east 
Estonia, fibulae (Olli 2013, 32, 43, 67; Olli 2010, 42ff). These differences may have 
resulted from a number of factors, starting from what the merchant may have 
had on offer at the moment up to strict choices on what to adopt (i.e. what people 
wanted to/were able to naturalise semiotically) and what not to adopt. 
Temporal boundaries. The temporal boundaries of tarand cemeteries have not 
been subject to as much discussion as spatial boundaries. These boundaries are 
mainly defined by the beginning of the construction of typical tarand cemeteries 
Figure 1. Reconstruction of the Uusküla II tarand cemetery.
385
Constructing and deconstructing boundaries in cultures of the past
(Laul 2001, 9). The exact dating of the burials is debatable, as most of the dates 
are based on partially obsolete typologies of items with a level of accuracy of 
a few centuries (for example, Moora 1938; Laul 2001), as a result, it is difficult 
to draw any conclusions about the rate of spread and period of usage of typical 
tarand cemeteries. 
The development and spread of typical tarand cemeteries took place in par-
allel with other types of grave. In coastal Estonia, Finland and central Sweden 
and in some parts of Latvia, these were preceded by early tarand cemeteries 
(Lang 2007a, fig. 169); hence, the transition from one grave type to another may 
not have been too drastic. No earlier monumental stone structures have been 
found in south-east Estonia (except on the eastern shore of Lake Võrtsjärv) (Laul 
2001, 27). At the same time, we are not exactly sure when such typical tarand 
cemeteries were adopted. In some areas, the development may have been grad-
ual, while in others, on the contrary, it may have been more rapid (Lang 2007a, 
Figure 2. Distribution area of the culture of tarand cemeteries.
386
Pikne Kama, Valter Lang, Maarja Olli, Katre Pärn, Tiit Remm, Maria Smirnova
203, 219). Tarand cemeteries were also in use for different periods in different 
areas. In some regions, the tradition of burying in tarand cemeteries lingered 
on for some time, even though new forms of burials were also adopted (Tvauri 
2014, 226–258, 291). Clear regional differences in burial forms appear at the end 
of the Roman Iron Age (around AD 300–400) and collective burials become 
more individual (op cit, 273ff).
The culture of long barrows
The culture of long barrows spread extensively in the forested areas of Eastern 
Europe in the 5th to 10th centuries. Even though some contemporaneous settle-
ment sites and forts are also known, the culture is still primarily defined based 
on cemeteries. 
The barrows are round or rampart-shaped burial mounds made of sand and 
surrounded with a trench (Figure 3). The height and diameter of the mounds 
can vary. The length of the long barrows is generally less than 20 metres, but can 
in some cases be up to 50 metres. The number of mounds in a cemetery can vary 
from a few to several dozens. The ratio of long to round barrows can also vary, 
even though the long mounds that gave the culture its name are generally many 
fewer in number. Not all barrows were built at once, some were reconstructed 
and reshaped multiple times during the use of the barrow cemetery. The barrows 
contain cremation burials with few or no items. The placement of the burials 
inside the mounds can be different: the remains of the dead could be buried 
in the ground underneath the barrow, inside or on top of the barrow. Clay urns 
have also been used for burial. Stone and wood structures can be found inside 
some barrows. Even though the area between the barrows has not been studied 
everywhere, it seems that flat pit cremation burials (not marked with a mound 
above ground) were used in the cemeteries in parallel with the barrows.
In 1903, the Russian archaeologist Alexander Spitsyn suggested that the bar-
rows were built by a Slavic tribe, the Krivichi, because the barrows were found 
in approximately the same areas where the Krivichi were supposed to have lived, 
according to the Novgorod Chronicles (Mikhailova 2014b, 6; Tvauri 2007, 248; 
Sedov 1974, 7). This became a dominant discourse that can still be encountered 
in modern Russian archaeological literature (Popov 2009, 120), even though 
numerous counterarguments to this theory have been published. Meanwhile, 
these barrows have also been associated with local Finnic peoples, especially after 
discoveries of earlier monuments became more common (Lebedev 1982, 33–34; 
Konetsky 1997), or areas of mixed Slavic and Finnic settlements (Schmiedehelm 
1965, 49). 
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Spatial boundaries. It is an archaeological culture defined on the basis of a site 
type that can be found in extensive area (see Figure 4). However, barrow cem-
eteries are not uniformly distributed in this area but are generally concentrated 
in certain regions that are separated by regions with no such cemeteries. 
Until 1968, the terms, ‘long barrows’ or ‘Krivitchi long barrows’, were used 
for all barrow cemeteries with cremation burials of the first millennium. After 
a thorough revision of the materials from the Smolensk barrow cemeteries, which 
differed from those of the Pskov region both chronologically and in terms of 
items, by Evgeny Schmidt, he suggested using cultural names based on territories 
and chronology in place of the generic term (Schmidt 1968, 225). As a result, the 
concepts of Pskov, Smolensk, and Polotsk (or, occasionally, Smolensk-Polotsk) 
cultures of long barrows appeared in literature and are still used today. Over 
time, regional differences have become increasingly clearer and articles published 
in the past few decades have generally focussed on specific micro-regions or 
individual cemeteries (Islanova 2006; Mikhailova 2009a, 40-41). Studies of the 
micro-regions of the Pskov area have raised doubts whether these regions can 
Figure 3. Archaeological excavations at the Suure-Rõsna long barrow.
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be called a single archaeological culture at all if they are sufficiently distinctive 
and independent (see Mikhailova 2009a, 41).
Temporal boundaries. The temporal boundaries of the culture are rather broad 
as well (5th–10th centuries) and the chronology is not too detailed, as the num-
bers of datable finds and radiocarbon dates are relatively small. Even though dat-
able finds are few, the excavation of more barrows and a comparison of the mate-
rials discovered has shown that the cemeteries around Lake Peipus and lower 
River Velikaya are older than those found in Smolensk and Polotsk (Schmidt 
1968). The spread of barrows has often been characterised as an ‘explosion’, as the 
Figure 4. The distribution area of the culture of long barrows.
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distribution maps can create the false impression that they all appeared pretty 
much out of nowhere at the same time (Kuzmin 2001, 66). However, the period 
preceding the barrows has generally been poorly studied, as unlike the barrows, 
which are clearly distinguishable on the landscape, other possible sites (for exam-
ple, underground cremation burials) are difficult to find. The barrows in south-
east Estonia have been associated with an earlier tradition of flat pit cremation 
burials (Aun 1992, 134–136), stone graves (Aun 2002; 2006), and an earlier tradi-
tion of burials in tarand cemeteries (Aun 2006, 122). 
The review of a large number of finds and excavation plans has allowed Elena 
Mikhailova to distinguish three stages in Pskovian long barrows. It seems that the 
first barrows were built at the end of the 5th century at the periphery of the later 
distribution area (south-east Estonia and the lower Velikaya river, the Mologa 
and Msta basins, and the zone between the Lovat and Daugava rivers), and that 
they contained a relatively large number of items imported from neighbouring 
areas (with different imported items found in different regions, depending on the 
neighbours). Between the 6th and 9th centuries the barrows spread to the north 
and the material culture became more uniform (Mikhailova 2014b, 221–230). 
At the same time, certain items related to women’s clothing that are prevalent in 
all other parts of the area of distribution of the barrows, have not been found in 
Estonia (Mikhailova 2014a, 221). Between the 9th and 11th centuries, barrow cem-
eteries fell out of use in the periphery of their distribution area; in other places, 
items of the so-called Old Russian type started to appear among grave goods 
(Mikhailova 2014b, 228). Apart from a small number of cemeteries (for example, 
Mikhailova 2009b, Aun 2005, Allmäe 2014), it is uncertain after what kind of 
period and for what reason the barrows were reconstructed and how long a par-
ticular cemetery was in use. Just as with many other types of site, it is unclear 
what motivated their adoption and abandonment.
Culture as a semiotic system and its boundaries
As stated above, connecting archaeological cultures to actual past communities 
is difficult not only due to the fragmented nature of the data, but also due to the 
complex semantics of the concept of culture itself. To bypass these difficulties, the 
concept of archaeological culture came to be treated as an “artificial term created 
by archaeologists merely for the organization of archaeological material, and it 
refers to spatial coexistence of certain type of artefacts and/or antiquities” (Lang 
2005, 13). Our aim is to enquire how the semiotic approach to culture could help 
in (re)constructing the cultural logic behind archaeological artefacts and gain at 
least hypothetical access to past cultural communities. 
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The abovementioned difficulties in mind, it is useful to proceed from the 
‘minimal model’ of culture explicated by the Tartu–Moscow school of semiot-
ics, which is based on the most fundamental features specific to culture as such. 
The most significant aspect of the conception of culture of the Tartu–Moscow 
school is that it does not define culture substantially (through artefacts, practices, 
ethnicity, etc.), but functionally, as a mechanism generating these artefacts, etc., 
a mechanism whose 
fundamental ‘task’ [..] is in structurally organizing the world around man. 
Culture is the generator of structuredness, and in this way it creates a social 
sphere around man which, like the biosphere, makes life possible; that is, not 
organic life, but social life. (Lotman & Uspensky 1978, 213) 
More precisely, Lotman and Uspenskij (1978, 211, 213) highlight three universal 
and co-dependent features specific to culture:
• semioticity: culture is a system of signs or codes, a set of ‘diecasting mechanisms’ 
that generate its own internal structuredness or organisation; 
• boundedness: culture is a marked-off sphere, structurally organised against the 
background of (unorganised) non-culture (nature) or (differently organised) 
alien (other) culture;
• collectivity: culture is a social phenomenon.
In other words, culture is a bounded collective semiotic entity. However, from 
a functional perspective, it is a mechanism that generates these entities. The 
semiotic means through which people interact with each other and with the 
surrounding world come to function as mechanisms through which community 
bounds and organises itself. Thus, culture is at the same time an entity and the 
mechanism generating the entity, in other words, a self-organising system. This 
organisation and delimitation as the inner logic of the culture is expressed in the 
material forms created by the culture. 
Even though culture is communal, the meaning of this term does not cor-
respond to that of ‘nation’ or ‘ethnos’, as these features of culture manifest them-
selves isomorphically on different levels, i.e., depending on the point of view, 
“culture may be treated as common to all mankind or as the culture of a particular 
area, or of a particular time, or of a particular social group”. (Lotman & Uspenskij 
1978, 214). On each level, culture manifests itself as a bounded collective semiotic 
entity that organises its life-world in specific ways and differentiates itself from 
relevant cultural other(s) in specific ways. This isomorphic nature of cultural 
mechanism allows us to analyse the external as well as internal boundaries of 
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the cultural sphere, as the external boundaries of a cultural sub-entity become 
internal boundaries of the larger cultural entity, etc. 
By viewing archaeological finds as texts whose materiality preserves and 
expresses the inner logic of the culture, a past culture as a whole can be viewed, 
to paraphrase Lotman, as a collection of “texts with lost codes” (Lotman 2005, 
215). The goal of semiotic analysis is to attempt to recover these codes and by 
doing so the internal organisation of the cultural system. 
Zaliznjak et al (1977, 50) have stated that in order to reconstruct a semiotic 
system, to identify its code, it is important that the studied text, i.e., the amount 
of available data, is large enough to enable separation of distinctive elements from 
those insignificant in a given system. Since archaeological sites form a ‘thin text’, 
i.e., the available data are fragmentary and purely material, the reconstruction 
of a number of codes specific to this culture is impossible. Therefore a modest 
attempt to (re)construct past culture in terms of its inner codes should inevitably 
proceed from these fundamental features of culture – semioticity, boundedness, 
and collectivity. In the following, we will describe how these features enable us 
to interpret archaeological finds as expressions of the self-model of a culture and 
how they can be used in archaeological analysis.
Semioticity
On the most fundamental level, culture can be viewed as a mechanism used 
by people to render the surrounding world understandable, i.e., to attribute cer-
tain organisation and form to certain material or activity, making them thereby 
understandable, meaningful parts of the cultural reality. In this sense, culture is 
distinguished from the extra-cultural as “‘being man-made’ (as opposed to ‘being 
natural’), ‘being conventional’ (as opposed to ‘being spontaneous’ and ‘being 
nonconventional’), or as the ability to condense human experience (in opposi-
tion to the primordial quality of nature)” (Lotman & Uspensky 1978, 211). From 
this perspective, the variety of such manifestations of culture is rather large – 
even a tilled plot of land is organised by culture according to certain principles, 
in comparison to the ‘natural’ environment. 
The central mechanisms that transform extra-cultural into intra-cultural, 
thereby producing the cultural sphere that has specific organisation, are sign 
systems as “diecasting mechanisms”, also termed codes since they function as 
“system[s] of constraints and prescriptions” (op cit, 213) – regulated (or struc-
tured, systemic) ways of doing, making, naming, etc., that turn “open” world 
into “closed-off ” culture. Needless to say, this regulation is necessarily incomplete 
(see op cit, 222). 
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Although the semantic dimension of various sign systems can be rather com-
plex, in the most elemental form, semioticity manifests itself in ‘coded’, i.e., regu-
lated, relationships between phenomena that are established through matrices 
of differences and similarities. At the most basic level, it is a difference between 
‘natural’ and ‘cultural’ forms, on a more complex level, semioticity manifests 
itself in differences and similarities between cultural forms themselves. Thus 
semiotic analysis starts with an understanding that everything can be done or 
made in different ways:
Walking could be an example. We may think of it as non-semiotic behaviour, 
basic locomotion, something we have in common with other species. But 
there are many different ways of walking. Men and women walk differently. 
People from different parts of the world walk differently. Social institutions – 
the army, the church, the fashion industry – have developed their own special, 
ceremonial ways of walking. Through the way we walk, we express who we 
are, what we are doing, how we want others to relate to us, and so on. Dif-
ferent ways of walking can seduce, threaten, impress and much more. (van 
Leeuwen 2005, 4)
From the perspective of the current study, for example, people can be buried 
in different ways. When this difference becomes regulated, it turns burial prac-
tices into the semiotic resources of a culture (see op cit, 3–6), i.e. a coded means 
of meaning making. For example, different burial practices come to mark social 
or kinship structures. In other words, these externally observable regulated dif-
ferences manifested in some substance are meaningful as expressions of the cor-
responding internal organisation of some socio-cultural domain, be it gender, 
social or religious order, mood, etc. Yet this also implies that not all differences 
are regulated and more than often the variations might be random or unregulated, 
thus meaningless or ambivalent.
Cultural codes also establish relationships between phenomena by regulating 
their use in particular contexts. The cultural sphere can be viewed as a collec-
tion of semiotic resources that are used selectively (brought together) in specific 
contexts whereby the particular selections made in particular contexts become 
themselves meaningful as differential features. This, in turn, implies that the 
nexus of meaning cannot be reduced to relationships between co-present phe-
nomena, since the absence of a particular element or feature is an equally impor-
tant aspect of the nexus. 
All products and means of human activity can thus be viewed as signs, 
as manifestations and expression of certain principles, or codes. These codes, 
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in turn, can be viewed as matrices that establish meaningful relations between 
various features or units in culture through which a cultural subject organises 
and perceives the surrounding world and positions itself within it. Thus from the 
perspective of the community, these codes are cognitive models, ‘know-how’ and 
‘know-that’ shared by its members (see also Goodenough 1957, 167). 
The primary goal of semiotic analysis is to identify the underlying logic of 
use of the semiotic resources (for example, mythological or religious code, culi-
nary code, ritual code of burial rites, etc.) through the comparative analysis of 
similarities and differences between particular semiotic resources in particular 
contexts. However, it is important to emphasise that this underlying logic is not 
expressed simply by the co-presence or distribution of artefacts but by the co-
presence and patterning of the meaningful differences manifest in the artefacts. 
While conjecturing about the particular socio-cultural domain corresponding 
to the differences is often problematic, the distinctions themselves become a pos-
sible starting point for further analysis when conceived as cultural boundaries.
Boundedness
The boundary is a fundamental feature of the semiotic model of culture, a mech-
anism that delimits and organises the world. Boundary in semiotic sense is 
a meaningful distinction, a ‘line drawn’ between co-existing phenomena that 
simultaneously organises and constitutes cultural domains by dividing the homo-
geneous world into distinct and identifiable cultural units and entities. Although 
cultural boundaries are fundamentally distinctions made in abstract semiotic 
space, since people ultimately operate in a physical space and use physical objects, 
the latter are used to mark the distinctions.
The cultural codes as ‘regulated differences’ can be viewed as boundary 
mechanisms, since they delineate cultural sphere into distinct cultural units 
(signs, texts, etc.) and organise them into more complex distinct cultural enti-
ties (i.e. genders differentiated by social roles, burial sites differentiated from 
surrounding environment or settlement sites). 
From the point of view of the constitution of culture as a collective semiotic 
entity, the fundamental cultural boundary is the distinction between what is 
culturally ‘own’ (us) in relation to the culturally ‘alien’ (other) (see Lotman & 
Uspensky 1978). It is a social distinction, a boundary drawn between individuals, 
groups, communities and membership based on various features, behaviours, 
and ideas. It is primarily a boundary created in the social space, but these bound-
aries may also be expressed or manifest in the geographical space (see Lotman 
2005, 211ff). As such, the own/alien distinction is one of the core cognitive models 
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of a community, defining at once the conditions of the culture’s internal unity, 
sense of belonging, and boundary in relation to the ‘cultural other’. However, 
since this is a reflexive distinction made by the culture, it does not require the 
actual or tangible existence of the ‘alien’ (i.e. a mythical enemy is good enough).
When viewed as boundaries, these distinctions themselves, the particular 
resources used to make them and the mode of marking them become meaningful 
as indicators of the relevance or meaning of the particular boundary for the cul-
ture. These resources and modalities are also indicators of the nature of relations 
between cultural entities. The boundaries are, as Lotman points out, semiotically 
more active points that can be conceived as units of translation, filtering and 
adapting the extra-semiotic information (Lotman 2005), therefore differences 
in artefacts used for marking boundaries carry information about the nature of 
contact between the cultural entities. 
These boundaries are manifested either as a difference in the semiotic 
resources themselves, including existence/lack of some resource (for example, 
difference in languages or types of artefacts differentiating two cultural com-
munities) or a structural difference (for example, the difference between a tilled 
field and an uncultivated landscape as a manifestation of the boundary between 
‘cultured’ and ‘non-cultured’ land, or between artefacts of the same type marking 
boundaries between certain socio-cultural domains).
The ‘regulated differences’ can be created intentionally or develop uninten-
tionally. Both can be found in archaeological sites, although identification of the 
particular mechanism can be problematic. Moreover, the ‘own’ and the ‘alien’ 
distinction may not be conscious or explicit in the culture, and only become 
apparent to the researcher as an implicit mechanism (for example, customs or 
habits of the culture that are not necessarily recognised internally as distinctive 
to the culture). In this case, the boundaries can become apparent on the level 
of cultural entities reconstructed by the researcher. An example of this is an 
archaeological culture as cultural area which is more extensive than the potential 
area of interaction of particular cultural subjects, i.e., presumably the cultural 
subjects themselves were unaware of the extent of this unity and might constitute 
a part of this greater cultural whole only through implicit mechanisms. While 
this greater cultural whole might appear homogeneous from the perspective of 
particular parameter chosen by researcher (i.e. common type of artefact), smaller 
communities within it might use some other artefact or feature (i.e. particular 
ornamentation) to express themselves as entities distinct from the neighbouring 
community. Thus while implicitly they are part of the greater whole, explicitly 
they might nevertheless perceive themselves as a distinct community. Therefore 
from the point of view of reconstructing the internal boundaries of the cultural 
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area it becomes necessary to understand the cultural logics that constitute the 
boundaries of smaller scale cultural entities. 
Collectivity and the cultural self-model
The internal logics of culture could be reconstructed as the set of cognitive mod-
els necessary to be a member of the cultural community. However, from the 
perspective of reconstructing cultural boundaries, the most relevant element of 
the internal logic of culture is its self-model, a culture’s cognitive model of itself as 
a bounded collective semiotic entity – its sense of itself as a socio-cultural unity 
among others. Since the boundaries of a culture as well as its unity as a cultural 
community are defined by its self-model, reconstruction of the self-model is 
prerequisite for reconstructing or evaluating cultural boundaries.
For the community all codes as cognitive models always have a self-modelling 
and self-descriptive aspect, they not only describe the way it organises the world 
but also indicates the way it positions itself in relation to the world, and perceives 
itself as a part of this world: 
The model models the world; or if not the world, then society; […] However, 
[…] it is always at the same time a representation of the knowing subject as 
well: every model proposes a certain relation to the world, or to its object, 
and implicates the maker or user of the model in this relationship. We can 
therefore always read back or reconstruct the modeller from the model itself. 
It is someone who stands to the world, or to others, in the relation which 
the model proposes. In this sense, all modes of representation can become 
themselves modes of self-knowledge as well. […] The model therefore also 
contains the peculiar physiognomy, the character and belief system of the 
cognitive subject, precisely in that it presents a world which is the world 
(or a putative world) for that subject. (Wartofsky 1979, xxiv–xxv)
Since all cultural codes enforce communal unity by being mechanisms behind 
community’s common forms of expression, practices, worldview, etc., they also 
implicitly entail the own-alien distinction by distinguishing those who have the 
codes from those who do not. Yet they can also constitute explicit social dis-
tinctions within the community. Moreover, the scope of the communal unity 
constituted by various codes can differ, resulting in a plurality of co-present 
boundaries. In one way or another, culture is never internally homogeneous. 
Rather, it is a complex matrix of various social unities and distinctions. However, 
from the point of view of group identity – its self-model – these unities and 
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distinctions have a different modality that reflects their respective relevance for 
the community.
Accordingly, we can distinguish between own-alien codes that have implicit, 
explicit, and symbolic modality. The implicit components of the self-model are 
the codes that are not consciously used to manifest communal unity, but which 
still function as such because we act as members of this culture by default when 
acquiring and using such models. These implicit components are not consciously 
used to distinguish oneself from other communities, however the distinction, 
i.e. the boundary, is implied by the unity. The explicit components are those 
semiotic expressions that demonstrate conscious differentiation from the cul-
tural other. These are differences that emerge as a ‘reaction’ to some adjacent, 
co-present community perceived as the cultural other. The symbolic components, 
however, are the signs or sign systems that are used to signify a distinct entity 
of a more or less abstract order, for example, a national flag, a coat of arms or 
a maker’s mark signifying a ‘nation’, a ‘family’ or a ‘master’ respectively as distinct 
semiotic entities. Symbolic components are elements that have no purpose other 
than to mark the boundary or unity of an entity. From the semiotic point of view, 
it would be interesting to enquire whether and at what point past cultures develop 
the self-consciousness of explicit or of symbolic order, and whether this can be 
identified in archaeological material. However, this issue remains outside of the 
scope of the current study.
These modalities can also manifest as a lack of a certain kind of distinction. 
For example, in the case of commingled bones the natural (taken-for-granted) 
unity and boundedness of the individual is lacking. The absent boundary 
becomes a distinctive feature of the domain of the dead. 
It may be presumed that the modality of the boundary in the self-model 
is tightly connected to the own-alien dynamics in the culture. Rendering the 
expression of the ‘own’ more coherent, explicit and symbolic modalities go hand 
in hand with the more significant or more problematic perception of the pres-
ence of the ‘other’, which brings about the necessity for self-determination and 
self-establishment by marking a boundary, or by marking the distinction between 
the spheres (but also geographical spaces) of the ‘own’ and the ‘alien’. The ‘own’ 
appears only against the background of an (imaginary or real) ‘other’, result-
ing in the desire or necessity to be different or mark the transition from one 
to the other in some manner. Equally, the lack of explicit or symbolic distinc-
tions informs us about inter-group relations as well as the type of collective self-
consciousness of those people and thus can inform us about the development of 
collective self-awareness in culture over time.
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A culture’s self-model builds upon the overall complex system of co-present 
cultural codes and has implicit, as well as explicit and symbolic components. 
As a collectively shared cognitive model each code creates a ‘sphere of unity’ 
within certain bounds and is, thus, at least implicitly a manifestation of a cultural 
boundary, of an own-alien distinction. Yet a more complex understanding of the 
self-model emerges from a comparative analysis of co-present distinctions, and 
by taking into account their modalities. Although the explicit or symbolic com-
ponents are of a higher order of organisation or structuredness, capable of recod-
ing the more implicit or less symbolic components of a self-model, or even appear 
as distinct code(s) of cultural self-description, ultimately every code functions to 
some extent as a means of self-modelling. Our conception of cultural self-model 
differs from the Tartu–Moscow school’s approach, as the latter conceived the 
cultural self-model to be a particular code that emerges at a certain stage in the 
development of a culture when it becomes self-aware or self-conscious (Lot-
man & Uspensky 1978, 227), and is therefore an explicit, or even symbolic con-
struct. However, modality is not a static or permanent feature of a code. Explicit 
or symbolic components might lose their relevance and become habitual and 
implicit over time, while previously implicit components can become relevant 
or explicit in particular circumstances, and boundaries themselves can shift or 
become obsolete. 
Cultural self-models and archaeological culture 
The semiotic approach enables us to “solve” the above-mentioned problem, 
i.e. delimiting archaeological culture on the basis of particular finds that lead 
to an inconsistent map with divergent borders drawn on the basis of different 
categories of find (see also Lang 2005). Firstly, this plurality and divergence poses 
a problem only when one presumes that ‘culture’ must necessarily be internally 
homogeneous. Yet the boundaries of the distribution areas of particular arte-
facts could be boundaries of particular sub-entities. Neither are the artefacts 
of a particular type themselves necessarily homogeneous across their distribu-
tion areas. By enquiring whether ‘regulated differences’ are manifest within the 
distribution area of a particular artefact, by studying the matrix of co-present 
codes in particular sites together with evaluating the modality of particular 
boundary mechanisms one can move closer to reconstructing the cultural enti-
ties on a more local scale. 
The own-alien distinctions are a fundamental part of cultural identity (or self-
model) and form the basis of cultural self-determination because they are expres-
sions of the boundary and also of the cultural mechanism of translation, i.e., they 
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are the locus where extra-cultural information is translated into the “language of 
‘own’ culture” (see Lotman 2005). Thus, the changes within a particular category 
of artefact could indicate something about the local context of the ‘translation’, 
for example why it was adopted in that particular form, or why in some instances 
some artefacts were not adopted by some communities. These changes or discon-
tinuities might have resulted, of course, for a variety of reasons other than the 
own-alien dynamics, yet they nevertheless became an integral part of the local 
cultural matrix and could be studies as such.
Culture as a system of the shared knowledge of a community can be analysed 
through its self-model isomorphically at all levels, i.e. the micro-, meso-, and 
macro-level. Thus, while tarand cemeteries might be the shared burial type of 
a larger area, the local differences in particular cemeteries might reveal more 
specific details about the self-model of that particular community. Certain 
kinds of difference identifiable upon the comparison of finds can be viewed 
as instances of a boundary, pointing to a transition from one cultural entity 
to another. By searching for and interpreting such identifiable differences, we can 
reconstruct the relationship of the remnants of ‘material culture’ with the semi-
otic workings of culture. 
To the extent that codes of past culture are always (re)constructed on the 
basis of archaeological material, these codes can be delimited in geographical 
space. The central question for the semiotic approach, however, is not where we 
can draw the tentative geographic border of culture in terms of such distinctions 
apparent in archaeological finds; what is important here is what the boundary 
mechanism, expressed in this type of find and in this manner, its implicitness or 
explicitness, say about the world and self-perception of this community and its 
sense of belonging and position in the world. In other words, what is important 
is the possibility to reconstruct the self-model and world-view of the community 
of the basis of these codes.
Cemeteries are, thus, semiotic units, they function in culture as meaning-
ful entities, the elements of which are functional (have purpose). Due to the 
presumed specific role of the cemeteries, they may be seen as expressions of 
a worldview and analysed as that (for instance, in the light of the central prob-
lems of mentality: what is the nature of reality; what are the needs that must be 
met; to what extent and by what methods are these needs met (see also Sorokin 
2006)). Functionally they can be viewed as means for dealing with ‘problems’ 
in social life. At the same time, there are practically no signs (everyday items, 
other types of cemeteries) of this social life (as the functional context of the text/
system). In other words, cemeteries were built and used, and items and people 
placed in them in a manner that seemed normal and natural (the specific goals, 
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the expressed message or the aspect of the needs that were dealt with, as well as 
their specificity or generality are more difficult to establish). Nevertheless, own-
alien distinctions can be considered one way of moving from the study of the 
cemeteries as cemeteries to the study of socio-cultural goals, messages and needs, 
as these distinctions can be viewed exactly as a manner of dealing with a certain 
‘problem’ of social life – specifically, who are we and how are we related to the 
world and others around us?
Semiotic analysis of sites
Approaching culture as a multi-level semiotic system, the fundamental mecha-
nism of which consists of self-models creating unity and a sense of boundedness 
on every level offers a theoretical model through which to analyse and interpret 
archaeological finds and (re)construct relations between them. This theoretical 
model can be adapted into method for the hypothetical (re)construction of cul-
tural subjects as self-modelling and self-delimiting entities. 
The aim of the semiotic analysis of archaeological material is to reconstruct 
these cultural entities by mapping relations and discovering patterns in the vari-
ety of information about the finds and sites. For this it is necessary to approach 
the finds as semiotic artefacts (networks of signs and expressions of codes) and 
interpret the distinctions (relations of difference) that emerge in comparative 
analysis as boundary signs, expressions of the own-alien code, i.e., expressions of 
the culture’s mental unity and its relationship with the cultural other. An under-
standing of what finds or features function as boundary signs and what the 
modalities are would take us closer to the reconstruction of a culture’s self-model.
In relation to the three modalities of the own-alien code, three semiotic 
modalities of boundary signs should be distinguished. First, on the implicit level, 
any cultural phenomenon different from something else can form a basis for dis-
tinction – function as a difference that creates differences. At the same time, 
implicit mechanisms appear as boundary signs first and foremost to an out-
sider, such as a researcher. Second, on the explicit level, certain items begin 
to be used consciously as means to manifest and generate difference. For this, 
one can ‘repurpose’ various artefacts available in culture by presenting them in 
a way that would distinguish them from the relevant other. Third, at the sym-
bolic level, certain artefacts are created specifically as boundary signs, as physical 
manifestations of a boundary often with a strong communicative motive (a fence 
or an enclosure for example). The different modalities of boundary signs indi-
cate the different values that the distinction between the own and the other has 
for this culture. At the same time, the different modalities of boundary signs also 
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indicate differences in the specificity and relevance of the boundary itself. The 
more explicit and symbolic the boundary, the more precisely it can be localised; 
the more implicit it is, the more reasonable it is to speak of a boundary area or 
a zone of gradual transition. 
Method of analysis
The investigation of cultural boundaries in archaeological sites is a three-step 
process:
(I) Thick description of the site, i.e., describing the finds as semiotic resources, 
as having a certain meaning potential for someone;
(II) Comparison with other finds of a similar type, spatially or temporally co-
present, to identify the differences between finds and thus determine the 
elements that might function as boundary signs;
(III) An attempt to reconstruct the own–alien code as a fundamental component 
of the self-model through the interpretation of these boundary signs.
These steps are carried out at the micro, meso- and macro-level. These levels refer 
to social units of various scales. The scope of each level is to be defined by the 
researcher – this is a question of how the researcher delimits his or her material 
of analysis, not a question of the dimensions of the studied culture itself. 
For the present discussion, the micro-level entity is defined as an individual 
person, the meso-level as a cemetery, and the macro-level as a region, all viewed 
as socio-cultural complexes. Our approach treats, on the one hand, entities 
on different levels as isomorphic semiotic systems operating on the basis of the 
same fundamental mechanisms; on the other hand, it treats a complete system 
on one level as a part of a higher level and the context of the lower level. Thus, 
a comparative analysis of one level forms the basis for the thick description of the 
next one; in other words, the goal of the analysis is to move, step by step, to the 
analysis of more complex semiotic systems.
Figure 5. Stages and levels of micro-, meso-, and macro-level analysis
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In the following we will sketch the goals of these stages of analysis and their 
basic questions in the context of the material examined in this study. 
(I) Thick description of archaeological finds: finds as a sign or a system of signs. 
In the first stage of analysis, the most important features of the finds, as well 
as the relationships between finds, are described. The goal of this description 
is to identify the finds or their features that could have been perceived as sig-
nificant by the cultural subject, as well as to determine which finds could have 
been perceived as belonging together in a ‘cluster of finds’ making up a single 
socio-cultural unit from the perspective of the cultural system, in order to dem-
onstrate what kind of conclusion can be drawn from the researcher’s point of 
view about the socio-cultural context of the appearance of the finds. Naturally, 
such descriptions and interpretations related to the point of view of a member of 
the culture are tentative; it is the task of the researcher to explicate the premises 
of these interpretations. 
The aim of the thick description is to acquire an overview of the possible 
collection of features that express how the find functions within the cultural 
system – its semioticity and sociality. This means questioning: whether it is a sys-
temic or an accidental feature; its artificiality and technicality; its practicality 
or impracticality; whether its creation or use is social and presumes learning; 
for whom and what might have been its semiotic functions; what kinds of social 
relation or distinction are expressed in it, etc. 
Thus, a cemetery is an expression of certain social relations, processes, and 
techniques (for example, someone buries someone else in a particular man-
ner); a complex of graves as repeated burial in the same place is an expression of 
communality, the relations between the members of the community, traditions, 
continuity, passage and transformation of knowledge; the complexity and certain 
impracticality of the burial rites point to rituals and beliefs that are used to re-
interpret and reassess simpler needs and possibilities of acting (for example, rela-
tively work-intensive cremation burials, reburials and monumental structures).
The analysis of the entities appearing on different levels focusses on whether 
and how the individuals, social units within the community, and the community 
as a whole are distinguished in terms of how someone was buried (found com-
plete or dismembered skeletons, individuals buried separately or in groups, partly 
or completely cremated, or not, with and without grave goods, etc.). On the 
other hand, the analysis also examines whether it is possible to determine to 
which cultural entity the goods belong (for example, whether the jewellery can 
be associated with a specific individual) or distinguish elements that are more 
likely to be associated with the burial rites, not the persons buried (for example 
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burial in everyday clothing vs burial with specific additions). Another important 
question is what levels of unity the artefacts related to burial allow us to distin-
guish (for example is the gravestone/monument erected for a specific person or 
a family or larger community). 
Yet the principal goal on this level is not only the interpretation of the finds 
(which is difficult at best and often impossible), but to use thick description first 
and foremost to establish the cluster of related artefacts or features accessible 
to the researcher that could, in one way or another, appear as cultural and social 
expressions and be used to identify units of the cultural system. Yet it is worth 
noting that the pre-existing model of cultural system could enable us to evalu-
ate the data requirements for its identification and pose questions about the 
missing data as well. In other words, the goal is to define the cluster of related 
features that enable us to describe finds from a semiotic perspective as belonging 
to a particular cultural system. 
(II) Comparative analysis of finds: similarities and differences. The next step after 
establishing an interrelated cluster of finds that can be identified as signs of a cul-
tural unit is the comparison of the units, forming a paradigm. This comparative 
analysis identifies their significant or relevant similarities and differences (com-
mon and distinguishing features, marked and unmarked features) and attempts 
to interpret the identified similarities and differences (possible causalities, moti-
vations, traditions). The goal is to discover the system of ‘regulated differences’, 
that is, to find out which kinds of difference can be interpreted as expressions 
of a cultural distinction. These will allow us to categorise the comparable units 
into types (types of individuals, families, communities). For example, are indi-
viduals buried in different ways? What differences can be found? Are these dif-
ferences in burial practices regulated or systematic in some way? Thus, can we 
distinguish types of individual based on types of burial practice (treatment of 
bones, artefacts).
Thus, if the goal of the first stage of analysis was to establish the organisation 
of finds/features into common clusters forming and defining a unit of the cultural 
system, then the aim of the comparative analysis is to establish the second order 
organisation of these finds/features, which would allow us to differentiate the 
types of the unit (i.e. types of individual, social unit, etc.). The goal is to recon-
struct the variant units of socio-cultural system(s) through the discovered units/
entities, thus the question becomes more or less about the interpretation of fea-
tures as manifestations of socio-cultural organisation. 
‘Regulated differences’, as discussed above, are artefacts or features that 
function as means to draw distinctions and identify a unit on the basis of that 
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distinction. In other words, they function as boundary signs. Thus, the goal is 
to study the distribution of units and their invariant basic structures (types). 
It must be kept in mind, however, that types are expressed not only in existing 
features but that the lack of some element can also function as a distinguishing 
feature; furthermore, from the perspective of the reconstruction of a cognitive 
model, another important question is when does the lack of some element have 
a self-descriptive value, i.e., when is identity expressed in negative terms (‘we’ are 
those who lack something or who do not act in a certain manner).
This is supplemented by the geographic interpretation of features to deter-
mine whether they are also related to a territorial organisation and whether a cer-
tain feature marks geographic limits or boundaries or is related to a geographic 
element that can thus be interpreted as a geographic boundary (river, sea, etc.).
(III) Reconstructing the self-model: the own-alien code. The goal of the last stage 
of analysis is the reconstruction of the own-alien code in terms of these boundary 
signs and their modality. In this stage, the focus is on the function of the identi-
fied boundary sign and the possibilities of the interpretation of the cultural ‘own’ 
and ‘alien’ it provides.
This is a question of what function a particular boundary sign serves in the 
internal organisation of a culture and of its relations to its context. For instance, 
boundary signs can be used to investigate the possibilities to interpret the rela-
tions between units of the same level (community and community), relations 
between units of different levels (individual and community), and in more 
global terms, the relations between the culture and its context or environment. 
For instance, we can ask which relations are marked (perceived as a boundary) 
and how in a culture, if and how a boundary sign expresses opposition, separa-
tion, connection transformations in information and meaning, etc.
Another important question here is the relationship between the modality of 
the boundary sign and the unit defined by a find or its feature; what the modality 
of the boundary says about the relevance of a unit of this level or about the way 
other types of unit or anything outside the unit is perceived as the cultural Other; 
and how it is positioned in the matrix of the own-alien code. For example, what 
does the modality of the boundary of a burial site say about its cultural func-
tioning and the relationship between everyday culture and burial culture. In the 
longer term, this enables investigation into how the modality of the boundary 
sign is related to the modality of the self-model.
The stages of this analysis can be summarised as follows: (I) Thick description 
of the finds, systematise the finds into a cluster pertaining to a certain unit 
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of the cultural system; (II) comparison of the units, systematise the features 
of the finds pertaining to particular units into features allowing to typify the 
units; (III) reconstruct the own-alien code through interpretation of the dis-
tinctive features as boundary signs, i.e. signs bounding the community for itself.
Thus, the goal of the analysis is to determine, step by step, the function of the 
artefacts or the features of the artefacts in organising culture and thus move from 
the levels of more immediate organisation (relations between finds in the context 
of an archaeological site) to more abstract levels of organisation (sociocultural 
space and the culture’s self-model). 
Next, we will present a brief micro-level analysis of one grave complex from 
both archaeological cultures, as well as a cursory account of the same in the con-
text of the meso- and macro-levels. A template for a more systematic description 
of the finds was provided that would afford to expound the relevant similari-
ties and differences within the dataset (see Appendix). However, as the current 
study was limited to re-evaluation of previous studies, the existing dataset proved 
to be rather fragmentary from the point of view of proposed template of data 
description. 
Micro-, meso-, and macro-levels  
based on the example of tarand cemeteries
The culture of tarand cemeteries will be represented by the Viimsi I and II tarand 
cemeteries. Two tarand cemeteries, both suffering damage before they were stud-
ied, were found at the edge of the klint at Viimsi Peninsula and studied during 
rescue excavations in 1990 (Lang 1993, 5–6). Cemetery I was larger, consisting of 
four joined enclosures; the total number of bones was also larger, and the items 
found quite elaborate. Cemetery II consisted of two joined enclosures, the burial 
site was smaller than the first one, and the number of finds and bones was also 
smaller (op cit, 8, 16, 18). Both cremated and uncremated bones had been buried 
in the graves and bones had fractured to a large extent and were commingled 
(Kalling 1993, 67). More thorough analyses showed, however, that the placement 
of the bones from the Viimsi I cemetery (bones from Viimsi II are lost) demon-
strated a certain level of individuality (Kivirüüt 2014, 30–36, 44). Both cemeteries 
have been dated to the 4th–5th century, although a certain temporal break can 
be identified in cemetery II based on the finds (Lang 1993, 54–55).
It is difficult to analyse the micro-level, that of the individual person, in tarand 
cemeteries due to the commingled, fragmentary, and collective nature of the 
burials. Bones are usually commingled with items in the grave, making it dif-
ficult to distinguish individual burials; the bones are often fragmented; pieces 
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of both cremated and uncremated bones can be found (Lang 2007a, 192, 203). 
A total of 29 cremated and 14 uncremated individuals were buried in the Viimsi 
I cemetery (Kivirüüt 2014, 18, 21). The sex and approximate age (adult, child) of 
several individuals could be determined, but only based on individual bones, 
as the material is fragmentary and commingled (op cit, 17, 18, 21, 22). The main 
feature here is the commingled nature of both the bones and the items, but there 
are a few exceptions (Olli & Kivirüüt 2017). 
One clearly distinguished individual was the inhumation burial of a 20–30 
years old male outside the wall of the enclosure (op cit). The burial was distin-
guished from the others by grave goods, location of the burial, and the partial 
survival of the skeleton (all other burials had been commingled, but in this 
case, the skull had survived, along with some leg bones probably also belonging 
to the same person). Unfortunately, the cemetery had suffered extensive damage 
before the archaeological investigation, making it difficult to interpret the finds 
(Lang 1993, 7). A necklace was found by the man’s bones, however that could not 
have been worn by the dead man due to its small size; other items found by the 
skeleton included a crossbow fibula, bracelets, a finger ring, a decorative mount, 
and pottery fragments (Olli & Kivirüüt 2017). The social status of the buried 
person was definitely high, as he was buried in a tarand cemetery; another special 
feature is the necklace found by his bones (op cit). These are not too common 
in tarand cemeteries, and only two necklaces were found in the Viimsi I tarand 
cemetery. The connection of the necklace to the man is not clear: he may have 
acquired it as a child, as a present or an item marking an important event in his 
life (op cit). The item may have also played a role in the burial rite, as one end of 
the necklace was broken (op cit). Another interesting aspect is the fact that the 
skull was not cremated – it was customary in Viimsi to remove the skull from 
the dead body and burn it, and then place the bone fragments back inside the 
enclosure (Kivirüüt 2014, 42–43). There may have been no chance to do this in his 
case, or an exception may have been made for him. The distinction between him 
and the other people buried there was clear, the differences including the grave 
goods, their number and selection, as well as being buried outside the enclo-
sure and not burning the head. We may presume that he had a special status 
in the community, either due to standing higher than the others and/or having 
a specific position. It is possible that there was a line between the man and the 
community in his lifetime that precluded his bones being mixed with those of 
other people. Another possibility is that the burial rite was not completed for him 
(his skull was not burned) and he remained buried outside the enclosure’s walls. 
If it would have been completed we may not be able to distinguish him from 
the others buried in the cemetery and he would not stand out from the other 
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dead. Nevertheless, his half intact burial outside of the enclosure does stand out, 
intentionally or unintentionally. 
At the meso-level, the level of the single cemetery, we can speak of communal 
unity with some variations that could be interpreted as individual preference. 
The Viimsi cemeteries were typical tarand cemeteries where people were buried 
both cremated and uncremated. The bones from the Viimsi II cemetery have 
gone missing, but judging by the drawings, they were placed in clusters along 
with items (Olli & Kivirüüt 2017). The Viimsi I cemetery contained a few clusters 
with finds and bones in addition to the inhumation burial outside the enclosure, 
probably indicating specific burials (op cit). At the same time, no cemeteries 
contained complete skeletons and finds were mainly uncremated. All the dead 
were buried along with a different set of items; these could be interpreted as grave 
goods offered by the living, or the personal items of the buried person, which 
could have been either their own belongings or socially accepted markers of 
group membership (op cit). The latter could include the crossbow fibulae found 
close to male bones (op cit). It is difficult to say what group was represented 
by wearing these fibulae, but wearing them may have displayed certain affinity 
(op cit). Even though the sets of items in the cemeteries were different, the gen-
eral appearance of the items was still similar, giving unity to the cemetery. Also 
indicative of uniformity are the similarities in burial customs and rituals carried 
out at the cemetery. Individuals are visible at the meso-level, but the emphasis 
is more on groups and general uniformity, which is more indicative of norms 
shared by the community. The two Viimsi cemeteries were similar in burial cus-
toms and grave goods, but cemetery II was far smaller than cemetery I. Based 
on demographic calculations, it has been proposed that an individual cemetery 
was used by a single family group (Lang 1993, 56). 
A separate problem is the status of a cemetery as a semiotic unit and the 
interpretation of the relations between cemeteries in a cemetery complex. Valter 
Lang has proposed that a new enclosure was built for a new generation (1999, 
76), Silvia Laul has also suggested that a tarand cemetery was used by the main 
line of a family and each enclosure was meant for an individual branched fam-
ily (1965, 349ff), the construction of new enclosures has also been associated 
with an increase in the wealth of the farmstead (Ligi 1995, 223), but no direct 
proof has been found for any of these hypotheses. In the case of the Viimsi 
I tarand cemetery, we may speculate that the enclosure wall separated different 
stages of the burial rite: the body was initially buried outside the enclosure wall; 
after a while the skull was removed, cremated, and placed inside the enclosure 
(Kivirüüt 2014, 43). The enclosure wall as a boundary between the worlds of the 
living and the dead might not be the only interpretation, as in several cemeteries, 
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bones and items have also been found outside the enclosure wall in the ruin; the 
latter could have functioned as a separate area where people were buried and/or 
rituals carried out (see, for example, Laul 2001, 74; Jonuks 2009, 219). The wall 
probably functioned as a separator in a (long-lasting) burial ritual or was used 
to distinguish people of different groups (for example, by generation). In some 
cemeteries, where the ruin probably appeared accidentally (see Lõugas 1975), the 
wall is definitely also the separator of the worlds of the living and the dead, and 
the physical boundary of the cemetery. 
The Viimsi cemeteries are a part of the north-west Estonian subgroup of the 
culture of tarand cemeteries that show some differences from other subgroups, 
for example, the spread of single tarand cemeteries, as well as their later date of 
erection and end of use compared to, for example, Virumaa, as well as different 
preferences in types of ornaments compared to other subgroups (Lang 2007b, 
134; Olli 2013, 107). The single most common type of fibulae are crossbow; several 
necklaces found show clear Scandinavian influence and many bracelets show 
local traits (simple design and decoration) (Olli 2013, 34; Lang 1996, 153, 158). 
In the case of north-west Estonia, we can speak of several different groups that 
had similar burial customs, construction traditions, and to a large extent also 
similar items; however, the era may have seen inter-group competition (rich 
vs poor cemeteries), different outside contacts (for example with Scandinavia, 
Finland, or other regions in Estonia) and so on, all of which had an influence on 
different small regions and made these uniform to some extent. At the macro-
level, different regional boundaries are clearer. At the same time, however, they 
share a number of common denominators, all of which speak of similar practices, 
beliefs, and burial customs.
Micro-, meso-, and macro-levels based on the example of long barrows
The culture of long barrows is represented by the Rõsna-Saare I barrow cem-
etery, located on the shore of Värska Bay in northern Setomaa. The cemetery 
comprised eight long and two round barrows, thoroughly studied by Mare Aun 
in 1976‒78. Along with the barrows of the Rõsna-Saare II and Suure-Rõsna cem-
eteries located nearby, these are one of the best-studied barrows in Estonia, with 
anthropological and zooarchaeological results available (see Aun 1992, 98–100; 
Allmäe & Maldre 2005; Aun 2006; Aun et al 2008; Allmäe 2014 for details).
It is easier to carry out micro-level analysis in barrows with cremation buri-
als compared to tarand cemeteries because the burials are not as mixed but are 
located inside the barrow in more or less compact sets of bones. However, since 
the sets usually contain only some of the person’s bones and the bones of several 
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individuals can be mixed together (see, for example, Aun et al. 2008, table I‒III), 
a micro-level analysis can be carried out only on cemeteries for which the bones 
have been osteologically analysed. Under the longest barrow in the Rõsna-Saare 
I cemetery (60 x 7‒8 m), a burial of a female was found in the middle of the burial 
platform beneath the barrow heap (burial VIII) (Aun 1979, 370). The cremated 
bones of the individual had in part been buried in a pit dug in the ground, in part 
scattered around the pit (op cit). The deceased was a 20–35 year old female; her 
grave goods probably included a whole horse, it`s cremated bones placed under-
neath the human bones in the bottom of the pit (Allmäe et al. 2007, 304–305). 
In addition, the burial included many fragments of different items, mainly the 
parts of a belt: the buckle and a lot of decorative round cover plates, as well as 
potsherds (Aun 1992, table 5). Compared to others buried in the same barrow, 
this individual is distinguished by the abundance of items. Another exception is 
the burial of a 20-year old male (IX), which is similar in both burial custom and 
items found, as well as a sacrificed horse (op cit; Aun et al 2008, table I). Due to 
the presence of the sacrificed animals and multitude of item fragments, these 
two burials (VIII and IX) have tentatively been termed as central for this bar-
row (Allmäe et al 2007, 273). Central burials were those that the long barrow is 
thought to have been erected for, probably for the burial of an individual of high 
social status (op cit; Aun 2005, 99). Of the rest of the bone clusters in the barrow, 
six others were buried in burial platforms under the barrow (with a total of four 
burial platforms, separated by trenches), but no items had been buried along with 
them. Five burials were found inside the barrow mound; tweezers and a bracelet 
fragment could probably be associated with these (Aun 1979, 369–370). Animal 
bones, including horse bones, have also been found in other burials in the same 
barrow (see Aun et al 2008, table 4).
Even though the number of belt parts found in these burials of a female and 
male is disproportionally large compared to the burials in all other studied bar-
rows (see Mikhailova 2014b, 176), it is difficult to determine from this material 
whether a social boundary existed between these two ‘central’ burials and the 
other eleven. The thin bronze details, probably used for decorating a headdress, 
belts and riding equipment, are considered an ethnographic trait of this culture 
(Mikhailova 2012, 261). Since these items are found in burials, it is possible that 
they were mainly part of the burial clothing, although material from contempo-
raneous settlements has not yet been sufficiently studied to conclude this for sure 
(op cit). Even though it makes intuitive sense that people with a special status in 
society were distinguished by more decorated clothes (either during their lifetime 
or on the funeral pyre, or both), it is possible that not all details of the clothing 
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were generally found among the ashes after cremation (see Jonuks & Konsa 2007, 
105), or picking them out was not always considered important.
Using a demographic model based on analysis of human bones from the 
Rõsna-Saare I barrow cemetery, it has been suggested that burials in barrows 
were made by a group of 10–15 people over 120 years (Allmäe 2014, 41–42). Group 
unity is manifested in the fact that all the dead were buried cremated, follow-
ing the traditions apparent in barrows, and no gender or age-based lines were 
drawn between the dead members of the community: those buried in the bar-
rows included women as well as men, and children of all ages, including babies 
(op cit, 43; Allmäe & Maldre 2005). At the same time, not all the dead were buried 
in the barrows in the same manner. Differences appear in how and where the 
cremated bones were placed in the barrow (see Aun 1992, table 2), what (if any) 
items are found along with the bones (op cit, table 5), and in the presence or lack 
of animal (horse) bones (Aun et al 2008, table IV). It is possible that these differ-
ences mark the different status of the members of the society. Thus, in the Rõsna-
Saare I and II barrow cemeteries, animal bones were found in only 18% of all 
burials, most of which were located on burial platforms that where constructed 
before the erection of the barrow (Allmäe et al 2008, 308). It might also be note-
worthy that most of the horse bones have been found in the longest barrows in 
the cemetery (op cit, 310). But it is probably impossible for us to determine which 
differences were actually essential and which were simply possible variations, as 
there is a lack of comparative material, since the number of thoroughly studied 
barrows and barrow cemeteries (with published materials) is small.
Even though the archaeological culture of long barrows seems homogenous 
throughout its distribution area (including the diversity in ways of burying 
bones), this could be a result of unevenness in how thoroughly different regions 
have been studied. Upon more comprehensive investigation, differences in the 
peculiarities of burial practices may be identified in closely situated cemeteries 
used concurrently (Aun 2005; Aun et al 2008). Thus, the Rõsna-Saare I barrow 
cemetery included more elements of burial rites that could be associated with 
stages of this culture that are older than can be found in the Rõsna-Saare II cem-
etery. For instance, the greater proportion of long barrow mounds and rectangu-
lar burial platforms compared to round barrows and round burial platforms, and 
clay pottery probably broken during the burial rituals (Aun 2005, 101).
Internal boundaries of this culture might be manifested in the differences 
in the external shape of the barrow complexes; for instance, a remarkable con-
centration of long barrow cemeteries and barrow mounds with a long general 
shape are located on the western shore of Lake Pskov compared to the other 
sub-regions of the culture (Aun et al 2008, 272). As another example, these 
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boundaries can also appear in grave goods: in south-east Estonia many types of 
women’s jewellery, common in the rest of the cultural area, are practically absent, 
including bracelets, glass beads, etc. (Mikhailova 2014a, 194).
Discussion
Burial place as a boundary sign and the basis for defining a culture 
One could claim that cultural areas outlined on the basis of burial places are bet-
ter reflections of communal semiotic unity than, for instance, cultural bounda-
ries drawn from the spread of some everyday artefact. Cultural areas defined 
by burial sites fulfil the requirement that phenomena marking a common culture 
must be collectively used. Cemeteries were built by a community and even if 
we focus on individual burials or the differences in the ways individuals were 
buried, we must still keep in mind that the dead were always buried by other 
people with significant awareness of customs and social regulations. 
The traditions of tarand cemeteries and long barrows demonstrate a uniform 
complex behaviour in a domain that is not directly dependent on natural factors 
or survival strategies. These burial sites contain artefacts, man-made structures, 
and also indications of traditions and beliefs. In addition to the artefacts, the 
cemeteries also contain the relationships of the individuals with these items 
in the form of human bones found with grave goods and reconstructed social 
situations. Thus, burial sites are complex semiotic systems that allow us to draw 
conclusions about other cultural domains in addition to burial traditions, such 
as for example religion, clothing, and social relations. 
From the point of view of cultural boundaries, burial customs present 
an interesting and multifaceted case. The external, structural differences between 
flat pit graves and barrows also raises the question of the semiotic function of 
the monumental earthwork of the latter – should the monumental structure 
be interpreted as a mnemonic structure, an expression of religious belief or dis-
play of power? Whichever meaning they had, the monumentality of both tarand 
cemeteries and barrows seems to indicate a shift in the code from an explicit, 
to a symbolic more ritualistic, modality.
The burial site itself is a boundary between the sphere of the living and the 
sphere of the dead. Death or the sphere of the dead is the cultural other present 
in the lives of every community, therefore the extent of the spatial area of a par-
ticular type of burial is a reflection of the ‘commonness’ of the cultural other 
demarcated by them. Thus, although the burial site is a boundary sign between 
the spheres of the living and the dead, the particular burial custom itself did not 
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differentiate the geographically adjacent communities, but rather, unified the 
communities of the cultural area. They can be interpreted as boundary signs 
between cultural areas by a researcher aware of the scope of the overall area of 
spread of the particular custom, but to the cultural subjects themselves they were 
from this perspective implicit signs. Burial customs might have functioned as 
explicit boundary signs between geographically adjacent communities in the 
periphery of the cultural area where difference between ‘our’ burial custom and 
‘alien’ burial customs was manifest and could have enabled the functioning of 
burial custom as a distinctive aspect of the cultural community.
On the other hand, the monumental nature of these sites indicates their 
explicit or symbolic modality for the community using them. This could be 
taken as an indication of the importance of the boundary between living and 
dead, and of dealing with death as cultural other in a specific way. The symbolic 
form of this boundary could be interpreted as an expression of more conceptual 
aspects of worldview, since these burial customs are not simply practical or useful 
communal habits. Therefore, if the elements appearing in cemeteries are similar 
in a single area, this allows us to be more confident about the semiotic unity of 
the area. Unlike some other types of archaeological material or sites, such as 
the occupation layer of a settlement site, which has accumulated as a result of 
non-intentional human activity and contains remnants of practical or mundane 
artefacts that have, on the level of self-modelling, dominantly implicit modality, 
burial sites have clearly been significant and important to the bearers of the cul-
ture. Even though a naturally accumulated occupation layer can also be viewed as 
a semiotically meaningful unit, a text, it is in this case a ‘text for us’, transformed 
into a text by a system of codes developed by the archaeologists themselves over 
the development of archaeology as science. Burials, in this sense, would be a ‘text 
for them’, made meaningful by the notions and codes lived in and used by the 
builders of the specific grave types (Antonova & Raevsky 2002). At the same time, 
we should not forget the question of to what extent interpretations inspired by 
the ideal and imaginary world of the dead can be projected to the world of the 
living. In other words, we may ask if the self-model reconstructed on the basis 
of burial places does not already possess a symbolic modality due to the cultural 
function of the cemetery, being therefore an idealised image whose relations with 
everyday practice is problematic, since symbolic self-models are realised on the 
everyday level only partially (see Lotman 2010). To what extent, then, do unity 
and boundaries reflect symbolic social and cultural order of the sphere of the 
living or symbolic religious order associated with the sphere of the dead?
Yet in the case of both tarand cemeteries and barrows, only a part of the 
society was buried there while the majority of people were buried in another 
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fashion, one that we have no archaeological traces of (Lang 2011). The fact that 
only a fraction of the population was buried in this symbolic way prompts addi-
tional questions. It highlights a distinction between those who were buried in the 
monumental, symbolic structures and the supposed majority of the population 
who were not. In this case, their monumentality would indicate the relevance of 
the distinction between co-present social groups within the culture. Should this 
be interpreted as a sign of social stratification, whereby only individuals with 
a specific social status were buried in this ritualised way, or is it a sign of cultural 
stratification, the co-presence of (at least) two communities, only one of which 
had a belief system that entailed this type of burial custom? The fact that the 
burial customs of the majority are unknown to archaeologists means, however, 
that for archaeology, the culture of the majority of the population does not exist, 
at least until it is confined to the study of the monumental graves. 
As a socio-cultural phenomenon (using Pitirim Sorokin’s classification of 
types of unity – see Sorokin 2006, 4), graves as entities are spatial congeries, 
found as clusters initially collocated by the buriers as an external agent and 
not by a force or relationship internal to the grave. Particular individuals and 
artefacts across time were gathered and united in the graves in specific ways 
by the social group. While burial rituals as boundary rituals had a specific func-
tion for the dead (perceived, of course, as necessary by the living), this kind of 
spatial accumulation and preservation in the monumental form indicates that 
among the significant functions of the cemeteries was the mnemonic function 
for the community. They served as sites of remembrance and continuity for the 
social group, indicating overall stability within the region. The diversity in burial 
practices evident in particular burial sites can be a sign of dynamics, i.e. change 
within the social group over time. However, it could also point to more severe 
socio-cultural ruptures, as gravesites or sacred places have often been repurposed 
by new social groups who might have different belief systems or self-models 
resulting in different burial practices at the same site.
This also means that the monumental nature of the cemeteries might not 
be an indication of a complex religious system created to deal with the afterlife, 
but a complex mnemonic system within the culture. They could be a means 
to establish continual relations between those who have died and those who live, 
a means to ensure that death would not be the end of their relationship. Thus, 
cemeteries are also the continual manifestation of those who have died. The 
fact that people are buried there selectively (and thus selectively remembered or 
united with those in mourning) indicates the possible existence of a rather sym-
bolic distinction between members of the community. As a selective mnemonic 
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structure, it could also indicate a social system of heritage within the community 
that requires the ‘presence’ of the dead.  
The same applies to the distinctions and unities evident in the cemeteries. 
The distinctions like that of the distinctive status of certain individuals as well as 
lack of otherwise natural distinctions (for example that of the physical-organic 
integrity of a human body) between those who are buried there can be inter-
preted as manifestations of symbolic unity expressed through commingled bones, 
thereby of boundaries of symbolic modality marking the existence of cultural 
entities with different status within the community. Whether to interpret them as 
a reflection of the religious-mythological order, that is, of the model of the sphere 
of the dead or that of social order, of the model of socio-cultural structure, like 
kinship, social status etc., or how to interpret the relationship perceived between 
these two orders would require a more extensive reconstruction of self-models 
with an implicit or explicit modality, that is, studying more mundane, non-ritual 
material.
When defining ‘archaeological cultures’, we can safely confine ourselves to 
graves (or fibulae, pottery, etc.), although this is insufficient to analyse the semi-
otic dimension of a past culture. The semiotic boundaries of the culture are not 
the result of the classification of archaeological items/sites, but arise from the 
internal unity of the culture established by the combination of codes expressed 
in these materials. This unity manifests itself in different finds in different man-
ners and to a different extent. Approaching culture as something that can be 
‘grouped’ after some material or other kind of criterion – as is common when 
defining archaeological cultures – is not enough. Culture is a system of systems, 
a unique combination of codes and a network of numerous intersecting internal 
and external boundaries.  
 Cemeteries only allow us to categorise some of the archaeological mate-
rial, as there are also extensive periods from which almost no graves have been 
found. At the same time, we have numerous archaeological cultures mainly based 
on the classification of pottery (the attempts to marry them to other item or 
site types have often been unsuccessful). A similar detailed comparison of two 
archaeological cultures could be repeated on an archaeological culture defined in 
terms of a certain artefact as a code, such as a type of pottery. This would allow 
us to present a more comprehensive picture of the society than that resulting 
from focussing on cemeteries. At the same time, pottery was certainly consid-
ered much less important than graves and might not have functioned as a basis 
for symbolic unity for the people themselves. The distinctions embodied in pot-
tery are also more likely to be connected to individual choices 
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However, the issue is not only in analysing what kinds of artefact or activity 
were more relevant for the community, functioning as means to mark bounda-
ries that have a more explicit and symbolic modality for the self-identifying 
community. The question is also in the scope and awareness of the unity uncov-
ered through the analysis of the culture in terms of this kind of material. While 
broader similarities between areas indicate mutual identification between neigh-
bouring communities as well as rather complex patterns of distant interaction 
and influences, locally different artefacts, however trivial they might seem in 
comparison to more symbolic customs, can be more revealing about the subtle 
distinctions made between neighbouring communities that interacted with each 
other directly. For example, taking fibulae as the basis for detecting the bounda-
ries would result in a different area of unity than, for example, some other item 
type or burial custom. Or in using the case of ornaments made following the 
Roman example, the sphere of cultural unity would appear far more extensive, 
but consciousness of this unity would probably be much lower. However, their 
particular features and decorations could have been explicit or even symbolic 
boundary signs marking locally relevant distinctions within or between co-pre-
sent communities. Since the self-model of one particular cultural community 
is a combination of codes with different modalities, the reconstruction of the 
self-model of past culture should, ideally, take into account the various artefacts 
as possible signs of boundary that might have different modalities.
From the perspective of the Tartu–Moscow school of semiotics, burial tra-
ditions are not necessarily more relevant due to the cultural status of religion. 
Rather because the cultural area outlined using burial traditions is smaller, 
more restricted, and has much clearer boundaries, they could be considered as 
a marked feature of a culture. As an illustration, we can imagine that another area 
could be found within the area of tarand enclosures where members of the com-
munity wear footwear of the same colour. The cultural status of this footwear as 
everyday items would be trivial in comparison to religion, but their status as the 
basis of communal unity and signs of cultural boundaries would be significantly 
higher. In this sense, cemeteries are just one means to demarcate a culture, but 
in our scope of interest they have a marked status as a basis of communal unity 
and signs of boundaries; however, it is possible to outline other, both more and 
less extensive cultural systems in this scope, none of which appear less important, 
just less clearly marked (i.e. implicit, explicit or symbolic). 
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Self-models of the users of tarand cemeteries and long barrows
It is generally very difficult to reach the micro-level or to distinguish individu-
als when studying tarand cemeteries because many individuals are represented 
by single bones. This fragmentation and disarrangement was probably inten-
tional. It seems that the physical boundaries that existed between human bodies 
in their lifetime were overcome after death. In death, a person’s bones were mixed 
with the bones of his (her) relatives and ancestors, losing the boundaries between 
the human remains, thus at the same time reinforcing the symbolic unity of those 
buried in the cemetery and the boundary between them and the other members 
of society who remained outside. 
The boundaries of the living body may have also been overcome after death 
at the spatial level. Only some of a person’s bones found their way into tarand 
cemeteries; the fate of the rest of the bones is unknown to date, but obviously they 
must have been treated in some other manner. Thus, after death, the person could 
have been partially buried in the grave while many parts were located in other 
places, something that was impossible in his or her lifetime. In barrows, we also 
see examples of such disarrangement of human bones and the division of a com-
plete body between the grave and some other space unknown to archaeologists. 
However, not all bones are mixed in barrows; this is limited to two to four 
individuals, separated from other burials by the pit, cluster, or urn they were 
buried in. More systematic study of the unities thusly created could reveal more 
about the relevant types and kinds of social unit. This kind of fragmentation of 
body and commingling of bones could be interpreted as indication that belong-
ing to and unity with certain phenomena (social group, geographic place, other 
living beings) was more important than individuality and individual (organic) 
integrity. The fragmentation and commingling of individuals in grave as a sym-
bolic space is a manifestation of a symbolic order established by self-model. 
There is also evidence of the special status of horses. Similar treatment of human 
and animal bones may have meant their co-existence after death; possibly the 
boundary between this world and the netherworld was crossed together. Thus, 
these unities and divisions might have been seen as relevant for the netherworld 
because of their relevance in the world of the living.
One result of the micro-level analysis is that an individual does not form 
a clearly distinguished cultural entity (with the exception of a few individuals 
who probably possessed a special status). This applies in the case of both tarand 
cemeteries and long barrows. We may speculate that this relative lack of relevance 
of the individual as social unit indicates a certain common feature in beliefs con-
cerning the relationship of the individual and the world in this era, in the light 
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of which both tarand cemeteries and long barrows are surface variations of the 
worldview of a relatively extensive region, characteristic of this era or area. Thus, 
even though the two cultural areas are clearly distinctive at the level of burial type, 
these spatial and temporal borders can take other forms in the deep structure of 
burial traditions, at the level of belief and world order. Individual graves gradually 
become more common in later times, and become ubiquitous only in relation to 
the spread of Christianity (in part, slightly before the introduction of Christianity, 
but still most likely under its influence). 
The meso-level analysis of the cemeteries raises a number of questions. 
Should the meso-level unit be the individual barrow, or the barrow complex? 
This is more a question of the definition of the material by the researcher. This 
decision must be made based on whether the variation in burial traditions is 
greater between different barrows or different barrow complexes. In other words, 
which boundary may have been more important for the users of these burial sites, 
since the meso-level is not defined by the individual burial places but by the 
cultural entity expressed at this level. 
In the case of tarand cemeteries, we may ask the same: should the meso-level 
analysis concern a single enclosure, all conjoined enclosures, or should we also 
include other tarand cemeteries located in the vicinity? However, single enclo-
sures are clearly bounded, indicating the importance of the distinction between 
people buried in separate enclosures as well. In our cases, this cultural entity 
could be a family, potentially an elite family, something akin to an extended fam-
ily, 10‒15 people. In the Viimsi case, it can indeed be presumed that the second 
grave reflects the branching (and the unhappy end) of the initial extended family. 
In both cases, we should also not forget the temporal dimension: neither 
tarand cemeteries nor long barrows are the remnants of a single moment in time 
but the end results of a long burial process. One long tarand cemetery with its 
numerous enclosures, as well as a group of barrows, reflects several hundred 
years in the life of a family or a family line, where each generation used only 
one part of the tarand cemetery or barrow complex. What made people decide 
to build a new barrow or tarand is an interesting question, since it establishes 
a boundary between two cultural entities as well. Of course, the emphasis was 
on the connection with the ancestors, as the same burial site remained in use, yet 
they still distanced and distinguished themselves from others by creating a new 
bounded area. The micro-, meso-, and macro-level analyses should also definitely 
keep in mind the dates of the compared cultural phenomena. It is possible that 
the differences between individuals, sites and regions could actually be related 
to temporal, not spatial or purely semiotic boundaries. 
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The common features of the north-west Estonian tarand cemeteries, as well 
as the distribution area of tarand cemeteries in general, includes a similar form 
of cemetery, collective burial, and frequent custom of placing ornaments in the 
graves. The finds in the tarand cemeteries are somewhat different, while still hav-
ing a similar general design. In north-west Estonia, however, groups might also 
have been distinguished by whether they used a single tarand or typical tarand 
cemeteries. The common denominator for them is collectivity and the com-
mingled nature, but people may have retained a certain amount of individuality 
even in death, as some burial clusters were discovered in the Viimsi I cemetery 
in which, even though no complete skeletons were found, the bones and items 
had been placed in the grave in sets (Olli & Kivirüüt 2017), allowing individuals 
to be distinguished. Since two rather similar cemeteries were located close to each 
other in Viimsi, they could have defined the boundary between two close families 
or communities. Their material culture and burial customs were similar, although 
they did bury their dead in different sites, marking the existing differentiation 
between these communities.
Analysis of the cemeteries allows us to draw conclusions about cultural sys-
tems of different levels, although the reconstruction of their mechanisms of semi-
otic self-determination and self-models would require a more detailed analysis 
(see the example in the appendix for more). Reusing existing descriptions of 
archaeological material turned out to be difficult, as the shift in research ques-
tions toward semiotic analysis directs the focus onto aspects that have been less 
relevant in existing practices of description in archaeology. 
Temporal boundaries of cultures
In earlier archaeological discussions of long barrows, the culture of long bar-
rows seemingly appears out of nowhere and stands against nothingness. Without 
a doubt, the areas surrounding the long barrows were not empty, but these ways 
of living and burial practices are archaeologically difficult to identify. Was the 
non-use of barrows in these areas in the second half of the first millennium 
a manifestation of conscious cultural opposition? Today, we know that barrow 
cemeteries were preceded in south-east Estonia as well as to the east of this region 
by flat pit cremation burials (Aun 2006, 15 and references cited there). We can 
also ask whether the erection of barrows was motivated by conscious cultural 
opposition to the preceding culture that did not utilise barrows. 
The end of the active use of tarand cemeteries marks a change in both cem-
etery type and used burial customs. An area distinguished by similar burial forms 
disintegrated for some reason, but was this also accompanied by changes in other 
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spheres of life, and why was it replaced with different forms of burial in different 
regions? Some common ideas related to burial in tarand cemeteries is that this 
method exhausted itself and necessitated change, whether as a result of internal 
or external factors.
Tarand cemeteries and barrows retained their importance and significance 
in the cultural landscape for hundreds or even thousands of years and were 
often repurposed. In 19th and 20th century traditional peasant society, tarand 
cemeteries were often taken for church foundations (Lõugas & Selirand 1989, 
71). Barrows, however, have mainly been associated with the Swedish War (the 
Great Northern War), at the time of which different nations buried their dead 
in different kinds of barrow (round barrows were supposed to be the burial sites 
of Russians, long barrows were used by the Swedish, and vice versa) (Aun 2009, 
83). These sites are no longer considered part of the ‘own’ culture but rather are 
signs of a preceding culture displaying continuity with the present culture. Thus, 
it is easier to identify the beginning of a culture using burial sites (for example, 
the time of construction of tarand cemeteries or long barrows), but once erected, 
they remain a part of the cultural reality. At some point new long barrows or 
tarand cemeteries were no longer erected, and the dead were buried in existing 
sites. It is thus important to analyse in depth when the period of the active use of 
tarand cemeteries and barrows ended. Was the established cultural area still uni-
form in the subsequent period? Did the changes affect all elements and regions 
of the culture in the same manner? Answers to these questions would allow us 
to be more confident that this entity was a single culture in the semiotic sense 
of a collective self-bounding entity that reacted to changes in a similar manner. 
At the same time, the different development of different regions could also 
show that the established system, ideology or social order changed, resulting 
in the disintegration of a cultural area and the end of the existing culture. The 
examples analysed seem to indicate that different areas developed in different 
ways after the end of the culture. For instance, the culture of long barrows started 
to fall apart before the end of the period of active use of the barrows, as barrow 
cemeteries were no longer used in the outer regions of their distribution area 
in the 9th to 11th centuries. Elsewhere, however, the barrows remained in use 
and often demonstrate continuity with the cemeteries of the Old Russian cul-
ture and medieval village cemeteries, these already being Christian burial sites 
(Mikhailova 2014b, 219). It appears that differences existed inside the cultural area 
already at the time of the culture, and the end of the culture only serves to empha-
sise them. Internal asymmetry of culture in terms of a more stable centre and 
a more dynamic and changing periphery is also indicated in Lotman’s model 
of the semiosphere (Lotman 2005). It is important to take this asymmetry into 
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account in spatiotemporal modelling of culture, since the duration of the culture 
within the cultural area is uneven and the spatial and temporal boundaries of the 
culture cannot be equated by force.
Internal and external cultural boundaries, their markedness
Because in both cases the majority of people were buried in another fash-
ion unknown to archaeologists, the question is, how central were burial rites 
in tarand cemeteries and long barrows to these cultures of the past, and were all 
the people living in these areas part of these cultures, sharing the same cultural 
self-model? Were these the burial sites of a cultural elite or distinct cultural com-
munity? In the first case, the different strata of the society form a singular entity 
and we could presume that the non-elites also participated in the rituals taking 
place there, making them part of the same burial culture, despite practicing it 
in a different manner (they probably could not bury their dead in these sites). 
Considering the explicit or symbolic nature of burials as a boundary between the 
living and the dead, could there have been, and under what conditions, different 
burial practices within one cultural community? What would that possibility 
tell us about the self-model of the culture and the role of burial customs within 
it? In one way or another, these cemeteries as the burial sites of a selected few 
determined one of the most central internal boundary of the cultural areas of 
tarand cemeteries and barrows.
In the case of barrow cemeteries of the second half of the first millennium, 
where, likewise, only part of society was buried (Lang & Ligi 1991, 28), an addi-
tional question arises: did people burying their dead in barrows of different shape 
also have a different status in the society? According to Mare Aun, the differ-
ent barrow shapes also symbolise different ideologies and different concepts of 
the world (Aun 2006, 116). Even though the exact nature of these differences is 
unclear, analysis of the pottery found in the barrows shows that the population 
burying in long barrows was more conservative compared to those using round 
barrows, the latter adopting new customs in the later stages of the culture (Aun 
2002, 88). This also indicates internal boundaries within the cultural area. The 
position of the people cremated and buried in pits in the same cemeteries near 
the barrows but whose burial places were not marked with a mound, remains 
unclear. 
The internal asymmetry of cultural space can also be observed spatially in the 
distribution area of tarand cemeteries. At the periphery of the area of spread, 
especially on the Izhorian plateau, but also in south-west Finland and northern 
Latvia, the difference from the centre is clearly visible. While the grave and burial 
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form, as well as the ornaments, are typical to the wider area of tarand cemeter-
ies, the placement of weapons in the grave pose the problem of interpreting the 
distinction manifest in this difference. The difference could have been created 
simply by the tradition one group of people had of placing weapons in graves, 
which could have been related to something other than differences in tribal 
background. This might have been a regional belief or even a specialisation and 
the expression thereof. The Izhorian plateau can be considered a ‘border zone’ of 
the area of spread of tarand cemeteries; hence, weapons found in graves could 
indicate status as a border zone, as an area opposing those lying to the east. It is 
possible that life in a border zone was more characterised by conflict and more 
dangerous than life in the inner zones of the culture, resulting in greater empha-
sis on weapons (in connection to social status) in this region. If weapons would 
indicate the status of the region as a border zone, the dominant code for self-
model would be that of burial type. In contrast, if weapons with their relation to 
everyday life and social organisation are prioritised in interpretations, an entity 
with a remarkably different self-model would appear – for example attributing 
symbolic value to weapons not in relationships with sharply different people 
considered non-cultural (people outside the tarand cemetery cultural area) but 
in relation to similarly cultural people using the same kinds of burial sites but 
valued somehow negatively. 
If we proceed with a view that people feel the need to express and define 
themselves for the purpose of identification (see Jenkins 2008) and use for that 
purpose various items available to them, smaller regional subgroups can be dis-
tinguished based on items placed in graves or cemetery types in the central parts 
of the distribution area. For example, the difference in cemetery types between 
the regions north and south of the Daugava in the Roman Iron Age, i.e. rectan-
gular stone enclosure vs round mound of earth with a stone circle at its base; 
or the difference in whether the dead were provided with weapons and large tools 
for the afterlife. Similarly, ornament sets were different in different regions, which 
may have created boundaries between the ‘self ’ and the ‘others’, be it explicitly 
or implicitly. These differences could be interpreted as manifestation of internal 
boundaries within the burial culture, that is, the people of the past might have 
perceived these differences as boundaries. 
The semiotic approach to culture would thus enable us to conceptualise how 
any site could be analysed as the manifestation of boundary mechanisms on 
different levels of culture. In the broader perspective, this allows us to assess the 
functions of boundaries manifested in different types of find and identify their 
mutual relations in order to reach a more adaptable and flexible understanding 
of the relationships and dynamics of cultural systems of different levels. 
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Conclusion
In this interdisciplinary study we investigated archaeological material and con-
ceptualisations from a semiotic perspective with the aim of evaluating how semi-
otic theories could be used for the analysis of archaeological material. This work 
resulted in a theoretical framework that was adapted to analyse archaeological 
material on micro-, meso- and macro-levels through a three-step process of thick 
description, comparison and (re)construction of self-model. The main question 
for the semiotic analysis proposed here is whether the similarities and differences 
within the archaeological finds could be interpreted as a manifestation of cultural 
distinction and what their modality or relevance could be in the self-model of the 
culture. In other words, could these differences be interpreted as an expression 
of cultural boundary recognised as relevant by the community?
The micro-level analysis of burial sites highlights differences between indi-
viduals, the meso-level analysis shows differences between burials related to 
larger socio-cultural units, and macro-level analysis focuses on regional differ-
ences. This thick description indicates the variability of boundaries within a 
single cemetery, as well as between individual cemeteries and between regions. 
Subjecting archaeological cultures to a macro-level comparison would highlight 
major differences and allow the outlining of a culture’s external boundaries. This 
kind of analysis could show which differences resulted from the culture’s natural 
internal heterogeneity and which mark the boundaries of the cultural area. 
The initial strategy of reusing existing descriptions of archaeological material 
turned out to be difficult, as the research questions based on the semiotic frame-
work directed the focus to aspects that have been less relevant in existing prac-
tices of archaeological description, therefore the required data was not as readily 
available. However, this itself indicates that interdisciplinary approaches afford 
new questions and re-evaluation of existing data and ways of describing it. There-
fore the discussion concentrated on the re-evaluation of received views and on 
posing questions informed by the semiotic perspective presented in the theoreti-
cal framework.
At the same time, when utilising archaeological material, we should not forget 
that the material is extremely fragmentary, and the analysis of the whole system 
may as well require something we have no archaeological evidence of. To wit, 
demographic calculations show that only a small part of the society, probably the 
elite, were buried in tarand cemeteries and barrows. The methods used for treat-
ing their dead by the rest of the members of the community have left no archaeo-
logical traces. Perhaps the most significant internal boundary found upon the 
analysis of the burial places is, thus, the one between the users and non-users of 
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the burial site. Unfortunately, it is difficult to judge how significant this boundary 
may have been in the past, or whether this marks a social boundary within one 
community or a cultural boundary between co-present communities.
The cemeteries themselves are complex semiotic phenomena, therefore as 
boundary signs they afford different interpretations: was the semiotic function 
of these monumental structures mnemonic (expressing relations with the ances-
tors), religious (expressing the relationship with death and the afterlife) or a dis-
play of power (expressing relations between social elite and laypeople)? 
One of the more interesting outcomes of the analysis concerned the fragmen-
tary nature of the buried individuals. More specifically, (selected) bones from 
different individuals were mixed together in both tarand cemeteries and bar-
rows. Thus, the corporeal boundaries between the living members of the society 
as well as between the living and the dead are overcome in death. The analysis 
of the absent boundary of individual within the cemetery brought to the fore the 
relative lack of relevance of individuals as a distinct social unit in both types of 
burial site. Thus, while the two cultural areas are clearly distinctive at the level of 
cemetery type, they seem to share a deeper structure of burial traditions at the 
level of belief and world order in relation to individuality and collectivity.
Cemeteries are, without a doubt, a rich empirical basis for the analysis of 
boundaries in cultures of the past, as they form a complex semiotic system result-
ing from conscious human activity. At the same time, cemeteries are not the only 
nor a sufficient, source for defining the semiotic dimensions of a past culture. 
The erection and use of monumental structures might have established certain 
boundaries in the past society; however, even these boundaries could have been 
ignored or deconstructed by different rituals, everyday practices and social rela-
tions. Studying some other type of archaeological source material would enable 
us to distinguish different kinds of boundary. The question here is rather one of 
the kinds of boundary to be studied. In the case of cemeteries, however, we can 
at least be sure that these boundary mechanisms were recognised by and impor-
tant for the people of the past themselves.
References
Adams, W. Y., Van Gerven, D. P. & Levy, R. S. (1978) The retreat from migrationism, Annual 
Review of Anthropology 7, 483‒532.
Allmäe, R. (2014) Rõsna kääbaskalmistud Põhja-Setumaal: põletusmatuste uuringu tule-
mu sed. – Tamla, Ü. & Lang, V. (eds) Ajast ja ruumist. Uurimusi Mare Auna auks. 
Muinasaja teadus, 25, 39–50. Tallinna Ülikooli Ajaloo Instituut, Tartu Ülikooli ajaloo 
ja arheoloogia instituut, Tallinn–Tartu.
423
Constructing and deconstructing boundaries in cultures of the past
Allmäe, R. & Maldre, L. (2005) Rõsna-Saare I kääbaskalmistu – esialgseid osteoloogilisi 
andmeid. – Aun, M. & Tamla, Ü. (ed) Setumaa kogumik 3. Uurimusi Setumaa loodusest, 
ajaloost ja folkloristikast, 121–137. Tallinna Ülikooli Ajaloo Instituut, Tallinn.
Allmäe et al 2007 = Аллмяэ, Р., Аун, М. & Малдре, Л. (2007) Предварительные 
результаты изучения остеогического материала курганных могильников Рысна-
Сааре I и II в Северной Сетумаа (Юго-Восточная Эстония). – Археология и 
история Пскова и Псковской земли. Семинар имени академика В. В. Седова. 
Материалы LII заседания, посвященного памяти профессора А. Р. Артемьева, 
298–310. Институт археологии РАН, Псковский археологический центр, Псков.
Allmäe et al 2008 = Аллмяэ, Р., Аун, М. & Малдре, Л. (2008) К вопросу о значении 
длинных курганов (по археологическим и остеологическим данным).  – 
Археология и история Пскова и Псковской земли. Семинар имени академика 
В. В. Седова. Материалы LIII заседания, 303–312. Института археологии РАН, 
Псковский археологический центр, Псков.
Antonova & Rajevsky 2002 = Антонова, Е. & Раевский, Д. (2002) Археология и 
семиотика. – Структурно-семиотические исследования в археологии. Том 1, 
11–26. Донецкий национальный университет, Донецк.
Aun 1979 = Аун, M. (1979) Об исследовании курганов у дер. Рысна-Сааре. – Eesti 
Teaduste Akadeemia toimetised. Ühiskonnateadused = Известия Академии наук 
Эстонии. Общественные науки = Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Sciences. 
Social Sciences. Том 28, No. 4, 369–373, Таллинн.
Aun 1992 = Аун, М. (1992) Археологические памятники второй половины 1-го 
тысячелетия н. э. в Юго-Восточной Эстонии. Олион, Таллинн.
Aun, M. (2002) Keraamika pikk-kääbaste kultuuri läänepoolse ääreala elanike mat-
miskombestikus I aastatuhande teisel poolel. – Lang, V. (ed) Keskus–tagamaa–ääreala. 
Uurimusi asustushierarhia ja võimukeskuste kujunemist Eestis. Muinasaja teadus 11, 
61–100. Tallinn–Tartu.
Aun, M. (2005) Pikk-kääbaste ehitusest. – Aun, M. & Tamla, Ü. (ed) Setumaa kogumik 
3: Uurimusi Setumaa loodusest, ajaloost ja folkloristikast, 97–120. Tallinna Ülikooli 
Ajaloo Instituut, Tallinn.
Aun, M. (2006) Pikk-kääpad Peipsi-Pihkva järve ümbruses. – Valk, H. (ed) Etnos ja kul-
tuur. Uurimusi Silvia Laulu auks. Muinasaja teadus 18, 112–128. Tartu–Tallinn.
Aun, M. (2009) Keskmine rauaaeg ja viikingiaeg (450–1000/1059 pKr). – Valk, H., Selart, 
A. & Lillak, A. (eds) Setomaa 2. Vanem ajalugu muinasajast kuni 1920. aastani, 70–125. 
Eesti Rahva Muuseum, Tartu.
Aun, M., Allmäe, R. & Maldre, L. (2008) Pikk-kääbaste tähendusest (Rõsna küla 
kääbaskalmistuste materjali põhjal). – Aun, M., Lõiv, M. & Tamla, Ü. (eds) Setumaa 
Kogumik 4: Uurimusi Setumaa loodusest, ajaloost ja rahvakultuurist, 269–290. SA Seto 
Instituut, Tallinn.
Banyté-Rowell, R. & Bitner-Wróblewska, A. (2005) From Aestii to Esti. Connections 
between the Western Lithuanian Group and the area of distribution of tarand-graves, 
Interarchaeologia 1, 105–120.
424
Pikne Kama, Valter Lang, Maarja Olli, Katre Pärn, Tiit Remm, Maria Smirnova
Brather, S. (2004) Ethnische Interpretationen in der frühgeschichtlichen Archäologie. 
Geschichte, Grundlagen und Alternativen. (Ergänzungsbände zum Reallexikon der 
Germanischen Altertumskunde, 42). De Gruyter, Berlin & New York.
Childe, V. G. (1925) The Dawn of European Civilization. Kegan Paul, London.
Eggers, H. J. (1959) Einführung in die Vorgeschichte. R. Piper & Co Verlag, München.
Goodenough, W. H. (1957) Cultural Anthropology and Linguistics. – Garvin, P. L. (ed) 
Report of the Seventh Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Study, 
167–173. Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C.
Islanova 2006 = Исланова, И. (2006) Верхнее Помостье в раннем редневековье. 
Тверской государственный университет, Москва.
Jaanits, L., Laul, S., Lõugas, V. & Tõnisson, E. (1982) Eesti esiajalugu. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn.
Jantunen, P. (2014) Nelisivuinen kivilatomus ja yksittäistarhakalmisto hautatyyppien 
eroja ja yhtäläisyyksiä Suomenlahden molemmin puolin. Master’s thesis. University 
of Helsinki.
Jenkins, R. (2008) Social identity. Routledge, London, New York.
Jonuks, T. & Konsa, M. (2007) The Revival of Prehistoric Burial Practices: three archaeo-
logical experiences, Folklore: Electronic Journal of Folklore 37, 91–110.
Jonuks, T. (2009) Eesti muinasusund. Dissertationes archaeologiae Universitatis Tartuensis, 
2. Tartu.
Jushkova 2011 = Юшкова, М. А. (2011) Эпоха бронзы и ранний железный век на 
Северо-Западе России. Диссертация на соискание ученой степени кандидата 
исторических наук Санкт-Петербург, Санкт-Петербург. 
Kalling, K. (1993) Viimsi kalmete luuainese antropoloogiline analüüs. – Lang, V. Kaks 
tarandkalmet Viimsis, Jõelähtme kihelkonnas. Töid arheoloogia alalt 2, 67–69. Eesti 
Teaduste Akadeemia Ajaloo Instituut, Tallinn.
Kivirüüt, A. (2014) A Comparative Osteological and Intra-Site Spatial Analysis of Tarand-
Graves. Master’s thesis. University of Tartu, Department of Philosophy, Institute of 
History and Archaeology.
Konetsky 1997 = Конецкий, В. (1997) К вопросу о формировании культуры длинных 
курганов. – Новгород и Новгородская земля: История и Археология. Вып. 11, 213–
225. Новгород.
Kossinna, G. (1911) Die Herkunft der Germanen. Zur Methode der Siedlungsarchäologie. 
(Mannus-Bibliothek, 6). Curt Kabitzsch, Würzburg.
Kuzmin 2001 = Кузмин, С. (2001) Рождение Северо-Западной Руси: демогенез и 
культурогенез. – Миграции оседлость от Дуная до Ладоги в первом тысячелетии 
христианской эры. Пятые чтения памяти Анны Мачинской (Старая Ладога, 
21–22 дек. 2000 г. Мат-лы к чтениям), 63–73. Санкт-Петербург.
Lang, V. (1993) Kaks tarandkalmet Viimsis, Jõelähtme kihelkonnas. Töid arheoloogia alalt 2. 
Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Ajaloo Instituut, Tallinn.
Lang, V. (1996) Muistne Rävala. Muistised, kronoloogia ja maaviljelusliku asustuse kujune-
mine Loode-Eestis, eriti Pirita jõe alamjooksu piirkonnas, I–II. Muinasaja teadus, 4. 
Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Kirjastus, Tallinn.
Lang, V. (1999) Kultuurmaastikku luues. Essee maastiku religioossest ja sümboliseeritud 
korraldusest, Eesti Arheoloogia Ajakiri 3 (1), 63–85.
425
Constructing and deconstructing boundaries in cultures of the past
Lang, V. (2005) Archaeological Cultures and Ethnic History: Some Examples from the 
East-Baltic Early Iron Age, Interarchaeologia 1, 11–28.
Lang, V. (2007a) The Bronze and Early Iron Ages in Estonia. Estonian Archaeology 3. Tartu 
University Press, Tartu.
Lang, V. (2007b) Baltimaade pronksi- ja rauaaeg. Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, Tartu.
Lang, V. (2011) Traceless death. Missing burials in Bronze and Iron Age Estonia, Estonian 
Journal of Archaeology 15 (2), 109–129.
Lang, V. & Ligi, P. (1991) Muistsed kalmed ajaloolise demograafia allikana. – Lang, V. & 
Jaanits, L. (eds) Muinasaja teadus 1, 216–240. Tallinn.
Laul, S. (1965). Virunuka tarandkalmed Võru rajoonis. – Eesti NSV Teaduste Akadeemia 
Toimetised 3, 317–377. Tallinn.
Laul, S. (2001) Rauaaja kultuuri kujunemine Eesti kaguosas (500 e.Kr–500 p.Kr). Muinasaja 
teadus 9; Õpetatud Eesti Seltsi kirjad 7, Ajaloo Instituut & Pakett, Tallinn.
Lebedev 1982 = Лебедев, Г. (1982) О времени появления славян на Северо-Западе. – 
Северная Русь и ее соседи в эпоху раннего средневековья, 29–39. Изд-во ЛГУ, 
Ленинград.
Leeuwen, T. van (2005) Introduction to Social Semiotics. Routledge, London, New York.
Ligi, P. (1995) Ühiskondlikest oludest Eesti alal hilispronksi ja rauaajal. – Lang, V. (ed) 
Eesti arheoloogia historiograafilisi, teoreetilisi ja kultuuriajaloolisi aspekte. Muinasaja 
teadus 3, 182–270. Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Ajaloo Instituut, Tallinn.
Lotman, J. (2005) On the semiosphere, Sign Systems Studies 33 (1), 205–229.
Lotman, J. (2010) “Kultuuri õpetamise” probleem kui tüpoloogiline karakteristik. – 
 Lotman, J. Kultuuritüpoloogiast, 60–72. Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, Tartu.
Lotman, J. & Uspensky, B. (1978) On the Semiotic Mechanism of Culture, New Literary 
History 9 (2), 211–232.
Lõugas, L. (1975) Tarandkalme uus rekonstruktsioonikatse. – Fenno ugristica 1. Tartu 
Riikliku Ülikooli Toimetised, Humaniora, 344, 198–210. Tartu Riiklik Ülikool, Tartu.
Lõugas, V. & Selirand, J. (1989) Arheoloogia Estimaa teedel. Valgus, Tallinn.
Mikhailova 2009a = Михайлова, Е. (2009a) Культура псковских длинных курганов. 
Проблемы хронологии и развития материальной культуры. Диссертация на 
соискание ученой степени кандидата исторических наук. Санкт-Петербург. 
Mikhailova 2009b = Михайлова, Е. (2009b) О деталях строения насыпей и структуры 
некрополей культуры Псковских длинных курганов. – Acta Archaeologica Alba-
ruthenica V, 76–88.
Mikhailova 2012 = Михайлова, Е. (2012) Металлические пластинчатые украшения из 
псковских длинных курганов: состав гарнитур. – Другая Русь. Чудь, Мерия и иные 
языцы, Stratum plus 5, 261–276. Санкт-Петербург–Кишинёв–Одесса–Бухарест.
Mikhailova 2014a = Михайлова, Е. (2014a) Культура длинных курганов в Юго-
Восточной Эстонии: общие черты и региональные особенности. – Tamla, Ü. 
& Lang, V. (eds) Ajast ja ruumist. Uurimusi Mare Auna auks. Muinasaja teadus 25, 
211–230. Tallinn–Tartu.
Mikhailova 2014b = Михайлова, Е. (2014b) Вещевой комплекс культуры псковских 
длинных курганов. Типология и хронология. Lambert Academic Publishing, 
Saarbrücken.
426
Pikne Kama, Valter Lang, Maarja Olli, Katre Pärn, Tiit Remm, Maria Smirnova
Moora, H. (1938) Die Eisenzeit in Lettland bis etwa 500 n Chr. II. Teil: Analyse. Õpetatud 
Eesti Seltsi Toimetused XXIX. Tartu.
Olli, M. (2010) Ornament rooma rauaaegsetel ehtel Kirde- ja Kagu-Eestis = Ornamentation 
during Roman Iron Age in north-eastern and south-eastern Estonia. Bachelor’s thesis. 
University of Tartu, Department of Philosophy, Institute of History and Archaeology.
Olli, M. (2013) Rooma rauaaegsed ehted ja ornamendid Eestis = Ornaments and Orna-
mentation during the Roman Iron Age in Estonia. Master’s thesis. University of Tartu, 
Department of Philosophy, Institute of History and Archaeology.
Olli, M. & Kivirüüt, A. (2017) Individual and collective burial places: an analysis of the 
Viimsi tarand graves of northern Estonia. – Kannike, A., Västrik, E.-H. (eds) Body, 
Personhood and Privacy: Perspectives on Cultural Other and Human Experience. 
Approaches to Culture Theory 7, 271−292. University of Tartu Press, Tartu.
Popov, S. (2009) Pikk-kääbaste kultuur. – Valk, H., Selart, A. & Lillak, A. (eds) Setomaa 2. 
Vanem ajalugu muinasajast kuni 1920. aastani, 120–122. Eesti Rahva Muuseum, Tartu.
Schmiedehelm 1955 = Шмидехельм, М. (1955) Археологические памятники периода 
разложения родового строя на северо-востоке Эстонии (V в. до н. э. – V в. н. э.). 
Эст. государственное изд-во, Таллин.
Schmiedehelm, M. (1965) Kääbaskalmistud Lindoras ja mujal Kagu-Eestis. – Moora, H. & 
Jaanits, L. (eds) Slaavi–Läänemeresoome suhete ajaloost, 17–62. Eesti Raamat, Tallinn.
Schmidt 1968 = Шмидт, Е. (1968) О Смоленских длинных курганах. – Славяне и Русь, 
224–229. Наука, Москва.
Sedov 1974 = Седов, В. (1974) Длинные курганы кривичей. Свод археологических 
источников СССР, Е1‒8. Наука, Москва.
Sorokin, P. (2006 [1957]). Social and Cultural Dynamics: A Study of Change in Major 
Systems of Art, Truth, Ethics, Law, and Social Relationships. Transaction Publishers, 
New Brunswick, London.
Tallgren, A. M. (1937) The method of prehistoric archaeology, Antiquity XI, 152–161.
Trigger, B. G. (1989) A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
Tvauri, A. (2007) Migrants or Natives? The Research History of Long Barrows in Russia 
and Estonia in the 5th–10th Centuries. – Slavica Helsingiensia, 32: Topics of the Ethnic, 
Lingustic and Cultural Making of the Russian North, 247–285. Helsinki.
Tvauri, A. (2014) Rahvasterännuaeg, eelviikingiaeg ja viikingiaeg Eestis. Tartu Ülikooli 
Kirjastus, Tartu.
Vassar, A. (1956) Lisandeid Eesti hõimude uurimisele Lääne- ja Edela-Eestis I–IV sajandil. – 
Moora, H. (ed) Eesti rahva etnilisest ajaloost, 160–190. Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, Tallinn.
Wartofsky, M. W. (1979) Models. Representation and Scientific Understanding. D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, London.
Zaliznjak, A. A., Ivanov, V. V. & Toporov, V. N. (1977) Structural-Typological Study of 
Semiotic Modeling Systems. – Lucid, D. P. (ed) Soviet Semiotics: An Anthology. John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
427
Constructing and deconstructing boundaries in cultures of the past
Sources of illustrations
Figure 1 – Valter Lang, 1999.
Figure 2 – Drawings: Maarja Olli after Lang 2007b, 127, Jushkova 2011, 244, figure 102, 
Jantunen 2014, kuva 2.1.
Figure 3 – Ain Mäesalu, 1983–1984.
Figure 4 – Drawing: Maria Smirnova, after Mihhailova 2014a, fig 1.
Figure 5 – Drawing: Katre Pärn.
Notes
This research was supported by the European Union through the European Regional 
Development Fund (Centre of Excellence in Cultural Theory, CECT), and by research 
grants IUT2–44, IUT20–7, PRG314 and PRG29.
Appendix.  
Examples of micro-, meso-, and macro-level systems of description
Micro-level







Gender male / female        
Age child / teenager / adult / elder        
Condition of bones whole / partial        
Missing bones          
Way of interring
disjointed / burnt 
/ partially burnt 
(which part) / etc. 
       
Position positioned / ran-dom / wrapped, etc.        
Clothing articles / style, etc. / 
condition of articles 
(ex. burnt) 
       
Ornamental artefacts        
Utilitarian artefacts        
etc.          
Result: type of indivi dual 
(discovered patterns)          
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Meso-level
Features Example of descriptors Burial_1 Burial_2 Burial_3 etc.
External features of 
individual grave
shape / size / monumental-
ity, etc.        
Construction materials used / structural details, etc.        
Grave composition individual / collective        
Number of individuals          
‘Type’ of individuals (outcome of microanalysis)        
Spatial position of 
individuals 
 spatial position of indi-
viduals / spatial position of 
types of individuals / etc.
       
Temporal structure ‘chronology’        
Artefacts
relatable unrelatable to 
individual / particular of 
burial ritual or part of daily 
life / spatial or temporal 
relation with individuals
       
etc.          
Result: grave type 
(discovered patterns)          
Macro-level







Number of graves          




graves and relations 
between grave types 
       
Temporal structure of 
graves `chronology`        
Artefacts artefacts not belong-ing to a single grave        
External features 
of grave site
features that do not 
belong to single graves 
but to the complex; 
general characteristics
       
etc.          
Result:  
type of grave site 
( discovered patterns)
         
429
Constructing and deconstructing boundaries in cultures of the past
On drawing boundaries in culture and theory
Daniele Monticelli
Given my ignorance in the field of tarand graves and long barrows, I will rather 
focus in this response on the interesting theoretical articulation that the authors 
establish between the four fundamental concepts highlighted in the title of the 
paper: ‘culture’, ‘boundary’, ‘(de)costruction’ and ‘past’. We have a series of dis-
parate phenomena –archaeological finds and their interpretations – which come 
into being as a knowable and recognisable totality, i.e. a culture, through a pro-
cedure of separation and individuation, i.e. drawing a boundary. The active and 
constitutive character of this procedure has to be stressed: the boundary and, 
consequently, culture are not out there as something that we could simply take 
notice of and ascertain as an incontrovertible fact. They rather emerge (or get 
lost) both epistemologically and ontologically only as a result of the retrospective 
boundary drawing procedure itself. It is not a matter of presence (or absence), 
but a matter of (de)construction, meaning, fundamentally, a matter of choices and 
decisions. Thus, the boundaries of ‘archaeological cultures’ change depending on 
the object(s) or practice(s) we decide to fore- and background, a decision that 
fundamentally transforms the culture in question and our image of it.
Things become even more complicated when we add to “cultural (de)con-
struction” its temporal dimension as an issue of distance and, at the same time, 
hereditary linkage. The past and its relationship with the present and the future 
are far from simple and unproblematic, particularly due to a fundamental, dis-
tinctive feature of culture, i.e. self-awareness, self-reflection and self-description, 
which the paper defines as the ‘symbolic’ level of cultural behaviour. This means 
that the (de)construction of culture is always an on-going and interested process. 
It takes place in time, creating or interrupting hereditary linkages and historiog-
raphies, constituting and dissolving identitarian belongings and communities. 
Drawing (and erasing) boundaries appears, from this point of view, the political 
act par excellence, an act that creates cultures and their communities as experi-
enceable and knowable objects. 
It is quite tempting to place in opposition two kinds of relationship between 
temporal distance and the drawing of cultural boundaries. The first, which we 
could define as ‘immanent (de)construction’ would characterise the contem-
poraries of a given cultural practice, for example our burial costumes, prac-
tices that occupy fundamental positions in everyday life and the processes of 
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communitarian identification; and the second, which we could define as ‘trans-
cendent (de)costruction’, would characterise future researchers as external 
observers able to reconstruct both the given practice and the cultural whole 
to which it belonged, including what the authors of the paper call the “inner 
logics” and “self-model” of the culture in question. Now, as we know from histo-
riography, the opposition between the immanent and the transcendent position 
is overly reductive and highly problematic. This opposition presupposes in fact 
the fixation of stable topological and temporal boundaries, while, as mentioned 
above, it is rather a matter of an on-going process in which boundaries and 
cultures are constantly constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed. This pro-
vokes interferences and short-circuits between different times – the past comes 
to inhabit the present or is projected into the future, becoming invested with 
renewed symbolic and community making capacity; or, the other way around, 
the present (and the future) colonise the past modelling it in their (real or ideal) 
image and resemblance. Our position in respect to a given cultural totality of the 
past is therefore, once again, not given but constructed, shifted or lost together 
with the boundaries we draw, the boundaries we decide to leave undrawn, and the 
boundaries we erase. This does not mean that any ‘historico-semiotic’ research 
that takes as its aim the reconstruction of some cultural whole is doomed to fail-
ure, but that the researcher should always be aware not only of the constructive-
ness of the object of study, but also of the constructiveness of his or her own 
position in respect to that object. In the case of culture, scientific transcendence 
(the myth of objectivity) is impossible quite simply because, as Tartu–Moscow 
semioticians never ceased to repeat, any attempt to cognise culture is already, and 
automatically, also a fact in the life of culture itself (Ivanov et al 1998 [1973], 60).
Another fundamental issue raised in the paper concerns the topological 
and symbolic function of the boundary itself. The boundary imagined as a line 
between two spaces may be understood both as an instrument of delimitation 
and separation, and, alternatively, as an instrument of connection and place of 
transition (see Monticelli 2009; 2012). However, the boundary can also be imag-
ined as the multidimensional border space that Lotman calls ‘periphery’ and 
which functions as an instrument of internal differentiation within a given semi-
otic space (center VS periphery) or an instrument of indifferentiation between 
different semiotic spaces – something in between that does not belong to either 
of the two spaces, or belongs to both of them at the same time. This is why 
boundaries can be both constructing and deconstructing devices, which does 
not always have to be an alternative. The semiotic analysis in the paper shows 
how the different functions of the boundary may have been activated together 
in the burial sites. The boundary separates there the world of the living from that 
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of the dead, but also marks the place of crossing and transition between the two; 
it reproduces social differences between members of the community (different 
kinds of burial separated by clear markers), but also undoes their corporeal sepa-
ration (the mingled bones that makes the burial site into a place of indistinction). 
Shifting the level of analysis and construction of the studied object from the 
micro- to the meso- and the macrolevel described in the paper provokes changes 
in the relevance of the different functions of the boundary for the researcher.
Spatial modelling is certainly a central feature of human cognition and culture 
as illustrated by the burial sites studied in the paper. Cultural semiotics and its 
complex understanding of the multivarious functions of the boundary offer us 
precious theoretical tools for the investigation of spatial thinking and its symboli-
cal values. It is no more a question, as it used to be in the ‘golden age’ of semiotics, 
of elaborating a new overarching metalanguage for the humanities, but of open-
ing a borderspace between and across different disciplines for experimentation 
with concepts and objects of different disciplinary origins. An experimentation 
that does not take ready concepts to be applied to ready objects, but establishes 
between the conceptual and the empirical side of the research a dialogical ten-
sion by which an original theoretico-methodologico-empirical assemblage may 
emerge, as the paper fascinatingly and convincingly demonstrates. 
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